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ABSTRACT
Existing liberal, libertarian and conservative critical approaches to Hayek suffer from
a severe partiality in the way they address his theory. Their insufficiency, however,
is bound up with problems intrinsic to Hayek's own thought. The ambiguities in the
relation between ontology and epistemology and the alledged independence of method
from its subject produce the theoretical basis of a highly subjectivist and conservative
social theory. This ambiguous mixture of conservatism and positivism finds its
expression in political philosophy in the tension between an idealist advocacy of
liberal values and a thorough defence of an unconditional evolutionism. In Hayek's
political theory the above mentioned ambiguities are stressed to the extreme. Thus,
the tension between the existing and the desirable, which derives from an inherently
contradictory epistemology, produces a situation of constant vicious circularity; the
existing and the desirable, in the form of evolutionist justificationism and idealist
liberal normativism respectively, appear as at the same time one another's
preconditions and results. Hayek's failure to achieve self-consistency in his political
theory is demonstrated through a discussion of his ambivalent attitude to democracy,
authoritarianism, social justice and the welfare state. It is concluded that despite the
contradictions inherent in its premises and structure, Hayek's theory achieves its wide
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Hayek's work is of multiple importance in the history of the 20th century
Western thought. First, it is important because it spreads over a vast area of
(overlapping or even distinct) topics. Hayek has covered a variety of topics such as
economics (both theoretical and applied), theoretical psychology, politics, history of
ideas, philosophy, epistemology and law, to mention but his major contributions.
Secondly, his work, understandably large if one considers the variety of topics, spreads
over a period of more than half the 20th century. Apart from its length, his work is
also characterized by a considerable degree of coherence at least as far as its aims are
concerned. In all major disciplines that he has been involved, Hayek has tried to
develop an argument for his ideal - the "free market society". In that sense, his work
is ideological in that it is thoroughly determined by a fixed political principle1. This
point brings forward the third reason of Hayek's prominent importance. He has
struggled throughout his life to supply contemporary capitalism with a sound ideology.
In J. Gray's words, "(...) Hayek seeks to raise up a system of ideas, a structure of
principles with the aid of which we can understand social and political life (...)" (J.
Gray 1986a p.l)2. This may sound a paradoxical or even trivial observation.
Paradoxical, because capitalism, as an all dominant mode of production, was
ideologically dominant even before Hayek's views gained any influence; and trivial
because capitalism has had more than a few defenders throughout its history. This
critique, however, might be a little hasty. The fact that capitalism as the dominant
mode of production is ideologically dominant as well does not imply that its
dominance is absolute or free from antitheses. Its dominance rests, rather, on certain
general principles and ideals (such as the sanctification of property, for example)
which might be expressed in different ways or even take different forms according to
the historically given socio-economic circumstances. To suggest that capitalism's
ideological dominance is unalterable in form implies a mechanistic simplicity. The
difficulty in determining the category of dominant ideology lies precisely in the fact
1 See also J. Gray 1982 p. 19.
2 It is not altogether clear why Gray uses this statement as a proof of Hayek's relation with classical
liberalism. The mere fact that Hayek produces an ideological construction does not seem to point
towards a classical liberal heritage anymore than towards a conservative or a socialist one. On that, see
also discussion that follows in the second part
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that its form depends on a multiplicity of different and interrelating factors in each
historical moment such as the general needs of capital, the relative position of the
distinct (and sometimes opposed) groups within the capitalist class as well as the level
of class struggle in society. It is, therefore, quite plausible to have more than one
ideological construction, which might even appear opposed to each other, but which
in their essence are "equally" bourgeois, according to the particular interests and the
historical moments that they express.
In that sense, although it is plain that the ideological dominance of capitalism
does not rest on individual "constructions" in the sector of ideology, the role that
individual philosophers play in the crystallizing of the form of the dominant ideology
is important. Hayek's attempt was to construct a comprehensive ideology, or at least
to set the foundation stone for one1. It is, therefore, an attempt to answer all those
quasi-"scientific" concepts of managerial revolutions, affluent societies and end of
ideologies which dominated the English-speaking world after W.W. II. It is these
concepts that Hayek has in mind when he talks of an almost voluntary retreat of the
liberal thought from the ideological battlefield and it is those intellectuals (more than
any Marxist) that he condemns.
A different approach, is advocated by Yvon Quiniou. Quiniou argues that
"Hayek's thought constitutes a real challenge for contemporary Marxism. It does so
in that it is wholly organized against socialism, despite its rare allusions to Marx." (Y.
Quiniou 1989 p.76, my translation). There might however be less of a difference
between the two approaches than it seems in the first place. It is a doubtless fact that
Hayek opposes his theory to the "socialist" road that the western societies have taken.
But it is still a matter of debate if one will agree, as Quiniou seems to do, on whether
this road is in fact socialist or not Hayek, then, rejects certain choices that the
western societies made that he labels as socialism but which are only different
versions of the bourgeois ideology2. If this point is relatively clear, then Quiniou's
1 J. Gray talks about "a coherent research program" (J. Gray 1982 p.20). That is, coherent as far
as its political aims are concerned.
2 C. Kukathas raises the same point His answer is that Hayek mainly opposes the Saint Simonian
version of socialism rather than Marxism (C. Kukathas 1989 pp.6-7). This answer however seems
misleading. Hayek does not reject any version of "socialism" just for the sake of philosophical
(continued...)
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argument does not seem to be different than the one proposed here. "Hayek sees a
mortal danger (...) in the increased role of the state and in social-democratic
experiences (...)" (Y. Quiniou 1989 p.76, my translation). "[Hayek's theory] presents
also a challenge, because of its increasing influence not only in the Right, but also in
an unstable socialist Left (...)" (Y. Quiniou 1989 p.76, my translation). It is only
through the doubtful equation of state intervention and Keynesian policies with
Marxism and socialism that Quiniou can draw his conclusion. Hayek's theory then
is an attempt to surpass the present form of the dominant ideology and, at the same
time, to provide a "different" framework of moral political and social values. That is
why he constantly condemns what he calls socialist contamination of the liberal
thought.
Finally, Hayek's theory is of great importance for one more apparent reason.
His opposition to any notion of "consensus" policy has resulted in him acquiring the
position of "conservative" or even "reactionary" and certainly "extremist" and "cynical"
as far as the moral outcomes of his theory are concerned, even in his own camp
(that is in the wider space of pro-capitalist academics). Milton Friedman makes the
point quite clearly: in talking about himself and those who shared the same ideals, he
says "[We] were a small beleaguered minority regarded as eccentrics by the great
majority of our fellow intellectuals." (Milton Friedman 1982 pp.VI-VD).
A. Arblaster puts it rather more sharply when he states that Hayek "(...) had been
treated as something of a freak, an anachronistic survivor from an earlier lost age." (A.
Arblaster 1984 p.340). It might sound a little exaggerated (or even irritating) that
Hayek used to complain about a deliberate "marginalization" but the fact is that the
main attitude towards him (and his colleagues in the Mont Pelerin Society) was
indifference (certainly by the whole of the political world) if not covert hostility.
Things changed, however, and by the mid-seventies Hayek had already become a
^...continued)
discussion. His opposition is explicitly political. In that sense it is of little use to try to trace down the
philosophical roots of what he rejects (also in view of the fact that they are both obscure and bitterly
disputed). It would be much more helpful to try to focus on the explicit political forms that Hayek
attacks and pass by any "labelling" attempts. N. O' Sullivan (1989 p.7) also comments that the New
Right rejects the liberal consensus of the 1960s.
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worldwide figure1. Already a Nobel Prize winner, he has established himself as one
of the most influential figures in the history of 20th century liberalism.
There is an endless debate as to whether Hayek actually anticipated the
changes that capitalism underwent during the post-W.W. II period or not. This debate
is all the more perplexed by the fact that the very usage of the word "anticipation"
seems quite problematic in a theory that relies so heavily on anti-historicism and the
unpredictability of social outcomes. The fact, however, remains that, starting from the
early seventies, Hayek's theory acquired a central position in the world of politics and
consequently in academia as well2. It was the actual change in socio-economic and
hence political conditions of contemporary capitalism, then, that brought forward and
established the relevance of Hayekian theory3.
In the first part of this thesis an attempt will be made to take into consideration
some parts of the existing works on the subject. The part comprises of two distinct
but interrelated sections. The first presents some critiques that concentrate on the
problem of mind in Hayek's theory. These critiques comment on the fundamental
problem of epistemology in Hayek's theory and its relation to ontological premises,
as well as to methodology in political philosophy. Closely related to the answers that
each scholar gives to these questions, is the overall characterization of the theory as,
for example, Kantian or non-Kantian, liberal or antiliberal. Thus, at the beginning of
the first section of the first part a controversy on whether Hayek is a Kantian or not
is used in order to highlight some methodological problems of such attempts.
1 See also, J.Gray 1982 p.19.
2 It should be stressed that it is this process that gives the Hayekian theory a distinct place. The
importance of Hayek's work, unlike, for example, Rawls' was first recognized in actual politics and
then in the academic circles.
5 As to this point, there seems to be a widespread agreement even between rival approaches. M.
Friedman, for example, in explaining why his work (and consequently the work of all others writing
in the same vein) remained under the shadow for so long, concludes that "[t]he change in the climate
of opinion was produced by experience, not by theory or philosophy." (M. Friedman in A.J. Anderson
1986 p. 129). A. Arblaster in his clearly hostile critique of the New Right makes the same point. "We
can only explain the attention presently given to the ideas of Hayek, Friedman and the market theorists
in terms of the particular circumstances of the 1970s and the 1980s, since it was certainly not the
novelty of what they had to say that attracted attention." (A. Arblaster 1984 p.340). The political
conditions that brought to the for those ideas are also stressed by S. Clarke (1987 p.424), and R. Plant
(1989 p.4).
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The second section focuses on some aspects of Hayek's social theory as
viewed through a certain (hopefully wide enough) range of critiques. For the most
part, these approaches try to investigate the extent to which these basic aspects of
social theory derive consistently from Hayek's epistemological and methodological
premises. Thus, in that section some accounts are given of the central notions of
spontaneous order and the rule of law, as well as of the issues of liberty, coercion and
the role of the state. Hayek's methodology is also touched upon, in view of its
function in social theory.
A labeling of the views presented in that context may perhaps be proved more
obscuring than helpful. Notwithstanding that danger and keeping in mind that some
characterization may, after all, be unavoidable, it can be argued that, in a broad sense,
the views taken into account tend to represent conservative, libertarian, liberal and
Marxist critical approaches. At no point of this work is it claimed that the
presentation of the literature on Hayek (or any other part, for that matter) is non-
evaluative. On the contrary, the second task that that part tries to achieve is to locate
the weaknesses and shortcomings of the critiques presented and to try to draw some
conclusions that will help establish the argument advanced in the remaining two parts.
The two remaining parts basically constitute the critical presentation and
development of the points touched upon in the first part. The first section of the
second part further seeks to present and criticize the ontological and epistemological
premises of Hayek's theory as well as the overall relations between the categories of
ontology and epistemology. At the same time, that section attempts to establish the
links between Hayek's theory and some philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries,
notably Hume, Berkeley, Kant and Mach. It is hopped that this comparison, although
less than systematic, will facilitate the understanding of Hayek's ideological heritage.
Furthermore, in most cases, it might help to penetrate beneath a modern phraseology
and discover the ideas that underpin a contemporary "radical" social theory. The brief
reference to the problem of methodology in Hayek's theory highlights the above
effort. Finally, the section closes with an attempt to account for the central questions
of causality and necessity in Hayek's philosophy.
The second section of the second part examines the application of Hayek's
epistemology on the central concepts of his social philosophy. Thus, that section is
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a more systematic exposition and critique of the capital but complex notion of
freedom under the rule of law and its theoretical framework. Firstly, it is the concept
of order as such but more importantly in its social dimension that is criticized. The
concept of law as the corpus of abstract rules that incorporates the principles of an
order occupies the second section. Law is again discussed primarily in its social
dimension. Finally, the most important part of the section is devoted to the concept
of liberty as presented in Hayek's theory, that is, as freedom under the rule of law.
In that section the status of liberty in Hayek's structure of values is discussed along
with the general attributes of the law of freedom. The section closes with an
examination of the role of the test of universalizability both as a demand for formal
conformity and as a claim for compatibility of a rule with the rest of the existing
rules.
The last part attempts an examination of Hayek's political theory in the light
of the discussion developed in the two previous parts. The sections of that part focus
on the major aspects ofHayek's thought but methodologically they all revolve around
the axis of the state. Thus, Hayek's views on the general rules and commands are
reintroduced along with a discussion of their use as devices of political obligation.
A brief discussion of the superficially terminological issue of the use of "government"
instead of "state" introduces the two major sections of the third part. In the first,
Hayek's idea of democracy is presented and criticized while at the same time an
attempt is made to place it in a more general trend of thought. The second major
section deals with the attack that Hayek launches against the welfare state. Issues like
social equality and justice are discussed along with an attempt to comment on the
moral considerations that arise out of them. The capital problem of political theory,
that is, the problem of the nature and function of the state constitutes the basis of the
above discussion. Hayek's suggestions for the functioning of the "government" stress
this discussion further in a more "positive" direction. Finally, the "Model
Constitution", the Hayekian Utopia, provides the chance for a better understanding of
the social and political implications of his theory.
It will be the main argument of this thesis - both in methodological and in
analytical terms - that the only way to interpret Hayek's theory adequately is as a
basically political theory - that is, as a defence of the needs of contemporary
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capitalism. It is only through that perspective that its inconsistencies can be
explained - that is, as inconsistencies based on and partly reflecting the actual
contradictions of the historical development of capitalism. Much in the sense of S.
Clarke's analysis of monetarism (S. Clarke 1987), then, but in a wider field of issues,
it is maintained that Hayek's theory is actually a response to the political and
ideological crisis of the capitalist state and its ideology. It is through this political
dimension that Hayek's theory acquires the consistency and continuity that method
alone or its epistemology are unable to provide. It is also through its primarily
political essence that it acquires its significance both for those who defend the existing
socio-economic formation and for those who oppose it.
Some terminological ambiguities might arise in the attempt to evaluate Hayek's
theory as a theoretical apology for capitalism. His thought is frequently characterized
as conservative throughout this work. Conservatism, however, in its more
conventional meaning in the English-speaking world, that is, as the political ideology
that arose as a reaction against the French revolution as well as its identification with
certain personalities such as Burke (R. Nisbet 1986), results in too narrow a concept
in comparison to the one employed here. Besides even the advocates of a more strict
use of the term agree that there is no ideological purity in it and that the common
points with liberalism are many and of fundamental importance (R. Nisbet 1986
pp.37-40). It is precisely these common points - which constitute the actual basis on
which both variations are developed - that are used as criteria in the definition of
conservatism here. Hence, instead of appealing to an abstract "turn to the past for
inspiration and for models on which to base policy in the present" (R. Nisbet 1986
p. 18) where the "past" is doomed to remain both obscure and empty of any concrete
content, what is proposed is to concentrate on the essence of the concept. Thus,
conservatism in the narrow sense, by its commitment to authority and property as its
two central concepts (Nisbet 1986 p.34) is hardly distinguishable from contemporary
liberalism. Even liberty, the alleged supreme value of liberalism, is happily
accommodated in that scheme1. This argument, of course, does not imply that there
are no differences between a narrow concept of conservatism and that of, say,
1 As R. Nisbet 1986 pp.34-35, shows.
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liberalism, as there are among different individual exponents of liberalism itself.
Rather what it attempts to point out is that in contemporary social conditions the
similarities between the two are fundamentally more important than their differences.
Thus, conservative is used here in order to imply a conscious attitude towards the
maintenance of the basic pillars of capitalism - notably, the private property of the
means of production and consequently the division of society into conflicting social
classes and the existence of a coercive state. In that sense conservatism acquires a
considerably wider meaning. It embraces, apart ffom the ideas traditionally described
as "conservative", all libertarian and the vast majority of liberal ideas as well. In that
sense, conservative is no longer opposed to liberal or socialist, but to anti-capitalist1.
It is, then, political conservatism, not in the sense of inscribing to a particular
political party or even a particular tradition of political theory (at least not always) but
in the sense of trying to preserve the actual basis of capitalist society, that
characterizes Hayek's thought. And it is political reaction, in the sense of radically
and violently fighting against any action or institution that may put in danger that
particular social organization, of what his theory is guilty.
1 At times, however, conservatism is also used in its conventional sense, as for example, is the case
in the fifth section of the first part where it is distinguished from liberalism and libertarianism. It is
hoped that this double usage of the term will not generate any ambiguities since in most of the cases
where the term is used in the latter "conventional" sense, it is either related to certain personalities
(notably toM. Oakeshott) or clearly contrasted to other expressions of political theory such as liberalism
and libertarianism.
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PART I: EXISTING LITERATURE ON ASPECTS OF HAYEK'S THEORY
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The number of scholars who have occupied themselves in criticizing Hayek is
far from moderate. There is hardly any article or book written in the 1980s
concerning contemporary social theory, theories ofmarket economy, philosophy of law
or theories of the state that has not got some direct or indirect reference to Hayek or
his theory. What follows can scarcely constitute a complete survey of this vast
literature: neither could it be argued that it is a systematic approach to its most
important parts. Rather, what is been attempted is an outline of the critiques of
certain scholars on particular sectors of the Hayekian thought These sectors will
constitute, mutatis mutandis, the main points examined in the subsequent parts. It is
obvious that such a survey is always in danger of becoming eclectic, over-simplifying
and formalist.
SECTION A: Philosophical Issues
1. Hayek's Kantianism as a Key to his Liberalism: Gray versus Forsyth.
Hayek's intellectual heritage has been the topic of a long and controversial
debate. It will be argued, however, that that debate, for the most part, has been
characterized by a considerable degree of seemingly inexplicable partiality. A critical
approach that aims to characterize Hayek as "Kantian" or "empiricist", "liberal" or
"conservative" is bound to leave a substantial part of his theory unaccounted for. A
comparison of J. Gray's account of Hayek as a Kantian hence a liberal, and M.
Forsyth's view of Hayek as an anti-Kantian hence anti-liberal is intended to help
illustrate the above point.
Gray places Hayek in the Kantian tradition; at the same time he assumes that
Hayek is the legitimate heir of classical liberalism1. Gray believes that in its
fundamental aspects Hayek's thought is Kantian "in its denial of our capacity to know
things as they are or the world as it is" (J. Gray 1986a p.4). It is also Kantian in its
1 J. Gray 1982 pp.19-66 and J. Gray 1986a esp. pp.1-26.
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refusal to accept any "pure core" of experience. Rather "the order we find in our
experiences, including even our sensory experiences, is the product of the creative
activity of our minds rather than a reality given to us by the world" (J. Gray 1986a
pp.4-5)1. From this follows the Kantian, according to Gray, assumption of the
impossibility of speculative metaphysics; the task of philosophy is to investigate the
limits of reason.
Hayek's Kantianism, then, is ultimately based on epistemology. However, it
is clear that Gray suggests an ontological liaison as well since he takes the organizing
mind as the primary category. Having said that, Gray examines another, secondary,
intellectual influence of Hayek - that is, E. Mach. Hayek's link to Mach consists
mainly of a certain ultimate monism in ontology. Gray bases his argument on
Hayek's The Sensory Order, where mind is presented as the order prevailing in a part
of the physical universe - that part which is ourselves. The implication is, according
to Hayek, that mind must always remain (to us) a realm of its own. Apart from the
ontological aspect Hayek is linked to Mach in yet another way; that of the denial (as
phantom problems) of traditional "metaphysical" problems such as the freedom of the
will. It must be stressed, however.that Hayek's relation to Mach and positivism, no
matter how important, is only secondary for Gray.
Gray's attempt,then, is to place Hayek primarily in the Kantian heritage. But
are the arguments that he presents sufficient? Keeping in mind that this is not an
essay on Kant, an attempt can be made to examine the implications of the above
mentioned linkage in terms of analytic utility. That is, the question that will be asked
is: does it help to solve the problems that emerge from Hayek's philosophical
account? In the first place, it should be mentioned that Gray's argument is based on
a partial reading of Hayek's work. To state that Hayek belongs to the Kantian
heritage because of his denial that the mind can know the world as it is, is certainly
a necessary but not a sufficient condition. The line drawn by Kant is certainly
characterized by an a priori inability of the mind to know the world as it is. But,
without implying that this is Hayek's case, this concept is also present in other
1 At the same time however, he also argues that for Hayek "the picture we form of the world
emerges straight from our interaction with the world (...)" (J. Gray 1986a pp.6-7, emphasis added). Is
the "world" creative of experience, then, or not?
12
philosophical trends1. Taken as the only condition, then, it can lead to no certain
conclusion. A reference to common ontological premises, thus, becomes necessary.
But it is precisely in ontology that Gray shifts Hayek away from Kant and into
Machian positivism. For Kant the existence of the thing-in-itself was a working
condition. Kant, of course, considered the thing-in-itself as unknowable. He,
therefore, reserved a place of fundamental importance for faith (or intuition). In that
sense, the thing-in-itself could gain its place in his theory not as an object of empirical
knowledge but as a result of the power of the human mind. Human mind was for
Kant and all powerful category and its power rested on the existence of the thing-in-
itself.
Where does Hayek stand in respect to all these concepts? Obviously, he makes
no reference to a thing-in-itself. In fact, his empiricist thought pushes him to deprive
it of any meaning whatsoever. The question "what is x" as such is meaningless for
him. In the first place, then, Hayek breaks with Kant's ontology by denying the
objective (in the idealist sense) existence of the thing-in-itself. He also breaks with
Kant, as Gray himself recognizes (J. Gray 1986a p.250n.) by totally relativizing the
distinction between appearance and reality. This is a somehow consistent result of his
positivist ontology. Since the impediment of the thing-in-itself has been removed,
there can be no legitimate reference to reality. Gray, however, suggests that this
extremist position is only held by Hayek "at times" while on other occasions Hayek
adopts amore Popperian "commitment to conjectural realism" (J. Gray 1986a p.250n.).
This is indeed a strange way of defending Hayek's theory. It seems to point towards
the contradiction rather than towards a way out of it. As Y. Quiniou points out,"(...)
Kant's critical rationalism stressed the metaphysical limits of reason, not its limits on
the plane ofexperience" (Y. Quiniou 1989 p.86, my translation). In that sense, J.W.N.
Watkins' comment on Popper seems relevant in Hayek's case as well. Watkins argues
that Kant saw clearly that the empiricist account of sense experience cannot solve the
problem of the creation of a coherent experience in human mind. "Kant's solution
consisted, essentially, in leaving the old quasi-mechanistic account of sense-organs
1 For example, in all theories that reserve a place for some notion of "beyond", be it secular or
metaphysical-theological.
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intact, and endowing the mind with a powerful set of organizing categories - free,
universal and necessary - which unify and structure what would otherwise be a mad
jumble" (J.W.N. Watkins in P.A. Schilpp 1974 pp.401-402)1. Watkins' criticism is
precisely that Popper's (and for that matter Hayek's) evolutionist positivism tends to
modify the Kantian view at both ends. Mind's powerful and necessary organizing
categories lose both their fixity and necessity. Hence, the limited role of reason that
Hayek implies in epistemology. At the same time, sense experience loses its
mechanistic and causal character2.
In what sense, then, can it still be argued that Hayek's view is Kantian? Gray
suggests that the Kantian element is saved because of the ultimate appeal to the
organizing power of the mind. According to Hayek, he says, the order we find in the
world may be the result of the method by which we perceive it - i.e. it may be the
product of the creative activity of our minds. But Gray seems to overlook two
important points in his argument. Firstly, he seems to be unaware of any
contradictions or even tensions that this assumption might generate in the Hayekian
system. It is, therefore, less than clear, as critics were quick to point out, that there
is a legitimate link between "the order that is called mind" which has been wholly
determined by pre-sensory experiences and the "uncompromising" assumption
mentioned above. Although Hayek is at pains to prove that pre-sensory experience
owes nothing to any sort of direct communication of the mind with the fixed
properties of the physical objects, it still remains unclear to what extent this pre-
sensory experience is determined by a given objectivity. Indeed, Hayek's lapse into
agnosticism3 only seems to confuse things: pre-sensory experience is totally
unconscious. From the moment we gain consciousness of it, it ceases to be pre-
sensory and becomes sensory which is a totally different thing. Pre-sensory
experience, therefore, seems to owe nothing to the a priori organizing ability of the
mind. But it also seems to owe nothing to any kind of direct communication of the
1 See also J. Gray 1982 p.27.
2 For a critique of Hayek's interpretation of causality, see part II.
3 The term connotes the a priori distinction between the realm of the "knowable" and that of the
"unknowable" by conscious rational activity.
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mind with the objective properties of the physical world, since this would be equal to
attributing a "pure core" to sensations - and, what is worse, this "pure core" would
have been an objective, materialist category. Gray is familiar with Hayek's efforts to
"purify" empiricism from materialism. Nevertheless, he is still inclined to take this
agnosticist approach at face value. He does not seem prepared even to question its
consistency or coherence.
Secondly, even if we are to go along with Gray in ignoring all inner problems
created by Hayek's evolutionism, we still cannot assume a Kantian heritage unless it
is demonstrated that Hayek's views are functionally compatible with Kant's. We have
already mentioned Hayek's refusal to acknowledge the existence of a thing-in-itself.
We have also mentioned his denial of the necessary (in the Kantian sense) and fixed
mental categories and the causal character of experience, along with his refusal of the
"pure core" of experience. What is finally left from the supposed initial identity
between Kant's and Hayek's approach is a rough parallelism. They both believe that
the world is not knowable. But whereas for Kant the thing-in-itself is a component
part of the existence, for Hayek it is not. Consequently, the fideist solution that Kant
offers in the end cannot be acceptable in the Hayekian system. Hayek is, for that
matter, closer to Hume1 than to Kant. In ontology for Kant there is no question as
to the determinant validity of the apriori mental categories and thus, finally, as to the
priority of mind over matter. For Hayek the question is dismissed as a fantom-
problem (at least verbally). For Kant mind is all-powerful in a twofold sense. It is
solely responsible for the organization of experience into coherent thought; and it
serves, in the last analysis, to reach the final answers concerning the world. For
Hayek, on the contrary, mind is an extremely limited category. Not only is it
condemned to give subjective (even arbitrary), partial and ineffective accounts of the
"world" but its main inability is essentially to explain itself. It would seem then that
according to that view mind can virtually explain nothing since the world "as it is"
depends on the way mind organizes it. But mind cannot explain the way it organizes
the world, hence, it cannot explain the world either. Any notion of universal and
necessary (mental) organizing categories has been ruthlessly eliminated from Hayek's
1 His views are also close to G. Berkeley's. On that see relevant discussion in part n.
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theory. Thus, he "purifies" Kantianism from the concepts of objectivity and necessity
as he has "purified" empiricism from materialism.
This also seems to be Forsyth's objection to the Hayekian view (M.Forsyth
1988 pp.235-250). Forsyth disagrees with Gray (and to a lesser extent with N.Barry
(1979)) in placing Hayek to the Kantian and even to the liberal tradition. "The idea
of a man as a self-determining being, and the idea of necessary, rational laws
governing the relationship of men as free beings, may be said to express the core of
liberalism" (M. Forsyth 1988 p.237), Forsyth argues. Forsyth derives this conclusion
from as prominent a liberal as Guido de Ruggiero. "Only one who is conscious of
himself as free is capable of recognizing the freedom of others" (G. de Ruggiero 1927
p. 13) and "To act and to act freely are the same; without freedom there is no action
but passion, mechanism, habit"(G. de Ruggiero 1927 p.352). Hayek on the contrary,
takes man to be essentially incapable of self-determination and the use of his
reasoning faculties (at least as far as ordinary social life is concerned). Forsyth's
criticism is made from an apparently liberal-idealist standpoint. In that sense, it will
be used only in so far as it serves to point out that Hayek is not a Kantian and
perhaps not a liberal either. His objections can be summarized in three major
propositions.
a] Hayek's idealism is inconsistent. The priority of mind is rendered problematic.
b] There is no distinction in Hayek's "scientific evolutionism" between human and
animal mind. If we are to take mind simply as a classificatory organism, then all
living beings are in possession of it. The evolutionary-adaptory process, genetical-
biological in its essence, which is taken to constitute the whole living process and the
total function of mind, is a mechanical process.
c] In the Hayekian theory there is no place for self-consciousness in the sense of the
distinguishing feature between the human and the non-human. Consciousness (in the
sense of self-consciousness primarily) is not defined adequately. Hayek's idealism
is incoherent.
Forsyth points out that Hayek's theory is anti-Kantian at least in that aspect.
By implying a mechanistic-evolutionary process of existence common to man and
animal Hayek fails to guarantee this distinct place for man as a value per se for
which Kant has explicitly argued. Again, in the problem of the priority-independence
16
of mind, Forsyth criticizes Hayek as being an anti-Kantian (and in that he comes in
a sharp conflict with Gray). He actually places Hayek's ontology in the Machian
tradition which he takes as a monist tradition. The universe, he says consists for
Hayek (as for Mach) of a continuum of physical events. "The reason why we have
to distinguish in practice between "mental" phenomena and "physical" phenomena is
that we are unable to comprehend the precise connection between specific physical
and specific mental events. The "autonomy" of the mind is thus saved but only as an
ersatz; it is merely an appearance that we have to accept because we cannot take the
last step of positively demonstrating it to be false." (1988 p.240). Forsyth's critique,
thus, focuses on the fact that Hayek's ontology weakens the sovereignty of mind and
leads eventually to a kind of ultimate materialism. If we are to take mind as a merely
conventional autonomous category, then the mind-matter problem runs the danger of
being solved on a materialist basis. The question of the knowability of the world
through a direct or indirect interaction with it, thus, becomes only a secondary matter.
Of course Forsyth's criticism should be taken as what it really is - that is, an attempt
at consistent idealist criticism of Hayek's philosophy. Forsyth could have been less
concerned with this "materialist" ontological position if he had followed Hayek's
thought to the end. In fact, Hayek makes a considerable effort to ensure that the
possibility of a materialist interpretation of his ontology will always remain a verbal
statement deprived of any actual meaning. To us, he says, mind was, is, and will
always remain the determinative category1. Therefore, Forsyth's criticism, although
perfectly justifiable in terms of "pure" philosophy, is only of secondary importance in
terms of the practical political results produced by the Hayekian theory. There, Hayek
emerges as a consistent idealist and takes pride in pointing out that his theory is
actually the only theory free from any hylomorphic concepts.
Is Gray's thought, then, totally arbitrary and out of place? Has Hayek's theory
nothing to do with Kant? And why is Gray concerned to relate Hayek's theory to the
Kantian heritage? Hayek's thought, it will be argued, is related to Kantianism (though
mainly through its Neo-Kantian version), as is to the thought of D. Hume. Indeed,
one of the most striking omissions of Gray's (and N.Barry's) book on Hayek is an
1 See discussion in part n.
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almost total lack of references to the Humean tradition in his latest writings. Hume
is mentioned just seven times throughout the book and only on two occasions has the
reference any clear significance for the Hayekian theory (J. Gray 1986a pp.7,130)1.
It seems, however, that the two theories have much in common and that an explicit
and direct link between them is of capital importance. In Lenin's words the essence
of Hume's theory as that of Kant's "is that they both in principle fence off the
"appearance" from that which appears, the perception from that which is perceived,
the thing-for-us from the "thing-in-itself'. Furthermore, Hume does not want to hear
of the "thing-in-itself", he regards the very thought of it as philosophically
inadmissible, as "metaphysics" (as the Humeans and Kantians call it); whereas Kant
grants the existence of the "thing-in-itself", but declares it to be "unknowable",
fundamentally different from the appearance, belonging to a fundamentally different
realm, the realm of the "beyond" ([Jenseits), inaccessible to knowledge, but revealed
to faith." (V.I. Lenin 1962 vol.14 p. 102).
In order to trace the reasons for Gray's insistence on linking Hayek to
Kantianism, it might be useful to take a closer look to Forsyth's denial of it. In fact,
Forsyth seems to deny the connection exactly for the same reason that Gray implies
it. Both scholars start from an intimate disposition to defend liberalism - and hence,
as has been argued even by conservative theorists, the political theory of capitalism2.
Gray believes that Hayek's thought is a legitimate and functional theoretical
abstraction from the actual problems of capitalism and, in that sense, that it produces
(or, at least, points towards) a way of explaining and overcoming them. Forsyth, on
the contrary, thinks that this is not the case at all and that the Hayekian theory does
not produce any viable solutions for liberal society. Gray, consequently, is trying to
endorse Hayek in the liberal mainstream3; by implication he uses Kant - the ancestor
1 In an earlier work Gray does have a separate paragraph on the influence of Hume (see J. Gray
1982). But apart from being limited in length this paragraph is also limited in content The reference
is exhausted to the influence of Hume in Hayek's social philosophy and only in respect to the question
ofmorality. Although his Hayek on Liberty is essentially an expansion of that work, this paragraph, far
from being developed, is in fact integrated in the general presentation.
2 The relation of liberalism and particularly neo-liberalism with capitalism is also stressed by
defenders of liberalism and conservatism. For example, N. O' Sullivan 1989 p.6.
3 Gray considers Hayek's thought as "The Rebirth of Classical Liberalism" (J. Gray 1982 title).
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par excellence of liberalism - as the ancestor of Hayek. His effort is to discover any
possible links or similarities between Hayek and Kant and to try to diminish (often by
omitting them) any differences. Kant is the catalyst through which Hayek becomes
acceptable in the liberal tradition. Forsyth follows the same path but in the opposite
direction. Starting from the rejection of the political applications of the Hayekian
theory as non-liberal, he emphasizes all possible differences between Kant (again
taken as an ancestor par excellence of liberalism) and Hayek in order to prove that
Hayek's theory is alien to the liberal tradition. The important thing, therefore, in the
examination of the above critiques is that one can never understand why they stress
certain points of Hayek's theory while at the same time they tend to minimize certain
others if one tries to proceed solely in terms of "pure" philosophy. This inexplicable
partiality, however, seems to be resolved if one treats the respective political positions
of the two scholars as the determinative factors of their critiques. It is only after the
"libertarian" views of Gray and the "liberal" views of Forsyth have been taken into
account that an understanding of their respective readings of Hayek (and for that
matter of Kant as well) can be reached. This argument also points out probably the
most important feature ofHayek's theory, that is, its loose inner structure and at times,
its inner inconsistencies that provide the necessary ground for such interpretations to
arise.
2. The Problem of Mind: Gray's Critique
The question of Hayek's conception of mind is of fundamental importance
because mind seems to be the concept that bridges the gap between his "value free"
epistemology and his "ultimate" monism in ontology. In doing so, mind also
constitutes the main category that Hayek uses in order to pass from philosophy to
social theory. Hayek's approach to the "mind problem" will be treated systematically
later on. Here some main critiques of his theory will be considered.
J. Gray stresses the importance of the Hayekian concept of mind, both as an
important philosophical problem and as the key that links Hayek's ontology (or, rather
the apparent lack of it) with his social philosophy. Hayek's case for the market
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process and for social order, Gray says, is one which appeals primarily to the
considerations of the concept of mind (J. Gray 1980a p. 121). "Hayek himself is
emphatic that these insights in the theories of mind and knowledge have the largest
consequences for social theory." (J. Gray 1982 p.31). In the account that Gray gives
of the Hayekian theory one could distinguish two periods or phases. At first, he
seems to be quite reluctant to accept Hayek's theory uncritically1. Then, his general
outlook changes radically2 and he ends up actually supporting Hayek vividly3. Hard
as it may be to do so, we shall try to follow Gray through all his intellectual journey.
It has already been mentioned that Gray places Hayek's general theory in the
Kantian tradition, and the treatment of the mind problem is no exception. Mind is for
Hayek, as for Kant, Gray argues, the only organizer of the order we find in the world;
knowledge, thus, cannot be constructed from a basis of raw sensory data; rather, it is
a product of the creative activity of mind. By implication, the world as it appears
becomes also the product of mind. Gray also quotes Hayek's own statement on the
relation of his theory with the Kantian conception of categories that govern our mind
(F.A. Hayek 1978 p.45n. and J. Gray 1982 p.31 and 1986a p.21). However, Hayek
is distinguished from Kant in that he considers these categories as alterable and
evolutionary rather than universal and invariant. And, above all, he thinks that mind,
exactly like society, is, after all, governed by laws, the content of which cannot be
known to us. The distinction that Gray makes - that not all laws are unknowable -
seems, here, of secondary importance. The essence is "that there must of necessity
be an unsurpassable limit beyond which we are unable to specify the rules by which
our lives are governed" (J. Gray 1986a p.22). The fact, according to Hayek, that the
mind is unable to grasp the most basic rules which govern its operation reflexively,
follows from its nature as a classificatory organ and the theorem that no system of
classes can contain itself. From these two basic premisses - that is, that "the life of
mind" is governed by rules and that these rules are not knowable - Hayek deduces that
1 See, J. Gray 1980a and 1981.
2 See, J. Gray 1982.
3 See, J. Gray 1986a. To this one may add a third period where Gray becomes "noticeably less
enthusiastic about Hayek's liberalism" (M. Forsyth 1988 p.235).
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conscious thinking must be governed by rules which are not conscious, that is, by a
"supraconsciousmechanism" or "metaconsciousmechanism" (J. Gray 1986a pp.22-23).
The totality of the rules are hierarchically structured, with the most fundamental
among them at any time being metaconscious, that is, unknowable. At the same time,
these rules are not conceived of as invariant principles with a fixed content. Rather
they are products of a process of evolutionary selection and modification. This, in
general terms, is how Hayek's theory of mind is presented in Gray's latest writings.
In his earlier writings, however, Gray's account is substantially different. The
link between Kant and Hayek is already present but the problem ofmind is considered
primarily as a debate within a different tradition. "One of the basic postulates of the
Hayekian system is contained in his endorsement of the Austrian thesis of the
autonomy of the human mind" (J. Gray 1980a p. 120). The main features of the
system are said to be subjectivism and skepticism. In that respect, Gray's early
critique is closer to the approach proposed in this thesis. Indeed, in Gray's account
of it, Hayek's theory approximates a form of subjective idealism and agnosticism.
The main accent is placed on Hayek's claim that human - i.e. individual - knowledge
is undetermined and unpredictable. The unpredictability of knowledge, however,
which is defined simply in reference to individual preferences, expectations and
beliefs, is already reassured both in principle and for practical purposes even before
its occurrence. Thus Gray emphasizes the psychologistic individualism that pierces
Hayek's theory. The emphasis on the agnosticist side of Hayek's theory is stressed
further by placing unpredictability of individual behavior in the centre of the Hayekian
theory of liberty. But, Gray argues, "[tjhere is much more to Hayek's argument for
ignorance than this" (J. Gray 1980a p. 120). Hayek's argument, according to Gray is
not simply that we cannot know the things-in-themselves (a somehow hasty statement
since Hayek disavows the thing-in-itself as such, only to reintroduce it as a necessary
assumption). It is also that sensory perception is always determined by a priori
mental categories; and further that these categories are not features of the physical
world. The implication of these presuppositions is that the determinative mental
categories become undeterminable in their t^rc .. "Indeed, in so far as he has taken
pains to deny that any of the categories of our thought is an invariant feature of the
human mind and has rejected the view that these categories reflect an unchanging
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nature of things, Hayek's epistemology, (...), is in the end hard to distinguish from a
form of pragmatism with deeply skeptical implications." (J. Gray 1980a pp.120-121).
Hayek's view, then, is skeptical according to Gray, in two respects. First, we can
never establish a direct link between our conceptual framework and the world.
Second, we can never correct or adjust our conceptual framework by directly
correcting its formal properties. Our ignorance is based on the combined effects of
the above inabilities: we can never acquire knowledge of any practical value from our
theoretical constructions which are by necessity highly abstract, nor can we organize
our practical experiences in any concrete or precise (theoretical) way. In order not to
be left with a completely agnosticist - and thus self defeating - approach, Hayek is
forced into an appeal to practice as the primary a posteriori criterion of truth. "Those
ways of thought which survive a natural selection process of competition with others
are presumed to contain some truth about the world" (J. Gray 1980a p.121)1. Thus,
the only way to avoid the complete relativity between truth and not-truth is (a
posteriori) faith2.
The second important criticism that appears in Gray's earlier writings refers
to the relation of ontology and epistemology in Hayek's theory. According to Gray
the autonomy of the mind is solely based on "a fallibilist epistemology combined with
a naturalistic evolutionary view of intellectual life" (J. Gray 1980a p.122). Questions
such as those concerning the freedom of the will and determinism are ruled out as
irrelevant while no special presuppositions in ontology are required. "Throughout his
writing Hayek seems to want to claim a kind of metaphysical neutrality for the
epistemological beliefs which he places at the heart of liberalism." (J. Gray 1980a
p. 122). Gray's reference to this aspect is admittedly quite laconic. It only mentions
the problem along with a remark on the apparent problems that the relativity of the
ontological commitments creates in any theory which bases its social philosophy on
a certain conception of human nature.
1 Emphasis added.
2 See also discussion on causality in part II and comparison with Berkeley. It seems that Gray could
not get over the arbitrariness of this position even in his most friendly critique. On that, see objection
raised in the end of this part.
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3. Anti-Rationalism and Anti-Liberalism: Forsyth's Critique
M. Forsyth's criticism emerges as the liberal answer to Hayek's "anti-liberal"
and challenging doctrine. We have already mentioned his objections to Gray's attempt
to present Hayek as a full-blooded liberal and, consequently, the reference to his view
on the problems of the theory of mind will be brief. Forsyth objects sharply to what
he calls - in a way similar to Gray's earlier critique - "Hayek's naturalist and
physicalist account of the mind" (M. Forsyth 1988). His critique focuses on the
problems generated by a quasi-mechanistic account that Hayek gives (mainly in The
Sensory Order) of the nature and function of human mind.
Hayek's commitment to such an approach, is certified by his close disciple C.
Nishiyama. Nishiyama argues that he knows of no other scholar who has pursued
more thoroughly the idea of "model-building in explaining the mechanism of the
activities of our mind" and further "Unless I am mistaken, according to Professor
Hayek, all these activities are without exception in their fundamental character the acts
of classification (...)." (C. Nishiyama 1967 p.340)1.
According to Forsyth, then, Hayek is anti-liberal, in the first place because he
bases the priority of the mind on unstable grounds. By arguing for an ultimate
physical monism in ontology, Hayek discredits the time-honored supremacy of human
mind and consciousness over matter. The fact that in the end mind is restored as the
ultimate category accessible to man, is, for Forsyth, an insufficient argument.
Furthermore, Hayek sharply distinguishes between human mind and consciousness.
By presenting mind as a "particular order of a set of events taking place in some
organism (...)" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p. 16) Hayek sets forward a naturalistic account of
it, which in turn is completed by a mechanistic characterization of "higher" mental
activities as a mere repetition of activities that already take place in "lower" levels.
Forsyth's objection to this is that it deprives mind and, indeed, consciousness of their
qualitative difference from (and superiority over) simple mechanical processes that
take place in the material world. The demand for a qualitative difference, rather than
a mechanistically additive (quantitative) account, can be identified with a demand for
1 Emphasis added.
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a transcendental and metaphysical content of mind and consciousness. Forsyth's
objection which points out that once we accept Hayek's naturalistic evolutionary
definition of mind there will be no qualitative difference between human beings and
beasts, rightly emphasizes the fact that there can be no Kantian and certainly no liberal
account of man without an ontological premise granting ultimate supremacy to the
categories of mind and consciousness.
Forsyth, again, criticizes Hayek on the grounds of the account he gives of
consciousness. It is precisely the meta-conscious or supra-conscious processes that
Gray defends so vividly, that Forsyth rejects. It is not altogether clear if Forsyth's
critique goes as far as to oppose to the whole tradition that serves as the theoretical
foundation of the Hayek's argument1. What is clear is that Forsyth explicitly aims
at discrediting the account of conscious behavior as simply the "verbalization" or
"making explicit" of what is already happening unconsciously. By implication,
Forsyth also rejects the view that all conscious action is uncreative. Again his claim
is that by depriving consciousness and conscious action of any qualitatively different
essence, Hayek is basically reducing it to a mechanical process. Forsyth, then, rejects
the idea of a meta-conscious or supra-conscious process playing the determinative role
in human conduct, on the grounds that it cannot provide a theory with the "radical
break with the order of nature" needed in all the liberal philosophic tradition.
Finally, his criticism also points to certain inner inconsistencies of Hayek's
theory. The first point that he makes seeks to emphasize the contradiction that
emerges from Hayek's claim that the "whole idea of the mind explaining itself is a
logical contradiction, nonsense in the literal meaning of the word" (M. Forsyth 1988
p.242). The contradiction arises from Hayek's account of mind as a computer-like
organism, as well as from his attempt to reduce all mental activity to physical
processes. It seems, therefore, that while Hayek states that mind can never be
explained - i.e. reduced to something else - what he is in fact doing is constantly to
reduce mental to physical activity. Hayek's highly acclaimed adoption of "dualism
1 See the concepts of "knowing how" (as opposed to "knowing that"), G. Ryle (1945-46 pp.1-16
and 1949); "tacit knowledge" of M. Polanyi (1967); "traditional knowledge" of M. Oakeshott (1962).
The link is rightfully established by Gray in his essays on Hayek. Although there might be less than
an identity between the above concepts and Hayek's account, this point certainly contributes to a better
understanding of Hayek's theory.
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for practical purposes" comes as a result of an all too materialist (physicalist) account
of the mind.
The second inconsistency pointed out by Forsyth concerns Hayek's claim that
we must assume the existence of an objective world towards the recognition of which
the phenomenal world is only an approximation1. Forsyth argues that the recognition
of such an objective world presupposes the conscious distinction of the subject from
his environment. Hayek presupposes, therefore, a decisive break (a qualitative
difference) between the organism and the environment. And although Hayek is trying
to minimize the problems that arise from this thesis by calling it yet another act of
classification of the organism it seems plain that "[i]t is one thing physiologically to
"typify" bundles of sensory impulses, it is another to classify sensory impulses as such
as the appearances of an objective external world." (M. Forsyth 1988 p.243), the latter
being a characteristic of human beings as a result of their self-consciousness which
Hayek actually denies in his naturalistic account of man. Unfortunately, Forsyth does
not seem to recognize any necessity in this contradiction. He only sees it as an
accidental point that appears in a certain section of The Sensory Order. In other
words, he does not see the gravity that Hayek attaches to this point as the only
alternative to extreme relativism. After having destroyed any notion of objectivity and
causality Hayek is left with the only solution - that is, to relativize completely the
relation between truth and not-truth, real and not real2. The arbitrary introduction
(from the outside, as an a posteriori category) of an objective world, which in addition
man is supposed to approximate to, although inconsistent, is made necessary by the
need for a certain notion of objectivity in a theory which is heavily based on
subjectivism and relativism.
1 See also Gray's permanent objections to the legitimacy of this assumption. This point seems to
rase criticisms throughout the ideological spectrum of Hayek's critics.
2 See relevant discussion in part II with reference to the problem as it appears in Berkeley.
4. Hayek's Unstated "Scientism": Miller's Case for a Solely Epistemological Critique
A further reference to a critique, that deliberately limits itself to questions of
epistemology alone, is perhaps useful at this point. E. Miller produces such a critique
which seems to point out some central problems in Hayek's epistemology.
Notwithstanding its scholarly achievements however, that approach is bound to remain
incomplete not because of any circumstantial reason but because it actually
presupposes a very similar ontology and above all a substantial agreement in political
premises.
Miller's critique although partial, is not without interest. After presenting
Hayek's theory of mind he draws a substantial distinction between Hayek's earlier and
later writings. In his earlier writings, Miller argues, Hayek gave a different account
of the mind and the process of knowing than in his more recent works. Based on a
somehow partial reading of The Counter-Revolution of Science Miller argues that
Hayek's case in the problem of mind rested on the admission that there are certain
universal categories of thought It is only through these categories that men can
communicate at any historic period and it is precisely because these categories do not
change substantially throughout human history that we can have an understanding of
the past. This very premise, argues Miller, becomes questionable in Hayek's later
writings. However, it seems unlikely that a temporal division of Hayek's work can
be useful here. The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse ofReason,
was first published in 1952, the same year as The Sensory Order in which Hayek
argues primarily on different grounds. The content of the former book first appeared
in the form of articles in the period 1941-50 while the first draft of The Sensory Order
dates from the late 1920s. Furthermore, at the same period Hayek published his best¬
seller The Road to Serfdom (1944). This book was written between 1940-43 while the
main argument was first sketched in an article in 1938 and expanded in 19391.
Besides, Miller himself argues that "[t]he problems that arise in Hayek's account of
human knowledge are visible already in TheRoad to Serfdom" (E. Miller 1976 p.385).
It seems quite misleading to argue that Hayek underwent a conscious change of mind
1 Data according to J. Gray 1986a pp.152-3.
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during this particular period. Rather, the part from The Counter-Revolution that Miller
isolates and overemphasizes constitutes one aspect of Hayek's theory while his
"relativism" constitutes the other, which exists simultaneously.
Miller proceeds to the examination of The Sensory Order in which he rightly
points out the inadequacy of Hayek's account of reality. After having divided the
world into two orders, according to the way it appears to us and to science, Hayek
emphatically disclaims any interest in what things "really are". But, Miller argues, his
entire argument depends on the presupposition that the scientific account is, in fact,
the real. From this observation Miller draws two conclusions. First, he says, Hayek
breaks with the tradition that attributes qualities to the things themselves. "Hayek
takes the view that science can account for things entirely in terms of their relations
and effects, so that there is no need to assume that essentially qualities or forms inhere
in the things themselves." (E. Miller 1976 p.388). And further "despite his unqualified
condemnation of Descartes' philosophy, Hayek's own distinction between the
phenomena, or the things as they appear to us, and the things as they subsist in the
world external to our mind is a reflection of the Cartesian dualism between mind and
world (...)." (E. Miller 1976 p.389). Indeed, Hayek does deny the existence of natural
kinds or classes in the material world. At the same time, he also argues that science
is trying to give an account of the world purely in terms of the relations and effects
between things. However, all thought, including scientific thought, is of the same
purely classificatory (mechanical) kind. It is, it would be remembered, precisely at
this point that Forsyth disagrees sharply and, by the same token, points Hayek's
inconsistency when he tries to establish a link between his theory of knowledge and
a notion of objectivity. In the same vein, Gray stresses the fact that despite Hayek's
assurance there is no legitimate way we can assume that the picture of the world
painted by science constitutes an approximation to reality. The second point that
Miller stresses is that Hayek's dualism is not implied for practical reasons - as Hayek
himself argues - but is in fact a reflection of an ultimate ontological dualism. The
point is admittedly brief and expressed in a rather abstract way, but at least it brings
forward one of the main problems in Hayek's supposedly ontology-free theory1.
1 See relevant discussion in part II.
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The second conclusion that Miller derives is what he calls Hayek's Kantian
dimension. Briefly, it is the point discussed extensively by Gray - i.e. that all we can
perceive is always determined by mental categories. The subsequent implication is
that sense experience can never falsify our categories and consequently the denial of
the empiricist "pure core" of sensations. Miller stresses the instability of the ground
that Hayek has placed himself. On the one hand, he says, Hayek has to retain the idea
that sciences give a correct account of the world because his own account of human
cognition presupposes a valid physiological explanation of the principles that underline
the process of knowing. On the other, Hayek's own conclusions on the subjectivity
of the character of knowledge undermine the very possibility of objective knowledge.
The categories which determine knowledge vary from each individual to another and
from each historical moment to another. At the same time, and because they cannot
be tested either in a reference to sensory experience or in reference to abstract
conceptual thinking they become the only ultimate reality. Although Miller does not
stress his critique that far, it seems plain that these conclusions may lead to a form of
solipsism1.
Miller's view is based on a presupposition - namely, that "[Hayek's] work in
the special sciences (...) is intended to rest on an epistemological foundation." (E.
Miller 1976 p.383). This presupposition can be interpreted in at least two different
ways. Firstly, it may imply that the theory of knowledge occupies a central place in
Hayek' system. Secondly, it may imply that his theory is based solely on
epistemological grounds. The respective implications are quite far reaching. So far,
the argument has been that the theory of knowledge and the critique of reason acquire
a central position in the Hayekian system. Miller agrees with that but does not stop
there. He seems to imply that the only adequate way to examine the whole of
Hayek's system should be limited to a debate within and about epistemology. Perhaps
his argument would sound less curious if he could produce some evidence that
Hayek's epistemology is somehow self-contained - that is, that it has a considerable
degree of independence from his ontology and methodology - and holds independently
from its political implications. Although it is not clear whether this is possible at all,
1 By "solipsism" is meant the attempt to reduce the world to subjective consciousness.
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the fact is that Miller does not attempt it. On the contrary, he seems to mingle a
series of political, philosophical and methodological topics with what he calls
epistemology. For example, he states: "When Hayek has primarily in mind the
political side of this modem conflict [the conflict between two "opposing" theories of
liberty], he speaks of two kinds of individualism, or two traditions of freedom, or two
kinds of liberalism. When he has primarily in mind the epistemological side of this
conflict, he speaks of two kinds of rationalism or else of the struggle between
rationalism and antirationalism" (E. Miller 1976 p.384). Such generalizations,
however, tend to obscure the problem. Hayek does indeed equate a certain kind of
individualism with a certain account of freedom and liberalism. But can we take these
equations at face value if we are to launch a valid criticism? By accepting these
equations rather uncritically Miller actually surrenders the ground on which any
systematic critique should be based - namely, Hayek's inconsistent ontological
premises and his attempt to present an ontology-free epistemology. In that sense,
Miller's critique lies much closer to Hayek's theory than its author thinks1. It is not
clear from the article whether this is only due to an essential agreement with Hayek
in philosophy or whether it is simply an inadequate line of critique. There are certain
indications, however, which point towards a combination of both. Miller stresses his
agreement with Hayek in that any "adequate account of economics and politics must
rest upon a proper understanding of the character of human knowledge" (E. Miller
1976 p.385). But, as we have seen in Forsyth's critique, the understanding of the
character of human knowledge is a very different matter from the "mechanics" or the
"know how" of knowledge and is, in fact, a problem which requires very specific
ontological premises. Again, in his conclusions Miller suggests an alternative (other
than "critical rationalism") to "constructivist rationalism". He argues for "a premodern
understanding of theoretical and practical science". This science "(...) aims (...) at
contemplative knowledge of the permanent forms of being. This rational activity
ennobles the knower and reorients his life, but neither equips him nor inclines him to
bring about a radical transformation of the world of everyday life." (E. Miller 1976
1 Even a comparison with Gray's later writings may prove unfavorable in that matter. At least Gray
mentions certain problems that arise from Hayek's "self-contained" epistemology and even thinks that
some of them are unsurpassable.
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p.393). Miller himself is quite frank both towards his own view and towards the
essence of Hayek's theory. For him practical activity is and must always remain
separated from rational conscious activity. "One need not set strict limits to reason,
as thus understood, or deny its capacity to know the nature of things in order to
protect the sphere of practice, for this kind of theoretical reason is not likely to
endanger the practical sphere." (E. Miller 1976 p.393)1.
Miller, then, far from criticizing Hayek on purely epistemological grounds
implies a very specific ontology. But it so happens that this ontology is likely to
bring about the same practical results as that of Hayek's. He overemphasizes the
epistemological aspect not because it is self-contained but because this is the only
point of difference with Hayek. As for the rest, it seems plain that there is a profound
agreement between the two thinkers. They both agree that the main danger comes
from the use of rationality and positive knowledge in the practical problems of
everyday life - which is only another way of saying, in politics. They both have the
same aim - that is, to separate effectively the domain of reason from that of practice
and make the latter unpenetrable by the former. The political implication of this is
that social life - viewed exclusively as the individual's microcosmos - has nothing to
do with rationality; the former is considered as the result of some other parameter
such as nature or luck. It is not that Hayek's theory is anti-rational or reactionary
according to Miller, then; it is simply that its epistemology does not provide adequate
support for its noble principles. "By basing his political theory on an insecure
epistemological foundation, Hayek endangers those very principles of liberty that he
wishes to defend." (E. Miller 1976 p.385).
5. The Conservative Aspects of Hayek's Theory: Oakeshott on Tradition and Implicit
Knowledge
A further link between Hayek and conservatism can be established through a
comparison of his theory with that ofM. Oakeshott. It has been mentioned that there
1 Emphasis added.
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is a close relation between the theory of knowledge guided by meta-conscious rules
of conduct and Oakeshott's "traditional" or "practical" knowledge. Oakeshott's
account of the mind is as follows: "Mind as we know it is the offspring of knowledge
and activity; it is composed entirely of thoughts. You do not first have a mind, which
acquires a filling of ideas and then makes distinctions between true and false, right
and wrong, reasonable and unreasonable, and then, as a third step, causes activity."
(M. Oakeshott 1962 p.89) There are two elements in this definition, both of which
are of major importance for the conservative account of mind. Firstly, Oakeshott
presents a view of the mind largely based on an activist perspective. Knowledge and
activity are considered as the component parts of mind. Secondly, thoughts are taken
as the only constituent of mind. Knowledge, as Oakeshott has argued at length
elsewhere1, is of two kinds: "Technical knowledge or knowledge of technique" and
"practical knowledge". The first sort of knowledge consists of the techniques involved
in every art or science, or in fact in every practical activity that requires some sort of
skill. This knowledge is in principle susceptible of precise formulation into explicit
rules. It is the sort of knowledge one can find in every manual and guide. It is also
the sort of knowledge which can be learned "deliberately" and remembered. The
second sort of knowledge - "practical" - can neither be reflective nor be formulated
in rules; it exists only in use. However, this knowledge is not esoteric; its distinction
from technical knowledge only refers to the way it may be transmitted. "Practical"
knowledge can not be taught or become a formulated doctrine but it can be imparted
and acquired. The only way to acquire "practical" knowledge is by practicing the art
(or science or activity) alongside someone who has already mastered it; or, in a social
context, alongside social practice. That is why it can also be called "traditional"
knowledge. The two sorts of knowledge, although distinguishable, are also
inseparable. Knowledge proper involves both of them and so does every practical
activity. However, Oakeshott seems to imply that the two sorts of knowledge, apart
from being inseparable, are essentially of the same kind. In fact, his point might have
been made more clearly if he had introduced one kind of knowledge of a dual
character, instead of two sorts of knowledge. After all, this seems to be his intention.
1 "Rationalism in Politics" in M. Oakeshott 1962 esp. paragraph 2.
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The distinction between "practical" and "technical" knowledge is to be distinguished,
in its turn, from "knowing how" as opposed to "knowing what"1. We cannot divide
knowledge into a theoretical part that tells us what to do and a practical part that
shows us how to do it, because "even in the what, (...) there lies already this dualism
of technique and practice: there is no knowledge which is not "know how" (M.
Oakeshott 1962 p.9). In that sense, knowledge is, for Oakeshott, "pre-eminently of
this dual character" (M. Oakeshott 1962 p.9).
Hence, knowledge is presented as a concept deeply rooted in practice. But not
practice in the sense of conscious rational activity of any kind; rather, practice, in
Oakeshott's sense, is dissolved in the ever flowing continuum of human existence and
reconstructed in the form of implicit, traditional mode of activity. In that sense, again,
the definition of mind as knowledge and activity seems to obscure the point. If there
is no knowledge without activity and if activity necessarily implies pre-eminent
knowledge, what is the point of reducing mind into two component parts? What it
could have been reduced to is rather a concept of the continuum of human tradition.
Otherwise, the definition will always run the danger of leading to an account of mind
composed of two temporally and/or spatially different qualities; and that is precisely
what Oakeshott disavows in the face of Rationalism.
Oakeshott's point is that there is no way of conceiving of the mind other than
through its actual mode of existence which encompasses all the major formulations
of ideas, morality etc.. Mind "has no existence apart from, or in advance of, these and
other distinctions." (M. Oakeshott 1962 pp.89-90). The identity of thought and action
goes far enough to permit Oakeshott to question the existence of explicitly formulated
principles determining action. Since activity necessarily implies a "knowing how" to
act and since this "knowing how" can be reduced to explicit statements only partly,
it is preposterous, literally speaking, to take any formulated propositions as the spring
or the regulative factor of activity. On the contrary, it is activity itself that determines
both the general mental formulations about it (principles, questions etc.) and the
manner in which they will be met. Even in the case where man has some
1 Here Oakeshott is possibly distancing himself from G. Ryle's distinction between "knowing how"
and "knowing that". At the same time, he cites with appreciation M. Polanyi's concept of "tacit
knowledge". (M. Oakeshott 1962 p.8n.; see also M. Polanyi 1964).
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prepositional knowledge about his activity, his knowledge goes further than what is
contained in the propositions. "It is clear, then, that the activity of these men (and I
would say all other activity also) is something that comes first, and is something into
which each one gradually finds his way: at no time is he wholly ignorant of it; there
is no identifiable beginning." (M. Oakeshott 1962 p.98)1. Thus, the ever-flowing
continuum that is called mind is firmly established in conservative thought. Human
conduct is thought to be determined by "what may be called the traditions of the
activity" (M. Oakeshott 1962 p.99) of which individual projects form the parts. In
Oakeshott's philosophy, then, traditional knowledge emerges as the sovereign,
determinative factor of human conduct. All problems, as well as their answers, are
tacitly implicated in activities and, in that sense, whenever one wants to account for
an activity, one has to look not at the premises or the principles of the individual (for
example, one's plans or ends) but at the traditionally determined modes of existence
of the activities themselves. "Human activity is always an activity with a pattern; not
a superimposed pattern but a pattern of the activity itself." (M. Oakeshott 1962 p.105).
Oakeshott's epistemology, then, is quite close to Hayek's. Hayek, along with
Oakeshott, takes practice to be the primary category in the constitution of knowledge.
Indeed this seems quite an unavoidable course for any theory which tries to establish
an a priori limitation to human reason and knowledge and, at the same time, seeks to
avoid a direct appeal to the metaphysical. Practice becomes the determinative factor
of knowledge not because it helps in the understanding of the functions of mind, not
because it is the ultimate verification of theory, but because it alludes to the intrinsic
limitations of mind: practice - usually taken as individual activity - demonstrates by
its high level of complexity and unpredictability that the mind can never come to a
full understanding of things. This course avoids dependence on an a priori appeal to
metaphysics. As Oakeshott puts it, "[tjhere is, in fact, no external harmonizing power,
insulated from the elements enjoying and in search of harmony" (M. Oakeshott 1962
p. 109). The appeal to an external, superimposed order seems to be avoided2.
1 Compare with Hayek's "undesigned results of human conduct".
2 Notice the context of the phrase: it is not the supernatural (for example, divine) that Oakeshott
is fighting against, but the natural - that is, the "order" in and of nature.
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Notwithstanding that, such a conclusion might be superficial. When Oakeshott talks
about external harmony or superimposed patterns he obviously means the harmony and
patterns of the elements themselves - that is, the way the objective world exists.
Hayek is doing the same thing when he states that the order we perceive in the
objective world is the result of the function of our organizing mental categories. In
that sense, Oakeshott is not excluding the possibility of a superimposed pattern or an
external harmony as far as the "elements" are concerned. What he says is that there
is no harmony in the external world while there is in our minds. This harmony is
actually "superimposed" (since it does not exist in the first place) on the objective
world. It is the same with activity. It is not caused by external reasons; it is not even
caused by psychological motives. "We do not first have a desire and then set about
discovering how to satisfy it; the objects of our desires are known to us in the activity
of seeking them." (M. Oakeshott 1962 p. 105). Acting is, thus, totally independent
from the objective world. On the contrary, it is dependent on mind; in fact, it is
almost identified with it (mind=knowledge+activity). The ontological supremacy of
mind is, thus, established; but not in its full sovereignty. It is not conscious mind that
determines the patterns or harmonizes reality. It is this unconscious part of it that
constitutes the stuff of "traditional" knowledge. In that sense, the patterns of activity
are not superimposed on mind but they certainly are superimposed on conscious or
rational mind. The appeal to transcendence is not avoided; it has simply changed its
form. Instead of taking the objective world as the primary determinative category
which "superimposes" its patterns on mind, he takes the eternally existing "mind" as
the determinative category of the objective world. Moreover, what should be noticed
is the necessity of a sharp distinction between the physical world and mind. Mind is
clearly not a part of the physical world in Oakeshott's account. Hayek is only eluding
the problem when he states that mind is a part of the physical world; that is why he
is immediately obliged to abandon this position. Oakeshott seems to be much clearer
on this matter than Hayek. The rationality of conduct cannot be imposed from the
outside, he says. Therefore, we must admit that it is a quality of the conduct itself.
How is Oakeshott to avoid the danger of relativism, always present in such theories?
By an appeal to traditional knowledge, once more: to be rational is to have
"faithfulness to the knowledge we have of how to conduct the specific activity we are
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engaged in" (M. Oakeshott 1962 pp. 101-102). Traditional knowledge, then, rescues
Oakeshott from relativism but at the cost of an open appeal to faith. His conclusion
is profoundly static and, in fact, irrational (rationality is identified with faith).
Oakeshott goes as far as to state that in sciences the conduct of a scientist can only
be called "rational" "in respect of its faithfulness to the traditions of scientific inquiry"
(M. Oakeshott 1962 p. 103). Despite its firmly static character it is not altogether clear
if Oakeshott's account has exorcised the danger of relativism. The inadequacy of his
definition of "rationalism" is apparent in his statement that the only "irrational"
scientist is simply "the scientific crank and the eccentric" (M. Oakeshott 1962 p. 103).
Although he has practically widened the notion of "rationality" to the extent that it has
lost almost any meaning it still remains to be proved that there is an objective
definition of the "crank" and the "eccentric" before any credibility can be given to his
definition.
The implications of this epistemology are of profound importance. Mind,
argues Oakeshott, is knowledge and activity. But the two elements are by no means
equal. Let us examine knowledge first. It is, in turn, constituted as "technical"
knowledge and "traditional" knowledge. These two elements are not equal either.
While we do have "traditional" knowledge without "technical" knowledge there is no
way we can have "technical" without "traditional" knowledge. Hence, the dominant
pole of the relation is obviously "traditional" knowledge. Knowledge, thus, may not
be equated with traditional knowledge but is certainly conditioned and delimited by
it since the latter prescribes the patterns of acquiring knowledge in general. Activity,
on the other hand, is conceived of as practical activity. But Oakeshott is emphatic
that practice cannot be distinguished from knowledge in any temporal or logical way.
Rather, it constitutes the demonstration of the existence ofmind in general. Practical
activity is, at the same time, determined by knowledge, as becomes apparent from
Oakeshott's account of it1. It is the a priori knowledge of the objects of our desires
that initiates and determines our practical conduct in order to obtain them.
But if knowledge is the determinative component part of mind and if
traditional knowledge is the conditioning part of knowledge itself, it follows that
1 As cited supra. See also M. Oakeshott 1962 p.105.
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traditional knowledge conditions and delimits the mind. When Oakeshott takes
practice as primary in the constitution of knowledge then he already presupposes the
determinative role of traditional knowledge in the constitution of practice itself1. In
that way, he can combine two apparently opposite things. On the one hand, he can
save the categorical qualitative primacy of traditional knowledge and imply its
determinative role throughout the mental and practical existence of human beings. On
the other, he can guarantee a securely diminished role of reason without appealing
directly to metaphysics.
Practical activity, however, has another function as well: that of the link
between mind and reality. Reality, according to Oakeshott, has no patterns of its own;
it is our mental patterns that give it a harmonized appearance. By implication, nature
itself, the objective world, emerges as the embodiment of traditional knowledge in the
form of traditionally determined patterns, regularities etc.. This concept has apparent
implications in political philosophy. Social reality, in the same way as objective
reality, is deprived of any patterns of its own that can be explained rationally. Rather
it is the product of the same traditional patterns that govern objective reality as well.
In that sense, it cannot be changed through practical activity since it is the
embodiment of the same sovereign category as governs practical activity. The social
position of the individuals, as well as the political status of a society, have nothing to
do with reason and conscious action; they, too, are determined by the inescapable
traditional continuity of things.
Tradition, although a category ofmajor importance, does not penetrate Hayek's
social philosophy to the same degree. Hayek's epistemology is in the same vein as
Oakeshott's. In social philosophy, however, Hayek replaces the sovereignty of
tradition as such with that of the naturalistic evolutionary selection of traditions, at the
cost of inconsistency. The essence, in terms of political theory, nevertheless remains
the same. The social position of each individual is a matter of luck; a result of
spontaneous powers that the individual can neither understand nor control. Take, for
example, the role of the general rules in social order. Hayek's aim is to strengthen
the liberal division between civil society and political power which he takes for
1 Also J. Gray as cited supra.
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granted. General rules, he argues, are the only guarantee of a free society. If rules,
and not men, govern, then we have the "Great Society". What is the alter ego of that
same proposition? Make general rules so sovereign that nobody can alter them; give
them the status of superhuman and suprasocial entities. That is, grant them the
absolute power to govern. If it happens that the content of these rales as "discovered"
by Hayek tends to be identical with the order of a capitalist society there is nothing
that could be done to change this. Furthermore, these rales are supposed to safeguard
a certain sovereign sphere of individual private activity. Which is only another way
of saying that the state too is granted an equally undisputable sovereignty in the
"political" sphere. One has only to look at Hayek's "Model Constitution" to
understand the extent of the strengthening of the state apparatus in the "Great
Society". The claim for "limited government", strangely enough, seems to imply a
hidden claim for a stronger state.
Despite the overall similarity of the two approaches, there are some interesting
differences. The source of these differences can be traced back to Hayek's ambiguous
position in respect to "scientism" and positivism. Despite his explicit condemnation
of what he terms "scientism" and positivism (the latter mainly in the form of legal
positivism), "scientism" is present in Hayek's work primarily in the form of
psychological empiricism1. The whole of The Sensory Order is dedicated to
analyzing "scientifically" the function of the mind. The theory of the cognitive
process, thus, becomes an analyzable and, what is worse, a "scientifically" analyzable
process. Hayek has probably rejected Oakeshott's appeal to faith without noticing its
necessity to his own argument. He has put himself in the impossible position of
rationally proving the a priori limits of reason. In that sense he has escaped an
unconvincing appeal to faith but at the cost of inner inconsistency. As Forsyth rightly
notices, the central premise of Hayek's philosophy is contradicted throughout the
course of the main argument of The Sensory Order. In that sense, Hayek's
naturalistic-mechanistic account of human mind comes into sharp contradiction with
that of Oakeshott. The latter's view is clear enough: "The whole notion of mind as
1 Most of Hayek's critics have pointed out his relation to positivism as one of the obscure parts of
his theory. At the same time, Hayek has been bitterly attacked for "committing scientism", as will be
shown later on.
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an apparatus of thinking is, I believe, an error;" (M. Oakeshott 1962 p.90) and "The
instrumental mind does not exist (...)" (M. Oakeshott 1962 p.91). Hayek's view, on
the contrary, stresses the instrumentality of the mind. The whole account of it, from
the formulation of the first fibre, the impulse, sensory (both pre-sensory and
conscious) experience and the formulation of "maps" is given in naturalistic
"scientific" terms and under the view that it is a mechanical process, similar to
"computer-building". In that sense Oakeshott's criticism of Hayek's The Road to
Serfdom1 seems to reveal much more than a methodological disagreement.
There might also be more than a simple difference2 in the nature of the part
of knowledge which cannot be articulated. It seems that Oakeshott rejects the notion
of a positivist and naturalist approach to mind altogether. Indeed, his critique of the
"rational man" looks more like a critique of the "positivist" than, for example, of the
"Marxist". Furthermore, he is explicitly against naturalism which he takes as being
in the same vein as rationalism3. What Oakeshott rejects, then, is at least half of
Hayek's initial premises4. If this point is valid, then, the subsequent difference in the
account of unarticulated knowledge in Hayek's theory acquires a fixed place5. In
fact, Hayek's account of unarticulated knowledge emerges as a result of his
"scientistic" attitude. The corresponding part of the "scientistic" account of mind is
the naturalist evolutionary account of knowledge. For Oakeshott, traditional
knowledge is socially fixed in the sense of being determined by a given unalterable
social practice, whereas, for Hayek, meta-conscious rules are determined by a process
of natural selection and evolution. Thus, far from being universal and unalterable,
they are constantly changing through a filtering which leads to the elimination of the
1 See M. Oakeshott 1962 p.21.
2 See J. Gray 1986a pp.114-115.
3 "Modem Rationalism and modem Naturalism in politics, in religion and in education, are alike
expressions of a general presumption against all human achievement more than about a generation old"
(M. Oakeshott 1962 pp.27-28n.)
4 For a similar critique see also A.H. Murray 1945. Murray criticizes Hayek for "scientism" which
leads to Cartesianism.
5 Fixed, that is, as opposed to accidental or unaccounted for, as Gray suggests (J. Gray 1986a
pp.114-115).
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most inadequate among them. Hayek, in other words, while retaining the conservative
conclusions of Oakeshott's theory, actually undermines them by an "ontology-free",
all-powerful "scientism".
6. Hayek's Anti-Rationalism as a Result of his Ontological and Methodological
Individualism: Quiniou's Critique
A rather different approach to the same subject is proposed by Y. Quiniou.
Quiniou derives Hayek's antirationalism from his ontological and methodological
subjectivism. He argues that Hayek starts from the liberal political proposition that
state interference in social and economic life should be minimized. From this
proposition follows the refusal of a central authority that may organize consciously
and wittingly social life. Now these two basic political propositions are further
perplexed and reproduced in various theoretical concepts of Hayek's theory. At the
political level, they are presented as the gradual absorption of the individual by a
transindividual state. Therefore, the refutation of "conscious control" becomes the
refutation of the collective as such. Liberalism, thus, becomes a practical
individualism which favors the element of spontaneity as opposed to social
consciousness, anticipation, provisional planning, organization. At a theoretical level
the refutation of consciousness appears as a critique of science; the idea that the social
field cannot be understood and controlled intellectually. By implication the Hayekian
individual is characterized by an unsurpassable ignorance. Another argument comes
to complete this concept, which, according to Quiniou, demonstrates even more clearly
the anti-scientific refutation of reason. "Hayek rejects what he calls "objectivism" in
social sciences because, for him, the subjective (opinions, needs, desires, classificatory
schemes etc.) intervenes in the very structure of social affairs and must, for that
reason, intervene as such in their explanation: the subjective is not something that
must itself be understood, but rather the starting point from which the social is
comprehended; and there must be no question, in principle, of submitting it to a
treatment somehow comparable (...) to the method of natural sciences." (Y. Quiniou
1989 p.77, my translation). In that sense the individual becomes an undeducible, self-
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contained concept. Consequently, society is not a given totality that we can
(reconstruct rationally, but only an open totality created by purely adding the
sovereign individuals, of individuals in inter-action. Therefore the total can only be
reproduced abstractly with the aid of partial functional models, which are doomed to
remain uncertain. Quiniou's conclusion is that Hayek's theoretical anti-rationalism,
coupled together with his practical anti-rationalism, is only the theoretical consequence
of his individualism (conceived of as "methodological individualism" in this case) (Y.
Quiniou 1989 p.78). But the only way to achieve this is actually to presuppose it
axiomatically: to take the individual as the ultimate explanatory concept is to grant it
an unintelligible character and, at the same time, to create a zone of reality essentially
inaccessible to reason; this consequence however was already inherent in the initial
methodological choice (Y. Quiniou 1989 p.78). The weakness of the Hayekian theory,
then, is to be found in its own premises. Hayek deprives social sciences of their
proper subject which is to objectivize the subjective and socialize the individual. In
doing so, he submits his individuals, which he has already placed outside social
science proper, in an explanatory process which he compares formally and directly to
that of the physical sciences. Quiniou's approach, thus, stresses the connection of
theoretical (and methodological) individualism with the refutation of reason in
politics. This relation in Quiniou's argument, is not a possible but a necessary one.
If the social, because of its ultimately individual character, is not theoretically
controllable, any attempt to control it practically, in terms of rational individual
conduct, becomes by necessity not only anti-rational, but indeed dangerous; it becomes
an effort to construct an artificial order which is by necessity contrary to reality
because of its very constitution.
Quiniou's criticism constitutes an attempt to confront Hayek's theory in many
respects and for that reason it will be used extensively as a reference in this critical
analysis. However, it suffers from defects, the most important among them being that
it ignores the inner problems and tensions of Hayek's theory. The main reason for
that, it could be assumed, is Quiniou's initial point of view, namely, that Hayekian
thought is unified and presents a real challenge to the Marxism which Quiniou is
obviously trying to defend. By taking Hayek's thought as a unified corpus that
constitutes a self-contained ideology, Quiniou misses some very important inner
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inconsistences and defects that emerge from Hayek's ideas. Quiniou, in other words,
is too willing to give Hayek the credit that his thought constitutes indeed a coherent
ideology. In that sense, he remains silent in regard to those critics who have
persistently pointed out that this is not the case. He also gives Hayek the credit of a
thoroughly philosophical thought, which in fact belongs to a different tradition. On
the other hand, Quiniou unlike most of Hayek's anglo-saxon critics who are
particularly influenced by empiricism (even if they do not admit it openly) offers an
essential connection between individualism1 as the fundamental principle of liberalism
and its potential political implications - the foremost among them being the conscious
refutation of reason. In that sense, Quiniou's critique is of the utmost importance: it
points out the fact that the very premises of liberalism are open to conservative and
reactionary interpretations.
1 That connection covers individualism both as ontological and as methodological premise; in that
sense, the distinction between the two is transcended at least politically.
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SECTION B: Social and Political Theory
1. Hayek's Social Theory as an Outcome of his Philosophical Premises
Many scholars have stressed the importance that the theory of mind has in the
development of Hayek's social philosophy and in particular for the concept of
spontaneous social order1. Gray takes the idea of the spontaneous social order as a
direct outcome of the theory of mind. "If the order we discover in society is in no
important respect the product of a directing intelligence, and if the human mind itself
is the product of cultural evolution, then it follows that social order cannot be the
product of anything resembling conscious control or rational design" (J. Gray 1986a
p.27); it has to be a spontaneously grown order.
In the two following parts an attempt will be made to disprove this idea. The
argument will acquire a dual character: on the one hand, it will be argued that the
Hayekian premises - namely, a) that society is not the product of an individual
intelligence, and b) that the mind is a product of cultural evolution - are both
insufficient and too conclusive. The result is, that the existence of spontaneous social
orders is far from an effortless assumption. In fact, it presupposes certain postulates
that are not included in Gray's account. What is more, these postulates already
comprise the conclusions that Hayek apparently derives as a result of his methodology.
On the other hand, it will be argued that Hayek's theory of the mind, taken
consistently to its final outcomes, might easily produce orders greatly different from
those prevailing in his "Great Society". This argument will take the form of
contrasting the logically potential outcomes of his theory with his equation of the
spontaneous order and what he terms a "free market society". The upshot of the
argument will again be that neither Hayek, nor any sympathetic scholar, will be able
to maintain a consistent reasoning when arguing on current social and political topics.
Hence, the suggestion of a "pragmatist" critique of his theory as determined by the
current needs of capitalism. In what follows, however, a limited survey of the vast
1 See, for example, M.M. Wilhelm 1972 and A. Shenfield 1976.
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literature related to Hayek's social and political theory will be attempted. The aim
will be to show that Hayek's theory is bound to disintegrate under sustained criticism
(J. Gray 1981 p.77). Such criticism has been launched by a wide spectrum of political
theorists leading almost invariably to the successful demonstration of Hayek's inner
inconsistencies.
2. Societies as Spontaneous Orders: Gray's Intellectual Journey
In his later writings, Gray is inclined to present, rather than criticize Hayek's
theory of spontaneous orders. Spontaneous order in society emerges as a necessary
outcome of the nature and function of our minds. Mind itself is a spontaneous order1.
Furthermore, our ideas are supposed to be the "visible exfoliation of spontaneous
forces". In that sense, "the order of our ideas is supervenient upon the spontaneous
order of the mind, which it can never reconstruct entirely or hope to supplant." (J.
Gray 1986a p.30). This interpretation of Hayek's ontological "monism", which for
"practical" reasons always becomes an actual dualism, serves as the foundation of
spontaneous order in society. Men, as conscious beings, can never govern either their
mental or their practical existence which is (by definition) depended upon an unseen
and uncomprehended structure of spontaneous orders in nature (and society). The
logical justification of the spontaneity of social life, thus, lies entirely in the
presuppositional domain that Hayek accounted for, when trying to explain the "nature"
and function of the mind. It is in no observable sense, a conclusion related to the
nature or origins of society per se. Rather, it is a conclusion of negative kind, reached
by the absence of any other plausible explanation once the Hayekian theory of the
mind is established. It must be noted, however, that both Hayek and Gray seem to
occupy a middle ground so far as the necessity of the existence of spontaneous order
in society is concerned. What is not clear in both writers is whether a spontaneous
social order is an unavoidable necessity, or merely a desirable outcome. Hayek's
1 En passant it should be noticed that for Hayek, as for Oakeshott, mind is to be distinguished from
brain.
43
defence of the need (but not necessity) of a theory which will explain society in terms
of spontaneous orders is indicative. "Of theories of this type, economic theory, the
theory of the market order of free human societies, is so far the only one which has
been developed over a long period (...)" (Hayek 1967/69 pp.71-72). Likewise Gray's
presentation of the spontaneous order endorses the view that a spontaneous order can
"cope with the ignorance we all share of the countless facts of knowledge on which
society depends." (J. Gray 1986a p.28 and 1982 p.34). This point gives an account
of the advantages that a spontaneous order has over something which is not a
spontaneous order - that is, it accepts indirectly the possibility of the existence of a
non-spontaneous order. A few lines below Gray expresses the same thought in an
even more ambiguous way when he states simultaneously that societies always depend
on practical (tacit,implicit) knowledge and that the advantage of a spontaneous social
order is that it can make use of that knowledge. Again, Gray argues for the
"impossibility" of central planning on two grounds. Firstly, nobody can concentrate
the practical knowledge on which social life depends because this knowledge cannot
be explicit and/or transferable. Second, since everybody is governed by supra-
conscious rules, even the directing intelligence itself would be subject to such
government. (J. Gray 1986a p.25 and 1982 p.32).
In an earlier, and substantially more critical argument, Gray presents the same
argument as follows: "In the Hayekian system the crucial objection to interventionist
programs, (...), is not merely that the results of such programs are unpredictable (...):
it is that interventionism presupposes a synoptic and concrete knowledge which no one
man or group of men can in the nature of things posses." (J. Gray 1980a p.126)1.
The problem, thus, is that although the existence of a non-spontaneous order is ruled
out in theory, practice shows that some societies are non-spontaneous at least to a
certain extent. Besides, that is precisely why Hayek attacks the welfare state. Now,
Hayek could have argued that at the most, planners think that they can plan societies,
but that this is a false belief. The problem with this line of argument is that it implies
1 Emphasis added.
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a notion of "false consciousness"1. Notwithstanding this implication, this society has
still got to be a spontaneous order. If the necessary condition of a social order to be
spontaneous is that we must treat it like one then the notion of spontaneity looks
rather problematic2. In one of his latest writings Hayek seems to "illuminate" his
inconsistency when he states that there are only two attitudes towards a spontaneous
order. One must either create an institutional framework within which it will function,
or upset the functioning of the "free" market. He even argues that a spontaneous
order created by a perfect market competition will not provide everything that we need
and therefore there is "ample opportunity for using deliberate organization to "fill in"
what the market cannot provide" (F.A. Hayek in AJ. Anderson 1986 p. 145). All of
a sudden, then, we learn that rational planning is not only possible but, in fact,
necessary for a "free" market society to exist3. It seems, therefore, that the furious
attack that Hayek launched against rational planning in a series of books, only holds -
if it holds at all - as long as it concerns mind in the abstract and/or an equally
abstract individual. But as soon as we have to face a concrete social formation, the
link between abstract mind and concrete social formation becomes quite debatable.
Before we proceed to the examination of the main component parts of social
spontaneous order as presented by Gray, we may consider an objection he presented
in his earlier writings, which is bound to remain unanswered in his later account of
the subject Gray objected to the use of the notion of spontaneous order in society for
two main reasons. First, he thought that the use of spontaneous order in society is
only a generalization of an idea used in the understanding ofmarket processes. In the
market place, he says, when the price mechanism does not operate the process that
might bring about an equilibrium is not clear. Second, even when this tendency of
equilibrium is present, it is totally up to the entrepreneurs to learn and profit from it.
1 This, of course, generates a further question: in what sense can it still be argued that each
individual is the best judge of his interests if we are to exclude a whole group (possibly a whole
society) of those who believe that their interests are better served in a "planned" social order? Can we
have a case of a "deceived" society? It seems that spontaneous orders are only valid to the extent that
they accommodate Hayek's notion of "Great Society".
2 See also M. Forsyth 1988 p.250 and relevant discussion in parts II and III}
3 Was Popper wrong in identifying his "social engineering" with Hayek's theory? see also relevant
discussion in part II.
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But this process of learning might fail to take place. Consequently, "If the
spontaneous coordination of activities may fail even in the marketplace, how strong
is the presumption that it will occur elsewhere?" (J. Gray 1980a p.131). In Gray's
opinion, then, "(...) it is a fundamental defect of Hayek's treatment of the notion of
spontaneous order that he gives us no clear conception of how such an order is formed
and maintained outside the sphere of market exchanges." (J. Gray 1980a p. 131). The
shift in Gray's later writings is radical, although not always well founded. Thus, in
his later writings he states that "Examples abound in Hayek's writings of spontaneous
orders apart from the market order." (J. Gray 1986a p.29 and 1982 p.34). Even if one
accepts that Gray grossly overlooked these examples in his earlier critique, the
procedure of the formation of spontaneous orders in society still remains to be
accounted for. Characteristically enough, Gray admits that Hayek's examples refer
to spontaneous orders in nature (for example, the formation of crystals) while his main
concern is to stress their importance in society (J. Gray 1986a p.29 and 1982 p.34)1.
There are three distinct but interrelated theses that combine the idea of
spontaneous order in society. First, there is the thesis that social institutions arise as
a result of human action but not of human design. Second, there is the thesis of
implicit knowledge which speculates that our knowledge of the world is necessarily,
partly inarticulable. Third, there is the thesis of the cultural evolution by the natural
selection of traditions. Gray's critique in his earlier writings proceeds as follows:
Hayek believes that an adequate account of society must rest on an adequate account
of human nature (J. Gray 1980a p.121)2. But Hayek, against Aristotle or even the
natural rights theorists, believes that human nature is not unalterable but traditionally
determined through the spontaneous growth of culture. Some problems are already
1 The smuggling of natural categories in social theory is common practice for Hayek. The area in
which this phenomenon is most widely applied is that of the social institutions that emerge as a result
of the rule of law. Perhaps the most penetrating view on that matter is to be found in J.WJN. Watkins'
critical approach (in A. Sheldon 1961). See also R. Aron (1961).
2 The status of human nature as a necessary presupposition in Hayek's theory is not altogether clear.
After all, it is because of its unclarity that Gray accused Hayek for pure proceduralism. However, the
view that an account of human nature is vital for the Hayekian theory is widespread among scholars.
For example, M.M. Wilhelm (1972 pp.170-171); also R. Aron (1961) for a similar view. The same
point is also made by G. Walker. Walker states that Hayek's social theory actually starts from his
assumptions about human nature (G. Walker 1986 p.10).
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apparent here. Since Hayek argues that there is always a limit in what human beings
can cognitively understand how can he express an opinion on the existence - or non¬
existence - of something that lies completely in the realm of the "beyond"? Gray
points out that Hayek is constantly seeking to establish a metaphysical neutrality for
the epistemological beliefs which he calls liberalism (J. Gray 1980a p. 122). This
ontological relativism, however, seems to leave little space for a reasoned account of
the conception of human nature on which Hayek's social philosophy depends (J. Gray
1980a p. 123).
In referring to the problems emerging from Hayek's account of spontaneity in
social orders, Gray focuses on the evolutionary utilitarian aspect. Since the
institutions of a spontaneous social order are not the products of human design their
establishment cannot be justified in terms of the benefits that their creators foresaw.
They can only be justified retrospectively: it is through the actual conditions that they
have produced once they have been established that people could perceive their
benefits. Hayek says that "No institution will continue to survive unless it performs
some useful function." (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.433n.)\ Therefore, what is good or bad
will appear by the decline of the groups that adhered the "wrong" beliefs. On these
grounds, Gray accuses Hayek of "scientism" and "social Darwinism". First, he says,
Hayek cannot find a criterion or measure for the utility he is appealing to. It must be
noted that this criterion emerges almost miraculously in his later writings. As a
version of a self-evident criterion Gray says that the success of the adaptation of rules
is to be measured in terms of "the growth of human numbers"2. This is quite an
obscure criterion3, to start with, and one whose relevance to liberalism is less than
obvious4. The argument seems to be that a society that favors the growth of its
population is a society that provides higher living standards. Higher standards and the
subsequent growth of population will lead to higher productivity which in turn will
1 In fact Hayek is quoting from A. Macbeath 1952 p. 120.
2 See F.A. Hayek 1983 p.48.
3 Also C. Kukathas 1989 p.194.
4 Also G. Walker questions the self-evident of the desirability of the preservation of the human race
as such (G. Walker 1986 p.60).
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provide even higher standards and thus the possibility of a further growth of
population, and so on. Justifying the growth of population in terms of high living
standards however is quite problematic since the growth of population in most of the
third world poor countries is much higher than that of, say, Europe where living
standards are obviously higher. What is more, in those countries the increase of
population seems to go along with an actual decrease of living standards. But even
if we were to evaluate a single society at two different historical periods according to
the increase (or decrease) of its population, the argument would still suffer from its
profoundly unhistorical character. For, as becomes clear from the various accounts
of the "merits" of capitalism that Hayek gives in many parts of his work, when he
argues that higher living standards emerge in a particular society at a particular
historical time he makes a direct comparison with the standards of a previous
historical period. Thus, for example, when he argues for the better living conditions
in the 1840s (incidentally known as "the hungry forties") and 1850s in England he
does so by directly comparing the productivity of that period with that of the pre-
industrialized era (F.A. Hayek 1954). But what this argument refuses to take into
account is the actual level of development of the productive forces at each period.
Thus, instead of relating living standards to the historically determined relative
development of productive forces and social relations, he "measures" them against
some obscure unhistoric quantitative criterion. At the same time, the above argument
refers only to the productivity in that society but it says nothing of the needs of the
people in it. It is only because Hayek takes a disturbingly static view of human needs
that he can conclude that a growth in productivity automatically implies better living
standards in a society1.
What is more, Hayek himself seems skeptical on this point. In his later
writings he confesses that he "would not agree that the process of selection by which
the morals of capitalism have evolved (...) consists wholly in assisting the growth of
population. Many of the worlds peoples would probably be much happier if
population growth had not been stimulated to the degree that it has." (F.A. Hayek in
1 For a social-democrat argument on human needs, see R. Plant and H. Lesser and P. Taylor-Gooby
1980.
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A.J. Anderson 1986 p. 149). His general argument seems to point against a further
increase of population (on voluntary grounds, of course) because resources are limited.
Second, in his peaceful evolution of competitive traditions, Hayek seems to
presuppose an already well-established liberal system. If, however, the choice is
between rival political systems there is no guarantee that liberalism will always have
the advantage. The same criticism, viewed from its conservative perspective would
lead to "what exists is good", thus justifying for example, bureaucratic expansionism
while condemning any reforming attempts towards a "free market society". Gray
concludes, much in the sense of D. Miller's critique1, that Hayek offers a
foundationless liberalism and that his theory aims exclusively at a defence of
liberalism against collectivist movements but is quite inadequate for a preliberal or a
postliberal society. Gray comments on this that "First, we lack anything resembling
a criterion for cultural "fitness" or utility of forms of life, and we are no less in need
of a measure of it. Second, we have nothing in society akin to the mechanism of the
natural selection of genetic accidents in Darwinian theory which guarantees the
survival of successful practices (however utility is defended). Third, and most crucial
for Hayek's purposes, there is nothing to support the belief that an unplanned social
order (or "cosmos") will always or typically be a liberal order." (J. Gray 1981 p.83).
The Hayekian theory occupies "an unstable middle ground" between skeptical
conservatism and liberalism. It cannot avoid relativism since it allows an unlimited
variability in the content of "true law" that emerges as a fruit of evolutionary
processes. "Further Hayek faces in a sharp form the standard dilemma of the
utilitarian reformer, in as much as any disturbance of time-honored arrangements is
bound to undermine those reasonable expectations whose protection figures so
prominently in utilitarian accounts of general interest." (J. Gray 1980a p. 130). Finally,
it must be noted that Gray places Hayek closer to the conservative tradition in that he
advances a claim for the exemption of at least some of the fundamental liberal
principles from continual criticism2.
1 See D. Miller 1977 pp.124-126.
2 In that Hayek breaft, radically with Popper who insists in the need of continuous piecemeal
criticism in all social institutions. It is again, a political rather than a philosophical difference that
divides the two thinkers.
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3. Tradition and Evolution: The Tension Between the Existing and the Desirable in
Wilhelm's Critique
M.M. Wilhelm's critique is roughly in the same vein as Gray's earlier
writings1. The first tension that Wilhelm detects in Hayek's account of society2 is
that whereas he attributes major importance to the value of institutions that have
evolved through a traditional long-term process, he also seeks to expose all institutions
to the challenges of the "free market", regardless of the effects that this exposure
might bring about3. Now, this critique - although not quite accurate - seems to point
to the tension between the conservative and the "scientific" evolutionary aspects of
Hayek's thought. The reason why the critique is not completely accurate is that it
overlooks the smuggling of the basic premises of the "free market" order at the very
beginning of Hayek's evolutionism4. Thus, Hayek can argue at length, using both
aspects of his theory interchangeably (and eclectically) without facing any serious
problems5. The "inaccuracy" of the critique, thus, lies in that it does not stress the
fact that Hayek takes capitalism both as a de facto condition and as a necessary
conclusion of his evolutionism. What Wilhelm could have said, instead, is that
according to his epistemology and methodology, Hayek should seek to expose all
institutions to the challenges of any established social order, regardless of its kind -
that is, regardless of whether that will be a "free" market order, or any other.
Notwithstanding this point, the critique holds to the extent that it stresses that,
according to Hayek, institutions acquire value from the mere fact of their existence
and not from any sort of rational justification. To that extent Hayek's proposition that
all institutions - including those which are now traditionally embedded in current
1 See M.M. Wilhelm 1972 pp. 169-184.
2 Much in the sense of M. Polanyi (1951 chapter 7).
3 Wilhelm is probably based on Hayek's account of science in F.A. Hayek 1978 pp.18-19.
4 In that sense, Gray argues that Hayek's evolutionism only holds within a well-established liberal
society (as cited supra).
5 For example, the possibility of destroying freedom of thought by the extension of doubt to the
field of traditional ideals. On that see M. Polanyi 1951 p.97.
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social life - should be judged according to some fixed principles of a "free market"
order, remains a contradiction.
The second objection raised by Wilhelm derives from the demand for an a
priori qualitative distinction between desired and existing principles1. "Unless Hayek
claims the right to decide which principles among those in a variety of societies are
"truly" basic and evolved, any society, and especially one with a democratic
government, may challenge Hayek and claim that it possesses certain anti-
individualist, goal-directed principles - evolved, certain, and, in a sense, of general
application - to justify the coercive norms that by Hayek's standards conflict with
many of the premises of liberalism." (M.M. Wilhelm 1972 p. 180).
A related but distinct set of problems emerges through the Hayekian account
of the legitimate functions of the state. Wilhelm points to the inadequacy of the
criteria that Hayek implies on that matter. Hayek would allow certain state activities -
such as the provision of theatres, stadia and parks - under the condition that nobody
in the "free" competition would undertake such jobs. However, the taxation required
for such policy, as well as the fact that by undertaking it the state actually supports
specific programs in the arts and recreation, seem to clash with the principles of a
(Hayekian) liberal society. This problem is related to another more serious one. How
can we be sure that the state activity through its representatives will in fact limit itself
only to the "agenda" prescribed by Hayek? Hayek's answer is that it will happen if
there is sufficient agreement among individuals on principles of liberalism. Wilhelm
rightly points out that this conflicts with Hayek's moral and psychological principles
according to which individuals are motivated by self-interest. Rather, what should be
expected is that self-interested bureaucrats will attempt to enlarge their share of
authority - particularly in the absence of specific incentives that would encourage
dedication and the equally important absence of a sense of commitment. The same
remark may be extended to the judicial process, where judges are expected to have a
similar behavior. Wilhelm takes into account Hayek's attempts to overcome the
inadequacy of psychological tests by introducing the "objective" test of generality and
abstraction, but he claims that the result of this attempt to extract "objective" law from
1 For similar approaches, see M. Forsyth 1988, R. Hamowy 1978, R. Aron 1961.
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the subjective effort of the authorities who administer it is to accept a rule of principle
which is, in fact, unreal (M.M. Wilhelm 1972 pp. 181-182).
4. The Rule of Law and its Relation to Individual Freedom
It is in the context of the spontaneous social order that Hayek presents the idea
of liberty under the rule of law. His notion has been widely criticized both as an
incoherent result of his - already problematic - premises and as an inadequate defence
of liberalism. Gray, in his critical period, regards the Hayekian notion of liberty as
a purely instrumental value (J. Gray 1981 p.74). M.M. Wilhelm argues that liberty
has a dual substance in Hayek. It is, at the same time, both an instrumental utilitarian
means towards the "fullest development in the interindividual process" (F.A. Hayek
1952b p.86) and a value in-itself1. Gray also attributes to Hayek the intention of
presenting a "value-neutral" concept of individual freedom2. The objection that Gray
presents is that Hayek's notion of liberty although seemingly negative is, in fact, a
positive one. It is positive in that it places liberty in the conceptual framework of
coercion and law. This results in a definition of a free scate as a state where one lives
under a regime of abstract rules which are applicable to all. Liberty, thus , is
obedience to laws. How, then, are we to judge among the infinite number of sets of
rules that exist? Hayek's criterion is the utilitarian one of the common good - where
common good is identified with facilitating the achievement of human (that is,
individual) purposes. Therefore, "In allowing that the defence of rules of justice is
finally to be conducted in terms of their promotion of desirable consequences, Hayek
(like Hume) must in this extended sense be regarded as a utilitarian theorist" (J. Gray
1981 p.76)3.
Hayek's commitment to the rule of law as the absolute safeguard of liberty
1 It does not look as if Wilhelm finds anything paradoxical about this dual character of liberty. The
troublesome position of liberty in Hayek's theory will be discussed in part II.
2 In the sense that it is useful to all "regardless of their view of the nature and sources of liberty's
value" (J. Gray 1981 p.74).
3 Hayek is actually characterized as an "evolutionary system-utilitarian" (J. Gray 1981 p.77).
raises new objections. In an analytical sense, this approach is inadequate, since it
justifies almost any measure taken by positive law as long as it has some formal
attributes (generality, equality before the law) and is felt to be in accordance with
traditional values. "Felt", indeed, is the right word, since the major part of these
values or patterns is not articulable or even conscious. As J.W.N. Watkins has
pointed out, Hayek is trying "to assimilate impersonal social forces and general civil
laws to noncoercive forces and laws of nature" (J.W.N. Watkins in A. Sheldon
1961)1. Hayek, says Gray, is mistaken in thinking that anything substantive can be
derived from the abstraction and generality of the rule of law; this is not a sufficient
criterion of a legal framework of a liberal character (J. Gray 1981 p.78). It is not a
sufficient criterion even of stability and predictability2. Again, not much that is
important is contained in the demand for equality before the law basically because
there is no objective way of defining the categories in which men can be classified.
The rule of law as such cannot give any adequate account of principles such as civil
and political rights unless a further ("external") justification of these rights is endorsed.
In Hayek's case this justification could have come from a natural rights theory, which
is precisely what Hayek disavows emphatically. The result can only be inner
inconsistency. His claim that the rule of law can function as a safeguard of individual
liberty is only valid - if at all - in a society that already accepts (to a large extent
uncritically) the basic liberal principles (J. Gray 1981 pp.78-79). Finally, the Humean-
utilitarian argument is no less inadequate for a defence of liberal principles. It might
function only in circumstances where all other moral rights will be clearly rejected on
the grounds of having less utility-promoting side effects.
In Gray's view, Hayek is actually inverting the relation between law and moral
rights. Rights are presented as variable and defeasible guarantees of protected areas
of action "subject to an overriding test of their utility-promoting effects." (J. Gray
1981 p.80). Liberty emerges as a moral notion. Much in the sense that Locke gives
to it, Hayek attributes a normative sense to liberty according to which to be free is to
1 See also R. Aron (1961 as cited infra) and FJt. Cristi (1984 as cited infra).
2 B. Leoni has persuasively demonstrated this point (B. Leoni 1973). He has also suggested an
alternative common law tradition.
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have the right to act. Not that there is anything wrong in relating normative
judgments of rights with freedom1. Hayek's error is that he does not specify these
normative rights in any but a purely procedural way.
In his later writings, Gray has produced a very different approach to the
Hayekian theory, as has already been mentioned above. There are extensive
references to Gray's views throughout this work so their presentation at this point will
be kept as brief as possible. His approach in his later writings is mainly defensive
and apologetic. Thus, he tries to meet a substantial amount of criticism that has been
launched against Hayek (notably in J. Gray 1986a). The last part of his book,
however, contains certain criticisms which, it would seem, survived his "shift" to the
Hayekian ideals. First, Gray argues, Hayek's account of the mind as a classificatory
mechanism, shaped exclusively by an evolutionary process, always leaves open the
possibility of it not picturing the structure of the world. The fact that we have so far
survived by adapting ourselves does not in itself support the view that the evolutionary
process generates any sort of gradual approximation to objectivity (it could be a sheer
coincidence). In that sense, we can at least hypothesize that the evolutionary trend
may be leading us ever further away from truth. Second, even if the above mentioned
epistemological objection to evolutionism could be met, there still remains another set
of questions. These relate to Hayek's assertion that the dominant traditions in society
are necessarily functional and adaptive for the needs of their members because they
are the product of the natural selection of rival practices. The main problem of this
thesis, according to Gray, is that we lack a criterion according to which we can verify
the functionality of traditions. The population test, suggested by Hayek, is ruled out
as too ambiguous. A third problem, closely related to the above, emerges from the
way the mechanism of natural selection works. Hayek suggests two mechanisms -
emulation and migration - which in no way seem to account for all possible cases.
In any case, what is clear is that the natural selection of traditions thesis need not have
outcomes that favor liberalism, as Hayek suggests. Finally, Hayek recognizes the
possibility of a non-viable morality emerging from a natural selection process. It
1 Gray does not seem to see any inconsistency in Hayek's verbal commitment to "value-free" and
negative liberty.
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seems, however, that he does not understand that this possibility puts his whole theory
in crisis. Gray does not think that the problem lies primarily in the tension between
traditionalism and libertarianism (although it is not altogether clear how this tension
is to be met), but in the conflict between the rationalist and skeptical aspects of his
theory. The mere recognition of some components of reality as non-viable, is itself
a product of rational insight. But if the problems borne by such elements or traditions
in actual life are to be solved in a rationalist way, the core of his system -
evolutionism of spontaneous orders - disintegrates. The political implications of
Hayek's evolutionary account of social institutions and orders in general are far
reaching. Even if the natural selection thesis could be given an unambiguous form,
as well as analytical power, it would still lack any moral content. Evolutionism, in
Gray's opinion, is, after all, doomed to the identification of the good with the
prevailing. "The result of the moral emptiness of Hayek's theory of cultural evolution
for political philosophy is that his system lacks definite normative standards for the
critical assessment of political practice." (J. Gray 1986a p.142).
5. The Libertarian Objection to the Rule of Law: Hamowy
Perhaps the most influential, and often quoted, critique of Hayek's concept of
freedom under the rule of law within the libertarian trend, has been developed over
the years, by R. Hamowy1. Hamowy points out that Hayek's definition of individual
liberty, as well as the rule of law, are inadequate. Thus, his argument does not extend
to all the problematic aspects of the Hayekian theory. Rather, he takes Hayek's
starting point - namely, his definition of liberty and the rule of law - at face value, and
then tries to prove that it is inconsistent with actual or potential cases of social life.
This line of argument, of course, admits much that has already been disputed in this
presentation.
Much in the mainstream of Hayek's libertarian critics, Hamowy criticizes
Hayek for not having a positive theory of rights prior to and independent from his rule
1 R. Hamowy 1961 pp.28-31; 1971 pp.349-377; 1978 pp.289-297.
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of law concept. This point is one of the most frequent criticisms to Hayek's theory.
However, most of the critics stop at this point. The result is that this tension acquires
an inexplicable character. The explanation of its existence - when such an attempt is
made at all - is that it is a logical mistake or even a naivety of Hayek's. The
alternative, proposed in this critique, is that Hayek is forced into a contradiction as
long as he wants to keep certain of his premises intact. Hayek has made clear, right
from the beginning of his long career, that in his thought there is no place for a priori
transcendental solutions1. In that sense, he refuses to take the transcendental step of
founding his social philosophy in a theory of rights - be it natural or otherwise - thus
breaking radically with the mainstream of liberals and libertarians. Instead, he
produces a "scientific" theory based on "value neutral" presuppositions that can only
lead to indisputable conclusions in a rather positivist way. If Hayek were to stop at
this point, then his theory could have been criticized in terms of "legitimate" premises
and coherent conclusions - in short, in abstract theoretical terms. The problem,
however, seems to be that, even more deeply rooted than positivism, or, for that
matter, any other theoretical premise, lies his decision to defend capitalism as the
dominant socio-economic formation2. That this is Hayek's actual starting point is
shown by the countless inconsistencies into which he leads himself whenever the "free
market" society tends to lose its absolute sovereignty3. It is also shown in the way
his critics face him. Every little part of his theory has been ruthlessly criticized from
different points of view: his economic theory, his theory of the mind, his
methodology, his social philosophy. Conservatives are "afraid" of the results his
"scientism" might bring about; liberals accuse him of anti-individualism and profound
attachment to traditionalism. What seems beyond any dispute, however, is his pro-
capitalist attitude, as well as his intention of defending capitalism against various
1 The stress should go to a priori because, as it will be argued in parts II and III, certain elements
of his theory - notably the "rule of law" doctrine - acquire an a posteriori transcendental character.
2 See also A. Belsey in R. Levitas 1986 p.181.
3 On the difficulties one is bound to face when one tries to give a "logically consistent" summary
of Hayek's thought, see P.W. Dyer and R. Harrison Hickman 1979 p.386. Also G. Walker 1986 p.32
and p.35.
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"dangers"1. That is why almost all the existing critique, at least as far as the
conservatives and liberals/libertarians are concerned, focuses on the success (or,
indeed, most of the times, on the inadequacy) of his case for capitalism.
Notwithstanding this point, Hamowy's argument summarizes the libertarian
view by stating that it is impossible to formulate any intelligible notion of coercion,
in the case of the negative definition of freedom, "(...) without prior recourse to a
theory of rights and that all attempts to define freedom result in hopeless conceptual
muddles without such a theory." (R. Hamowy 1978 p.287)2. Hayek's definition of
coercion is problematic, according to Hamowy, on more than one ground . If
coercion is the manipulation of one's data (or mind, in the sense of this term as
employed by Hayek in The Sensory Order) in order to serve another man's purposes
and if coercion necessarily implies the possibility of an alternative course of action
(F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 133) then a paradoxical conclusion occurs. Whenever one has
no alternative3 coercion does not occur. Therefore, if one is trussed up without the
ability to move, one is still free in Hayek's sense. Hayek's definition is also
problematic in that it states that one is free as long as one's environment is not
manipulated in a way that benefits another. But, Hamowy argues, this definition is
useless as such, because under it the overwhelming majority of human interactions are
taken as coercive4. This definition could become meaningful, however, if Hayek
could distinguish between coercive "manipulation" and the terms in which one is
prepared to render one's services. Hayek is trying to establish such a distinction by
saying that as long as the services of somebody "are not crucial to my existence or the
1 There is hardly any scholar who doubts Hayek's pro-capitalist attitude. Indeed any differentiation
on that point would probably focus on the content of the term "capitalism" rather than on Hayek's
attitude towards it In fact, Hayek himself has repeatedly identified capitalism with his blueprint
2 Hamowy also quotes with apparent approval HJ. Mc Closkey's definition of liberty, according
to which "The historically important concept of negative liberty is that of non-interference with rights,
where rights, their content, nature and grounds are variously conceived and where liberty is usually
thought of as one among other rights as well as consisting in liberty to enjoy rights in general." (HJ.
Mc Closkey 1965 p.489; also quoted in R. Hamowy 1978 pp.296-297n.).
3 As in the example Hayek uses, where one's hand is guided by physical force to sign (F.A. Hayek
1960 p.133).
4 Is it not the great advantage of the "free" market society anymore, that it benefits the majority of
individuals in the majority of cases?
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preservation of what I most value" the conditions he exacts for rendering them are not
coercive (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 136). Hamowy attacks these criteria persuasively. His
conclusion is that no theory of objective individual freedom can ever be based on such
inherently subjective criteria (R. Hamowy 1978 pp.288-289). Hamowy (like Gray)
accuses Hayek of lapsing into a positive notion of freedom in the end. His
"philosophical muddle" drives him away from his initial strictly negative notion of
liberty to an essentially positive one: I am unfree (coerced) to the extent that I am
deliberately denied those things which I find preserve what I most value. Thus, my
freedom may require that others be forced to act in a particular way (R. Hamowy
1978 p.289).
The inadequacy of Hayek's notion of freedom is further extended by his effort
to establish a link between the rule of law (taken as general abstract rules) and
individual liberty. Hamowy points out Hayek's intention of equating the rule of law
with the laws of nature, and the implications that such equation has. Again his
critique persuasively disposes ofHayek's claim that in so far as one knows in advance
what one is not allowed to do, one need never place one's self in a position where one
will be coerced, but it does so on pragmatist grounds. That is, there is no reference
either to the inner incoherence that emerges from such a position or to the real
purpose of Hayek's argument. Hamowy also presents a detailed critique of Hayek's
theory of the rule of law. His intention is to show the inadequacy of all the Hayekian
criteria as safeguards of a liberal society1. Hamowy's conclusion is that "Hayek's
preoccupation with theformal structure of law has led him to disregard the substantive
limitations on law without which personal liberty cannot be ensured. In the absence
of additional substantive limitations which go beyond the satisfaction of mere
structural requirements, the law can become an instrument of government power as
repressive as any which would exist under an arbitrary despotism." (R. Hamowy 1978
p.296).
1 See part II, critique of the universalizability test
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6. The Rule of Law and the Free Market in Baumgarth's Critique
The libertarian critique - as differentiated from the more liberal accounts of
Forsyth and Wilhelm - is also represented by W.P. Baumgarth. It is worth noticing
(although, perhaps, not surprising) that the common elements between the two
approaches are much more important than their differences. In fact, it seems that the
only domain of substantial difference does not lie in the theoretical field - hence, the
apparent similarity of the grounds on which they attack Hayek theoretically - but,
rather, in the political suggestions that they present as more plausible alternatives to
Hayek's political theory - notably the role of the state in contemporary societies.
Baumgarth's critical presentation of Hayek's rule of law doctrine suggests an
apparent unity in Hayek's theory. Much in the sense that Gray later implies,
Baumgarth concedes that "(...) Hayek's formulation of the principles of the "rule of
law" serves as a synthesis of his notions about man, mind and society, as an
application of his epistemological views of the limitations of human intellect, of his
modified rule utilitarianism, and of his notions of spontaneous order in society to the
problem of the nature and limits of the liberal state." (W.P. Baumgarth 1978 p. 11).
In short, the "rule of law" doctrine is thought to constitute the upshot of Hayek's
thought in social and political philosophy. Moreover, for Baumgarth (as for a number
of scholars), there is little doubt that Hayek is, after all, an utilitarian. Seeing the rule
of law under that perspective, Baumgarth categorically states that"(...) general rules
are necessary for important considerations of social utility;" (W.P. Baumgarth 1978
p. 14). Baumgarth is primarily interested in examining the legitimacy of the rule of
law. Hayek attempts to legitimize the rule of law by an appeal to its general and
impersonal character. That is, because the rule of law is not designed by any
individual, it can not be said to be just or unjust. Even if we try to surpass the
justice-neutral concept of the rule of law, Baumgarth says, even if we take justice as
fairness in a Rawlsian sense, Hayek's answer would be: "Once we have agreed to play
the game and profited from its results, it is a moral obligation on us to abide by the
rules even if they turn against us" (F.A. Hayek 1967/pp.l74-175). Baumgarth further
contends that "Hayek's attempt to show that the market alone is the compatible
economic corollary of the rule of law, which he takes to be fair, emerges as the
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vindication of the fairness of the market itself." (W.P. Baumgarth 1978 p. 16). This
remark is of capital importance in that it places the "market" at the centre of Hayek's
theory1. In that sense the rule of law - partly contrary to Baumgarth's own opening
remarks - is not the principal category in Hayek's political philosophy any longer.
Rather it emerges as the catalyst that is used in order to prove the moral status of the
actual primary category - the market. Viewed in this light, Hayek's theory comes
much closer to what may be considered as the leading position of this thesis - that is,
that it constitutes a dynamic apology for capitalism. Society does not become "free"
or ""Great" just because it conforms to a rule of law. A liberal society, in Hayek's
view, is the one which conforms to the (very concrete and precise) demands of the
market as expressed abstractly, on the level of ideology, in the rule of law. Hence,
the "Greatness" of the liberal society is not actually derived from the abstractness or
generality of its laws but from their conformity with the concrete demands of the
market.
This, of course, is not Baumgarth's line of argument although he comes close
to it when he contrasts Hayek with the old Whigs. The latter, he says, were advocates
of tradition per se. Hayek, on the contrary "(...) is based upon more of rationalist than
historicist presuppositions; that is to say, [he] is more interested in principles than in
tradition, particularly when that tradition can easily become a conveyor of anti-
liberal institutions. Not commitment to tradition alone, but defence of traditional
institutions of liberty seems to characterize Hayek's insistence on the "rule of law"."
(W.P. Baumgarth 1978 p.20)2.
One secondary remark can be made here, with reference to Hayek's attempt
to present his version of justice-as-fairness. He says, and Baumgarth uncritically
accepts it, that the results of the game should be tolerated because the actors have
given their a priori agreement to the rules of the game. Now, this (Lockean or
Nozickian) argument could be acceptable in the context of different theories (for
example, contractarian theories) but it seems quite problematic in Hayek's theory.
1 It is not implied that these are (or even could have been) the conclusions of Baumgarth himself.
It is just contested that Baumgarth's critical analysis clarifies unintentionally the Hayekian categories.
2 Emphasis added.
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After all, Hayek was at pains to establish the point that each and every decision we
make is determined by the whole bulk of the traditions that we inherit, that we can
never acquire a transcendental critical standpoint, as far as the decisions in our lives
are concerned, and that the debate on the freedom of the will is actually a debate over
a "phantom-problem". In what sense, then, can it be argued that the "fairness" of the
outcomes of the social game is rooted in our initial agreement to play it by certain
rules since we never had a real choice? Furthermore, arguments like the above
contribute to the ambiguity of the Hayekian position1, as far as the role that the
spontaneous orders play in his theory is concerned. It is obvious that if we are to take
the evolutionary nature of spontaneous orders as an objective necessity (as Gray
suggests) the attempt to legitimize market values according to their fairness is not
valid. And again, if our agreement on the rules of the game is determinative enough
to legitimize market outcomes, then the process of spontaneous evolution of orders is
empty of meaning.
Baumgarth's critique basically follows the line of three of the most influential
of Hayek's critics - namely, R. Hamowy, B. Leoni and J.W.N. Watkins2. In the dual
problem of freedom and coercion Baumgarth agrees with Hamowy on the inadequacy
of the Hayekian definitions. Particularly with respect to Hayek's curious definition
of the legislation that falls under the rule of law principle, Baumgarth notes that laws
of nature are not the same as laws of state. Hayek pushes this equation as far as to
argue that general, abstract rules are like natural obstacles that affect one's plans.
Therefore, if one knows beforehand what is allowed to one, then one need not place
oneself in a position where one will be coerced; hence, one can always remain free
(F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 142). But, Baumgarth observes, the laws of state can be changed
while the laws of nature cannot; furthermore, if the analogy was correct, then one
would choose to disobey those rules of the state which would not suit one's plans
whenever one could get away with it, just as one tries to avoid natural calamities.
This conduct can hardly be considered as a stable foundation of a free (even in the
Hayekian sense) society. Baumgarth's argument again illustrates Hayek's intention
1 Briefly mentioned already and discussed in more detail in part n.
2 As cited supra.
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of equating "impersonal social forces and general civil laws to noncoercive forces and
laws of nature". The matter, however, is not pushed any further, it is simply taken
as one of the many cases where Hayek produces an inadequate definition. Dismissing
Hayek on such grounds, however, seems quite simplistic. The open question,
however, is what are the conclusions emerging from such an account of law and
legislation had the Hayekian argument been accepted. Both in part II and in part III
it will be argued that what Hayek is ultimately after is an equation of the existing
socio-economic formation in all its aspects with a superhuman "natural" objectivity.
Once we accept his supporting arguments, capitalism emerges as an all-powerful
eternal social organization and, what is more, it acquires a place essentially beyond
the reach of human intervention.
Baumgarth's critique forms a part of the mainstream1 which claims that no
social theory can exist in the absence of an a priori theory of rights. As a critique of
the formalist and merely consequentialist account of the rule of law that Hayek
produces, Baumgarth says: "The real question is rather, is the particular act of
coercion, whether by the state or the individual, just? That is to say, an independent
ethical criterion seems necessary in judging the status of coercion." (W.P. Baumgarth
1978 p. 17). The whole of Baumgarth's critique rests on this particular thesis. In that
sense2, he remarks that it is the content of the rule, as well as of the command, that
makes it just or unjust for the libertarian, rather than any formalist characteristic.
Likewise, as far as legitimate state intervention is concerned, Baumgarth comments
that the deficiency of Hayek's confusing arguments is due to his denial of a theory of
human rights. In a way that will be adopted by Gray in his early writings on Hayek
and others, he says: "Although admitting that interference by the state into the
envisioned private sphere, (...), is undesirably coercive, Hayek's conceptual
dependency of rights upon the principle of the rule of law deprives the former of any
use as an independent criterion of judging laws." (W.P. Baumgarth 1978 pp.18-19).
At the same time, Baumgarth notes that not even Hayek can remain consistent to his
account of the rule of law when he deals with actual social and political problems.
1 Common to liberals and libertarians, at least in Britain and the US.
2 And by doing so he is adopting a rather dangerous, for his standards, essentialist outlook.
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In particular, Hayek says that "the pleasure or pain caused by the knowledge of other
people's actions should never be regarded as a legitimate cause of coercion" (F.A.
f&
Hayek 1967 p.145) and consequently, he denies the legitimacy of state intervention
in such fields as religious practices. Baumgarth notes that "(...) such a judgement
cannot be derived from the formulation of the "rule of law" notion, but only from
some notion of substantive rights." (W.P. Baumgarth 1978 p.19). The critique that
Hamowy (and Leoni) has launched against the Hayekian test of universalizability
holds good in Baumgarth's opinion too. Thus, he concludes that "What alone makes
for long-run certitude, as also for a check upon power, is some notion of, some
provision for substantive rights." (W.P. Baumgarth 1978 p.25).
7. The "Continental" Liberal Critique of the Rule of Law: Aran's Freedom of the Will
The "continental" liberal link is provided by R. Aran's critical presentation1.
Aran, contrary to Hamowy and Gray, classifies the Hayekian definition of freedom
strictly in the negative tradition. However, like Hamowy, he thinks that Hayek's
definition is somehow too wide (R. Aran 1961 p.203). He also thinks that Hayek's
account suffers from an arbitrary attempt to provide an objective content to liberty.
"Hayek wanted to define liberty by the absence of coercion and coercion as an
objectively identifiable situation." (R. Aran 1961 p.204, my translation). Aran then,
like Hamowy, thinks that this is impossible in the context of Hayek's theory. In so
far as Hayek is trying to imply any notion of objectivity - either by the reference to
the rule of law or by any objective criteria of coercion - his effort is foredoomed. On
the one hand, his criteria are scattered under scrutiny; on the other hand, whenever he
tries to refer to external criteria he generates inconsistencies. Aran, again like
Hamowy, points out that if Hayek's definition of coercion is taken as such most of the
actions between individuals in society would have to be considered as coercive.
However, the conclusion reached, although apparently similar to Hamowy's, actually
differs essentially. Hamowy says that an independent pre-existing - "objective", in the
1 R. Aran 1961 pp.199-218
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sense of universal - theory of rights is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
definition of liberty. Aron says, "(...) it is not essential any more whether the
individual chooses his ends or means or not; what is essential is that he has to obey
to an order that he does not approve of and that he judges this order as being contrary
to his rights or to fairness." (R. Aron 1961 p.204, my translation). This argument is
clearly the same as far as its negative side is concerned - that is, it criticizes Hayek
exactly for the same reasons as Hamowy. It is also close to Hamowy's in that it takes
conformity with rights as the ultimate criterion of liberty. But, whereas for Hamowy
the stress was on the existence of an independent and pre-existing theory of rights
(implying a certain "objectivity"), for Aron it is the individual judgement on whether
one's own rights are suppressed or not that becomes the determinative factor. The
result is that Hamowy criticizes Hayek for the unavoidable subjectivism that his
criteria bring about, while Aron criticizes him for an attempt at objectivism in his
premises. Aron, thus, concludes that if we have to take into account the subjective
element in the definition of coercion, we must also do so in the definition of freedom
and it is precisely for this reason that Hayek's appeal to general, permanent rules
cannot guarantee liberty.
In further criticizing the notion of freedom under the rule of law, Aron points
out that Hayek is ambiguous as to the precise relation between rules of law and
liberty. On the one hand, he admits that, at times, even general rules might become
coercive. On the other, he does not say that, in fact, they do. Aron, in the spirit of
J.W.N. Watkins and Hamowy, argues here that Hayek's ambiguity is due to a
distinction, the retainment of which is vital to the validity of his theory - that between
laws and commands. Rather than using the modest expression that Hamowy adopts
from Watkins - namely, that Hayek is "overimpressed by the logical distinction
between a positive command and a prohibition" (R. Hamowy 1978 p.290) - Aron
explicitly states that if Hayek were to admit that a general rule could in fact express
concrete human will his whole theory would crumble. Aron's critique of the criteria
of a rule of law is much in the same vein as Hamowy's, Leoni's and Watkins'. The
conclusion, however, is again different. Instead of an appeal to a theory of rights,
Aron, obviously influenced by his "continental rationalist" tradition, argues, "It is not
the minority or the majority that will find the solution [that is, in Hayekian terms,
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decide whether a certain rule is a "rule of law" or not], (...)> but the men of reason
belonging to both." (R. Aron 1961 p.208, my translation). This objection implies
more than what it explicitly argues for. Aron's point is profoundly different, and
indeed, opposed to that of Hayek's. The appeal to human reason as an ultimate
criterion ofmorality constitutes the evil which Hayek is trying to exorcise throughout
his theory. It also differentiates Aron from the British and American libertarian critics
of Hayek, who try to establish an "objective" transcendental point of reference in the
form of a theory of rights. The upshot of Aron's argument is that there cannot be any
objective criterion of non discrimination and non privilege any more than there can
be any objective criterion of coercion. The impossibility of finding an objective
criterion of coercion and, consequently, of liberty becomes apparent, in Aron's view,
from Hayek's own account of the protected private sphere. Aron does not deny the
vital, for the liberal theory, necessity of the existence of a protected sphere of
autonomous individual activity. But, contrary to J.S. Mill, he agrees with Hayek that
this sphere is delimited primarily according to historical circumstances. But if the
content of the private sphere, asks Aron, is historically variable, how can we have an
eternal "objective" definition of non-coercion? In his view, a theory of liberty can
only be valid if the historically variable element becomes the overall determinative
criterion of liberty. The rest of the Hayekian criteria (non-discrimination, generality),
thus, will acquire a significance only if taken as complementary parts of this basic
premise: as a whole they will be pointing towards an ideal - that of the liberal society.
But the content of that society will not be fixed. For example, the ideal will prescribe
a reduction to the minimum of non-discrimination, but the content of discrimination
will not be objective. It will vary according to historical circumstances1. In that
sense, Hayek's theory is only valid, according to Aron, as long as it describes an ideal
1 Notice that, in terms of methodology, this is also Gray's suggestion (J. Gray 1986a). Gray insists
in taking all the criteria together, as a corpus, contrary to Hamowy's methodological approach. I do not
see how this approach can simplify things. In the case of Aron it seems quite straight-forward that once
the historical element is established, not only the content of the other criteria but also their relation to
the primary and, consequently, their relative weight, will vary considerably. Gray's view does not seem
to offer any essential support to the Hayekian thesis; on the contrary it seems to confuse it further rather
than clarify it. His approach is discussed at length in part EL
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for our society1. But its philosophical foundations are fragile. It cannot be used as
an analytical theory of human history and it cannot justify liberalism in its historical
dimension. The problem of Hayek's theory, then, is that to the extent that it is taken
as a general philosophy it tends to presuppose too many things. "Before society can
be free, it must exist" (R. Aron 1961 p.215, my translation); but the problem with
Hayek is that he takes as granted a society where the individuals will be "educated"
in the theory and practice of liberalism. "Hayek's philosophy takes for granted the
outcomes that the philosophers of the past considered as the primary objectives of
political action." (R. Aron 1961 p.215, my translation). It should be noted that Aron,
like his British and American fellow-travelers, stops his critique at this point. Hayek's
theory is, thus, considered as an ambitious effort generated by noble intentions which
has unfortunately failed due to "logical" mistakes. There is again no reference to what
Hayek has actually tried to achieve or to the implications that even a partial
application of his theory might have2. What, then was the cardinal mistake of
Hayek's, according to Aron? "Perhaps the final reason why I hold that the philosophy
elaborated by Hayek in order to ground his liberalism is insufficient, is that he refuses
to take into consideration the problem of internal liberty." (R. Aron 1961 p.213, my
translation). This position tends to bridge the gap left after the dismissal of Hayek's
objective notion of coercion. The objective definition of coercion is impossible "(...)
from the moment that states of consciousness are taken into account, liberty does not
only depend on the non-interference of others in one's private sphere." (R. Aron 1961
p. 213, my translation). Liberty, then, according to Aron, cannot be conceived
separately from the liberty of the will or consciousness. There cannot be any
objective definition of coercion since what counts is whether an individual feels
coerced at a particular historical time. This situation will inevitably occur whenever
an individual will not recognize the legitimacy and/or the rationality of state power.
In a way quite similar to that of Forsyth, Aron argues that liberty should be defined
according to the morality of individual conduct. "It is enough to oppose passions to
1 Indeed, there seems to be an agreement among libertarians on that point
2 Aron was writing in 1961 when Hayek's theory was far from being politically influential, let alone
applied.
reflections, or "animality" to consciousness to make (internal) liberty appear as the
term of the effort by which the human animal climbs to humanity." (R. Aron 1961
p.214, my translation). Not that this definition does not have dangers; a coercive
imposition of a moral uniformity might occur. But this is simply the only way; there
can be no common values whatsoever (respect for a liberal society being the primary
among them) if people are not somehow "educated" to accept and promote such
values.
A comparison of Aran's critique with that already mentioned by British and
American libertarians can now take a more comprehensive form. Aron and the
libertarians, have the same overall approach to the Hayekian theory. They generally
agree with it in terms of its political premises, but they think it is insufficient. Thus,
according to Hamowy's critique, the overriding difficulties present in Hayek's theory
are, first, a too narrow concept of liberty, linked to the rule of law rather than
definitionally independent; second, the rule of law is conceived of as a sufficient
rather than a (potentially) necessary condition of a free society. Compare with Aron:
"But these two ideas [negative liberty and general rules rather than commands] are not
sufficient either in constituting a philosophy of liberty or even, in our times, in
determining the criteria delimiting a free society" (R. Aron 1961 p.217, my
translation). Both approaches criticize Hayek precisely on the same aspects of his
theory. But, surprisingly enough, they reach different - if not opposite - conclusions.
In the libertarian critique, Hayek is thought to be excessively subjectivist, even
relativist His formalism is doomed to relativism because of the lack of an "objective"
pre-existing and separately developed, determinative theory of rights. In Aran's
critique, however, Hayek's failure lies in his attempt to establish "objective" criteria
of freedom. It is this "objectivism" that Aron disavows in favor of a subjectivist (and
necessarily relativistic, it would seem) freedom of consciousness. This disparity of
views is also apparent in the way the two trends see Hayek's "scientific" evolutionism.
In the libertarian version, there is a notable lack of reference to the problems emerging
from this idea. Rights, instead, are taken as the determinative category of political
philosophy. In Aron, on the contrary, the evolutionist element of Hayek's theory,
simplified as a mere historical delimitation of the sphere of individual freedom,
emerges as the determinative frame, within which the freedom of consciousness will
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flourish in each historical moment. Not only is any appeal to a rights theory left out,
but the very prospect of formulating an "objective" theory of liberty is negated by
definition.
What is the common denominator of the two critiques? They both think it
necessary for a liberal political philosophy to have a transcendental ideological
foundation. By "transcendental" is meant a theory that goes beyond the actual social
relations; a theory that does not depend on historical social conditions, but rather
determines them. That is the function of a theory of rights (whether it is a natural
rights theory, or a more sophisticated modern version) in the libertarian trend of
thought. That, also, is the function of the "freedom of consciousness" that Aron1
suggests. Hayek refuses (even inconsistently) to base his theory on any transcendental
category. He denies a rights based political philosophy on the grounds of its being
non-sensial. Social evolution, alone, will determine what the rights of the individuals
are. He also denies the "freedom of the will" as a metaphysical problem. His theory,
therefore, becomes a relativist "historicist" (justificationist) account of human society.
The important point, however, as it emerges both from the critiques launched against
Hayek, and from his failure consistently to follow his own line of argument to the
end, is that a transcendental foundation of liberalism is a sine qua non if the theory
is to retain some coherence.
But, is Hayek totally innocent of any attempt to transcend the limits set
forward by his own theory? The problem has been pointed out by many critics but
Aron2 presents it in the clearest way. There is an equation that takes a central place
in Hayek's theory, says Aron; that of the rules of law with the rules of nature. The
rule of law, like the rule of nature, prescribes what an individual can and cannot do3.
In that sense, it prescribes the fixed conditions in which the individuals must adapt
their lives and conducts. Many objections are presented by almost all of Hayek's
critics to this equation. Aron, faithful to his subjectivist approach, says that the
1 Similarly to many British liberals, like Forsyth.
2 Along, perhaps, with J.WJi. Watkins.
3 Hayek would certainly object to that; but see critiques attributing to his theory an essentially
positive content of the concept of liberty (cited supra and in part II).
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equation does not hold because actual individuals do not feel it as valid. Baumgarth
(W.P. Baumgarth 1978), following Watkins, says that the two classes of rules are not
the same because they are not created in the same way. What is more, if we are to
equate them, no moral blame should fall on those who try to escape unfavorable rules
of law. Aron, stresses that the rules of law can be followed or transgressed at will
while the rules of nature obviously cannot. They all agree that the rule of law can be
changed while natural rules cannot.
There are two important points on which these critiques fall short. Firstly, the
law of nature equation serves for Hayek as the transcendental legitimation of his
political philosophy in the same way that an "independent" theory of rights of the
abstract individual, or the "freedom of the will" legitimizes liberal political philosophy.
Thus, Gray notices that "(...) [for Hayek] law occupies a pre-existing domain of
objectivity, fully autonomous and independent of human decisions" (J. Gray 1986a
p.68). The above mentioned critiques, starting from essentially the same trend of
thought as Hayek's, fail to recognize the functional role of this equation. Their
arguments are limited to the arbitrariness of Hayek's theoretical conclusions. But they
fail to realize the position that these conclusions occupy in the structure of the
Hayekian system as well as their importance for the validity of the system itself. That
is not to suggest that the critiques presented above are non-sensical. It is only to point
out that they are rather limited. They focus only to the problems generated by the
adoption of Hayek's transcendental solution but ignore the question: is it legitimate
to use transcendental solutions at all? This is due to the fact that they start essentially
from the same trend of thought in which the transcendental foundation of political
philosophy is taken for granted. Secondly, and related to the first point, these
critiques fail to account for the political outcomes of this equation1. Instead they are
exhausted in pointing out the (numerous) logical inconsistencies that result from it.
This failure is mainly due to the essentially identical major political premises of the
critics. In that sense, for example, no scholar finds anything wrong either in the
position that capitalism is a morally superior socio-economic formation, or that it is
just as eternal and unalterable in its basic principles as the laws of nature. The same
1 See parts II and III for a more detailed critique.
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applies to many secondary positions concerning private property, social inequality etc..
It is in vain that one searches for an argument stating that the equation actually
functions as the theoretical sanctification of current social relations, and thus, works
against those who are worse off. It seems that the only thing that it works against is
the time-honored "freedom of the will" and the equally time-honored "rights" of the
abstract individual.
8. The Civil and the Political: Normativism and Decisionism in Cristi's Critique
A very different approach to the Hayekian principle of the rule of law is
offered by F.R. Cristi1. Cristi compares Hayek's ideal of the rule of law to the
"Mephisto of the pre-Hitler era", Carl Schmitt. The argument focuses on the relation
of liberalism to democracy and the concept of political power in the theories of the
two authors. The conclusion is that the distance between Hayek and Schmitt (a
distance that the former has tried hard to establish) is in fact less than both Hayek and
most of his scholars believe2. The implications of this conclusion are of major
importance for the argument presented in this thesis - that is, that Hayek is primarily
an advocate of capitalism on political grounds and, hence, his unhesitating defence of
a social organization that can hardly pass as purely philosophically founded liberalism.
Cristi's starting point is that Schmitt's main target was not liberalism but
democracy. It should be noted that this conclusion is contrary to Schmitt's own self-
understanding. He thought liberalism to be his primary ideological adversary. This
is also Hayek's view. Cristi's research, nevertheless, convincingly shows that Schmitt
was actually attacking the democratic component of 19th century liberalism (F.R.
Cristi 1984 p.529). This point seems to apply in Hayek's case as well. Hayek
apparently fights for liberalism. What he identifies as the content of anti-liberalism,
however, tends to be identical with democracy in the sense of popular sovereignty.
1 F.R. Cristi 1984 pp.521-535.
2 Some unexpected support for Cristi's argument can be derived from N. O' Sullivan's view of
Schmitt which, far from contrasting him with the neoliberal social theory, considers him as "the greatest
twentieth century theorist of social philosophy" (N. O' Sullivan 1989 p.5).
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In that sense, his attacks arc not directed against, say, socialism as such, but against
every political application of democracy.
At the same time, Schmitt's contribution to the Nazi ideology remains
undeniable. How, then, is this apparent contradiction - to the eyes of the liberals - to
be surpassed? How can a theory be pro-fascist and, at the same time, not anti-liberal?
Cristi, here, follows the Marxist tradition in indicating that liberalism, in its classical
formulations, already contains the contradictions that may lead to fascism. Much in
the spirit of Arblaster's account of the limits of liberalism1, Cristi stresses that what
Schmitt "actually objected to was liberalism's inability to preserve its main body of
doctrine free from democratic contamination." (F.R. Cristi 1984 p.524). The key to
the understanding of Cristi's analysis lies in the fundamental distinction, inherent in
liberal ideology in all its versions, between civil society and the state. The notion of
the rule of law indicates the upshot of this distinction and thus becomes the primary
category of liberal legal and political theory. It is through this distinction, expressed
in the form of the rule of law, that civil society becomes a separate sphere that
presents its (legitimate) demands for the least possible interference from the state. At
the same time, this "least possible" formulation indicates the fact that for the vast
majority of liberals the state remains a necessary evil2. Hayek is no exception to this
rule3. Indeed, a "free" society is one which can achieve an objective encirclement of
authority. Liberalism, then, is not incompatible with coercion provided that the
authorities that administer society allow all individuals equally to foresee their course
of action.
In the initial distinction between state and civil society, liberalism ascribed to
the latter a protected domain of individual rights. The purpose of the rule of law was
to eliminate any unwanted interference in this sphere. At the same time this
distinction also prescribed the state a secured domain - that of the monopoly of the
1 And against Hayek's and most liberals account of liberalism as the exact opposite of
"totalitarianism", both in its "red" and in its "black" version.
2 For a penetrating analysis of the state-society relation in liberal theory and, in fact, in capitalist
society, see J. Hoffman 1988.
3 This view is disputed in part HI. The argument presented there holds that for a considerable part
of New Right theorists the state is not an evil at all and in fact is quite desirable.
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political power. Conceived under this scheme, the state was assured independence and
autonomy. Its function was to prevent the politicization of civil society - a function
that would guarantee its own existence. The problem, however, is that the social
changes of the 19th century fatally compromised the authority of that state.
Democracy, says Cristi, demands the politicization of civil society and thus results in
the weakening of the state as a monopolizing entity of political power. This was what
characterized the historic compromise between liberalism and democracy. This,
however, was an unstable compromise not only in the eyes of Schmitt but in Hayek's
eyes as well1. It was against that state that Schmitt had turned. Not against the
autonomous state of liberalism that monopolized political power, but against the
democratic weakening of that state as this was expressed in the Weimar republic.
It is interesting to notice that Schmitt, who was the one who introduced the
notion of "total state"2 gave a different connotation to it than did Hayek or, for that
matter, the majority of English-speaking liberals. The distinction between totalitarian
and authoritarian, according to which liberalism is taken as compatible with the latter
m
but not with the former (F.A. Hayek 1967 p.161), was not his idea of totalitarianism.
On the contrary, his distinction between qualitative and quantitative totalitarianism
turned authoritarianism into a variant of totalitarianism3. Thus, it was against the
"weak", democratic state and against its most prominent institution, the parliament,
that Schmitt fought. The parliament, according to Schmitt, was the instrument by
which civil society was trying to control the state and deprive it of its autonomy.
Schmitt's solution to this problem was, of course, the Reichspraesident. This
is the point of confrontation with Hayek. Hayek developed his theory, according to
Cristi, as an attempt to defend liberalism from Schmitt's views. The apparently
normative and procedural content of his rule of law can thus be seen as the exact
1 It seems that the identification of liberalism with democracy tends to loose the "self-evident"
character that the liberals themselves used to imply. Rather in the manner of classical liberalism of the
18th century (notably in its most conservative, British version) the New Right openly expresses its
distrust and even hostility to democracy. For a classical critique see the works of H. Laski 1924 (esp.
chapters I and II), 1951 and C.B. Macpherson 1977 and 1962. For a contemporary account J. Hoffman
1988, see also A. Arblaster 1984.
2 Interpreted as "totalitarian" in English.
3 See F.R. Cristi (1984 pp.526-527n.) for the full argument.
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opposite1 of Schmitt's decisionism. The value of law, according to Hayek, depends
on its procedural origin, as well as on the self-evaluated norms. For Schmitt, on the
contrary, it is the existential quality of a will that determines the validity of the norms.
But, contrary to the view of Hayek, who bases all his critique on the personified form
of Schmitt's proposition, as well as on the decisionist element which he sees as
determinative in this scheme, Cristi argues that the institution of the Reichspraesident
should not be understood in that way only. Schmitt understood, notably in his later
writings, that to base the whole of authority on decisionism was to build on fragile
foundations. "Decisionism now appeared to him as one-sided as normativism in that
it lacked the objectivity needed to legitimate a stable framework for continuous
political action." (F.R. Cristi 1984 p.529). The Reichspraesident, in that sense,
constitutes the basis for both normativism and decisionism because it actually
transcends them both; it thus becomes somehow self-evaluating in that it embodies the
objective framework that could mediate between state and civil society.
Hayek accuses Schmitt of extreme decisionism. This allows him to present his
conception of order, a system based on abstract relations, as the diametrically opposed
conception. In reality however, the transcendental essence of the Reichspraesident has
much in common with the transcendental essence of Hayek's rule of law. The
difference between the two theorists is further diminished when certain decisionist
elements, present in Hayek's theory, are taken into account. Hayek is in agreement
with Schmitt that the state and civil society are distinct. What is more, he takes the
state's independence as an undisputed fact, thus arguing that a liberal order is
compatible with authoritarianism. Nevertheless, he seems explicitly opposed to central
planning and proposes a negative role for the state. This indicates that he takes civil
society's ability for self-regulation for granted2 and confirms the dethronement of
politics from it. However, the negative status of the state is disputable3. After all,
it is the state that positively restricts itself to negative action. The depoliticization of
1 A "mirror-image", in Cristi's words.
2 Hence, the frequent critique that Hayek's theory implicitly presupposes a contemporary liberal
society.
3 This has already been mentioned in the libertarian critiques on that matter.
civil society, thus, becomes actually the active preservation of the monopoly of
political power by the state. This leads to an inability of civil society to decide under
which conditions the Hayekian spontaneous social order becomes imperilled and
requires positive intervention. The knowledge of that situation as well as the decision
to alter it - being political in nature - lie beyond the powers of civil society1. Seen
in this perspective, Hayek's admittance that the power to declare a state of emergency
belongs to the state, does not appear to be so far removed from Schmitt's decisionism.
This decisionism becomes even more determinative when one conceives of the
rule of law as a concrete framework of social and political organization. Behind the
generality and abstractness that objectively delimits the institutions of government, lies
the actual decision to abide by such a rule. This decision finds its motivation not in
the abstract realm of law, but in the concrete social relations of civil society. That the
rule of law is compatible with non-democratic systems has been powerfully
demonstrated even by libertarian critics2. What has not been stressed by libertarians,
however, is stressed by Hayek himself when he attacks the idea of democracy insofar
as it might be extended further than some purely formalist methods of governing.
Democracy is acceptable if it conforms to the rule of law in regarding all individuals
as equal, however unequal they may in reality be. Despite Hayek's attempts to show
that the order we live in is not the order of any rational design and that its
significance may be different from the intentions of its creators, the fact remains that
this order, taken in each historical moment, is not abstract, but represents a particular
class structure. The fact that Hayek is at pains to demonstrate that this class structure
is "natural", that is, the product of "selective elimination" and the result of the
"survival of the fittest", is apparent in the (attempted) equation of the rule of law with
natural laws3. In Hayek, as in Hume, social stratification is the product of chance and
circumstance. Hence, the description of the ideal society as one where one would like
to place one's children if their place was to be decided by lot. In his theory the
1 See also critique of the rule of law as expressed through Hayek's "Model Constitution", in part
m.
2 Apart from R. Hamowy (as cited above), see also J. Raz 1977.
3 As Watkins, Aron, Gray have repeatedly demonstrated, for example.
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sovereignty of the people has been replaced by the sovereignty of "nature". Cristi
rightfully comments that in Hayek's theory "nature teaches us to accept the solidarity
of subservience." (F.R. Cristi 1984 p.534).
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CONCLUSION PART I
The critical presentation of some parts of the literature on Hayek's thought has
had a twofold purpose. It firstly sought to present the issues on which the relevant
debate has been developing over the past fifty years. Secondly, it tried to locate the
limits of these critiques. As far as the first point is concerned, it would seem that
Hayek's theory has indeed been widely criticized. There is hardly any part of it that
has not fallen under intense scrutiny and usually, in the end, been more or less
rejected. The one certain conclusion, then, is that Hayek's thought is not only liable
to criticism but indeed vulnerable. Throughout the years scholars have developed an
ability to discover new points of incoherence, new sources of inconsistency, new
contradictions. The question, however, seems to be why have all these scholars
occupied themselves with Hayek's theory in the first place? The question becomes
all the more perplexing in view of the fact that Hayek's theory had been fully
developed and criticized by the beginning of the 1960s, that is, long before it attracted
the great flow of criticism. How then can a theory with so many obvious weaknesses
become the centre of an intense scholarly debate for such a long period?
The answer to that question brings forward the second aim of this part. For,
it would seem logical to assume that for all their originality and insight most of these
critiques have failed to meet Hayek's challenge conclusively. Notwithstanding this
deductive assumption most of the arguments presented above clearly point towards
actual problems in Hayek's thought. It is not, then, on the inaccuracy of the critiques
themselves that the problem rests, for Hayek's theory is indeed inconsistent and
problematic in very many ways.
It will be argued that its strength does not lie in its inner coherence but in its
political dimension. It is the aim of Hayek's theory and indeed the function of his
system in political terms that makes it both most appealing and particularly
challenging. In that sense, the inner problems of the theory, far from being of
secondary importance, demonstrate the necessary limitations of a theoretical account
that seeks primarily to defend the existing social organization.
The same point can be derived negatively from the "incompleteness" of the
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views of his critics. It must be clear by now that most of the critiques presented thus
far belong to the liberal/libertarian and conservative camp, that is to the wider
precapitalist area. The same method will be retained throughout the two remaining
parts. What is sought is to try further to establish the point that these critiques are not
incomplete because of some personal inadequacy of their authors but because it is
hardly possible to grasp the political function and significance of Hayek's thought
without denying the very premises of capitalism which are also the premises of the
critics themselves. It is precisely that social and political dimension of the Hayekian
theory which most of his critics fail to recognize.
This further step, that is the link between the inner problems and the political
dimension of the theory, will be attempted in the course of the two following parts.
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PART II: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HAYEK'S THEORY
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The importance of epistemological issues in Hayek's thought cannot be
overemphasized. Hayek himself is frequently at pains to establish the connection
between his philosophical premises and his social theory. The argument advanced in
this part does not question the importance of that issue in the first place. On the
contrary it seeks to indicate that its importance is to be found not only in the cases
where there exists such a connection but also in those where there is an apparent lack
of it. In other words, it is the parts of Hayek's philosophy that are maintained and
used as premises in his social theory, as well as the parts that simply disappear or
even contradict these premises, that express the overall importance of the relation
between philosophy and social theory. Obviously, this objective presupposes a close
examination ofHayek's own statement of his philosophical principles. It is under that
same perspective that the relation of his thought to that of his intellectual ancestors
is examined. The purpose of the argument then is not simply to characterize him as,
say, "idealist" or "materialist", "positivist" or "empiricist" (although the linkage with
such trends of thought largely occupies the first section); far less is to attribute to him
the label of "Kantian" or "Humean". Rather what is attempted is to locate the
elements of these theoretical traditions that Hayek uses in his theory and in what way.
SECTION A: The Theory of Mind: Ontology and Epistemology
1. The "Inadequacy" of the "Old" Philosophy
In the opening of his book The Sensory Order, Hayek poses the question: what
is mind? He then dismisses the possibility of treating the problem within the limits
of traditional philosophy1 because the difficulty is "in deciding what part of our
knowledge can properly be described as knowledge of mental events as distinguished
from our knowledge of physical events" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.l). Hayek, then, does
not intend to refer his theory to some set of ontological premises. On the contrary,
1 i.e. within the limits of the nature-mind relation.
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he seems to focus on the epistemological side of the problem exclusively. His distrust
towards ontology can also be asserted by his attachment to positivism and Mach:"(...)
for the young student interested in philosophy (...) who felt a distaste for orthodox
thought, Mach was the only alternative" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.VIII). In the course of
dismissing the way the "old" philosophy put the problem, Hayek sketches out his own
approach. "We shall have established a "correspondence" between particular
physiological events and particular mental events if we succeed in showing that there
can exist a system of relations between these physiological events and other
physiological events which is identical with the system of relations existing between
the corresponding mental events and other mental events" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.2).
It is not quite clear in what sense this restatement of the epistemological
problem is different from that of "traditional" philosophy. In the first place, this
approach essentially presupposes the dualism of mind and nature (mental as distinct
from the physical) ontologically. Secondly the term "event", which here acquires the
role of the common denominator of the two prevailing "orders", is left almost wholly
unexplained. The analytical validity of the term becomes even more problematic in
the light of the difficulties that Hayek himself has raised against "traditional"
philosophy. For, it would seem, the task that he puts to himself now - namely, to
establish a "correspondence" between mental and physical events - presupposes the
ability clearly to distinguish between them. This passage already reveals the relation
of Hayek's approach to that of Machist empiricism. Furthermore, the very way of
posing the problem is quite revealing. Hayek wants to "prove" that there exists a
relation between mental and physical events. In order to do so he presupposes the
existence of two category-orders. These orders do not acquire any clear ontological
significance in Hayek's theory. Hayek does not address this problem head on, but he
does give an indirect answer. If we can prove that there are two orders of events,
mental and physical, Hayek says, then we will have to assume the existence of an
external world (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.173) concerning the nature of which we can get
no information through the mental order. The external world is not a necessary
presupposition according to this approach but only a "logical" assumption - i.e. a
consequence of the existence of the mental world. The conclusion that the mental
world is in fact an independently existing determinative factor according to which and
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through which everything else exists, becomes thus, for Hayek, the necessary starting
point. We see here both of the component parts of Hayek's philosophy. The mental
is prior to the material. "Mental" is meant in a subjective individualist1 way. This
is subjective idealism. But even so our mental world cannot give us any positive
information about the external world. This is agnosticism.
The way Hayek proposes to approach the problem of the mental-physical
relation is by examining what he calls the order of the sensory qualities. It must be
kept in mind that Hayek does not intend to give any definition of the nature ofmind2.
Hayek emphasizes : "It seems that a question like "what is XT' has meaning only
within a given order, and that within this limit it must always refer to the relation of
one particular event to other events belonging in the same order" (F.A. Hayek 1952a
pp.4-5). In that sense, "an answer to the question of what determines the order of
sensory qualities constitutes an answer to all questions which can be meaningfully
asked about the "nature" or "origin" of these qualities" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.2).
Notice that in putting the problem in this way, Hayek actually presupposes
agnosticism almost by definition. The distinction between the two orders and the
assertion that there cannot be any meaningful question concerning the nature of an
"event" that transcends the limits of its own order leads to the a priori establishment
of a sharp distinction between the mental and the physical. Thus, the "gap" between
them - that is, the "gap" between the subject and the object, the cognitive process -
appears to be unbridgeable by definition. The subject-object relation becomes an a
priori impossibility.
Hayek starts from the separation of the world into two orders. This separation
is based on the way our senses perceive different events. On the one hand, there is
the phenomenon, namely the way senses "understand" certain stimuli and the way they
"classify" them3. On the other hand, there is the physical, the way certain physical
1 In that sense, Hayek distances himself from any notion of "Universal Idea" or "Spirit", and thus,
from any attempt at objective idealism.
2 As M. Forsyth seems to imply (in M. Forsyth 1988 p.239).
3. Two very brief remarks here: Firstly, Hayek (along with Mach) does not believe that we
understand and "classify" with our brain but with the complex framework of our nerves. In other words
(continued...)
events are classified by science according to some characteristics of their own. "There
exist now, in fact, at least two different orders in which we arrange or classify the
objects of the world around us: one is the order of our sense experience in which
events are classified according to their sensory properties (...); the other is an order
which includes both these same and other events but which treats them as similar or
different according to as, in conjunction with other events, they produce similar or
different other external events" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.3). This crucial division is
accompanied by the warning that neither the phenomenal nor the physical order should
be identified with or contrasted to what we call in ordinary language the "real" world.
Many problems arise from this distinction. It remains completely obscure how
"science" acquired this objective standpoint. As Gray notices, Hayek's whole theory
strives to prove that this Aristotelian standpoint is fallacious1. To admit it would
imply, firstly, that there are some objective events, secondly, that we can perceive
them and, thirdly, that we can "classify" them in a way other than according to
preconceived mental categories. Each and all of these assumptions are refuted in The
Sensory Order (even objectivity is thought to derive its existence from formal rational
systems). And although Hayek tries to deny that the classification of the second type
is more "real" his success is very doubtful. For, either science classifies according to
the properties and qualities of the "events", or it classifies according to the properties
we attribute to them - that is, according to the preconceived formal systems - in which
case there cannot be any real distinction between the mental and the physical and, in
any case, the latter can never be classified according to the properties of the "events"
themselves.
"It is indeed doubtful whether on the plane on which we must examine these
problems the term "real" still has any clear meaning" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.4). Hayek
3(...continued)
for Hayek as for Mach thinking is not a function of the brain but of our neural system. Secondly, in
the closing section of his book Hayek argues that his theory is in fact the only non materialist theory
because it does not use any "hylomorphic" concepts when describing the mental order (F.A. Hayek
1952a p.178). But if sensory and mental are two words to describe the same order then Hayek is in fact
giving a substance to the mental.
1 By Aristotelian standpoint Gray means the possibility of distancing oneself from the object of
one's enquiry so as to acquire a "pure" perspective.
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plainly admits that his theory does not accept any reality except, of course, that of the
"orders" he has just introduced. The fact that he does not accept reality does not
preclude the demand that reality should be identified with the construction of his
system as a whole1. Indeed, this problem is apparent in all subjectivist and skeptical
theories which try to dismiss the existence of objective reality. One might disagree
on a certain content of the word "reality" but, when one tries to dismiss objective
reality altogether, the first impact would logically be that one's theory, the very
procedure by which one is trying to prove that reality does not exist, becomes in its
turn either a refutation of the initial claim or a non-entity. In that sense, Hayek's
attempt to deprive "real" of any meaning might be interpreted as an attempt to deny
all existing concepts of reality only to introduce his own2.
This problem was apparent in all the 18th century skeptical theory. Both
Berkeley and Hume, while denying objective reality in the materialist sense, were at
the same time trying to find some criteria according to which they could distinguish
between the real and the fictitious. Berkeley refuses the existence of things outside
our consciousness; by doing so he comes face to face with the problem of the
distinction between real and not real. Being aware of the problem he is trying to
provide an answer which turns out to be less than satisfactory. "If any man thinks this
detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what
has been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. (...). There are spiritual
substances, minds or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at
pleasure; but these are faint, weak and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by
Sense (...). These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former," (G.
Berkeley in Fraser 1874 p.51). At the same time, there seems to be a very close
connection of Hayek's ontological concepts with those of Hume. Indeed what Hume
calls "skepticism" is quite close to the heart of the "new" philosophy. These concepts
are characterized by a refusal to explain sensations as the effects of objects or spirits,
1 The problem persists no matter what the content of "reality" will be. Thus, an advocate of
metaphysics can easily argue that "despite the intellectual humility of his "critical rationalism", Hayek
vests enough confidence in his own reason to be able to assure, on the basis of it, that there is no supra-
natural order of reality which could ever influence or interpose itself in the natural order, whether in
the matter of ethics or anything else." (G. Walker 1986 p.36).
2 See also J. Gray 1980a.
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that is, to deduce them from the external world on the one hand, or, from a deity on
the other1. Some attention should be drawn to the fact that for Hume the two
alternatives were at least relatively clear as well as to his "warning" that the relation
between perception and reality will always remain the favorite topic of the
skepticists2.
It, thus, appears that, as Plekhanov has noticed3, neither monism nor the
recognition of a certain ultimate unity in the world are enough to guarantee the
separation of a theory from idealism4. Terminology apart, as long as the absolute
counterpoising of the mental to the physical is retained, a theory cannot escape the
lapse into some kind of idealism.
2. The Two Orders of the World: Monism and Dualism in Hayek's Ontology
Let us now examine this division of the world into orders .The term order has
a twofold meaning in Hayek's theory. Firstly, it replaces the "metaphysically" charged
concept of the world that the traditional philosophy uses. Secondly, it becomes
consequently the "basis", the organizational concept of Hayek's theory. The content
of the term is not clarified, to my knowledge, in any part of Hayek's work. In a
broader sense we can say that the content of the concept is identical with the content
of the book The Sensory Order. More concretely, "order" for Hayek is the result of
a certain classification. The category, therefore, tells us nothing concerning the
objective existence of matter and its relation to mind. It is rather an "epistemological"
category in the sense that Hayek gives to the term "epistemology"5. But is Hayek
1 See in particular D. Hume 1894 pp.151-153.
2 For a critique of Berkeley's and Hume's concepts of objective reality see also J. Bennett 1971
chapters on reality and objectivity respectively.
3 See Plekhanov 1956 p. 12.
4 See also T. O. Oizerman 1988 pp.54-74.
3 That Hayek's intention is to produce a theory based on epistemological grounds only is also
advocated, among others, by E. Miller 1976 p.383.
84
actually using epistemology in the ontology-free sense he implies? When he says that
all that exists are orders of events is he not making an ontological rather than
epistemological point? Classification presupposes, of course, the classifying subject.
The question that Hayek asks refers to the relation of that subject to the results of
his/her own classification. But, in that way, ontologically speaking, the classifying
subject emerges as the only (necessarily) existing thing. "Objective" reality, in the
form of the result of the subject's action, becomes the manifestation of the latter's
own existence1. Thus, in ontology the problem is solved without being positively
stated. "Order", then, cannot acquire the significance Hayek is trying to attribute to
it outside a definite ontological frame.
The initial problem however does not lie in the relation of the subject to the
results of his actions, but in the relation of the acting subject - active subjectivity
being the only way of grasping the existence of the subject - to objective reality. That
question Hayek refuses to pose and it is in the light of that relation that his theory
acquires a problematic character. For, notwithstanding his verbal monism, Hayek
actually presupposes a Cartesian ontological dualism2. In that sense, "order" as a
categorial concept seems a misleading term. If "order" is a conventional term which
helps us understand the way nature exists, then the only assumption could be that the
world is real, objective and that it exists independently from our thought. At the same
time nothing can be assumed on the knowability of that world from the adoption of
"order" as such. It also means that there is no ground for the dubious identification
between the mental and the physical as two orders. If, on the contrary, order is a
word that describes the organization of our mind only, then the only assumption could
be that the world exists as a product, a construction of our mind3.
Hayek's reluctance to attribute any meaning to the existence of a "real" world,
as well as his affinity with Berkeley and Hume on that matter, point towards the latter
answer. But the concept of "order" is also used in a more "skeptical" way. In order
1 Notice the similarity with the Cartesian cogito ergo sum.
2 See also E. Miller 1976 p.389.
3 On that see, apart from the classic Marxist literature, I. Frolov (ed.) 1984, and especially T.
Oizerman 1988. Western accounts can be found in D. H. Ruben 1977; also M. Cornforth's somehow
simplistic view in M. Cornforth 1954 especially in volume III.
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to grasp the epistemological function of orders, Hayek says, we must try to relate
them to each other. It is obvious that since he considers objective reality a
meaningless category, this relation can only be a comparison not of the elements of
the orders but of the "similarity of the structures as wholes and the position of the
corresponding elements within the structure" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.39). This task is
left to the concept of "isomorphism" which here plays the role of the logical mediator
between structures.
It must be remembered that Hayek initially distinguished between two such
structures (mental and physical). It must also be remembered that both of them were
introduced as purely epistemological categories. Finally an attempt was made to show
that this introduction of orders actually presupposes a shaip (Cartesian) ontological
dualism between mental and physical which, although not identical with Hayek's
distinction between mental and physical orders, is nevertheless their logical basis. In
order to compare the two initial systems-orders, Hayek introduces a third order
(neural) which is only a part of the physical. Isomorphism, says Hayek, exists only
between the mental and the neural orders. But, by definition, it does not and cannot
exist between the mental and the physical orders. He further implies that it does not
exist between the neural and the physical either. Now the neural order, being a part
of the physical, serves as the necessary link between the mental and the physical. It
furnishes the basis for the construction of the system-order of the phenomena. Thus
Hayek is trying to place the roots of the phenomena within some sort of objectivity.
The crux of his argument, however, lies elsewhere. For, neural order is but a part of
the physical. The rest of the latter, thus, is doomed to remain in the realm of the
"beyond" by definition. In that way Hayek manages to accommodate his "skepticism"
without explicitly taking refuge to the Kantian thing-in-itself. The rest of the physical
order, albeit clearly in the "beyond", does not have either the fixity or the necessity
of the thing-in-itself1. Its "necessity" is exhausted in its function in the system as a
whole. But its content need not be either fixed or accessible. Hence the
predominantly subjective content of Hayek's political theory.
The concept of "order" and its function, thus, are of outstanding importance in
1 See also E. Miller 1976 p.385.
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terms ofmethodology. First, it presupposes a sharp Cartesian ontological dualism that
underpins the whole of Hayek's theory. Second, it functions as the limit beyond
which we can never have access. Third, it deprives the realm of the "beyond" that
emerges as the result of its own function, of any fixity or necessity.
3. The "New" Philosophy of Hayek: Problems of Epistemology and Idealism
The part of Hayek's book which concerns the characterization of his own
theory is one of the most neglected chapters of The Sensory Order. Nevertheless, it
has a special interest as far as Hayek's eclecticism is concerned, because it is there
that Hayek "proves" the difference of his theory from traditional materialism and, in
fact, from all previous philosophy.
In the first place he denies the "accusation" that his theory is materialism on
the basis that materialism "implies certain conclusions which are almost the opposite
of those which in fact follow from it [his theory]" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.177). On the
contrary, Hayek's theory is the only alternative to the "hylomorphic manner of
thinking" which has prevailed among philosophers. "(...) it is indeed the only theory
which is not materialistic" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p. 178) because his account of the
mental world "does not attribute to mind any property which we derive from our
acquaintance with matter" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p. 178). At the same time, it is distinct
from idealism because it rejects the a priori distinction between physical and mental.
It is also different from the "double aspect" theories because "What could be regarded
as the physical aspect of this double faced entity would not be the individual neural
process but only the complete order of all these processes" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.178)
which is only another name for what we call mind. Notice the inadequacy of this
argument. Hayek shifts the stress of the "double aspect" theories - which are only a
category of dualism - from ontological essence to subject. The fact that Hayek
verbally dismisses individual mind as the subject of his ontology - a circumstance
which is not established adequately in his proposed individualistic-compositive method
- does not detract in the least from the fact that he conceives of reality in the
rationalist dualist way. Thus, Murray avers with much justification that for Hayek
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social sciences "deal with the phenomena of the individual mind" (A.H. Murray 1945
p. 151). The overall concept remains one of a sharp distinction between mind and
nature even if the first pole of the relation is conceived supra-individually1.
That is how Hayek presents his "new" theory. To begin with, let us
concentrate on the definition of mind which is not infected by any "acquaintance" with
matter. "This order which we call mind is thus the order prevailing at a particular part
of the physical universe - that part of it which is ourselves" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p. 178).
In the first place, then, mind is still defined in reference to the physical universe
(matter). Furthermore, Hayek openly admits the rationalist identification of "mind"
(which, in that case, is further identified with "knowledge") in the abstract with "our"
mind (and knowledge). It seems now clear enough that the effort Hayek is making
to purify his theory of "hylomorphic" concepts only demonstrates the correctness of
the remarks of those critics who have stressed the importance of his rational
"dualism". In Hayek "(...) the argument against objectivism assumes the sharp
distinction between object-out-there and idea which is characteristic of modem
psychology" (A.H. Murray 1945 p. 149) and philosophy.2
Hayek's starting point, namely the division of the world into phenomenal and
physical orders, is inconsistent if it is taken in a Kantian sense. He introduces a
theory according to which we can only get to know the phenomenal, or mental order
of things. The physical order, on the other hand, is a classification "we" make of
events according to the result they produce in conjunction with other events. But if
every perception we have, being a mental activity, can only lead us to the phenomenal
order, how can we ever talk about a classification (mental activity) which might lead
us to results different than the mental order?
The task that Hayek puts to himself is to prove that there exists a certain
"correspondence" between the phenomenal and the physical world. In materialist
empiricism one could imagine of the possibility of such a correspondence since certain
1 For similar views see also A.H. Murray 1945 and E. Miller 1976.
2 It could be argued that Hayek is actually adopting a position close to that of Berkeley whereby
the ontological priority of mind is established by an a posteriori identification of nature with mind (G.
Berkeley in Fraser 1874 pp.87-88). See also Fraser's own comments on the inconsistency of the
Humean position that Hayek adopts on the problem of knowability of the world (Fraser 1874 p.81).
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characteristics were attributed to the objects as such. Thus, we would not have any
reason to suspect that these objects would be different before becoming known to us.
There existed a certain independence between the knowable object and the process of
knowing.
In Hayek's theory the object to be known is thoroughly determined by the
process of knowing. Knowing (or classifying) necessarily requires only the active
intervention of mind in a determinative sense - a self-contained "interpretation". If
that is true, if an active self-contained "interpretation" according to a priori mental
categories is a necessary condition of knowing itself, then there cannot be any
classification of events according to their relations with each other. If, on the other
hand, there were a case where knowing involved something more than the
(re)structuring of the rational form (order) - that is, a notion of "facticity" - then the
system would run into trouble. For, whatever transcends the limits of the a priori
forms of thinking is bound to be left out if the system is to retain any validity as such.
So, if the presupposition that all we know involves the active interpretation according
to a "map" is correct, it follows that we cannot know anything whose existence is
independent from our synthesis of the understanding. The existence of the "objective"
world necessarily implies the existence of our classifying, interpretative thought.
Therefore, we can never know any object or event which is not related to our
subjective classification; we can never know anything about the way "pure" events are
related to each other1.
We have tried to prove Hayek's inconsistency on two levels. Firstly, if our
mind has access only to the phenomenal world then we cannot make any judgement
on the "order" of the physical world, or, if we can get to know (even approximately)
the physical world, then the sharp distinction between phenomenal and physical does
not hold any longer. We will have to admit that the "beyond" reaches into the "this-
side" and determines it. Secondly, if all that our mind perceives are phenomena
(mental world), then we cannot make any statement about the existence of an external
1 Thus,"(...) the purely phenomenal world within consciousness (Locke and Hume) cannot create
science, which cannot be explained as a merely subjective product." (G. de Ruggiero 1921 p.41).
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world1 unless we use a transcendent concept2; or, if we state that an external world
exists, we cannot defend the position that our mind is capable of knowing a
phenomenal world only.
Hayek suggests, for "practical" reasons, that if we want to learn something
about the world we must adopt a dualistic approach. "In this specific sense we shall
never be able to bridge the gap between physical and mental phenomena" (F.A. Hayek
1952a p. 179). This dualistic approach results in an attack that Hayek launches3
against the materialist concept of human self-determination. Its existence is not
required for "practical" reasons but for reasons which derive from the heart ofHayek's
theory. It is because Hayek believes that nature (the physical) is an unordered sum
of unnecessitated events (i.e. "irrational") which acquires a certain shape because of
our (rational) mental activity, that this dualism becomes necessary. If we accept that
necessity and causality exist in nature primarily, then we do not have to adopt any
"practical" dualism in epistemology in order to explain our ontological
presuppositions. Hayek's dualism, then, is made necessary for reasons implicit in his
theory4. It is the link between a verbally ousted ontology and a conservative social
and political theory. The "inability" of the human mind to comprehend itself and the
world becomes the basis of Hayek's social and political theory; it also becomes the
starting point from which he deduces his conservative individualism.
Hayek seems to base his methodological dualism on man's inability to
understand the world as a whole. Whatever we may be able to know about the mental
world (as well as the physical he should have added) will be the result of our previous
knowledge about the mental world. "The whole idea of the mind explaining itself is
a logical contradiction - nonsense in the literal meaning of the word - and a result of
the prejudice that we must be able to deal with mental events in the same manner as
we deal with physical events" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p. 192). And although Hayek does
1 Since the very procedure of making a statement is a mental activity and therefore the event that
it refers to a part of the phenomenal world.
2 For example, faith.
3 Notably, in his social theory.
4 For a similar account, see E. Miller 1976 p.390.
not exclude the possibility of the brain building a machine which will be able to
explain its (the brain's) actions1 we can take Forsyth's remark that "Unfortunately
Hayek does not seem to recognize that this "prejudice" is the very one that has guided
him throughout his whole analysis. His account of mental activity is based on the
idea that it can be and in principle is reducible to physical activity" (M. Forsyth 1988
p. 142) as a supplementary proof of Hayek's eclectic shifting between naturalism and
idealism. The picture is completed with Hayek's conclusion in the last paragraph of
The Sensory Order. "Our conclusion, therefore, must be that to us mind must remain
forever a realm of its own which we can know only through directly experiencing it,
but which we shall never be able fully to explain or to "reduce" to something else"
(F.A. Hayek 1952a p. 194). After a full 193 pages Hayek comes back to the initial
idealist position: mind is not a different substance but to us it must remain forever a
realm of its own. Mind cannot be defined simply because it cannot be reduced to
something else. But then how can we argue that "in some ultimate sense mental
phenomena are" nothing but "physical processes"? Hayek's theory is doomed to veer
between elements of verbal materialism and idealism. But in any case it cannot
constitute - as Hayek seems to believe - a "third way" in philosophy. His efforts to
define the basic categories of matter and mind in reference to a third concept (pre-
sensory experiences) have failed simply because this is not possible.
4. The Distinction Between Method and Ontology
There is also another implication that this dualism has for Hayek's theory: it
distinguishes completely between ontology and methodology. This confrontation of
ontological and methodological principles leads to the theoretical inconsistency that
we have mentioned before. Ontologically Hayek suggests that in the last analysis the
world is physical. But whenever one has to make any judgement on it one must look
at it in a dualist perspective; for us the gap between the mental and the physical
cannot be bridged. What Hayek does not seem to take into account is that the very
1 Notice that this possibility is ruled out completely from Hayek's social theory.
91
statement that the world is physical is a judgement and thus it has to be made on a
dualist basis. Therefore, the principles "there is a monist order in the world" and "to
us only a dualist approach is possible" cannot hold together in epistemology.
Furthermore, this distinction between ontology and methodology makes the
first an empty word. Indeed, when we examine Hayek's social theory we shall notice
that his ontological monism is altogether forgotten while the methodological dualism
has become the only guideline according to which his social theory is structured.
Here, the "theoretical" acceptance of a judgement on how the world is becomes
irrelevant since to "us" the only possible approach is through the sharp dualism
between the mental and the physical. It is precisely in that field that its implications
can better be grasped. In social sciences, Hayek says, the only adequate method of
proceeding is the individualistic or compositive method. Why is that so? Because in
social sciences there is no sensuous content whatsoever and thus the sovereignty of
the rational form becomes the only actuality. It seems that on the plane of social
sciences Hayek has answered the initial dilemma of the rational dualistic approach on
the basis of its first alternative. It is the rational form that will determine precisely
and solely its own content, thus delimiting, at the same time, the existence of that
content Thus, no actuality - in the sense of irrational content - can ever exist in that
field. Hayek's dogmatic rationalism leads him to extremes when he states that social
sciences do not deal with given wholes but only with constructed rational systems-
models, built from "familiar elements". The whole, then, exists in so far as we can
select from the mass of irrational content the elements that will fit to our rationally
preconstructed model1. It is clear, however, that this view excludes large areas of
actuality. The subjectivist element that Hayek introduces in his "new" theory,
although not of capital importance at this point, only aggravates his account. For, it
makes the construction of a rational formal system a "private" affair that takes place
within the individual mind of the isolated subject. Literally, then, even "our"
knowledge becomes too wide a category for the Hayekian system; only "my"
knowledge can be accounted for2.
1 See also A.H. Murray 1945 p.150.
2 For a relevant argument, see T. Adorno (et al.) 1976.
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5. Epistemology and Methodology: Anti-Rationalism and the Principles of Scientific
Discovery
A closer look at the debate over Hayek's methodology might prove useful at
this point. Most of the methodological discussions on Hayek spring from the more
or less critical approach of the writer to his theory of mind and knowledge1. Thus,
for Nishiyama, there is no question as to the starting point of Hayek's philosophy.
"It is rather notable that a strong emphasis to the undeniable limitation of human
reason or a categorical denial of the claim of human omniscience provides a corner
stone, if not a starting point for the Hayekian thought." (C. Nishiyama 1967 p.339).
The refutation of reason is, then, undeniably the basic philosophical premise of
Hayek's2. The powerful negation of reason both in Hayek's theory and in
Nishiyama's defence of it, however, seems somehow incomplete. Hayek and
Nishiyama are, after all, concerned not to be characterized as irrationalists. Whether
this is one of the remnants of Hayek's "scientism" or simply the result of the belief
that a direct appeal to the "irrational" would discredit his theory, the fact remains that
Nishiyama, perhaps more than Hayek himself, scholastically stresses that Hayek's
theory is not against reason as such but only against "unlimited reason". Reason is
not to be denied altogether. On the contrary, it is pushed further and further but
always with a humble realization of its limitations. Nishiyama even states that
Hayek's theory actually promotes reason more than any other (C. Nishiyama 1967
p.341)3.
In terms of methodology, Nishiyama states that "no science can exist apart
from the method that can be called hypothetico-deductive-observational method" (C.
Nishiyama 1967 p.341). Consequently, the unity in science is founded, primarily, on
1A similar point is made, with regard to the positivist dispute on methodology, by J. O' Neil (1973
p.5).
2 Nishiyama, in his effort to persuade for the importance of this point, does not hesitate to appeal
to the traditional culture of his Japanese audience. One easily understands the "irritation" of the
orthodox liberal; after all the Japanese tradition and culture, admirable as it may be, is certainly not a
liberal one.
3 See however the more "distanced" critique of R.A. Arnold (1980 p.344).
methodological grounds. This method stresses the role of hypothesis in scientific
investigation. Indeed, as Nishiyama avers,"(...) no systematic enquiry in science has
made progress apart from some hypotheses, adapted to its special topic." (C.
Nishiyama 1967 p.342). From this self-evident fact Nishiyama "deduces" the three
principles of the Hayekian methodology. Firstly, there can be no verification of a
hypothesis; only a refutation of it. Secondly, scientific theories cannot predict the
occurrence of an event, only its non occurrence. "In this sense the predictions made
by scientific theories are really of the nature of the prognosis of principle." (C.
Nishiyama 1967 p.342). Thirdly, there cannot be a complete falsification of an
hypothesis any more than a complete verification of it. "What this means is that there
is no such thing as truth in the field of science but only contingent truth (...)." (C.
Nishiyama 1967 p.342). So, Nishiyama concludes, "Philosophy must once again make
it explicit that no method can exist apart from some assumption involved in the choice
of this method." (C. Nishiyama 1967 p.342). It is not altogether clear how one can,
starting from a mere common-place statement, reach so profound conclusions.
Hypothesis, taken as a sine qua non condition of science, is, of course, just such a
common-place concept. Common-place, that is, to the extent that we take men as the
creators of science. There can hardly be any theory that fulfills the above condition
and denies the priority of hypotheses in inquiry. Besides, if there were one such
theory, it would have been likely to be Hayek's since it is Hayek who denies the
relevance of the outcomes of human conduct in reference to men's initial plans
(hypotheses). And it is Hayek again who denies any essential relevance of his
ontological premises to his "ontology-free" method.
What Nishiyama really means is not merely that a hypothesis is prior to an
inquiry; his point is that the hypothesis is in a different category from the inquiry and
that its priority is qualitative rather than chronological, determinative rather than
presuppositional. The question, therefore, is not whether a hypothesis is needed for
scientific investigation, but whether this hypothesis is something qualitatively different,
self-contained (and in that sense arbitrary) in relation to objective reality, or if it is
framed and thus determined by objective reality (the inquiry itself being considered
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as part of it)1. This question, although not stated openly, is nevertheless answered in
the conclusions presented by Nishiyama. No method exists apart from an assumption
involved in its choice, he says. After the refutation of objective reality in the third
principle of "methodology", it becomes apparent that the assumption mentioned - as
in the initial hypothesis - is taken as a distinct category whose relevance to reality is
debatable, to say the least. In that sense Nishiyama states, possibly exceeding Hayek's
anticipation, that all hypotheses are value-relevant and the point is to have them
purified of this value-relevancy. The triviality of the initial statement is now
transformed completely: the content of the term "hypothesis", far from being merely
the physiological mental function of a human being, is taken to be the "mental as
such", that is, the uniquely distinct territory of the "universe" which can know the
phenomena. Thus, hypotheses, along with assumptions, are taken together as
constructions of the mind, completely cut off from an access to reality. That is why
the demand for a value-free hypothesis emerges as the objective. But this purification
cannot take place as the result of rational action; "such rigor can be assumed only in
the free competition of various hypotheses" (C. Nishiyama 1967 p.342). There is
much more than a simple deduction from the initial premise to the above conclusion;
there is much that is taken as self-evident and unavoidable and much that is actually
introduced through the back door. Hence, it is not the fact that an hypothesis is
needed in a scientific inquiry that needs to be discussed, but the content of the term
"hypothesis". Had Nishiyama discussed this, he would have found it less easy to
acquire the widespread agreement he implies. The same method is followed in the
statement of the three methodological principles of scientific investigation. The
principle of falsification is indeed of major importance in natural sciences and
Popper's contribution to this area is, I think, undeniable. But is it only one step from
this principle to "the methodological foundation of Professor Hayek's" - i.e. the
assertion of the sovereignty of the general rules in society? Again, as in the case of
the hypotheses, Nishiyama starts from a widely accepted principle and, by the same
token, introduces certain elements of the Hayekian theory as equally widely accepted.
1 Nishiyama implies a Popperian use of "hypothesis". For a critique of Popper's concept of
"hypothesis", see T. Adorno in T. Adorno (et al.) 1976 p.69 and p. 112).
Furthermore it is quite logical that no complete falsification can exist since this would
practically mean the verification of an hypothesis - something that is ruled out as
impossible right from the beginning1. But "what this means" is far from being a self-
evident assertion. Nishiyama, in an original empirio-critical mood, tries to annul truth
altogether. If he means that there are no absolute eternal truths in social sciences -
a thesis that the development of science has largely supported even in the field of
natural sciences - then Hayek, or Popper, are certainly not the first to introduce it.
But from this point to the argument that there is only "contingent truth" there is a long
way to go2. Nishiyama actually denies a certain abstract content of "truth" only to
replace it by an equally abstract and unhistorical denial of truth as such3. But such
a denial is not beyond dispute. Popper's mistake to equate political "openness" with
openness in science has been a frequent target of criticism. But if in Popper's case
this resulted in a certain "closedness" through the imposition of a "telos" (such as
knowledge) in a structure without subjects4, in Hayek's case it leads to an open
political conservatism. For, by superimposing his political ideas upon such a
methodology, Hayek produces a sterile theoretical construct that can be evaluated only
according to the political significance of its propositions.
Two conclusions, related to methodological premises, can be drawn from the
above discussion. Firstly, Hayek's methodology is, itself, "value-relevant" - i.e. it
presupposes of necessity certain ontological premises. The fact that Hayek does not
relate it explicitly to his actual ontological premises can only be taken as an
inconsistency. The very statement that "all methodologies are value-relevant"
becomes, in its turn, a value-relevant statement. The same applies to the introduction
of all three major premises of "scientific enquiry", as well as to the suggestion that in
1 Notice that Popper advocates the possibility of a decisive refutation of a hypothesis (K.R. Popper
1972 p.122 and K. Popper in T. Adorno (et al.) 1976 p.89). Indeed that is his sole criterion of science.
2 The same point is made by R.S. Rudner (1954 p.166). Rudner is tackling the subject from a
different perspective but he reaches the same conclusion. He even remarks that if Hayek seriously
implies methodological subjectivism in social sciences he does so only by an appeal to intuition.
3 Adorno's remark that, empiricist methods whose attraction lies in their claim to objectivity actually
favor the subjective, seems quite accurate in this case (T. Adorno in T. Adorno (et al.) 1976 p.71).
4
see for example, K.R. Popper in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave 1970 p.7. See also Adorno's
comments in T. Adomo (et al.) 1976 p.59.
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a "free competition of hypotheses" this value-relevancy can be surpassed. These
statements constitute methodological premises and are, as such, value-relevant. Self-
consistent skepticism, then, has to lead to relativism1. Secondly, Nishiyama, more
than Hayek himself, stresses the empiricist-scientistic content of Hayek's theory. It
is the dualism between facts (accessible by science) and values (mental constructions)
and the demand for a purification of methodology in science that places Hayek's
theory in the "scientistic" camp. And it is his belief in the inability of human mind
to understand this process of purification, as well as the essential priority of the mental
over the physical, that gives his theory a distinctive conservative flavor2.
The consequences of the use of the individualistic-compositive method in
Hayek's theory are far-reaching. By placing the weight of his argument on the
predominance of the analytic method over the compositive in the case of natural
sciences and vice versa in the case of social sciences,it is argued3, Hayek misses the
point: "Indeed, it will appear that Professor Hayek has himself in this respect not quite
escaped from the trammels of scientism - or, as we will call it further on,
Cartesianism." (A.H. Murray 1945 p. 152). The important conclusion that Murray
reaches in his critical examination of Hayek's theory is that methodology alone is
simply not enough to lead any philosopher to a substantive conception of society4.
As he puts it "The problem is clearly a matter of premises, and not merely one of
method." (A.H. Murray 1945 p. 152). The fact that Hayek attempts to establish his
"Free Society" by using an apparently ontologically neutral method is in itself a proof
of his "scientism" or "Cartesianism". "If Professor Hayek expects his individualistic
compositive method not to lead him into a planned, mechanistic view of society he
1 For a liberal account of the constant danger of relativist outcomes in liberal-skeptical theories, see
J.A. Hall 1987 chapter 1. For a socialist inclined critique on the same subject, see A. Arblaster 1984.
On Hayek's "historical relativism" that comes about as a result of his persistence on social evolutionism,
see N. Bany 1982 p.55. The aspect of "cultural relativism" is stressed in the same context by D. Gordon
(1981 p.ll).
2 See also F.A. Hayek in F.A. Hayek 1954 pp.3-29 where he gives one of the most clear examples
of the application of his concept of methodology in social sciences and in history in particular.
3 A. H. Murray 1945
4 A similar view is presented by R.S. Rudner 1954 pp.164-168; for a "classic" debate on the
possibility of having "pure" methodology in social sciences, see T. Adorno (et al.) 1976.
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must examine carefully the premises involved in his theory of the nature of his
subject-matter (...). Method alone is not sufficient." (A.H. Murray 1945 p. 152). And
further "The compositive method by itself is still too near cartesian scientism (...)."
(A.H. Murray 1945 p. 152). The points that Murray stresses, then, are: firstly, that
methodology alone is not enough to produce a conception of society. This point
should have already been clear to Hayek since he seems to hold the same view in the
course of his presentation of the problem of methodology. However, both he and
Nishiyama commit the error of considering their methodology as irrelevant to any
ontological premises. Secondly, the particular methodology that Hayek uses is - one
could say for the above mentioned reasons alone - too close to rationalism and
"scientism".
In discussing Hayek's premises themselves, Murray argues that Hayek "has
gone back to before Descartes prepared the way for (and himself committed) scientism
by separating res cognitas from res extensa, thereby giving priority to res extensa and
the methods suitable for the study of res extensa" (A.H. Murray 1945 p. 153). This
leads Hayek to a typical and inevitable cartesian dualism. Hayek's dualism then, lies
in the separation of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself and the consequential
relegation of the latter to an unknowable realm; a separation which is not
methodological but ontological. In that sense, it becomes a necessary precondition of
his theory. Finally, it must be stressed that at least for Murray, Hayek's intention to
introduce the idea into social phenomena is quite obvious. This introduction, however,
seems to be implied contrary to Hayek's explicit intention (as expressed by
Nishiyama) of "purifying" social sciences from any subjectivist ideological
contamination.
6. The Unity of Methodology in Hayek's Theory
It would seem then that Hayek's theory, being "skeptical" in form, has
managed to initiate some confusion among scholars in that field. Many among them
are all too easily prepared to accept the dismissal of totality and of any ontological
presupposition from Hayek's account. For example, N. Barry suggests that Hayek's
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ideas underwent an important shift at a certain point and are now characterized by his
"acceptance of Sir Karl Popper's account of the basic unity of scientific method" (N.
Barry 1979 p.27) thus implying that a monistic concept underpins Hayek's philosophy.
Indeed, Hayek himself argues in the opening pages of his Studies that there is no
essential difference between the methodologies of the various disciplines of science
(F.A. Hayek 1967/69 p.VIII). A.H. Murray (1945), on the contrary, avers that Hayek
implies a fundamental difference between social and natural sciences; a difference that
derives from the differences in their subject-matters. Barry obviously implies that
there was a period when Hayek held a different view on the nature of the
methodologies of social sciences. This view, however, is hardly argued for. The
difficulties that Hayek should have faced in view of the consequences that this shift
would have had in his own theory remain obscure. The concept of the "shift" also
ignores some very important remarks that lurked in Hayek's thought ever since
W.W.H. For example, what is attempted in The Sensory Order is an overall account
of the function of mind during the cognitive process, irrespective of the concrete
subject-matter of that process. In the last section of the book, Hayek clearly seeks to
establish the relation between the physical functioning of the mind and the process of
cognition as a necessary (i.e. logical) one in all its manifestations.
The above objections hold for the attempt that Murray makes to distinguish
between methods in social and physical sciences in Hayek's theory. In fact, Murray's
own view is that such a distinction exists and that Hayek's criteria are not adequate
enough and/or radical enough to bring the distinction forward clearly (A.H. Murray
1945 p. 151). These views, however, tend to confuse two different things. One has
only to look at Hayek's disciple and admirer, Nishiyama, in order to gain a clear
picture of the Hayekian resolutive-compositive-individualistic method. From that
account it becomes clear that methodology occupies a very special place in Hayek's
system. Indeed, it is so closely connected with his philosophical views and, above all,
with social and political philosophy, that neither is there any place for radical
differences between the various sciences nor for any radical "shift". One might argue
that Hayek's terminology underwent some changes - thus becoming more "philosoph¬
ical" - as a result of his acquaintance with Popper, but that is as far as one can go
safely. Murray, nevertheless, thinks that Hayek distinguishes between social and
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physical sciences because of the nature of their subject-matters. "The subject-matter
of social sciences cannot be classified into the categories of the natural sciences for
the social sciences have to do not merely with the relation between things but with the
relation between man and things and man and man." (A.H. Murray 1945 p. 150). The
question, however, is not whether we can use the concrete techniques of the various
sciences interchangeably but whether there are any categories the same in principle
in the process of cognition and thus in scientific investigation. To that question Hayek
never hesitated to give an affirmative answer.
The unity of scientific investigation is assured in the Hayekian thought by
means of two further abstractions. On the one hand, there is the identification of
"our" knowledge with knowledge in general. The bearer of this conception of
knowledge is man in the abstract. Thus, in the subject-object relation, the first pole
acquires its content irrespectively of the second. Furthermore, through the reduction
of "our" knowledge to classification in terms of formal rational self-contained systems,
the second pole becomes reducible and in principle calculable. Hayek's preference
for the various "concrete" techniques (econometrics, statistics etc.) in social sciences
is a testimony to that. It now appears that Hayek is using abstract man as the
quantifiable measure of all things. In this quantification of the abstract man he/she
becomes in his/her turn a "thing" directly comparable to the other things that surround
him1. What is maintained, then, is that the unity of scientific method in Hayek's
theory does not derive from the identity of the techniques the various disciplines use2,
but from the very principle of the existence of his formal rational system. It is this
principle that allows Hayek to argue that in social sciences, as in natural sciences, the
obligatory starting point as well as the only possible conclusion is the (individual)
(reconstruction of formal rational systems from the orderless irrationality of the
"given" "elements". This is the only way to account for the prominent role that the
various forms of calculability - mathematization - play in his theory, as well as his
explicit belief that the ultimate role of science in general is classification - i.e.
1 For a similar view, see Y. Quiniou 1989 p.78.
2 Although, in that respect too Hayek suggests an essential "merger" of the technics towards a more
quantifiable direction.
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construction of formal rational systems. The unity of scientific method is a sine qua
non for the existence of Hayek's formal rational structures1. In that sense, it can be
argued that the unity of methodology derives directly from Hayek's initial dualism.
7. Hayek and Popper on Methodology
A further elaboration of the debate which has developed over the years
between Hayek and Popper on the use of the term "social engineering" can be used
as supplementary basis for the above argument. Hayek has emphatically rejected any
notion of social planning; by implication, he also objected to "social engineering" as
an all too "mechanistic" term. Popper's view, in his first edition of The Open Society
(1945) was that what Hayek called "centralized" or "collectivist" planning
corresponded largely to his "Utopian Engineering". By implication, and since both
writers used the above terms to describe one side of a dual problem, Popper thought
that Hayek's "planning for freedom" corresponded to his "social engineering". The
interesting point is that Popper explicitly derives this correspondence from Hayek's
"scientism". "In other words, Hayek's criticism [of central planning] belongs to the
realm of social technology. He points out a certain technological impossibility,
namely that of drafting a plan for a society which is at once economically centralized
and individualistic." (K.R. Popper 1973 p.285n.)2.
In his later editions of The Open Society, Popper completed his view without
modifying it. After the publication of The Road to Serfdom, he says, it became clear
that Hayek would not use the term "social engineering", because he believes that it is
associated with what he calls "scientism". However, Popper continues, "if by
"scientism" we should mean the view that the methods of the social sciences are, to
1 Notice that for Popper at least it is clear that this unity constitutes the basis of his social
engineering. Notwithstanding Popper's systematic demonstration of the inner relation between his epis-
temological beliefs (which Hayek seems to adopt) and his view for social engineering, Hayek still
refuses to accept the logical necessity of the latter with no apparent justification, as will be argued
below.
2 First emphasis added.
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a very considerable extent, the same as those of the natural sciences, then I should be
obliged to plead "guilty" to being an adherent of "scientism";" (K.R. Popper 1973
p.286n.). It seems plain, then, that Popper accepts a relation with positivism much
more easily. This point leads back to Murray's critique of Hayek. Indeed, the
essence of his objection - that is, that Hayek cannot construct a "Free Society"
underpinned by an ontologically neutral methodology, and that his methodology was
too close to "scientism" - is what Popper openly admits. In that sense, Popper
believes that, in the last analysis, Hayek too is of the same opinion. Therefore, he
suggests, if the terminological issues are left out, Hayek's views are, in fact, favorable
to his "Social Engineering" to the extent that Hayek, too, argues for the need, in a free
society, of a reconstruction of what he terms a "legal framework". Thus, Popper's
view remains essentially unalterable. The "scientistic" approach to which he pleads
"guilty" also applies, in his opinion, to Hayek's case1.
Popper repeats this view in his later The Poverty ofHistoricism2. He mentions
Hayek's objection to his term and proceeds to a clarification. Take the technological
hypothesis that one cannot centralize within a planning authority the knowledge
needed for the satisfaction of personal needs in society. The social engineer must use
the technological knowledge provided by the hypothesis which informs him of the
limitations of his own knowledge, says Popper (K. Popper 1960 p.64n.). Popper
insists that this case will demonstrate the compatibility (if not identity) of his ideas
with Hayek's. The fact, however, remains that Popper does not see any difference
between his system and that of Hayek's despite his insistence on the technological
nature of the hypothesis and the engineering role of the reformer.
Hayek's own position3 does not seem to point towards an essentially different
direction. Hayek states that he is reluctant to adopt the term because "engineering"
suggests too much of a technical problem of reconstruction. However, the content of
1 The same opinion is expressed by R.S. Rudner. Rudner argues that although Hayek disavows
scientism in the sense defined by Popper he is unable to produce an argument which will establish his
point. Rudner concludes that "it is not always so clear that the distinction to which Hayek's important
arguments apply is a distinction in methodology." (R.S. Rudner 1954 p.164).
2 K.R. Popper (1957) 1960.
3 At least as it is stated in his relatively recent F.A. Hayek 1976 p.l57n..
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the term seems to be in accordance with his view that "we can always only tinker with
parts of a given whole but never entirely redesign it" (F. A. Hayek 1976 p.25).
Related to the above discussion, but also pointing out an original problem that
emerges when an account of the Hayekian theory is to be given in such terms, is
Gray's view of the differences between the two philosophers. Although Gray's initial
statement is that Hayek's account is quite different from that of Popper's, he does not
seem to be able to establish his view sufficiently. Gray suggests that Hayek espouses
a sharp distinction between the growth of knowledge in natural and in social sciences.
Gray also argues that Hayek's case for a "Free Society" precludes "anything like
conscious planning even of specific social institutions ("piecemeal social
engineering")" (J. Gray 1986a p. 113). This argument, however, has been doubly
refuted both by Popper and by Hayek himself. Popper's view has already been cited;
Hayek's refutation appears in the form of positive propositions for the planning of a
"Free Society"1. It is also apparent in Hayek's own equation of the essence of
Popper's view with his account of social change (cited above). Gray's concluding
remarks seem to reveal some difficulty in finding any substantial differences between
the two thinkers in terms of purely philosophical premises. "Hayek differs from
Popper, then, in his highly conservative view of the limitations of reason and the
dangers of theoretical inquiry into the social order and his corresponding modest
account of the role of the state in social life." (J. Gray 1986a p. 113). But, Gray adds
immediately, "It would be a mistake to exaggerate this difference: both, after all, are
critical rationalists, sharing a common attitude to the constructivism of Bacon and
Descartes in the theory of knowledge" (J. Gray 1986a p.113). Both also endorse an
evolutionary view in epistemology. This seems to suggest that they both start from
similar (if not the same) epistemological and methodological views. It also seems to
stress the importance of Murray's critique - namely, that in the last analysis it is a
matter of premisses. Hayek ends up with a highly conservative account, not because
his "scientific evolutionary" method led him to this, but because he led his method to
1 See critique in part II and especially in part III on Hayek's proposal of a "Model Constitution".
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conservatism; his conservatism was implicit right from the beginning1. Popper, on
the other hand, using a similar epistemology2, "was led" to politically different
conclusions3. Again, Hayek does not hesitate to abandon his highly acclaimed
epistemology and methodology when their outcomes are not in accordance with his
political views. As Gray himself observes, the view that our reasoning always comes
to a stop at our most basic practices ("justificationism") poses severe problems in the
Hayekian theory whenever Hayek suggests that some areas of contemporary practice
must be revised in a radical way. "The justifications view that all criticisms must
presuppose uncriticizable postulates or assumptions seems to be abandoned by Hayek
in practice when he condemns large areas of current moral sentiment and practice as
inimical to liberty, social stability and indeed to the continuance of our civilization."
(J. Gray 1986a p. 114). It is precisely this phenomenon, and the resulting impossibility
of accounting for Hayek's theory in purely theoretical terms, that underpins the view
that any critique of Hayek's theory which aims beyond a mere description of his
inconsistencies must take his political premises as the determinative factor.
8. Agnostic Implications of Hayek's Theory
It would be superficial to assume that the distinction between epistemology and
ontology and the exclusion of the latter from Hayek's theory was due to some kind
of mistake or naivety. Rather it is the result of a necessary "omission" which,
paradoxical as it may appear, springs right from the heart of modem rationalism.
Hayek, of course, is well known for his denouncement of rationalism. Indeed, his
work can be characterized - not without some justification - as anti-rationalistic. But,
as can be shown from most of the passages where Hayek deals with rationalism, the
1 For a similar point, see Y. Quiniou 1989, A. Arblaster 1984 and R. Vernon 1976 (p.265 and
p.266).
2 For a different view see KJ. Scott 1960-1961 pp.331-336.
3 Indeed, it now seems plain that the "consensus" politics of the 1950s and 1960s were deeply
influenced by the "social engineering" thesis.
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term is used in a superficial and unhistorical way1. The characteristic of modern
thought, however, (in contrast with that of, say, the Middle Ages) is that it refuses to
accept the world as something that has simply arisen independently of the knowing
subject and tends to conceive of it rather as its own product2. Kant was in line with
this view and so were Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and Leibniz before him to the
extent that they all believed - each in his own, different way, of course - that the
object of cognition can be known by us for the reason that, and to the degree in which
it has been created by ourselves. It is on this basis of cognition whereby the objects
are constructed out of the formal propositions of objectivity in general and classified
into formal systems (like mathematics) that modem rationalism was developed. And
that is as true in the case of Hume and Berkeley - whom Hayek considers as the
founders of his anti-rationalism - as it is in case of Spinoza and Leibniz3. What else
is the doubt of the "skeptical" philosophy as to the ability of "our" knowledge to
achieve universally valid results-, if not the other side of an unlimited confidence in
the ability of these systematized, classified objects to account for the true essence of
all things? What is in common in both cases is the equation of formal, rational
knowledge with knowledge in general and with "our" knowledge. Rationalism in the
sense of a formal system whose unity derives from its orientation towards that aspect
of phenomena that can be grasped by the understanding, existed, of course, long
before the birth of modem thought. What however distinguishes modem rationalism
is its claim to find a principle to connect up all phenomena which in nature and
society are found to confront mankind4. Hayek's5 use of anti-rationalism is
employed unhistorically as an abstraction. But if the question is pressed as to which
1 Hayek seems to place his whole argument in a false dilemma: either one will accept the absolute
sovereignty of consciousness or one has to concede for a sovereignty of "nature" - primarily understood
in the sense of his social evolutionism. The point comes out clearly in R.A. Arnold's (1980 pp.344-347)
presentation of the "Hayekian position".
2 The following analysis is based on the concepts that G. Lukacs advances in G. Lukacs 1971 and
G. Lukacs 1980.
3 On that point see Adorno's critique of positivism in T. Adorno (et al.) 1976.
4 See G. Lukacs 1971 111-121.
5 And, it should be noted, Popper's also.
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spheres of life is this anti-rationalism related then it becomes clear that Hayek's anti-
rationalism is only the other side of modern rationalism.
The way Hayek faces the problem of philosophy is much the same as the way
the "skeptical" theorists have done before him. The problem seems to be reducible
to two seemingly unconnected, if not contradictory complexes. On the one hand, there
is the matter (in its logical sense), that is the content of the forms/categories with the
aid of which "we" can get to know the world because we have created them. On the
other, there emerges the problem of the "whole", of the totality of knowledge, or the
"ultimate objects of knowledge" which are needed in order to gather partial knowledge
into a totality, a cognizable world.
Hayek, along with the skeptical philosophers before him, dismisses the
possibility of answering the second set of questions. He even takes them as false
problems1. However, the question of totality is by no means left out of the Hayekian
system. It emerges for instance in the sharp distinction between phenomena and
noumenena and the repudiation of all attempts of "our" reason to obtain knowledge
of the latter. The first set, thus, the content of the forms, appears to have nothing to
do with the second which now constitutes the realm of the "beyond". Nevertheless,
totality seems to leave the beyond and re-enter the "this-sidedness" of the problem
every time the question of relating the sensuous content to the rational form appears.
It does so in the form of the orderless irrational content, that is as the content that it
is impossible to reduce to its rational elements2. Thus the existence of the sensuous
content has to remain absolutely irreducible (i.e. irrational). This is how Hayek comes
to face the problem of the "pure core" of empirical facts. The question for him is: are
they to be taken as "given", or can this "giveness" be dissolved further into rational
forms - i.e., can it be conceived as a product of "our" reason3? Hayek promotes the
1 Something that Kant has already done in his Critique of the Pure Reason, notably in the section
on the Transcendental Dialectic, but also Hume, and of course Mach and modern empiricism, positivism
and perhaps more crudely than all, pragmatism.
2 The most extreme case here is the concept of the pre-sensory experience the content of which is
taken as irreducible by definition because it is unconscious.
3 The question holds both in the case where empirical facts are purely "sensuous" and in the case
where their "sensuousness" derives from their "factual" essence, as Lukacs (1971 p. 116) notes.
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latter answer. But in doing so he does not seem to understand the consequences for
the existence of his own system. With that, totality leaves the "beyond" for good and
reappears as the necessity for formal rational determination of the system - now taken
as a whole, an all-embracing system, hence an ultimate object of knowledge.
Furthermore, the impossibility of comprehending the whole with the aid of the
conceptual framework of the rational partial systems and the irrationality of the
contents of the individual concepts are only the two sides of the same problem.
It can thus be shown that the demand for a universal system - a demand central
to the whole of modern rationalism too - which so clearly emerges from the
mechanistic approach of Hayek's, becomes impossible as soon as it is consciously
stated1. For a rational system (order) has meaning to the extent that it arranges the
partial (individual in that case) systems of forms into a coherent whole. This
arrangement must be "necessary", that is, it must be created by the partial forms
themselves. Such a system is all embracing and self-sufficient - that is, "closed" - in
the sense that it is determined by the positing of its first principle; all consequences
must be contained in the first principle, deduced from it, and thus, they must be in
principle predictable and calculable2. And that holds good for Hayek's claim as to
the unpredictability of the consequences of social order too. For Hayek's claim is
merely a quantitative one. He argues that no one can grasp the totality of postulates
which appear as an infinite process. However, this limitation implies the impossibility
of surveying the whole of the system at once; but it says nothing of the principle of
systematization as such. That is why Hayek in his Sensory Order does not exclude
the possibility of a computer doing so; a possibility which he later subdues in the light
of the disastrous effects it would have for his political theory.
Furthermore, the principle of systematization is hardly reconcilable with any
kind of "facticity" that has to be accepted as actuality. Hence, the dilemma arises.
Either the irrational content must be wholly integrated into the rational form; that is,
the system must be comprehensive enough to accommodate all irrational contents
1 This point is also made with regard to the absolute distinction between facticity and concept by
T. Adomo (in T. Adomo (et al.) 1976 p.6).
2 See G. Lukacs 1971 p.117.
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rationally and ignore the rest as if they had no actuality; or, once we accept actuality,
the content or matter must be comprehended as reaching into the form and its
organized structure as a system - that is, in the system itself. In the former case the
result must be the exclusion of actuality as non existent, hence, dogmatism. In the
latter, its inclusion as the determinative factor of the system. But in that case the
system can no longer hold as such. At best, it might become an account of facts
which are not rationally linked, that is, not systematic. The system loses its self-
sufficiency as well as its "closeness", but at the cost of self-annihilation.
It is precisely this insoluble dilemma that forces Hayek into the abandonment
of ontology as amounting to "metaphysics". And it is also that contradiction that
forces him to deny as "unscientific" any attempt of philosophy to achieve a unified
account of the whole realm of the knowable. Knowledge, in Hayek's theory, can only
hope to provide the understanding of isolated specialized areas by means of abstract
rational special systems which are fully self-sufficient and for that reason "closed".
It is his firm belief that "The social sciences, thus, do not deal with "given" wholes
but their task is to constitute these wholes by constructing models from familiar
elements". Hence, Murray quite accurately remarks that, for Hayek, "Social sciences
has to do with a world of "constructs" or ways of thinking." (A.H. Murray 1945
p. 150). This also explains the profound importance that Hayek attaches to some
techniques such as statistics in social sciences.
His dismissal of the knowability of the social being is also based on the
impossibility of knowledge's constituting a unified whole. His account of
methodology in the "independent" sciences derives again from the demand for
"exactness" in each "independent" scientific area and his (true) belief that the highly
abstract specialized rational systems used in such an area cannot give an adequate
overall account of the knowable1. Rationality in the sciences and in "our" knowledge,
then, emerges as the possibility of our creating unproblematic rational partial systems
in a methodically purified world, that is, after their abstraction from the "irrationality"
1 Economics are only a subject-matter in that problem. The abandonment of "macro-economics"
and their replacement by "econometrics" furnishes a clear example of the above problem. The
implications are even more extreme in the case of Friedman and the Chicago School as well as in the
whole tradition of American pragmatism.
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(non-createdness) of their underlying material base.
Nowhere is this distinction (and counterpoising) of the created-hence-rational
as opposed to the non created, given-hence-irrational more clearly present in Hayek's
theory than in his fundamental category of the rule of law1. Thought, for Hayek, can
only establish the irrationality of matter as the "ultimate fact". This irrationality,
however, reappears every time an attempt to give an account of the whole is made2.
It is from this point that the category of culture and cultural evolution of traditions (so
prominent in Hayek's social theory) acquires its function. Tradition, in its dual
substance of made but not designed, becomes the ultimate horizon of totality. It
cannot be derived from anything else and has to be accepted in its own terms, as
"facticity". It is the ultimate facticity the limit beyond which nobody can reach; and
at the same time it also acquires its irrational or rather supra-rational character as
facticity, with all the social and political implications that this may have3.
The problem of objectivity or actuality, acquires a rather crucial significance for
the Hayekian theory. In the closing section of The Sensory Order Hayek states that
"We must assume the existence of an objective world (or better of an objective order
of the events which we experience in their phenomenal order) towards the recognition
of which the phenomenal world is only a first approximation" (F.A. Hayek 1952a
p. 173). It seems, however, quite unlikely that we shall be able to find any reason
for this conclusion in The Sensory Order. On the contrary the whole argument is that
there does not exist any relation of gradual or procedural or any other kind of
approximation between the mental and the physical order, not to mention the solid
denial of objective or real world right from the opening of the book. In the first
place, notwithstanding the initial rejection of the "metaphysical" distinction of classical
philosophy - i.e. that between appearance and reality4 Hayek seems unable to escape
from it. In that case his thought clearly concedes legitimacy, in the last analysis, to
the distinction between appearance and reality. Secondly, however, the position held
1 The distinction reaches its metaphysical highlight with the equation of social with natural laws.
2 As in the case of society, or history for example.
3 These implications will be examined more thoroughly in part in.
4 Or, form and content as it has been expressed supra.
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by Hayek in the above passage presents some difficulties which become fatal for his
system as such. For, Hayek is now trying to resolve the problem of totality by the
(logical) hypothesis that the irrational, orderless and "given" actuality1 can, in fact,
be mastered. It is obvious that the mere recognition of an objective actuality which
transcends the limits of irrational matter as content, implies not only the recognition
of matter-out-there but also the tacit admission that the rational form may be
determined by the irrational content. Hence, the inadequacy of the system-order as
such - that is, the impossibility of establishing formal logical (i.e. systematic) links
between the various facts the forms of which are (or can be made) rational2.
The self-annihilating (for the system) consequences of the above passage can
also be seen in the way actuality is accounted for. It is by means of a logical
assumption, that is, by a logical transcending of the limits of the system-order itself.
It should be noted that the objection raised here does not imply the recognition of the
form-content or appearance-reality relation either as a false or as an unsurpassable
problem. So far, it only seeks to delimit the horizon of that dilemma and to point up
the impossibility of both holding to the epistemological sovereignty of a formal
rational system and transcending that system (by means of formal rational
assumptions) by recognizing an "independent" actuality. Thus, the above quoted
passage has repeatedly been pointed out as an example of inconsistency3.
That the concept of actuality cannot be derived from Hayek's system can
probably be shown best with reference to his social theory. Here Hayek emphatically
excludes the possibility of getting to know anything that approximates to a totality
precisely on the grounds that a classification of actuality into a formal system can
never be adequate. Here, thus, there is no question of a gradual or any other
approximation between appearance and reality. On the other hand, as Gray observes,
Hayek sometimes relativizes any distinction between appearance and reality (J. Gray
1 In that case, objective actuality.
2 Something to be noticed here is the immediate "correction" of the term "world" with the term
"order". It remains completely incomprehensible how Hayek managed to attribute an order to objective
actuality. After all, it is the irrationality and orderless character of that realm that Hayek seeks to
establish throughout his work.
3 See for example, M. Forsyth 1988 p.243.
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1986a p.250n)\ There is an obvious note of disapproval in Gray's remark too. He
seems to imply that such a relativism would inescapably lead to a sort of agnosticism
the consequences of which we can hardly overcome. This view, which, in fact, seems
to correspond to a very real danger for the Hayekian system, stresses the disastrous
results that this relativization of the relation between the rationally constructed form
and the "given" content might have. But what lies behind it is the tacit assumption
that what appears at first sight as "given" is bound to remain in that state throughout
the process of knowing. Hence, the need for a clear distinction at every time between
the rationally constructed and the irrational "given". Indeed, this is the only way to
avoid relativism once the two poles of the relation are taken as independently existing,
self-contained categories - that is, once they have been abstracted from the relation
itself. And in so far as Hayek sees the question of totality, of the ultimate objects of
knowledge, either as metaphysics or as irrelevant to epistemology, in so far as he
tends to consider (through the a priori limitation of mind) the "ultimate" objects of
knowledge as formal rational classifications of irrational content, that is, in so far as
the problem of the origins and nature of irrational content is unconditionally
recognized and considered as insoluble, one can hardly accuse Gray of doing him any
injustice. What Hayek emphatically disavows, however, could be the way out of that
dead-end position: that is, dynamically to relativize the two poles of the relation by
recognizing the constant possibility of the "given" becoming "created" and the
"created", "given". It is this resolution of actuality into necessity that Hayek is not
prepared to undertake, as will become clear in the causality-necessity question
discussed below2.
Even if there were an objective world, a judgement that Hayek should have
never permitted himself, the whole of The Sensory Order is dedicated to convincing
1 Notice that, for Gray, it is clear that Hayek tackles the problem strictly within the limits of
traditional philosophy.
2 Notice, however that, for all his reluctance to attribute any clear meaning to actuality, in his
political theory Hayek, at least at times, seems to conceive of actuality as "goodness" thus lapsing into
dogmatic conservatism. Thus, Nishiyama, obviously feeling uncomfortable for advocating antirationalism
in the field of politics, "explains" that"(...) as soon as we enter from the discursive world of scientific
investigation to the one of action, we shift [sic!] from our anti-rationalism to our critical rationalism"
(C. Nishiyama 1967 p.346).
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us that we will never come any closer to an understanding of it. Furthermore, as Gray
rightly points out, Hayek does not manage to prove that our knowledge does in fact
approximate actuality through the process of trial and error and its "historical" version
of competing traditions. Especially after the exclusion of necessity from Hayek's
theory the problem becomes unsurpassable. That is, developments in human history
hitherto might as well lead steadily away from actuality rather than towards it1.
Another problem appears with the identity that Hayek implies between the
physical and the external world. It should be remembered that Hayek defines physical
world in the opening of The Sensory Order as the classification "we" make of certain
physiological events. Consequently, both the phenomenal and the physical orders are
classifications of our mind - they are products of our consciousness. So, the question
of the relative priority as between mind and matter has already been answered without
been asked. Maybe that is why Gray comments: "In philosophy, as in life, Hayek
avers, we must take much for granted, or else we will never get started" (J. Gray
1986a p.5). There is no logical or epistemological necessity to attribute any
objectivity to the "physical" order. Hayek himself implies this, in a way that marks
what is going to remain a constant tension between a naturalistic-mechanistic and an
antirationalistic-conservative approach throughout his work, when he discusses the
problem of reality. "To accept this latter test [procedure employed by physical
sciences when they ascertain that two objects which appear identical do not behave
in the same way in relation to others] as the "criterion" of reality would force us to
regard the various constructs of physics as more real than the things we can touch and
see" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.5)2. It is quite clear that Hayek cannot derive the existence
of a real world from his theory. There is no legitimate way of referring to the
external world, in an objective sense as distinct from ourselves, let alone to take it as
an "order", when the only thing that initially exists is organizing mind. Indeed, Hayek
tends towards this position in some parts of his book. "Whenever we study qualitative
differences between experiences we are studying mental and not physical events, and
1 For the presentation of Gray's objection see the relevant section of part I.
2 M. Forsyth (1988) however, seems to be on the right, especially in the context of the
"approximatation" theory, when he points out that that is precisely what Hayek is doing in his
mechanistic account of the cognitive process.
112
much that we believe to know about the external world is, in fact, knowledge about
ourselves" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.6). Now, although Hayek has distinguished his
division of the world into phenomenal and physical from the traditional idealist
distinction between appearance and reality, in the philosophical section of his book he
seems to return to the traditional concept. The distinction between phenomenal and
"physical" (which in his opinion is now equivalent to external) world is treated along
the lines of traditional philosophy: "We thus possess knowledge about the phenomenal
world which, because it is in this manner implicit in all sensory experience, must be
true of all that we can experience through our senses. This does not mean, however,
that this knowledge must also be true of the physical world, that is, of the order of the
stimuli which cause our sensations" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p. 168). In this passage the
physical world is not treated as the formal rational order that man attributes to nature
but as the order of nature itself which man is unable to reach. Notice, however, what
an unstable status this order has. On the one hand, it is supposed to have a "structure"
of its own; on the other, this status is attributed to it only as long as it is a "content" -
that is, a stimulus for the formal rational system-order.
We have seen that in this section of The Sensory Order Hayek applies the term
"physical" as a synonym of external. This means that he recognizes of necessity at
least two distinct parts - "subjective" and "objective", internal (rational, formal, sys¬
tematic) as distinct from external (actuality). This, however, leads us to an
inconsistency: the unified order of events - Hayek's "monism" - collapses.
Furthermore, he identifies the external, physical world with something that exists
independently from our mind - although he admits that it exists only for "us", as an
order of stimuli. It is, thus, in the form of the distinction between res cognitas and
res extensa that dualism becomes the actual starting point of Hayek1.
9. Hayek and Machian Empiricism: The Theory of Pre-Sensory Experience
Hayek's book The Sensory Order, being a treatise of theoretical psychology,
1 See also A.H. Murray 1945.
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extends over a wide field of topics which cannot be accounted for in this critical
presentation. It might, however be helpful to focus on the last section of the book
which refers to the "Philosophical Consequences" of the theory and which constitutes
what is to become the philosophical basis of Hayek's social and political theory1.
The first problem that Hayek faces in this section refers to the relation of his
theory to 19th century empiricism as developed by Mach. We have argued before that
Hayek's theory can best be understood when related to Mach's empiricism. In fact
Hayek's theory is a "development" of Mach's empiricism in a more agnostic direction.
That his theory constitutes a development of Mach's is also Hayek's point of view:
tideaj]
"(...) in so far as we have been led into opposition to some of these traditionally
associated with empiricism, we have been led to their rejection not from an opposite
point of view, but on the contrary, by a more consistent and radical application of its
basic idea" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p. 172).
The main point of Hayek's critique focuses on the concept of the "pure" or
"primary core" of sensation that 19th century empiricism introduced. The problem
(for Hayek) in this concept is that it implies that the root of the process of knowing
the world - which is supposed to be based entirely on experience - is a kind of direct
communication of properties of the external objects with the mental world. In other
words that the basis of experience is the external objective world. The fact that Hayek
is driving 19th century empiricism towards agnosticism must not discredit his (true)
belief that he is trying to eradicate some of its inconsistencies. Indeed, he is doing
so in view of the radical effects that the "pure core of sensations" concept had in the
validity of the system as such. It is precisely because any direct communication of
the system with actuality would imply some sort of determinative effect of the latter
that this concept must be ousted. The way Hayek criticizes 19th century empiricism
is also very illuminating in view of the contradiction he is facing when he tries to
establish a relation, and what is more a relation of gradual approximatation, between
appearance and reality.
Hayek's critique, then, is directed towards the assertion that objects have
1 On the importance of the book and especially its last chapter there seems to be a unanimous
agreement among modern scholars.
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certain "properties" of their own which might be transferred through our nerves.
Classical empiricism, and Mach as probably the most influential among its leading
figures, interpreted experience as the only epistemological category. They held that
the debate over the relation of matter with consciousness was obscuring and outdated.
But experience was used by Mach in a rather eclectic way. Mach, for example, lapses
into Berkeleyism when he declares that "What we call matter is a certain combination
by elements (sensations)". At the same time Mach often strays into an interpretation
of experience which is open to materialist reading: "The close connection of thought
and experience creates modern natural science. Experience gives right to a thought.
The latter is further elaborated and is again compared with experience"1. From the
above it becomes clear that Mach (and as a matter of fact empiricism) did not manage
to give a consistent account of the word experience2.
Hayek seems to be in complete agreement with this part of empiricism. He
is not in the least troubled by the fact that all empiricists in order to give a definition
of experience are obliged to take refuge in the most general categories of matter and
consciousness. He is not troubled by the fact that the supposed primary category of
experience must be referred to a wider category which is indifferently either matter
or consciousness whenever he is trying to define it. In The Sensory Order he is
unable to refer to one of his basic epistemological categories without at the same time
referring to "Ego", "Consciousness", "Mind" or "external world" and "physical world".
He is constantly obliged to come back to the relation between being and thinking,
matter and mind etc., either indirectly (as in the opening pages of his book), or
directly (as in the closing section). Nevertheless, this is the part of empiricism that
Hayek accepts. He "only" rejects the part of empiricism that attributes some
objectivity to the "events" that provoked experience3.
1 As quoted in V.I. Lenin 1962 p. 145 and p. 150 respectively.
2 For a full discussion on that, where many criticisms of Mach and Avenarius by contemporary
idealists and materialists are taken into account, see V.I. Lenin 1962 pp.144-153. For a scholarly
bourgeois view, see also G. de Ruggiero 1921 pp.51-60. Notice that for de Ruggiero it is clear that
critical empiricism reintroduces idealism in epistemology.
3 Thus, coming close to what de Ruggiero calls absurd irrationalism when criticizing certain currents
of empiricist thought (G. de Ruggiero 1921 pp.60-61).
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In that sense Hayek is purifying empiricism of remnants of materialism.
"According to our theory, the characteristic attributes of the sensory qualities, or the
classes into which different events are placed in the process of perception, are not
attributes which are possessed by these events and which are in some manner
"communicated" to the mind; they are regarded as consisting entirely in the
"differentiating" responses of the organism by which the qualitative classification or
order of these events is created;" and "Every sensory experience of an event in the
external world is therefore likely to possess attributes (...) to which no similar
attributes of the external events correspond" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.166). Here again,
we have the two component parts of Hayek's philosophy. First, subjective idealism
and the denial of anything objective or independent of experience. Then, thanks to
an epistemological inconsistency, we reach agnosticism. The external world exists but
we are not in a position to know anything about its nature.
Hayek also rejects the whole line of materialist empiricism (Bacon, Hobbes,
Locke et al.). This rejection becomes even more apparent in his social and political
theory. The objection to the Lockean principle nihil est in intellectus quod non antea
fuerit in sensu provides the opportunity for him to develop his theory of pre-sensory
experience which is also the answer to Mach. "Sense experience presupposes the
existence of a sort of accumulated "knowledge", of an acquired order of the sensory
impulses based on past co-occurrence; and this knowledge, although based on (pre-
sensory) experience, can never be contradicted by sense experience and will determine
the forms of such experiences which are possible" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p.167). Here,
once again, Hayek seems to place his thought squarely in the appearance-reality, or
form-content problematic. It becomes, thus, obvious that the sovereignty of the formal
rational categories remains undisputable. "Given" irrational matter exists only as the
content of the systematized form; to the extent that it transcends it, it simply cannot
exist for "us". No "communication", no correspondence between the rational form and
its irrational content is allowed1. This reductionism of matter-out-there into matter
as content only leads to a dogmatic overlooking of anything that does, or might, exist
1 There is, of course, a sharp contradiction between this concept, which practically constitutes the
main argument in The Sensory Order, and the correspondence theory that Hayek is trying to establish
in the very last pages of that work.
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apart, either as "metaphysical" or as irrelevant to "our" knowledge. For Hayek, then,
the decisive element which determines the importance and the mere existence of the
content of experiences is the rational, formal system-order. It is clear that the relation
between form and content is a one-way relation. Therefore, the assurance that
"experience is not a function of mind or consciousness, but (...) mind and conscious¬
ness are rather products of experience"1, should now be examined under a new
perspective. For, by experience is already meant a category wide enough to account
for the whole of the construction or the rational system-order. This view is quite close
to Oakeshott's skeptical conservatism2. Indeed Oakeshott's view is that there is no
external harmonizing power which is superimposed on mind. However, in his view
it is apparent that he takes mind as superimposing its forms (patterns) on some
ambiguous content. The sovereignty, one-sidedness and self-efficiency of formal
rational systems is clear enough in Oakeshott. The fact that Hayek uses the
ambiguous (because of the potentially materialist interpretation it carries) term
"experience" meaning by this exactly the same thing as Oakeshott, certainly does not
add to the clarity of his theory. Lenin's criticism that "the word experience on which
Machists build their systems, has long served as a shield for idealist systems, and now
serves Avenarius and Co for eclectically passing from the idealist position to the
materialist position and vice versa" (V.I. Lenin 1962 p. 151) is still quite accurate.
We may also note, en passant, a contradiction which appears between this
definition of mind and consciousness and Hayek's concluding remark, namely that
mind is an entity of its own which cannot be reduced to anything else. It is, of
course, a contradiction in terms, since Hayek has just defined mind as a product of
experience. But it is nothing but a contradiction in terms; Hayek's inner belief is
precisely that rational forms are self-sufficient (even in the guise of pre-sensory
qualities). If we interpret the above quoted passage in the light of Hayek's concluding
remark we will end up with the essence of the theory: an eclecticism in terms which
serves as a cover for idealism.
Hayek replaces the concept of the "pure" core of sensations as the primary
1 Note again the striking similarity with Mach's concepts.
2 As cited supra.
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category of empiricism with that of pre-sensory experience. By pre-sensory
experience, Hayek means the building up of a framework according to which all
perceptions will be classified and acquire their mental significance. "All that we can
perceive is thus determined by the order of sensory qualities which provides the
"categories" in terms of which sense experience can alone take place" (F.A. Hayek
1952a p. 167). This pre-sensory experience is supposed to be acquired by the "past
experience of the individual or the species". In that way, Hayek believes that he has
answered to the problem of the primary category of epistemology and, at the same
time, dismissed the metaphysical "pure" core of sensations. By implying the concept
of species experience, Hayek cannot get away from the problems generated by an
individualistic account of experience. "Species" is only used as a synonym for
individual or as a mythologized and stylized individual. Hayek's concept of pre-
sensory experience, conceived of either individually or on a "species" basis, does not
answer the real question: how is this experience to be accounted for? Hayek says: by
direct interaction with physical stimuli (F.A. Hayek 1952a chapter V); but, he adds,
this experience was not conscious. But if man is capable of acquiring experience
through a direct interaction with the external world, then the whole theory of self-
determined experience as the only possible one does not stand any longer. In the
process of acquiring his first experiences man reflects the external world in his brain
in a more or less accurate way. But, Hayek says, this process is not conscious;
therefore, we must assume that during the process of the accumulation of pre-sensory
experience man does not actually acquire any knowledge of the external world. This
part of Hayek's theory faces many criticisms. Some amongst them have already been
mentioned in the previous part. Liberals, for example, are unhappy with this
naturalistic and mechanistic approach which tends to weaken the sovereignty of
consciousness. How is the latter going to keep its sovereignty if it is ousted from the
level of ontology and is allowed to appear only after the essential process of the
formulation of the "self* has been completed? Hayek, here, breaks completely with
the liberal tradition in that he considers the primacy of consciousness to be wholly
determined by some previous mechanistic process. To the contrary, he comes closer
to Locke's sensualism whereby man is considered as a tabula rasa on which pre-
sensory experiences are inscribed. It is precisely this crude mechanistic approach
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which takes the process of formulation of the "self' as an unbroken continuum of
successive systematic classifications of data that liberals1 disavow. And they seem
to be in the right when they point out that there is nothing distinctively "human" about
such a process which is equally true for all living beings. The question can be pushed
even further in that Hayek's theory is unable to give sufficient grounding to its
presupposition that pre-sensory experiences must indeed be unconscious.
Notwithstanding these objections, pre-sensory experience is of capital
importance. It actually marks the break ofHayek's epistemology both from positivism
and from liberalism2. What is interesting, in that respect, is that it does so in a
naturalistic and "scientistic" way, rather than by means of an appeal to the
"metaphysical" (for example, to the divine), as the "conventional" conservatives are
doing. In that respect, again, Hayek's theory resembles Oakeshott's "skeptical"
conservatism.
The key to the understanding of Hayek's thought lies again in his rational
dualistic approach to the problem of experience. The problem that he faces is that
consciousness appears to be an internal part of the body, which emerges and dies with
it and at the same time appears to be superimposed on it as a guiding determinative
power. The problem, however, taken in abstraction, as an isolated problem of the
"self', acquires an objectively unsurpassable status. Thus, Hayek is forced into the
naturalistic, mechanistic account of the process of knowledge and being. What he
refuses to see is that this dilemma disintegrates once the "body" and consciousness are
not considered in isolation, but as the categories that relate the "self' to its totality, as
individual within the social being.
Hayek's account of the acquisition of the means of knowledge brings forward -
albeit, in an ideologized and false way - the actual situation that predominates in the
social and political "order" he is defending. Man is a tabula rasa in relation to the
experiences he acquires initially. However, knowledge, as well as social activity, can
only be accounted for as conscious knowledge and activity3. Likewise, in the "Great
1 See, for example, M. Forsyth 1988 and R. Aron 1961.
2 See also E. Miller 1976 p.385.
3 See also G. de Ruggiero 1927 p.352.
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Society" man confronts a reality "made" by himself but not designed; that is, a reality
which is alien to him (incomprehensible etc.). He is, at any time, at the mercy of
some eternal, superhuman (i.e. supra-individual) "laws"1. His activity is limited to
the exploitation of the chances that are given to him within those laws. But even in
this "activity" he still remains the object rather than the subject of events. Therefore,
the only proper domain of individual "activity" in that case appears to be the internal:
the awareness of those laws and the awareness of his reactions (desires, beliefs etc.)
to the course taken by events separately.
Experience, however, is certainly not conscious in the sense that man does not
decide whether he will have such and such experiences in the first place. But this
does not tell us anything about the knowability of the world. One must presuppose
that the only experience that leads to knowledge is conscious experience, as Hayek
does - i.e. the result of the dictations of a "free" will2 - in order to conclude that the
world is not knowable. To the extent, however, that man is capable of reflecting the
external world in his brain in a more or less accurate way the latter becomes both
objective and knowable in principle. That is not to say that the process of reflection
is a wholly passive affair3. The argument presented here simply maintains that it is
an image of the external, objective world that we acquire as a result of experience,
rather than a totally subjective self-generated and self-contained interpretation of it,
as Hayek maintains4.
In both cases, however, the theory of pre-sensory experience collapses.
Experience is only valid, in so far as it describes the way individuals come to know
the world. But to the extent that it is used in order to cover the independence of the
category of matter in relation to consciousness and the knowability of the world, it
necessarily leads to problems. The fact that Hayek criticizes the concept of the "pure"
1 Which are even equated to natural laws.
2 A presupposition which is false since experience is not conscious in that sense.
3 For a well-grounded defence of the reflection theory in epistemology, see J. Hoffman 1975 esp.
ch.5.
4 For a materialist interpretation of the process of acquisition of knowledge, see E. Bitsakis 1988.
For a further account of the Marxist theory of knowledge, see J. Hoffman 1975.
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core of sensations within a subject-object or form-content relation is also clear from
his own conclusions. Science, he says, tends to construct an all-comprehensive and
self-contained formal model that will reproduce all the relations between the objects
(events) of the external world but will not provide us with a correspondence between
its parts and the objects of the world. Pre-sensory experience is the basis on which
a theory that cuts all remaining linkages between the objective world and our minds
is built. "To get beyond phenomena, to reach the inner essence of things (...) all these were
regarded by him as attempts to soar our mental atmosphere. His advice was virtually
this: (...) Record, group and classify; but recollect that, when you have done so, you
have attained the limits of your powers". "The aim of scientific investigation is not
(...), the discovery behind the veil of appearance of the nature or the essences of
things in themselves". "The aim of science can only be the development of a system
of categories or principles, in the end organized wholly deductively, which is adequate
to the experience it seeks to order". These two views could easily be thought to
originate from the same person; but they are not In fact they are written with a
difference of no less than a whole century. The first is taken from a book on Hume
(W. Knight 1886 p.137), the second can be found in Gray's book on Hayek (J. Gray
1986a p.6). The similarity of the descriptions is striking.
10. The Dismissal of Necessity: A Subjectivist Account of Causality
The above discussion brings forward the need for amore thorough examination
of the problems of causality and necessity. It must be clear that for Hayek, these
categories, being closely connected to epistemology but also transcending it, can never
acquire an objective status outside the formal system-order. On the contrary they must
be delimited by and exhausted within the activity of the classifying "self'. We have
already mentioned the inadequacy ofHayek's methodology when he stated that we can
derive a "correspondence" between the mental and the "physical" if we prove that the
relations between certain mental and other mental events are identical with the
relations between the "corresponding" physical and other physical events. This
statement surely does not provide us with any criterion of the relation between the
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mental and the physical. It can well justify any religious belief. For. example, for
ancient Indian tribes two apparently related physical events - namely the gathering of
clouds in the sky and rain - were related (or "corresponded") to two mental events
equally related to each other, namely the prayers of their priest and the moods of their
gods. One may argue that the relations between the mental and the physical are far
from being identical. But this argument would be based on the assumption that "our"
or the "scientific" account is actually objective and, thus, true while the Indians' is
not. The development of science through history can provide us with many more
examples. Even if we assume that we know the objective relation between two
physical events Hayek does not provide us with any criterion according to which we
can compare this relation with a relation between two mental events. Indeed, it is
very doubtful if any such criterion exists at all. If the relation between two physical
events is objective, then its identical counterpart in the mental order has to be
objective too. If the relation in the physical order is unalterable, then the relation in
the mental order has to be unalterable as well. One can easily see how profoundly
static, and, in fact, irrational such a concept becomes.
In Hayek's theory there is no notion of necessity. On the contrary, nature
consists of an infinite sum of semi-self-contained substructures which in their turn
consist of an infinite amount of elements1. We select among them according to some
criteria immanent to our mind. Causality is therefore present as logical causality in
the sense that we select this and not that because we believe that it will help us
predict certain events that will maintain the structure. Let us now see Mach's opinion
on the subject: "The Humean criticism [of the conception of causality] nevertheless
remains valid". "Apart from logical necessity no other necessity, for instance physical
necessity, exists". "In nature there is neither cause nor effect". "I have repeatedly
demonstrated that all forms of the law of causality spring from subjective motives and
that there is no necessity for nature to correspond with them"2. We see that Hayek's
concept is identical to Mach's. And that Mach does not deny that his concept of
causality is based on Hume. We also see that for Mach logical and subjective
1 Another word that Hayek takes from Mach.
2 As quoted in V.I. Lenin 1962 pp.158-159.
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causality are synonyms. The line, thus, is as follows: from Hume to Mach and
empiricist agnosticism explicitly; from there to Hayek's agnosticism implicitly.
Furthermore, in nature there is no continuity, no connection "of any significant
kind" between different events. How did Hayek end up with this conclusion? From
the "evident" fact that if this were not the case we would not be able to predict
anything about the physical events1. It didn't occur to Hayek that we might be able
to predict despite the fact (indeed because of the fact) that the world is a unified whole
because this is contrary to his theoretical structures. The striking similarity between
Hayek's statement "The fact that the world which we know seems wholly an orderly
world may thus be merely a result of the method by which we perceive it" and the
19th century empiricist statement "The comprehensive character of natural law is due
to the ingenuity of the human mind" and "Man is the maker of natural law"2 is only
a secondary proof that Hayek's theory is at least 70 years old despite the new
terminology implied.
Arguing that nature is independent from man-made laws certainly does not
imply that it has no laws at all. Nature is ordered according to laws of its own and
what we call order, purpose, law are merely words used by man in order to understand
the initial existence of nature. This does not mean that these concepts do not have
any objective content corresponding to what is happening in nature. It simply means
that there is no identity between mind and nature. It also means that these words
express reality in a more or less abstract and conventional way. It shows too that in
order to understand particular phenomena we must isolate them "arbitrarily", detach
them from their natural connection and wholeness and examine their nature, cause,
effect etc. The fact that human concepts of law, cause or effect have some objective
content can also be asserted in terms of their being products of the human brain which
is in turn a product of nature3.
1 So, if reality does not agree with our theory, too bad for reality! In fact, Hayek uses Carnap's
formulation according to which it is "a stroke of good luck" that formal rational classification applies
to reality (the point is made by Adomo in T. Adomo (et al.) 1976 pp.21-22).
2 Karl Pearson, as quoted in V.I. Lenin 1962 p. 160.
3 For a full development of the materialist concept, see F. Engels 1947 part 1; for a contemporary
Marxist analysis, see J. Hoffman 1975 and E. Bitsakis 1988.
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Hayek, on the contrary, implies a subjectivist interpretation of the process of
knowing. There is no objective necessity (necessity in nature); necessity exists only
in our minds1. The deduction of necessity and causality from human reason instead
of objective reality distinguishes human reason from nature in an absolute way. This
is the real basis of Hayek's "practical" dualism in epistemology. A dualism which is
not at all implied only for "practical" reasons as Hayek suggests, but which is the
necessary outcome of this distinction. This is also the methodological basis of
Hayek's political individualism which, in turn, as we shall see, is much closer to
solipsism and agnosticism than to the classical liberal thought. Furthermore, this
deduction also ends up submitting nature to the domination of reason, as a part of it,
instead of taking reason as a part of nature. That is why Hayek's verbal materialism
("mind is a part of the physical universe") is only an inconsistency in terms of his
theory. If we take nature to be as unordered as Hayek believes and if law and order
are imposed on nature from the outside, then there is nothing left to prevent any
conclusions of religious or mystical character. But if man is a part of nature (as
Hayek suggests) and nature is so unordered how could man's mind become able to
acquire such a highly ordered structure?
A striking characteristic of Hayek's theory, as we have already mentioned, is
the extreme eclecticism through which he is constandy changing places from idealism
to verbal materialism and vice versa. Thus, in The Sensory Order we read, as a
critique to Mach: "(...) by destroying the conception of elementary and constant
sensations as ultimate constituents of the world, it [Hayek's theory] restores the
necessity of a belief in an objective physical world which is different from that
presented to us by our senses" (F.A. Hayek 1952a p. 176). This statement might sound
quite materialist in the first place. But as we have seen Hayek's theory is an attempt
fully to distinguish between what we can learn directly of the existence of the world
and what this world really is. In fact, Hayek is rejecting the phrase "what the world
really is" altogether. His theory can provide us with no adequate proof for the
existence of an objective world. On the contrary, he is constantly trying to prove the
1 See also S.R. Letwin in F. Machlup 1977 p.152. Letwin clearly states that Hayek attributes both
necessity and freedom only to human rationality.
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second part of his statement - namely, that what we know about the world is different
from what the world is. This latter can only be accepted as an assumption (i.e.
mental, "interpretative" activity of the self) which is not based on any direct (sensory
or other) communication. In other words, what we see and touch is only a
phenomenon which has nothing to do with objectivity. It is a world (order) which
depends entirely on our predetermined mental activity. The objective world is
something we must assume (with no obvious entitlement...) but something we will
never get to know. Literally speaking the above quotation is revealing: Hayek's
theory simply restores the external world as a mere belief, a logical activity
("necessity", in Hayek's theory) but not as being.
The total failure of Hayek's theory to demonstrate that there exists something
more than the organizing Ego is shown only a few lines after his above-quoted
"materialist" statement, when Hayek derives natural order from mental order (F.A.
Hayek 1952a p. 176). It is therefore surprising to find N. Barry arguing on exactly the
opposite lines. In his account of Hayek's subjectivism, Barry seems to miss the point
altogether. Thus, he argues that when Hayek says that knowledge is subjective he
does not mean that opinions and values cannot be removed from analysis. But if
opinions and values could be removed what would it be left after their removal1?
Surprisingly enough, Barry maintains that it would be the mere facts. This concept,
however, contradicts Hayek's approach almost directly. If there were a way of
reaching this "pure core" of knowledge, then Hayek's belief that it is impossible to get
to know things as such and his whole theory of pre-sensory experience and "maps",
would become useless. Barry's argument is based mainly on the second chapter of
The Counter-Revolution ofScience where Hayek is trying, among other things, to draw
a distinction between the process of knowledge in the physical as opposed to the
social sciences. Barry's understanding of the argument is that in physical sciences
truth is independent of what men think of the world since it derives its existence from
the objective properties of the material world, whereas, in social sciences, "objectivity"
is pointless since these sciences are only interested in human action which is supposed
1 On that see also Gray's explicit objection. For Hayek, says Gray, we can never acquire a
transcendental point of view. Barry seems to adopt the account that Nishiyama gives of the Hayekian
methodology, with all the problems that appear in it
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to be due exclusively to mental procedures. Barry's interpretation of the Hayekian
thesis suffers from two problems. Firstly, the objectivist character that he ascribes to
knowledge of the world, although at least partly correct, simply is not what Hayek
believes. Hayek's argument is that the question "is there an objective world?" is
meaningless, and that, even if there is such a world, we can never get to know it.
Secondly, this all too sharp separation of the objective (facts, natural sciences) and the
subjective (values, social sciences) generates the problem of the origin of the
subjective1. If the relation of man to nature and of man to other men is to be
examined simply as a subjective relation based on values and opinions, if causality
and necessity are excluded from social sciences, then how can the origin as well as
the "nature" of those values and opinions be explained2?
But what does Hayek try to prove here? The answer comes in a highly
controversial chapter of The Sensory Order (F.A. Hayek 1952a chapter V) and
especially in the section where Hayek treats the "model-object" relation. It appears
again in many parts of his work, for example, in the lecture he gave at the Alpback
Symposium (F.A. Hayek 1978 chapter 3). According to Hayek, our knowledge of the
environment is based on pie-sensory experience in the first place. That means that the
first experience that any organism will have cannot have any direct significance to it.
But every occurrence of such experiences will contribute to the formation of a
network within which every neuron will acquire a defined place and therefore a
distinct significance. When this network becomes complex enough it will become a
"map" i.e. a theory of how the world works. The consequent classifications of
impulses that will take place in this network will produce the "model" of the order of
events that we approach. Thus, the process of getting to know something becomes
the process of a "model-building" according to the initial "map". We select among
an infinite number of elements which constitute our complex environment the
elements which are essential for the prediction of events which are important for the
persistence of the structure. It is a matter of "good fortune" that the world consists
1 For a further critique of some positivist trends on that matter, see J. Hoffman 1975 esp. pp. 189-
198.
1 It is characteristic of that difficulty that in his own examples Barry has to take refuge with the
"visitor from another planet" in order to find an "objective" spectator (N. Barry 1979 pp.22-26).
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of events not interdependent to any significant degree because otherwise we would not
be able to select any isolated small parts of this huge structure, which, as a whole, is
too big for us to conceive, and therefore we would not be able to predict anything.
This process of selection has certain limits. We can never expect to take into account
the whole of the world including ourselves because any model, in order to be
conceived, requires another model of higher complexity.
Such is the theory of knowledge that Hayek presents. What we know as
Nature is the result of the way our mind is organized. It makes little difference that
Hayek presupposes that the initial stimuli are physical; so long as they are physical
they are unconscious and therefore they do not play any role to the process of
acquiring knowledge. From the moment that we gain consciousness it is not the
physical stimulus that we get to know but our theory for it. "Our perceptions are our
only objects" said Hume some 200 years ago...
11. Conclusion
It has been the main purpose of this section to attempt to demonstrate the
inadequacy of Hayek's philosophical premises. His theory meets both serious
problems of inner coherence and overwhelming difficulties when used as an analytical
tool in his social theory.
Hayek tries to present a "new" philosophy. He does so by rejecting the basic
categories of traditional philosophy as "metaphysics". In this regard, the influence
upon him of the "skeptical" philosophy of the 18th century and 19th century
empiricism is obvious. His effort may be resumed in three fundamental propositions.
Firstly, he rejects ontology as irrelevant to philosophy. Secondly, this leads him to
present a "purely" epistemological theory. Purely that is, both in terms of its denial
of ontology and in terms of its "scientific" account of the cognitive process. Thirdly
and perhaps more importantly, he intends to base his entire system, be it social,
economic or political, on the outcomes of this "new" theory of knowledge.
The argument in this section seeks to dispute these propositions both
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separately and taken together, as a whole. Hayek's theory is not new in any but the
most superficial verbal sense. His denial of ontology cannot stand serious examination
since it soon becomes clear that in reality he himself presupposes implicitly some very
specific ontological premises. What is more, these premises tend to contradict his
verbal attack on rationalism to the extent that they are themselves a variant of
Cartesian dualism. His theory, then, is not "purely" epistemological as far as the
exclusion of ontology is concerned. But it is not "purely" epistemological in terms
of producing a scientific account of the cognitive process either. For, apart from the
highly disputable status ofHayek's "scientific" arguments themselves, the theory, were
it to be taken at face value, would become untenable basically because of its inability
to give an acceptable notion of actuality. Finally, Hayek fails to fulfil the third
proposition in that his premises are already problematic and incoherent enough to
exclude even the possibility of seriously undertaking the task of basing a social and
political theory on them1. On that last point however, the whole second section of
this part is dedicated.
1 See also A. Belsey in R. Levitas 1986 p.180.
128
SECTION B: "Freedom under the Rule of Law": Order and Freedom
1. "Order" and "Rule": The Foundations of Hayek's Political Philosophy
So far, we have commented on Hayek's philosophical principles. We have
argued that the Hayekian theory of knowledge lies heavily on two component parts:
subjective idealism and positivist agnosticism. This bizarre mixture of agnosticist
positivism with subjectivism gives the Hayekian theory its distinct color1. An attempt
will be made now to examine Hayek's social philosophy. There are two
complementary concepts which compose the heart of the theory and they are presented
together under the label "freedom under the rule of law". Those concepts will be
examined again in the final chapter and an attempt will be made to show their relation
to the actual political circumstances that prevail in a capitalist society. In this section
the idea of "freedom under the rule of law" will be commented on primarily as a
theoretical principle, that is, according to its inner consistency as well as in respect of
its compatibility with the rest of Hayek's theory.
One of the key concepts in the discussion of freedom under the rule of law is
that of order. Indeed, Hayek dedicated the whole first volume of his Law, Legislation
and Liberty to the clarification and delimitation of this concept in the field of social
theory, as well as to the definition of its function in the problem of liberty2.
Hayek defines order as "a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements
of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance
with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations
concerning the rest, or at the least expectations which have a good chance of proving
correct"(F.A. Hayek 1973 p.36). There is a profound similarity between this definition
- which basically consists of a proposal of how one can get to know an order, rather
than what an order is - and the basic methodological proposition, stated in the opening
1 Apart from Y. Quiniou's (1989) critique of Hayek's subjectivism, see alsoW. Jopke (et al.) 1978,
chap.3.
2 For Hayek's account on the importance of order see F.A. Hayek 1973 p.35.
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pages of The Sensory Order and discussed in the previous part. In The Sensory
Order, Hayek stated that the question "what is X?" has no meaning as such and that
all we can hope to prove is that there exists an overall correspondence between the
phenomenal and the physical world. It must be remembered that for Hayek the
physical world is orderless as such (no causality or necessity prevailing in its
"structure") but can acquire some order as a result of our mental interpretation of it.
In that sense, the definition of order should also be understood as a mental
construction; furthermore, the idea of causality implied in this definition - i.e. that we
can form correct expectations of the whole from our acquaintance with the part - is
only meaningful in Hayek's theory, if it refers to a logical process, not a physical one.
Causality, it has been argued, has only meaning for Hayek as logical causality and not
as objective necessity. Causality in that sense appears again on the level of political
philosophy in the discussion of abstract rules of just conduct. On that level the
dualism of phenomena and things-out-there appears as a distinction between values
(rules of conduct) and facts (actual cases). Hayek again stresses that the relation
between facts and values is a "causal" relation. That is, a relation constructed in its
totality in our minds1.
From the definition of order Hayek draws two conclusions. Firstly, every
society must possess such an order; secondly, such an order can often exist without
having been deliberately created. From that second conclusion Hayek makes the
distinction between made and grown orders. Made or constructed orders (exogenous)
are the orders which have been deliberately planned by an intellect. Grown orders are
what Hayek calls spontaneous orders (endogenous) which have not been deliberately
planned.
Unfortunately, Hayek does not prove that order is a necessary element of every
society although he states it. What is more, this conclusion cannot be deduced from
any ofHayek's previous philosophical statements2. It has long been argued by Hayek
that the way we form ideas is determined by pre-sensory and sensory experiences. In
fact, what we call the world is our sensory - in the wider sense, including pre-sensory
1 We shall return to this point later.
2 See also R. Vernon 1979 pp.64-65.
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- order. Accordingly, the application of Hayek's philosophical principles to the
formation of social orders can only lead to subjectivism. A society can never be
constructed according to one order, it must possess as many orders as the individuals
who live in it. There is no evidence in Hayek's philosophical works that could lead
to the notion of a unitary perception of society by its members. This brings forward
a second point, implicit in the distinction between made and grown orders. In The
Sensory Order Hayek argued that there is no possible way that human mind can get
to know an order in its totality. Consequently, it is impossible to construct one as
well. Nevertheless, in his political writings Hayek seems to accept at least the
possibility of the existence of a made order1. The argument now seems to be: we
ought not to construct an order because there is no way we can take into account all
its details. This differentiation is not merely quantitative. It now seems that Hayek's
attempt is to prove that grown orders are better than made ones. If Hayek was
following his initial position - namely, that there is no way we can get to know an
order entirely - the conclusion should have been that only grown orders exist.
Consequently, the argument would not lie on which order is better but on which order
can exist. If no individual mind has the capacity to construct an order in every detail
it is obvious that even the most well articulated order will still leave many points
uncovered and that these points will follow the evolutionary process that Hayek
suggests. So, if we are to follow Hayek's thought, there certainly cannot be any fully
planned order2. But it also seems that there cannot be any fully grown order either.
Hayek's general argument on grown orders is that they are man-made but not man
designed. In other words, that those who built them could not foretell the results of
1 For a detailed account on that point, see R. Vernon 1979 pp.57-79.
2 For a consistent development of the necessarily spontaneous or "polycentric" character of all
orders, see M. Polanyi's contribution in E. Streissler 1969. Polanyi argues that there is no such thing
as a planned economy and, consequently, that all economies are of a "polycentric nature". The same
argument is developed in more detail in M. Polanyi 1951 pp. 133-137. Serious reservations can be
raised however against Polanyi's argument too. For all his clear statement on that matter, Polanyi's
theory, at times, does not escape the trap of arguing for the desirability rather than the necessity of
spontaneous orders. Notice also that while he explicitly argues for the mutual exclusibility of
spontaneous and deliberate orders in principle (M. Polanyi 1951 p.l 15) he also suggests that where
smaller numbers are involved deliberate orders are not only possible but in fact desirable (M. Polanyi
1951 p.156). Is then society a spontaneous or a deliberate order? For the inadequacy of the Hayekian
argument on the possibility of having a designed society, see also C. Kukathas 1989 p.l 14.
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their actions. Because this is due to the implicit inability of the human mind to
understand an order in all its dimensions, we can say that it is not only those who
built it alone but every human mind that is incapable of understanding the order and
foretell its results. This thought has a twofold implication. On the one hand, even in
a planned order the planner cannot foretell the results of his own plans1. On the
other, in a grown order the results might coincide with the individual plans. So, the
distinction between made and grown orders looks much milder now. Notice, however,
that this view leads inescapably to a sort of justificationism ("what exists is good") of
which Hayek has been accused by "friendly" and hostile critics alike. It seems that
the only way a social order can be judged is a posteriori, according to its results.
And even then, the judgement would be only of secondary importance since the
crucial question - that is, whether this order is viable or not - will have been answered
de facto2. The advantage that Hayek's position has is that it can present the "free
market society" as a qualitatively superior state of affairs and, at the same time, argue
that this society is a permanent one. In other words, it tends to bridge the gap
between the evolutionary approach that leads inescapably to the conclusion that the
"free market society" is only a temporary stage in the process of development of
mankind and his initial intention of arguing for it as an eternal and teleologically
justified state of affairs. This tension is apparent throughout Hayek's work and
acquires its most clear form when Hayek discusses social organization (order) in terms
of applied politics.
The first conclusion drawn from the definition of order was that every society
possesses an order by necessity. It is Hayek's firm belief that order is not only a
necessary characteristic of every society but the supreme concern of all individuals as
well (F.A. Hayek 1976 chapter 7). But not any order, only the spontaneous (grown)
order which is the characteristic of the Great, Open or Good Society3. "(...) the prime
1 See also C. Kukathas 1989 p. 104.
2 For some among the many critiques that highlight that point see M.M. Wilhelm 1972 and J. Gray
throughout his scholarly study of Hayek's thought. Notice also that from the moment that an order must
be politically enforced in order to survive, as Hayek suggests, it can hardly be taken as categorically
different from any sort of "designed" order (R. Vernon 1976 p.266).
3 Always with capital letters, as M. Forsyth (1988 p.244) remarks.
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public concern must be directed (...) towards the conditions for the preservation of a
spontaneous order (...)" (F.A. Hayek 1976 p.2). Here Hayek uses the distinction he
drew earlier in order to justify the qualitative superiority of a certain kind of order.
Since order is an attribute of all societies but since not all societies were Open, Great
or Good he must find a criterion according to which the distinction will be made
possible. However, this criterion is not stated in Hayek's works. In fact, it is very
doubtful if a criterion exists at all on that basis1.
So far, Hayek has argued on the idealist path. He has constructed (although
he would certainly object to the term) an ideal type of society which corresponds to
an ideal type of order. His argument is that we ought to accept that kind of order due
to our inability to understand and consequently to construct anything better. Things
are getting more difficult when Hayek uses his "restricted" or "system utilitarianism"
in order to describe the process of the creation of spontaneous orders as well as to
justify them. In reality, it is a mixture of "scientific" positivist concepts combined
with a utilitarian terminology that brings about what Gray calls a "natural selection of
competitive traditions". Hayek sees our society as a product of a peaceful eliminatory
competition between different traditions. Throughout the process of history, different
traditions, and the orders resulting from their application, were formed by different
groups of people. The rules that constituted these orders prescribed a certain way of
life for the members of those groups. Some of the groups survived and prospered and
even incorporated members of other groups while others perished. The groups that
survived have thus proved the superiority of their way of life and in that way
persuaded or simply demonstrated to the others that this is the best way to organize
themselves.
It is in this way that Hayek introduces the "scientific" criterion of effectiveness
according to which rules and the consequent orders are to be evaluated. This limited
utilitarianism, however, imposes some problems concerning inner inconsistency, as in
fact any limited utilitarianism does. Hayek's utilitarianism is teleological; he starts
from contemporary society, which he considers to be the closest to the ideal, and
deductively assumes that since this is the existing society it must be the one that
1 As Gray, Hamowy el al. were quick to point out (see discussion in part I).
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adapted best to the changing conditions. It is evident that this way of reasoning can
justify almost anything1. The crucial question, nevertheless, remains unanswered.
What is it that guarantees that the outcomes of this process will coincide with the
"Great Society"? Not only is Hayek evading the question, but by criticizing the
outcomes of that process at least in so far as it leads to socialism or a "socialist"-
contaminated welfare state, he openly undermines his "scientific evolutionism"2.
For all his efforts to avoid a transcendental justification of the liberal "Great
Society", then, Hayek seems in the end to come back to the position from which most
defenders of liberalism start. He either has to abandon his views on the "Great
Society" and accept an unconditionally conservative justificationism, or he must
introduce a criterion from the "outside" (moral, rational etc.) according to which the
results of the process will be evaluated. The fact that he does neither explicitly is due
to the circumstance that he takes - quite uncritically - the liberal society to be the
necessary outcome of the process almost by definition3. Pressing the question further,
it rapidly transpires that Hayek does indeed introduce a qualitative criterion as well:
the outcomes of the evolutionary process are desirable only when they are
"spontaneous", that is, when they lead to the "Great Society". This point is
overlooked in many critiques which maintain that Hayek seeks to expose all
institutions to the challenge of the free market. Thus, what is not taken into account
is the fact that for Hayek the order of the "Great Society" is presupposed in the
conception of the market; hence, there is no challenge at all4. We see here an
expression of the same problem of vicious circularity that permeates the whole of
Hayek's epistemology and social theory: "scientific" evolutionism is supposed to
underpin the social organization of the "free" market society; at the same time,
however, this type of social organization is actually a sine qua non of the existence
1 For example, the existence of socialist states as well as the welfare state in exactly the same terms.
2 See also G. Walker 1986 p.65.
3 Thus, R.A. Arnold (1980 p.347) argues that in fact Hayek is not an evolutionist at all. What he
refers to is rather a construction of a certain type.
4 Thus, "Hayek's specification of the environment in which the "evolutionary process" is to take
place guarantees him efficient outcomes" (R.A. Arnold 1980 p.348).
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of social evolution itself. Thus, Hayek's "Great Society" is both the outcome and the
necessary presupposition of his evolutionism and vice versa. Apart from the obvious
problem that this perplexity imposes, namely the possibility of societies being
deliberately constructed, it also weakens the initial "evolutionism".
The parallel use of the two arguments brings a certain tension into Hayek's
reasoning. On the one hand, we have a version of the well known idealist categorical
imperative - we ought to accept the spontaneous order because it is the realization of
the ideal and thus a qualitatively superior state of affairs. We do not have the right
to compromise for the sake of any material or other advantages. Abstract rules - the
backbone of every "Great Society" - are our ultimate values. On the other hand, we
have the "scientific" evolutionary argument, a totally moral-free way of proving the
superiority of our society - the application of an ontology-free method. Spontaneous
order is the best because it is the most effective sort of order. This means that order
is valued as a more or less adequate tool that enables us to reach the ultimate aim, that
is, to adapt and survive1.
The problem, then, is that spontaneous order is presented both as an idealist
ultimate value and as a utilitarian device. Hayek's answer to this difficulty seems to
be that although abstract rules are merely instruments of classification that reflect our
ignorance we must treat them as ultimate values. "This means that though these rules
ultimately serve particular (though mostly unknown) ends, they will do so only if they
are treated not as means but as ultimate values (...)." (F.A. Hayek 1976 p.17). This
attempt to overcome the tension between idealism and positivism in political
philosophy is the crucial point in Hayek's social theory. The question that suggests
itself here is why do we have to create ultimate values if they do not exist? This
point separates Hayek from positivism, as well as from empiricism, quite dramatically.
In fact, it is the only innovation that Hayek brings in political philosophy. The
positivist ideas of an ideology-free social and political theory that prevailed in the
capitalist world for a great part of the 20th century appear no less hostile to Hayek
than does socialism. Hayek's intention is to "prove" in a "scientific" way the
1 Hayek argues explicitly for the instrumental value of the rules of law in many parts of his work
(notably in F.A. Hayek 1976). On that point, see also G. Walker 1986 p. 14.
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superiority of a certain conception of social organization. That this was his intention
became clear ever since he published The Road to Serfdom. But both in that book and
in The Sensory Order his theory was presented mainly as antisocialist and as
antimaterialist respectively while in his later works he seems to be equally hostile to
all "neutral" social theories as well. Hayek's view on this score is that positivism in
philosophy and in legal theory as well as political pragmatism lead to socialism. This
might look quite far reaching1; but it is a fact that, historically speaking, positivism
and pragmatism have proved compatible with forms of social organization that Hayek
rejects (the welfare state being the most comprehensive of them all). Thus, it can be
suggested that Hayek's massive attack on "neutral" social theories and the consequent
re-ideologicalization of political philosophy constitutes the response of bourgeois
thinking to the dead end (both economic and political, moral etc.) that capitalism was
facing by the beginning of the 1970s2. Hayek's own arguments seem to point in that
direction as well. If one ignores the label "socialism"3 that Hayek attaches to a huge
variety of fundamentally different opinions, one will see that the major part of his
attack is not merely directed against the practices existing in the socialist countries but
against those concepts and practices that prevailed during the growth of the welfare
1 Barry, for example, thinks that the opinion that the welfare state is bound to lead to socialism and
totalitarianism "seems more than a little extravagant" (N. Barry 1979 p.117). Also see N. Bosanquet
"(...) it is even more difficult to understand why Hayek thinks that "socialists" have been responsible
for the growth of the welfare state. The role of such conservatives as Bismark is not discussed." (N.
Bosanquet 1983 p.35).
2 In that sense, "The introduction of the idea into social phenomena by Professor Hayek marks in
fact a reaction against the prevailing cartesianism of our time which has also invaded the social studies."
(A.H. Murray 1945 p.153). The argument that Hayek's theory (as a part of the general school of
thought of monetarism) is in fact an ideological response to the legitimacy crisis of the capitalist state
is also advanced in S. Clarke 1987.
3 Indeed, Hayek seems to have a unique concept as to what (and who) constitutes socialism. He has
been widely criticized for attributing the "accusation" of socialism to all but socialist theorists, as well
as, for rejecting from the liberal tradition some of its most important forerunners. It has been suggested
that this is due to Hayek's eclecticist approach which aims at establishing his theory as the only
"natural" heir of liberalism. In order to do so, Hayek is obliged to reject a huge part of liberalism and
to incorporate an equally important part of theories, the liberal origin of which is a matter of debate,
to say the least. For a critique from a liberal point of view, see R. Harrod 1972 pp.293-301. For a
detailed critique focusing on the exclusion of the 19th century utilitarianism from liberalism, see
Robbins 1961 pp.66-81.
136
state1. In theory, it is basically the ideas of the golden age of technology and of the
neutrality of the state that Hayek criticizes. It is the idea that if politics is divorced
from ideologies and left to "neutral" technocrats, things would improve rapidly. In
politics it is above all the "collectivist" tendencies that prevailed among people leading
them to get organized in trade unions and develop a concept of social justice that
Hayek rejects2. This interpretation of Hayek's suggests an explanation for his relative
"underestimation" before the beginning of the 1970s. It is only after the massive
disillusionment of the late 1960s and early 1970s that Hayek's theory was given
extensive attention. It also offers an explanation for the aggressive character of the
theory. According to Hayek the reason why the welfare state collapsed (apart from
its theoretical mistakes) was because it promoted the instincts that were hidden in
ordinary people - such as social justice and collective organizations and actions - from
the times of tribal societies onwards. His theory, in opposition to this, aims at fighting
those instincts and at either persuading people to reject them or forcing them to do so.
The adoption of abstract rules as ultimate values creates some problems of
inconsistency in Hayek's theory as well. If we accept the theory of the natural
selection of competitive traditions as valid, then the conclusion should be that in the
process of the development of human societies the most effective rules survived and
created the "Great Society". If the process of selection is "natural"3, if only the best,
i.e. the most effective rules survive, why do we have to treat them as something
different than what they really are, that is, tools for the achievement of our ends?
Hayek's answer to this is that "the Great Society will not function or maintain itself
unless we do so. The rules of a "Great Society" will serve their purpose only if we
treat them as ultimate ends. But then where is that blind, unpredictable, unconscious,
unknowable, abstract natural process that leads to the "Great Society"? Is it just
1 Barry suggests that the main reasons why Hayek's theory has become the centre of interest today
are both that economic liberalism is "Perhaps the most significant intellectual movement in the current
revival of political philosophy" and "the apparent breakdown of the postwar consensus on economic and
social policy." (N. Barry 1979 p.l and p.3). It is precisely this "end of ideologies" theses that Hayek
rejected right from the beginning. Also N. Barry 1987 chapter 1, "Against Consensus".
2 For a similar concept P. Dunleavy and B. O' Leary 1987 pp.132-3 and N. O' Sullivan 1989 p.7.
3 A kind of continuous "evolutionary filtering" as Gray suggests (J. Gray 1986a p.34).
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man's conscious decision to submit to certain principles1? This contradiction is made
even more obvious when Hayek suggests "practical" solutions to the problems of our
society (M. Forsyth 1988)2. Ever since The Sensory Order Hayek has been trying to
prove that both human beings and societies (orders) follow an unconscious
evolutionary process in which only the most capably adapting will survive. At the
same time, his social theory tends to reject the actual results of this evolution on
morally imperative grounds. Hence, when he rejects certain parts of our actual
society, he does so only to introduce imperatives according to which our society will
become ideal. For example, his "Model Constitution" amazingly ascribes the right
people to the right places so that the right rules will be produced3. There is a double
paradox in this proposal. Firstly, if we follow Hayek's principles this "constructivist"
proposal could not (and certainly should not) take place at all4. For, it is Hayek's
explicit belief that the human mind cannot grasp the outcomes of the evolutionary
process that takes place in society. His proposals, however, presuppose not only the
ability to understand the alleged incomprehensible social processes but also a further
ability to organize them rationally. Secondly, even if Hayek could escape the fate of
mankind, even if he could be in a position to understand and consequently to suggest
ways in which a "Great Society" might be realized, there should not be any need to
do so. Spontaneous orders should take care of that through the evolutionary
infiltration of traditions. After all, they are spontaneous precisely because they do not
1 In that sense, "the socio-economic patterns can be said to require certain political practices only
because they depend on such practices; and if they depend on such practices, the view that they
constitute a "spontaneous" order becomes questionable" (R. Vemon 1976 p.266).
2 In that sense, "The prophet of spontaneous orders would appear to have fallen for the attractions
of paper schemes" (N. Bosanquet 1983 p.36).
3 For a similar concept, see also J. Gray's "The Road to Serfdom: Forty Years On" (in The Institute
of Economic Affairs 1984). Gray brings forward a series of practical political propositions in order to
promote a neoliberal "spontaneous" order. He even speaks for the necessity of "producing a new
generation of journalists" to win the battle of ideas pp.41-43. But, see the more "practical" view of N.
Barry's who rejects the opinion that the victory of neoliberalism depends on winning the battle of ideas,
in "Ideas versus Interests" (in The Institute of Economic Affairs 1984).
4 Thus, "The proposing and applying of constitutions may rightly be seen as a schematic utopianism,
and one properly suspect for its abstractions of tangible realities and its rationalistic formalism and
controls" (K. Widmer 1981 p.9). Widmer's argument is that Utopian thinking and consrtuctivism is an
important part of the Hayekian thought as well as of the whole liberal tradition (1981 pp.5-62,
especially pp.8-10).
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have a need for the "right" people to make them happen1.
2."Law": Facts, Values and Subjectivism
Having discussed Hayek's concept of order and rule an attempt can be made
to describe his account of the idea of law. It can be said that, for Hayek, law is the
corpus of abstract rules prevailing in a certain order and being responsible for its
function and maintenance. In that sense, the character as well as the form of law is
determined by the corresponding character and form of the rules prevailing in a certain
order. A rule in order to exist does not need to be articulated: "such rules might in
a sense not be known and still have to be discovered because from "knowing how"
to act, or from being able to recognize that the acts of another did or did not conform
to accepted practices it is still a long way to being able to state such rules in words"
(F.A. Hayek 1973 p.72). Law, in the sense of enforced rules, is coeval with society2
and thus prior to legislation. Its main feature is that it does not require any conscious
knowledge; rather it is the kind of tacit or implicit knowledge that Hayek has
described in The Sensory Order and The Counter-Revolution of Science, that law
needs. Nevertheless, law became articulated (at least up to a point) in the process of
human history. This articulation had two different effects on the concept of law.
During and because of the articulation itself the rules underwent some changes. But
while these changes were by no means so important as to permit us to talk about
different, purely intelligently constructed rules the concept that law is man-designed
as well as man-made prevailed in our society. Nevertheless, the fact is that rules are
not created; they pre-exist and they are waiting to be discovered. This is even true
1 On this contradiction, especially as it appears on the matter of law, see also J. Gray 1986a p.69.
It should be taken for granted that, since Gray is a favorable critic of Hayek's, he sees no contradiction
but only a "fascinating tension"; nevertheless, he seems to capture the general outline of the problem
quite adequately. See also N. Barry "Ideas versus Interests" (in The Institute of Economic Affairs 1984)
where he poses the question: But what if spontaneous evolution produces not the order of classical
liberalism but the stagnant immobile societies? Barry concludes that Hayek's attack on rationality can
produce a dead end and even subvert the validity of the theory. On that, see also L. Robbins 1961 p.70.
2 For a discussion of this concept, see part III.
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when the legislator is called to formulate rules on which nobody has acted before.
So far, Hayek has tried to justify his ideas on the articulation of law only
indirectly. The effectiveness criterion implied now leads him into one of the most
important parts of his theory, that of the distinction in the field of political philosophy
between ends and means and its projection in morals as the distinction between facts
and values. Thus, he argues that there is no real difference between factual and
normative rules on the ground that "To the primitive mind no clear distinction exists
between the only way in which particular results can be achieved and the way in
which it ought to be achieved" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.80). But, since "from a statement
of fact alone no statements about appropriate, desirable or expected action not any
decision about whether to act at all can be derived" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.80) and since
action is not caused by facts but by our desire to achieve some preconceived ends, it
follows that in the case of the primitive mind the desired end will be achieved in the
only way available. The problem arises when more than one way is available. In that
case and since the "desired end is included in the premises all sorts of normative rules
may derive from them" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.80). This point is decisive for the
understanding of Hayek's theory. Its importance is also stressed by Hayek himself
when he argues that it is only possible to understand his account of the rule of law
when one has accepted the distinction between facts and values1.
The first point to be raised on this score is Hayek's denial of causality in social
theory. His denial of causality in ontology and in the theory of knowledge has been
discussed in the previous section of this part. It has also been argued that the
outcomes of this denial in the field of social theory and politics lead Hayek to
solipsism2. The distinction between facts and values serves as a confirmation of this
view. Facts, according to Hayek, can never be the cause of man's actions. By
implication, "Since choice in action arises from ideas, the study of society is the study
of phenomena formed by subjective ideas"(!) (A. Shenfield in F. Machlup 1977 p.67).
1 See also F.A. Hayek 1973 p.112 and 1978 pp.297-299.
2 For a defence of Hayek's concept see N. Barry 1979 chapter 2. But even Barry, at times, feels
uneasiness in defending all Hayekian positions. In that sense, he argues "It is undoubtedly true that mere
observation is not adequate to explain much of social phenomena." "But at times Hayek simply asserts
as a metaphysical dogma that there is no such thing as objective data (...)" "Outside economics and law
subjectivism might reduce everything to uninteresting explanations." (N. Barry 1979 p.26).
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The real cause of action for Hayek then, lies only within the human intellect1. Only
when mind produces some desirable ends can it be expected that an action will take
place. Therefore, there is no causal relation between reality (facts) and human actions.
Causality is again perceived as a logical function of the mind. That is, it is perceived
as a relation between intelligently produced ends and intelligently selected ways of
achieving them. But this conception is not simply an abstract idealist one. It is also
a voluntaristic conception. Not only does it cut human desires (ends) off from reality;
it also suggests that they are compatible with all sorts of subjectively conceived
normative rules once they have been taken into account before-hand, that is, as parts
of the premises. The two compulsory conclusions derived from the above tension of
are
argument: firstly, human desires are irrelevant to reality; they are completely
subjective and therefore it is impossible for anybody to predict them. Secondly, the
actions that will be performed in order to achieve those ends are likewise dependent
on the wills of all individuals. After all his arbitrary reductions of reality to human
will and mind Hayek is left with only one possible conclusion: nothing can be said
about the ends of others and nothing can be said about the ways in which they will
try to achieve them. In fact, it is quite doubtful if Hayek has the right to assume that
"others" exist at all.
Notwithstanding these problems Hayek manages to produce a whole social
theory from such presuppositions2. "The reason why all the individual members of
a group do particular things in a particular way will thus often not be that only in this
way they will achieve what they intend, but that only if they act in this manner will
that order of the group be preserved within which their individual actions are likely
to be successful" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.80). So, not only is it a fact that people act in
the same way under similar circumstances but there is also a rational justification for
that (apart from simple empirical observation). But, how did Hayek reach that
conclusion? In the first place, it is highly improbable that people will do particular
things in a particular (same) way because, according to Hayek, there is no logical
possibility of assuming that they have the same ends. But, even if they did, it would
1 See also F.A. Hayek 1949 p.59 and p.71.
2 Even causing G. Walker to characterize him as an "objectivist" in morals (G. Walker 1986 p.36)
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not automatically follow that they should try to achieve them in the same way, since
for one end there is an infinite number of subjective normative rules. Hayek reached
his conclusion by introducing two "new" parameters in his theory. In every case, he
says, there are ways of acting which are more effective than others. These ways will
be chosen by those who wish to reach a particular end. And, the effectiveness of a
certain way of action will be judged both according to whether one can reach the
desired end and according to whether this way of acting is conducive or not conducive
to the maintenance of an overall order. The problem that appears in this view,
primarily, is that it simply cannot account for a concrete social situation1.
It is true that normative principles appear to acquire some independence at a
certain stage of development of society. However, it would be superficial both to
delimit this relation to that stage only and to make it absolute by counterpoising its
abstracted poles. Hayek's empiricist approach allows him to "explain" the origin of
the relation between ends and means or facts and values in purely quantitative terms.
In the beginning there was one way of doing something; thus, there could be no
contradiction. When alternative ways emerged, normative considerations emerged as
well. Thus, by creating an unbridgeable gap between ends and means, facts and
values, Hayek remains unable to explain the historical development of society. The
relation that bears the importance, in terms of social philosophy, however, is not one
between ignorance and knowledge but that of knowledge itself conceived historically.
The fact that, when only one way of doing something is known, no discussion on
alternatives can take place, is completely irrelevant to Hayek's conclusion - i.e. the
absolute distinction between facts and values. Moreover, this conclusion seems to
presuppose that the desirability of an end might exist independently of the desiring
subject. For, if the desirability of an end is determined by prior normative
considerations, then it is clear that ethical questions have already been answered
before the desirability is established. At the same time, however, every normative
consideration must have some concrete content, if only indirectly and implicitly. In
that sense, one can establish normative considerations only on the basis of one's actual
1 C. Kukathas generalizes the same point by arguing that this is the source of the "inadequacies of
liberal individualism as moral theory and political doctrine" (C. Kukathas 1989 p. 108).
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existence, that is, on the basis of the totality of one's social relations. It is evident
that, according to Hayek's absolute distinction of ends and means, the alleged
interchangeability of the determinative roles of the two antagonistic poles of the
relation can be extended to the infinite, thus producing a vicious circle.
In reality, Hayek has assumed the independence of the normative "rules of
conduct" long before counterpoising them explicitly to factual ones. It is the isolation
and consequent mystification of the "statement of fact" and its presentation as an
abstract static objectivity that gives him the opportunity to do so. In the first place,
Hayek ignores the inseparable coexistence, in the determination of man's existence,
of social reality and personal decision. Then, he further isolates the content of the
latter by conceiving of it as determined by correct or incorrect "pure" knowledge
alone1. In that sense, he cannot see that the desired end, the posited goal, must
always be the result of alternatives posed by the subject and society together.
There are two levels on which Hayek's concept could be criticized. The first
is whether the complementing of agnosticism and solipsism with some "objective"
categories produces any better overall results; and the second is whether Hayek has
the logical "right" to complete his theory the way he does.
Starting from the second, it should be pointed out that the use of "objective"
categories seems somehow strange in Hayek's theory. By "objective" should be
understood, in this connection, categories that are applicable to everybody. Such is
the use of effectiveness as a criterion ofman's actions. It is obvious that effectiveness
is a much too abstract concept to be taken as a concrete criterion and that much, if not
everything, depends on the meaning it can acquire. This is even more true when one
comes to judge normative rules - that is moral principles - by it. Hayek deliberately
avoids clarifying what he believes effectiveness means. The criterion he suggests,
namely whether a rule promotes the survival and success of the individual, is in its
essence a tautology. Effective is something that has effective results2. Therefore, he
needs a further category in reference to which effectiveness can acquire some concrete
1 That is, as formal quantifiable data.
1 Thus, "The survival of an institution cannot of itself be evidence of its efficiency or usefulness
in any but a trivial (or perhaps tautological) sense." (N. Barry in The Institute of Economic Affairs 1984
pp.61-62).
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meaning. This category is the concept of the maintenance of the order. Now
effective is defined in two ways, as what promotes individual ends - a too abstract
definition - and as what maintains an overall order. Obviously the second definition
is much more concrete but it remains all the same arbitrary. The starting point of
Hayek is that not only the individual desires (ends) are unknown but that since they
depend totally on subjective mental functions (that is, since they are totally irrelevant
to actual facts and conditions) there is no possible way that we can make any
statement concerning them. But now, all of a sudden Hayek not only makes a
statement but he also gives a shape and a concrete content to those desires: individuals
act in the most effective way possible in order to maintain an overall order. How is
this "objective" desire to be justified? Because in that order individual actions are
likely to be successful. But in that case, it is the form of the order, that is, a factual
state of affairs, that determines the actions of the individuals and not a mystical
subjective mental procedure.
Thus, when H. H. Gissurarson argues that Hayek adopts a Berlinian critical
view according to which, if freedom "is simply not to be prevented by other persons
from doing whatever one wishes, then one of the ways of attaining such freedom is
by extinguishing one's wishes" (I. Berlin 1969 p.XXXVTII) he misses the point. For,
it is precisely the example of the "contented slave" that Hayekian individualistic
voluntarism is unable to answer. If Hayek were to present a position where the
concept of liberty would be a fixed idea towards which each individual should strive,
the spontaneity of the development of society would be subverted. Furthermore, the
core of the superiority of Hayek's theory, its very "openness" - namely, that it does
not prescribe any ready-made solutions on the question of freedom, but rather
safeguards the conditions in which each person can individually pursue his/her ends -
would disappear. The introduction of some kind of false or misguided consciousness
- i.e. the position that only some individuals have the ability to understand and
consequently to pursue their interests - is an open contradiction in Hayek's theory1.
But does the admission of "objective" categories improve Hayek's theory at
1 H. H. Gissurarson in The Institute of Economic Affairs 1984 p. 16, as well as, the whole chapter
"Unnoticed loss of liberty". For a supportive view to the argument presented here, see R. Hamowy 1978
p.288 were Hayek is accused of being unable to answer the contented slave "paradox".
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all? What it certainly does is inscribe Hayek in the category of conservative
philosophers. Not only is Hayek formally a conservative, since he accepts all the
basic principles of conservatism; he also is essentially conservative too. The
preservation of an order - but not of any order, as we have seen, only of the
spontaneous order of the "Great Society" which happens to be identical with
capitalism in its most aggressive form - rooted in a profound negation of reason, is
elevated to the supreme value of Hayekian theory.
Many critics support the view that Hayek is in fact a conservative1. For most
of them however conservatism is to be understood, according to certain formalistic
characteristics, as a totally different (even opposed) trend of thought from liberalism.
time
Thus, when arguing that Hayek is a conservative they, at the same, try to distance his
thought from liberalism. N. Barry however, comes close to the essentially
conservative core of Hayek's theory when in a discussion of the similarities (and
differences) between the two traditions, he maintains that today there is much more
in common than the traditional "enemy" - i.e. socialism. In fact there is a common
attitude towards "politics, society, property, justice and albeit to a lesser extent, the
state." (N. Barry 1987 p.87). Antirationalism has now become a common element
between conservatives and neoliberals. The spontaneous development of societies, the
main "new" contribution of neoliberalism in social and economic theory, "is in fact
an old conservative idea" (N. Barry 1987 p.88). Skepticism, and the belief that
because of our ignorance "there is an implicit commitment to the preservation of
traditional practices and procedures" (N. Barry 1987 p.88), is an argument that derives
from Hume who is the intellectual forbearer of both doctrines. Even the evolutionary
approach that Hayek introduces is only another form of the conservative understanding
of society in terms of organic growth (N. Barry 1987 p.90). Anti-egalitarianism and
1 For example, see the sympathetic commentator K.I. Vaughn "The Constitution of Liberty from
an Evolutionary Perspective" in The Institute of Economic Affairs 1984 p. 125; also, N. Bosanquet 1983
p.33 and p.35 where Bosanquet comments on the "uneasy" postscript of the Constitution of Liberty.
Even G.C. Roche III feels that one cannot dismiss the label "conservatism" from Hayek's theory easily;
he therefore proposes to face the problem as a result of possible semantic confusion (G.C. Roche III
in F. Machlup 1977 pp.7-9). Another "friendly" critique comes from R. Harrod. In his essay "Professor
Hayek on Individualism" Harrod argues that "What Professor Hayek seems to be doing here is roughing
in a philosophical defence not of individualism but of the best type of conservatism" (R. Harrod 1972
p.297).
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the importance of family and, of course, of private property are also the main features
in both doctrines (N. Barry 1987 pp.90-91)1. Barry's overall argument seems to be
that there is a mutual infiltration of conservatism into neoliberalism and vice versa.
It is according to this notion that the label of conservatism acquires predominant
significance for Hayek's theory. For, it is the apology for the principles of capitalism
that constitutes the essence of his theory as well as the cause of its unity. Perhaps
Hayek's own concluding comment in The Constitution of Liberty can be interpreted
as a similar proposition2. "In that sense I doubt whether there can be such a thing
as a conservative political philosophy. Conservatism may often be a useful practical
maxim, but it does not give us any guiding principles which can influence long-range
developments" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.441).
3. Freedom under the Rule of Law: The Question of Ultimate Values
Having discussed the concept of law as it appears through the complementary
concepts of order and rule we may now approach the concept of freedom under the
rule of law. The first task is to try to locate the position of that concept in the
Hayekian system. It seems that there is a widespread variety of opinions as to what
really constitutes Hayek's ultimate social and political values. The two mutually
antagonistic poles in this theory, evolutionism and voluntarism, give rise to different
interpretations. Thus, for example, Hayek is presented as primarily an advocate of
freedom in the liberal sense by R. Atkinson3. This also seems to be the opinion
advanced in The New Enlightenment, a highly controversial book where Hayek
himself emphasizes in an interview the evolutionary and traditional aspect of his
theory. N. Barry is a good example of a puzzled scholar. In Hayek's Social and
1 On this point see also B. Girvin 1988.
2 Although Hayek obviously thinks that it is only conservatism that has been absorbed into
liberalism.
3 R. Atkinson 1988.
4 D. Graham and P. Clarke 1986.
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Economic Philosophy, liberty is considered as "the centre of gravity" of Hayek's
thought. A few pages later, however, he reintroduces the question of whether liberty
is a value in itself or whether it depends on other things. The answer "Hayek holds
both these views" and "But although he does say that freedom is an important moral
value irrespective of its consequences his main emphasis is on it being essential for
his theory of progress and his theory of acquisition of knowledge" (N. Barry 1979
p.67) does not seem to clarify the problem1. A different opinion takes Hayek to be
defending "liberty as the supreme good, a rights-based ethical tradition" as well as
"markets as discovery mechanisms and as information devices" which brings him to
regard the "maximization of knowledge" (in the sense of data) as the supreme value2.
Hayek's concept of freedom is also the key concept on which R. Norman's criticism
is founded3. It seems thus that the view that "Hayek is not precise as to the place of
individual liberty in the structure of values of his social system" (P.W. Dyer and R.
Harrison Hickman 1979 p.389) almost suggests itself. In Gray's book (J. Gray 1986a)
the two tendencies are presented with almost equal weight and are left totally
uncriticized. Thus, Gray believes that the spontaneous order as it emerges through the
evolutionary concept is one of the two basic ideas of Hayek. The other is freedom
under the rule of law; but when the question "How then does the idea of spontaneous
order strengthen the case of liberty?" arises he is unable to give a satisfactory
answer4.
Hayek's own testimony as to what is to be considered as the ultimate value of
his theory is not helpful at all. In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek claims that freedom
is the ultimate value. But by freedom Hayek there means freedom of economic
activity, not freedom under the rule of law irrespective of the commands of the latter,
and it is precisely because of that meaning that freedom is contrasted to democracy
1 Also N. Barry 1987 p.50 and p.63 where he considers the two component parts (efficiency and
liberty) as holding independently to each other.
2 P. Dunleavy and B. O' Leary 1987.
3 R. Norman 1987.
4 En passant, we must note that Gray's question is not correct because it presupposes: a) that there
is a relation between spontaneous order and liberty, and b) because as it is phrased it gives to liberty
the status of an ultimate value - a status that Gray has not admitted throughout his book.
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in that paragraph (F.A. Hayek 1944). In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek
apparently takes freedom as the basic concept of his analysis. But it is here that a
peculiar content of freedom first appears clearly: "Whether he is free or not does not
depend on the range of choice but on whether he can expect to shape his course of
action in accordance with the present intentions (...)" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 13). The
second chapter of the book gives a detailed account of the "selective elimination" of
traditions and underlines the fact that "the case for individual freedom rests chiefly on
the recognition of the inevitable ignorance of all of us concerning a great many of the
factors on which the achievement of our ends and welfare depends" (F.A. Hayek 1960
p.29). Now liberty has ceased to be a value per se and has become an outcome of the
evolutionary process that mankind follows and a device leading to "the achievement
of our ends and welfare". It seems then that individual liberty is a concept shaped for
"rule following-animals" (C. Kukathas 1989 p. 90). Furthermore Hayek states that
"Liberty is essential in order to leave room for the unforeseeable and unpredictable;
we want it because we have learnt to expect from it the opportunity of realizing many
of our aims" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.29). Here the utilitarian approach is even more
clear. Finally, in Law Legislation and Liberty, Vol. n, Hayek suggests that abstract
rules must be treated as if they were ultimate ends because it is only through such a
universalized statement that we can guarantee the preservation of an abstract order.
"(...) a timeless purpose which will continue to assist the individuals in the pursuit of
their temporary and still unknown aims" (F.A. Hayek 1976 p. 17). Again Hayek is
using the rule of law, "the science of liberty" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 148), in a utilitarian
sense. The subjectivist relativist approach, the unknown individual aims and welfare
appear here as the real ultimate ends.
It, therefore, comes hardly as a surprise to find most of the liberals and
libertarians attacking Hayek on this point. What they all object to is the attempt to
construct a liberal social and political theory without preconceived normative premises.
The essence of their objection also delimits the field in which the liberal critique can
take place. At the best, they attack Hayek's unconfessed return to normativism as a
methodological inconsistency. Nobody, however, seems to understand that Hayek is,
indeed troubled by the transcendental essence of normative values in liberalism. That
is why he tries to derive normative values from his positivist and empiricist
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methodology. His failure to do so, along with his critics' failure even to be puzzled
by his attempt, can be interpreted as a defacto weakness of liberal ideology as regards
a transcendental foundation for its values1.
What can we make out of the perplexed ideas on the ultimate ends of Hayek's
theory? Our opinion is that Hayek's chief concern is "freedom" but not in the
classical liberal sense. Not as a civil or political or even social value, but as a market
value. That is, Hayek believes that the ultimate end is economic "freedom"2 or the
ability to act without constraints within a given capitalist society3. It is a
characteristic of all critics of Hayek that whenever they discuss the problem of liberty
they feel obliged to relate it to the existing or proposed economic order (either as
"catalaxy", or as a market society). Not that there is anything wrong with the view
that economic freedom is an important aspect of liberty, according to the liberals
themselves4. Private property was, of course, always at the centre of bourgeois
philosophy5. What however has changed in its more modern advocacies, is that it has
become the centre itself, even verbally. It is now presented as the only important value
in social theory thus reflecting the legitimacy crisis of the system. It is also
characteristic of the peculiar (by liberal standards) Hayekian concept of freedom that
when one tries to discuss it as a social value - i.e. as a value which is related to but
not fully determined by the economic order - one will soon end up in unsurpassable
1 G. Walker is a good example on that matter. Although he recognizes Hayek's conscious attempt
to avoid a transcendental foundation of his political theory and although he further perceives that this
leads to an unavoidable contradiction between philosophical premises and political aims, he still insists
that the problem with Hayek's theory is that "he lacks any objectively valid, self-evident "good" in
which to anchor his system of ethics" (G. Walker 1986 p.59, also p.50). For an analytical account on
the tendencies on that matter within the libertarian camp, see D. Gordon 1981 pp.7-35.
2 See also R. Levitas in R. Levitas 1986 p.91.
3 Thus, "Free, that is in Dr. Hayek's sense, i.e. competitive and individualist" (G.L. Arnold 1960
p.101). See also S. Brittan's view according to which Hayek (and the New Right) is sympathetic to
freedom only in the economic sphere (S. Brittan 1980 p.32).
4 For example, see J. Gray 1986b pp.62-72.
5 Notice the identity of opinion between liberals, libertarians and conservatives on this matter.
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contradictions1. This concept, thus, accommodates the abstract idea of freedom with
the (equally abstract) ideas of survival or development that many scholars tend to
regard as Hayek's ultimate values. For, it is neither survival nor freedom as such that
Hayek advocates; rather it is the survival of concrete capitalist society and the
achievement of a concrete economic "freedom" that he places at the top of his
structure of values.
It must be remembered that this conclusion is not reached by directly reflecting
on Hayek's reasoning but by interpreting the dead end that Hayek's theory is leading
to, if examined as a typical liberal one. In that sense, we must not seek, in Hayek's
writings, any direct proofs assuring our conclusion. Rather, what must be sought are
some hints that might permit us to formulate such a conclusion. Therefore, it is the
overall character ofHayek's approach that provides us with the best confirmation here.
It is true that Hayek does not provide us with any clear landmark as to where existing
ends and the desirable order begins. On the one hand, he continually describes our
society as Great and Free, our civilization as the ultimate one possible, our legal
framework as the law of freedom; on the other hand, he constantly criticizes it for
having entered the path which leads to socialism and destruction, thus implying that
it is not Ideal any more2. Consequently, it can be assumed that there is another form
of social organization higher than ours. This mixing of the existing with the desirable
is not accidental. Hayek is constantly shifting places between what is and what ought
to be, because his aim is to defend the foundations of the existing society efficiently.
That may sound like a paradox, if we face capitalism as a static socio-economic
formation. After all, it is a fact that we are living in a capitalist society and therefore
the evolutionist approach would be enough to justify it: after a long process of
eliminatory selection we ended up with the society most able to adapt, the
qualitatively superior - i.e. capitalism. That might describe Hayek's general approach
up to a point but it certainly does not exhaust the whole problem. For, a consistent
1 In that sense, Hayek's discussion of freedom "not only must start from the premise that members
of a society have only property claims on and property obligations to their fellow members in the
legitimate area of political relations but must also presume that it is incumbent on all of us to accept
the same premise as a categorical one." (J. Viner 1961 p.233). For a further discussion of freedom in
the "Great Society", see part III.
2 Thus, his theory becomes at a time both descriptive and prescriptive (G. Walker 1986 p.63)
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evolutionism that would lead to "what exists is good" can hardly constitute a solid
basis for a political proposal aiming at influencing actual social relations in a concrete
society. Evolutionism can be used in order to confirm the superiority of capitalism
as a whole, but its adequacy becomes questionable when it comes to accounting for
the concrete social relations which take place within this general frame at a particular
historical time. It is precisely this problem that Hayek's imperatives undertake to
solve. Their role is to act as the measure against which actual social relations are to
be evaluated. Notice that this is only another expression of the (already criticized)
circularity in Hayek's arguments: the "right" imperatives emerge as natural outcomes
of the evolutionary approach that Hayek proposes. All other social values that happen
to exist in a concrete society are dismissed as remnants of the ideals that prevailed in
earlier social formations. At the same time, however, the imperatives that Hayek
advocates become also the actual presuppositions of evolutionism itself in the absence
of which the "Great Society" will decline. It is only in those societies where Hayek's
imperatives have already established themselves, that evolutionism is allowed to take
place. Thus, Hayek's imperatives are both the outcome and the cause of his
evolutionism and vice versa.
Hayek, then, is an evolutionist as long as he defends capitalism as a general
frame, but he uses imperatives when discussing the actual social relations within that
frame1. Social democracy and the welfare state cannot be dismissed on an
evolutionist basis2. They have to be judged according to imperatives. But, why do
they have to be dismissed in the first place? Because, as Hayek says, they are an
obstacle to the survival of capitalism itself. Whether one would accept Hayek's
"threat" that they lead to socialism, or merely observe the fact that it is quite difficult
for a capitalist state to assure full employment and a surviving economy at the same
time, is not that important here. What is important is to understand that Hayek's
1 That "market theorists" take capitalism as the only basis of a "free" society is a view held not only
by "socialists" but by liberals and conservatives alike. See, for example, N. O' Sullivan 1989 p. 18.
Moreover, R. Nisbet explicitly states that the purpose of freedom is the "protection of individual and
family property" (R. Nisbet 1986 p.47).
2 See also, N. Barry "The activities of the state cannot be determined by evolution, chance or
custom since these factors seem to have produced the contemporary bloated social-democratic state"
(N. Barry 1987 p.65).
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starting point, his own "ultimate principle", is the maintenance of capitalism - a
conclusion that is made clear through the identification of the public good with the
maintenance of an overall order, to say the least1. Although it is evident that this is
a broad interpretation of Hayek's theory, it is also one that has the advantage of
providing an explanation of much of what is considered to be Hayekian unsolvable
contradictions. The use of the "Great Society" as a present and at the same time
futuristic ideal type of society, the inconsistency between ontology and methodology
and the inner inconsistency of methodology itself may well be explained in that
scheme.
4. Freedom under the Rule of Law: Evolutionism and Imperatives
For Hayek, the concepts of freedom and the rule of law cannot be separated.
Law is "the science of liberty". There cannot be liberty without law and law is the
only safeguard for liberty. Hayek then, follows Burke in conceiving of liberty as a
characteristic of an order governed by certain rules. Therefore, in what follows we
shall try to examine the characteristics of the law of liberty. By doing so we will be
giving an account of Hayek's concept of liberty in its theoretical form. In the last
chapter we shall try to examine the practical political consequences of that theory, as
well as the compatibility of the theoretical premises with their practical outcomes.
There are four characteristics of the law of freedom: a) the recognition of an
individual private sphere of action, b) the general and abstract character of the rule,
c) its resulting impartiality and d) its purposeless character. If these four conditions
are satisfied, then the absence of (illegitimate) coercion is guaranteed and so is
individual liberty2. Hayek seems to promote a "restrictive" concept of liberty3.
1 Hayek's intention of presenting the basic characteristics of capitalism as eternal is also shown in
N. Bany's argument. Barry argues, in accordance with Hayek, that "The most famous historicists were
really trying to make the political point that the universal theorems of economics that emerged in the
last century were relative to a so-called capitalist period of historical development and would cease to
be valid beyond that point." (N. Barry 1979 p.35). It is quite doubtful, however, if such teleological
conclusions can be reached by a "scientific evolutionist" approach.
2 For a similar account of liberty see F. Machlup's contribution in E. Streissler 1969.
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Liberty for him is only the absence of deliberate personal coercion. From this
definition it follows that whenever we want to create the conditions of freedom, all
we have to do is to examine the ways in which all deliberate coercion can be
dismissed (or at least minimized). Many scholars are satisfied by trying to
accommodate Hayek's account of liberty into the negative-positive scheme. It seems,
however, that the analytic effectiveness of that distinction - if it has any1 - is quite
debatable in Hayek's case. For example, the unconditional classification of the
Hayekian freedom as "negative" liberty2 meets serious objections even in the
liberal/libertarian camp. Even in the case where "freedom from" is identified with
negative liberty quite apart from any Berlinian connotation3 many objections are still
left unanswered. Thus, Hamowy points out that Hayek lapses into a positive concept
of liberty because of the inadequacy of his initial conception. "I am unfree (coerced)
to the extent that I am deliberately denied those things which I find preserve what I
most value; this argument is constructed in such a way that my freedom can require
that others be forced to act in a particular way (...)." (R. Hamowy 1978 p.231).
Quite apart from these objections, probably the most essential point on that
matter is made by Gray (1981 pp.75-76). Gray notices that by taking the rule of law
as the only condition on which liberty rests, Hayek is actually promoting a positive
Rousseauesque view of liberty according to which "(...) "true law" cannot limit
freedom". Since it is only subjection to the arbitrary will that constitutes unfreedom
and since such a situation of unfreedom can only be avoided by subjection to the rule
of law, it follows that for Hayek freedom is, actually, to abide by the rule of law4.
Notice, however, that for all its validity Gray's remark is incomplete. For,
notwithstanding its formal articulation, freedom in Hayek's theory has nothing to do
3(...continued)
3 "Restrictive" is used in the literal sense. It has nothing to do with "restrictivism" as it is used by
Gray (following Weinstein's concept) in J. Gray 1980b pp.507-526.
1 See, for example, C. Taylor in A. Ryan 1979.
2 Promoted, among others, by Lord Robbins 1961 p.67 and R. Aron 1961 p.200; on that matter see
also K. Dixon's attempt to combine negative freedom with a welfare-oriented political theory (K. Dixon
1986).
3 See, for example, Jacob Viner 1961 p.231.
4 For a full account of Gray's views on positive and negative freedom, see J. Gray 1980b.
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with any "Rousseauesque" (or for that matter Kantian) concept of liberty1. In fact,
as Cristi2 observes correctly, it is with Rousseau's idea of freedom under the popular
sovereignty that Hayek's thought is incompatible3. If individual freedom is identified
with the reign of the rule of law, then Hayek's theory acquires a legal character.
Nevertheless, Hayek himself tends to reject this character. Thus, he argues that the
rule of law is not merely a legal doctrine: "The rule of law is therefore not a rule of
the law, but a rule concerning what the law ought to be, a meta-legal doctrine or a
political ideal" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.206). Here again Hayek argues along the lines of
a moral-imperative tradition. Nor is this idealization of the "rule of law", and
consequently of political philosophy, accidental. With it, the tension between
"scientism" and political philosophy rebounds into a tension between a fragmented,
formalistically conceived reality and an attempt to resynthesize that reality into a
comprehensive ideal whole which, nevertheless, should not be based on rationalism.
It is, thus, a tension (contradiction) between a rationalist, formalistically conceived,
systematic "reality" and an (almost explicitly) superimposed ideal the task of which
is to express that "reality" in terms of political philosophy. It has already been argued
that in Hayek's case this attempt arrives at its horizon in the unhistorical (and
metaphysically charged) conception of tradition. The content of the "rule of law",
conceived formalistically, is not of a legal but of a political and historical character
(albeit with a supra-historical appearance). Hence, its overall characterization as
metalegal or political ideal (F.A. Hayek 1960). Thus, what Hayek is in fact doing is
only an application of his epistemological agnosticism to political theory. By
considering the "rule of law" as meta-legal, Hayek is founding it in history or
tradition; but he is doing so only as a part of his systematic attempt to question reason
as the basis of law. By depriving it of rational content he renders it only a formal
calculus according to which one is able to determine the legal consequences of one's
actions as precisely as possible. That is why the essence of the "rule of law" is to be
1 Rather Hayek tends to conceive of free people as "legally secured atoms" (R. Vernon 1976 p.267).
2 See relevant section in part I.
3 The belief that freedom is inseparable from the rule of law is common among neoliberals. G.
Dietze, for example, argues that "The rule of law is, in a way, the other side of freedom" (G. Dietze
in F. Machlup 1977 p.117).
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regarded as incomprehensible both by common people and by the jurist himself. But
this mystical character is attributed to it by definition as a transcending of the initial
formalistic epistemological approach.
The question that emerges from Hayek's formalistic reasoning is why should
the "rule of law" be accepted as a political ideal. There are at least two answers that
suggest themselves directly in Hayek's work - not to mention its countless
interpretations. The first is that law ought to be a political ideal because it constitutes
the ultimate social value per se. We have already mentioned this concept and so we
will not expand up on it. The second answer is twofold. Law ought to be as Hayek
describes it because it is the outcome of a process of natural selection and elimination.
Thus, the rule of law that managed to survive and establish itself in our society is
logically the most effective. Its effectiveness however should always be understood
in terms of its ability to maintain a certain social order. In that sense the rule of law
cannot be a political ideal; it can only be a means towards the political ideal which
is the preservation of social order. The second part of this answer concerns the idea
that the rule of law ought to be as Hayek suggests because it promotes the unknown
interests of each individual. This version obviously remains incomplete as long as it
is defined from the "outside" - that is, as long as the agents (individuals) cannot
express their feelings on whether the rule of law does actually promote their interests
or not. It also remains ambiguous since no identifiable criterion exists according to
which one can measure a society against its efficiency to promote those interests.
That is why Hayek suggests that it will not prevail unless it becomes "a common ideal
shared and unquestioningly accepted by the majority" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.206). In
that case, nevertheless, the ideal seems to be the pursuit of individually unknown
interests and not the rule of law. The latter appears again as the most effective means
of achieving the ideal but as not the ideal itself. It therefore remains to be shown why
it is necessary for the majority to accept the rule of law as an ideal instead of what
it really is - i.e. a means. Although the two above mentioned answers can be regarded
in a sense as "utilitarian" they certainly differ to a great extent. The first is based on
"a natural evolutionary" concept which leads to the admission that everything that
exists is good, while the second presupposes a distinct subjectivist ultimate value
(pursuit of individual interests) and arbitrarily identifies this with a method of
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achieving it - the rule of law.
This line of argument also introduces some further implications. Hayek clearly
states that the effectiveness of the doctrine of the rule of law depends on its
unquestioning acceptance by the majority. This, of course, contradicts the natural
selection doctrine since it introduces as determinative a subjective and "non natural"
criterion1. Furthermore, it reduces the whole argument to a commonplace and
tautological statement. It is quite probable that a society will be "well functioning"
and continuing if the majority of its members unquestionably accept certain principles
irrespective of the content of those principles. Finally, we must notice Hayek's
troublesome appeal to the majority. It indicates, to say the least, a certain
inconsistency in Hayek's line of argument, since, as we shall see later, for Hayek the
main threat comes from what he calls majoritarian democracy. If endorsement by the
majority is a necessary condition for the rule of law in the first place, then why is it
not necessary whenever a practical political decision is to be made? Hayek should
have either accepted the majority opinion as a necessary criterion or rejected it
altogether throughout the political process. His argument instead seems to be that
majority opinion is respectable, and even desirable, when it goes along the lines of his
theory but that it becomes an obstacle and therefore has to be left out from any moral
or political consideration when it tends to move towards any other direction.
The conclusion here is that Hayek's maxim of the rule of law lacks
justification. Hayek maintains that it is desirable but he does not argue, at least not
consistently, why or to what extent2. Now, this lack of consistency provides an
additional proof of the opinion we expressed above: namely that Hayek's ultimate goal
is the justification of capitalism in general and of its particular needs in the concrete
phase of its development3. It does so at least in an indirect way: since Hayek does
not provide us with any definite answers as to what the ultimate values of his system
1 For the constant tension between evolutionism and subjectivism in Hayek's theory, see also G.
Walker 1986 pp.54-55.
2 Thus, permitting to N. Barry to comment that his theory collapses into an "uncritical
traditionalism" (N. Barry 1982 p.45).
3 Similar conclusions can be derived indirectly from G. Walker 1986 p.48 and R. Vernon 1976
passim.
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are and why, he leaves some space for other interpretations which should be primarily
judged not according to their fidelity to the original text but according to their
effectiveness in providing answers where he has failed.
5. Characteristics of the Law of Freedom: The Distinction Between Public and Private
A closer examination of the characteristics of the law of freedom is perhaps
necessary at this point. The first point to note is that law must recognize an individual
private sphere in which no interference by positive law or governmental actions can
ever be legitimate. It is not necessary to mention that this preposition constitutes one
of the most fundamental maxims of bourgeois society. It has appeared in different
forms, from the very beginning of liberalism, but acquired a more definite shape in
the 19th century and especially in J.S.Mill's works1. For Hayek it seems to be the
sine qua non of a law which can become the law of "liberty". This private sphere, in
which no external interference is legitimate, is to be delimited according to the results
that individual actions will have. That is, if certain actions and their results concern
only the individual actor then the rule of law cannot interfere in any sense in their
realization. If, on the contrary, they might have consequences which will influence
other individuals as well, then the rule of law should clearly define the limits within
which these actions ought to take place. En passant, it might be noticed that hand in
hand with this private sphere of "rights" goes the defence of private property. Thus,
Hayek says that "(...) to divide the material objects of our environment into what is
mine and what is another's is the principle aim of the rules which delimit spheres(...)"
and consequently "The recognition of private or several property is thus an essential
condition for the prevention of coercion(...)" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.140)2. But the
defence of property in terms of a protected domain is not altogether trouble-free. It
1 Notably with the attempt to distinguish between the "civil" and the"political".
2 Notice that this is by no means a liberal or libertarian view only. As prominent a conservative as
Nisbet quotes approvingly the proposition that the right to property is more important than the right to
life itself (R. Nisbet 1986 p.55) thus demonstrating that the sanctification of property transcends any
formalistic distinction between liberals and conservatives.
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may be that Hayek takes property as the basis of civilization - even arguing that this
is a "scientific" fact - and as the necessary precondition of a rule-governed society, but
it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain this kind of classical liberal argument in
contemporary societies. In one of his eclectic accounts of classical liberalism, Hayek
quotes half of Locke's position (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.141) and thus argues on a rights
based tradition that a person who possesses property is free. But by property Hayek
means in this connection the possession and exchange of one's own labor only. But
what happened to the other half of the classical Lockean argument that a free person
should also be the possessor of the fruits of his labor1? It is simply left out of the
neoliberal account of freedom2. Thus property is still the basis of freedom but its
content has been readjusted to contemporary circumstances. Property as a social
institution in its abstraction guarantees freedom but a person can still be free if he has
no possessions at all. Thus, we end up in the paradoxical situation where property is
considered to be the basis of individual freedom while, at the same time, people are
supposed to be free even if they do not possess property themselves3.
The delimitation of the private sphere appears in Hayek's work in two clearly
distinct ways. The first way is in accordance with the classical definition of J.S. Mill,
that is, it distinguishes between "actions towards others" and actions which are not of
this kind, according to their effects. In that sense, Hayek points out, there are certain
actions "which are clearly not of this kind" (i.e. "actions towards others") "such as
what a person does alone within his four walls, or even the voluntary collaboration of
several persons, in a manner which clearly cannot affect or harm others" (F.A. Hayek
1973 p. 100). These actions should never come under the jurisdiction of a rule because
this will signify the infringement of liberty. Hayek's examples as to what constitutes
an action which does not bear effect upon others are deliberately abstract4. Being
1 For the transition from universal natural rights based liberal tradition to the justification of
unlimited property in classical liberalism, see C.B. Macpherson 1962.
2 For a contemporary account of this point see J. Hoffman 1988.
3 In fact sometimes they are considered to be more free than those who do possess property. See
also J. Viner 1961 p.231.
4 For a similar view, see also C. Kukathas 1989 p.160
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aware of Mill's inability to define the private sphere in an adequate way, Hayek is
trying to circumvent the problem of definition while at the same time presupposing
the existence of privacy. The problem that goes along with the definition of the
private sphere of individual action, however, is implicit in the very concept and
consequently it appears whenever a theory appeals to it. It can be described briefly
as the complete distinction and the consequent confrontation between the individual
and society. In the history of liberalism many philosophers, including J.S. Mill, have
taken this distinction for granted. Hayek seems to do the same thing here. But what
is "surprising" in Hayek's case is not that he has chosen this fiercely criticized scheme
concerning private and public spheres but that he did so after developing a whole
"monist" philosophy according to which the distinction between natural and mental
(i.e. "artificial") is rejected. If Hayek actually held the monist position, he would have
found it difficult to presuppose a distinct sphere of individual action, since this sphere
can "exist" if we ascribe to the individual minds a distinct substance. From saying
that the mental attributes of the individual are part of the sum of the attributes that all
individuals have, it does not follow that a sphere within which the individual subsists
in isolation, might exist. All individual actions will necessarily be determined by the
fact that the individual's mentality is a part of the whole; therefore, a "private" sphere
as distinct from and opposed to the whole is not even conceivable. By this, I am
merely implying that a monist concept of individuality as a part of the whole does not
permit the introduction of sovereign private spheres where the individual is supposed
to act as a self-contained category.
This brings us to the second way in which Hayek is trying to justify the
existence of a "private sphere". "Its aim cannot be to protect people against all actions
by others that may be harmful to them, but only to keep certain of the data of their
actions from the control of others" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 143). Now, this concept is
clearly different from the first one. While in the first Hayek was referring to actions
that clearly do not affect others, here he states that "there is hardly any action that
may not conceivably affect others" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 143). In that sense a private
or protected sphere is not defined as an independent ground of action but, rather, as
a sum of information about actions. The criterion therefore is not whether my actions
will affect others but "whether the actions of other people that we wish to see
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prevented would actually interfere with the reasonable expectations of the protected
person" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 143). The difference between the two versions of private
(or protected) sphere are of great importance. While in the first version Hayek adopts
a position quite similar to that of Mill in the second the similarities are only
superficial. In the second case the protected sphere is not supposed to guarantee
individual freedom in the sense of self-realization but merely the privacy of certain
classes of information (data). Hence, its aim is not freedom, but private knowledge
of information. Unless a definite link between such knowledge and freedom is
established, the "private" sphere remains irrelevant to the problem of freedom.
But does the protected sphere become more justifiable even if it refers only to
the assurance that certain data will remain known only to the protected individual?
Hayek is identifying the practical outcomes of this knowledge with the reasonable
expectations that an individual might formulate in a situation. But what does a
"reasonable expectation" mean? This question is bound to remain unanswered in
Hayek's work. If, however, we press upon him the need for an answer to this
question, we might imagine a most totalitarian regime where the most elementary
rights are abolished; under this regime people will continue to act; and it is probable
that they will form expectations concerning the results of their actions.
Now, what would be a reasonable expectation in such a regime? Clearly an
expectation that is likely to come true. Then we can say that in any regime (even the
most oppressive) a protected sphere still exists since the actions of the government
will not interfere with the reasonable expectations of the actor. The criterion that
Hayek uses in delimiting the protected sphere, then, becomes relativistic and
subjective. Reasonable expectations, in order to be reasonable, should take into
account primarily the frame in which they appear. Hayek is obviously presupposing
that this form is a bourgeois democracy but this is, in terms of his own evolutionary
argument, by no means a necessary condition. So Hayek has two alternatives: either
he has to inscribe to "reasonable" a transcendental, eternal meaning and thus render
it a mere fiction, or he has to leap into complete relativism. Apparently, he does the
second: "The enforcement of religious conformity, for instance, was a legitimate object
of government when people believed in the collective responsibility of the community
towards some deity (...)" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 143). But the question here is not
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whether it was legitimate or not. The question is whether it provided for or protected
the sphere of individuality. And the answer should be the affirmative. Because if by
protected sphere we understand the control of certain data according to which we form
reasonable expectations, in the above example, the only reasonable expectation that
could be formed by anyone is in fact that religious conformity should be enforced.
It is, then, the (Berlinian) dead end of the "contented slave" that Hayek's relativistic
subjectivism is unable to surpass.
Hayek's concept of the protected sphere of individuality, although presented
as a condition of the law of liberty in general, can therefore only acquire some
meaning if examined within the concrete conditions of a capitalist society1. And
again, within these conditions, its relation to liberty remains far from clear. Finally,
we must note a contradiction implicit in the two spheres theory in all its versions. A
violation of the private sphere is at the same time inescapably a public offence and
therefore not an individual matter. The use of the term "protected" instead of
"private" makes this contradiction even more clear. It is a concern of the state to
delimit private spheres as well as to punish those who trespass them2. The state thus
becomes "an agency concerned to promote or maximize freedom" (C. Kukathas 1989
p. 164), something that connotes an apparent inconsistency with Hayek's supposedly
Kantian standpoint.
6. Abstractness and Generality
The second characteristic of the rule of law is its abstractness and generality.
As Hayek states, "Law in its ideal form might be described as a "one-and-for-all"
command that is directed to unknown people and that is abstracted from all particular
circumstances of time and place and refers only to such conditions as may occur
anywhere and at any time" (F.A. Hayek 1960 pp. 149-150). This abstractness and
generality of the rule of law is a necessary characteristic which depends on the nature
1 See also R.A. Arnold 1980 pp.341-352.
2 For a statement similar to Hayek's, see J. Gray 1986b p.81.
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of our society. Only in small societies where every member knows every other is it
possible to conceive of rules which ascribe particular things to particular persons
because there, each member possesses a concrete and considerable amount of
knowledge of the personality and expectations of all the others. "But the greater the
society, the greater the likelihood that the knowledge which its members will have in
common will be abstract features of things or actions; and in the Great or Open
Society the common element in the thinking of all will be almost entirely abstract"
(F.A. Hayek 1976 p.12)1. Hence, the abstract character of the rules of law is based
primarily on the quantitative component of the society and the consequent complexity
of the relations between its members; it is also considered as a necessary feature of
the rule of law in the "Open Society". Such rules end up by constituting a general
frame within which the individual moves independently; they prescribe the limits of
his/her movements but not the movement itself.
So, the abstract and general character of the rule of law is prescribed in a
twofold way. Firstly, its essence is by necessity abstract since it describes a highly
complex order. Secondly, its form should also be general so that no particular
individual or group of individuals will be discriminated against and thus coerced
before he or it chooses to act. This generality is considered by Hayek to be "the most
important aspect" of the abstractness of the rule of law.
The spectrum of formalism has long haunted liberal political theory. In
Hayek's case its presence is particularly enervating for liberals and libertarians alike2.
In fact, Hayek senses that the accusation of formalism is bound to confront his theory
constantly. Thus his account of the conditions that safeguard liberty is mainly
apologistic in its essence. It might be helpful to see how the same problem is tackled
by some more charitable theorists. In a description of what he calls "fuzzy
liberalism", F. Machlup gives a list of some classical liberal demands as well as of
their application in modem societies. His argument seems quite simply to be that
some abstract formalities - like the much celebrated equality before the law - have
unfortunately been "extended" into practical measures of actual social life. As long
1 For a similar position, see M. Polanyi 1951
2 For example, N. Barry 1987 p.63.
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as they were merely ambiguous demands they were liberal; but, when they were
turned into practical applications, they became illiberal. This line of argument shows
adequately the relation of the "new" liberalism to its ancestors. In the same sense, F.
Machlup argues that the two fundamental errors responsible for the distortion of
freedom in our society are, firstly, that we tend to regard "freedom from" as an
expression of liberty equal to "freedom to", and, secondly, that we tend to confuse "I
may" and "I can" (F. Machlup in E. Streissler 1969 pp. 123-124). According to this
concept "freedom from" is not a freedom at all because it requires positive action in
order for it to emerge. It is only "freedom to" that can be said to express the "liberal"
ideal of freedom; because "freedom of speech and of religion give people the right to
speak, express themselves, and worship in any way they like;" (F. Machlup in E.
Streissler 1969 p. 123). But what it does not do is give people the ability to put their
thoughts into practice, that is, to act. Similarly the distinction between "I may" and
"I can" points towards a highly formalistic concept of freedom. Freedom exists
whenever I may do something irrespective on whether I can do it or not. The
introduction of such freedom is almost inevitably accompanied by some "illuminating"
examples, such as, "I am free to buy the most expensive diamond in the world even
if do not have the money" whereas "I am not free to buy drugs even if I have the
money" (F. Machlup in E. Streissler p.124)1. Obviously, the list of examples can be
extended infinitely if one adds the freedom of the individual to fly, or his/her freedom
to visit the moon regularly... .
The problems that emerge from the formalist definition of the characteristics
of the law of liberty seem to be well known to Hayek. He is aware that although the
rule might use an impersonal and "general" language, discrimination can still take
place. He is also aware that during the articulation of the law into specific rules some
sort of normative judgement will emerge. Thus, the "perfectly neutral framework" that
the rule of law is supposed to provide will not be all that neutral after all. To this
Hayek proposes the test of universalizability.
Here, again, Hayek seems to have modified his approach during the course of
1 Notice that this time the restriction is only legal; it does not refer to the ability to act in a certain
way.
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two decades. Although a law might be general it still might classify different groups
of people into different positions, he says. In fact "some such classification, even
within the group of fully responsible citizens, is clearly inevitable" (F.A. Hayek 1960
p.209). The criterion according to which the law should be judged is that "those
inside any group singled out acknowledge the legitimacy of the distinction as well as
those outside it" (F.A. Hayek 1960 pp.209-210). Now Hayek, for some obscure
reasons, calls that criterion the criterion of equality before the law, although it is
evident that it refers exactly to the opposite. It is precisely because equality before
the law is an ideal that will always remain beyond our reach, as Hayek himself
acknowledges, that we must adopt the "legitimacy" criterion. The same concept
appears in a different form as well. Thus, a distinction is drawn between the
lawgivers and the rest of the people and it is further argued that "The chief safeguard
is that the rules must apply to those who lay them down and those who apply them -
and that nobody has the power to grant exceptions" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 155).
The two criteria however might produce some problems of consistency. If law
is allowed to and in fact does distinguish between different groups of individuals, then
it is hard to see why it should not distinguish between the two particular groups, the
lawgivers and the rest of the subjects. It could be argued that the distinction between
lawgivers and the rest of the people is one that law should not make, although it may
make distinctions between other groups because such distinction infringes liberty. But
that is something that Hayek is not saying and in fact could not say. If Hayek were
to argue that there are certain distinctions that infringe liberty as such whereas others
do not, he would have implied an absolute criterion according to which all distinctions
would be classified, that is, an a priori normative criterion based on some sort of
theory of rights, as most liberals and libertarians suggest. That criterion should be so
comprehensive that it would contain all possible distinctions occurring among all
persons and groups in society. But this is precisely what Hayek maintains to be
impossible - i.e. to get to know and consequently to take into account beforehand any
case that might occur in a complicated order. That is why he is obliged to suggest a
much more abstract criterion, that of legitimacy. But if this argument is valid then
there is no possible way of rejecting any sort of discrimination by the law. Any
discrimination is permitted as long as "those inside the group as well as those outside
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it" believe it to be legitimate, a position that leads directly to relativism. In that sense
any objection concerning a discrimination between groups - for example that between
the lawgivers and the rest of the people - which is made on the basis of absolute good
or bad categories becomes indefensible.
Finally, the legitimacy criterion produces an infinite number of problems when
one tries to use it as a practical guideline. This is mainly due to the ambiguity of the
concept of legitimacy. It is unclear what should count as legitimate in a society. For
example, it can easily be argued that the reason why people live under particular
social conditions may be due to indifference, ignorance, acceptance, will, choice,
tolerance and so on. It certainly sounds gross to put all possible reasons under the
same label and to use it in order to draw such politically dangerous conclusions.
Matters become even worse when one tries to apply the legitimacy criterion in a
particular case - say a distinction between two groups of persons. Nevertheless, the
two concepts (the legitimacy criterion and the non-discrimination principle) are two
forms of the same line of thought. They are both based on a quantitative
presupposition. In both cases the universalizability test means that a certain group of
people are either treated equally by the law, or accept an unequal treatment for certain
reasons.
In his later writings, though, Hayek appears to argue on a different basis.
Thus, the test of universalizability is now transformed into a test of "consistency or
compatibility with the rest of the accepted system of rules or values". Hayek now
seems to have abandoned any quantitative measure; the "(...) question of what would
be the consequences if everybody did a certain thing" is a misleading question because
most actions "would become obnoxious if everybody performed them" (F.A. Hayek
1976 p.28). Therefore, universalizability is not a "physical" or "practical" test; it
refers merely to our moral beliefs. It is thus equated with the question of whether we
want a rule of law to be generally applied or not. Hayek goes so far as to state that
the compatibility of a rule with the majority of the rules prevailing in a society is the
only criterion according to which we can judge that rule. In that way he renders
social sciences unnecessary. By doing so, he lapses into a paradoxical position, for,
at the same time, he concedes that social theory is necessary for explaining (i.e.
evaluating) the rules as well as altering them (C. Kukathas 1989 p.82).
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Although Hayek never denied that the test of universalizability was at the same
time a test of compatibility, in his later works he focuses exclusively on the latter,
leaving aside all the other parameters he was suggesting before. The most important
among them is the practical aspect of the test. It seems to me that in his earlier
writings the test referred to moral as well as to practical situations. In that sense
Hayek implied the legitimacy criterion - which could be broadly identified with that
of the moral compatibility of a rule - but, at the same time, he also implied the
practical criterion of non-discrimination between the lawgivers and the subjects of the
rule. Here, on the contrary, any relation to the practical is rejected by definition.
There remains only the moral sphere within which the test is supposed to take place.
And, again, this sphere is defined in a subjective idealist sense - as an inner process
different within each individual. The relations that take place in the real world - that
is, the social relations and their legal expression through actual laws - is thus
presented as merely an abstract relation between individual moral values. The test of
universalizability becomes more consistent (no contradiction between legitimacy and
practical non-discrimination any more) but it does so by losing its grasp upon reality.
It becomes a totally abstract, literally non definable procedure that leads to relativism
and agnosticism1.
7. The Universalizability Test: Formalism and Utilitarianism
At this point, it may be helpful to consider Gray's analysis of the Hayekian test
of universalizability, both because it articulates quite clearly the whole idea -
something that Hayek himself has failed to do - and because it seems to have Hayek's
personal approval. Gray is trying to defend Hayek's approach that the
universalizability test is the only criterion that enables us to say whether a certain rule
is a rule of law or not. Accordingly, he suggests three consecutive requirements of
1 For a different account of the changes that Hayek's theory underwent, see N. Bosanquet 1983.
Bosanquet argues that from Law, Legislation and Liberty onwards Hayek's main concern is the
distinction between "nomos" and "taxis" and their definition respectively. He also believes that the
defence of "nomos" as the supporting condition of the "Great Society" derives mainly from Hayek's
"scientific" evolutionary approach rather than his idealist imperatives.
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the test: firstly the demand of consistency as between similar cases, a demand that
leads to "a merely formal demand of non-discrimination"; secondly, the demand "that
one put oneself in another man's place" or the impartiality demand; and, thirdly, the
requirement of moral neutrality. In Gray's view if the test of universalizability is
understood in this sense then all criticisms based on the insufficiency of the formal
general character of the rule will collapse.
In that way Gray identifies the consistency criterion with that of formal non¬
discrimination. But this point, however, is quite debatable. In order to establish that
identification Gray presupposes that the consistency criterion refers to similar cases.
But this presupposition is incomplete to say the least. It has been argued earlier that
the use of the legitimacy criterion in order to justify a certain rule points in a different
direction. A discrimination is justified if both those who are affected directly and
those who are not believe it to be legitimate. But if Gray could find some ground for
a practical application of the universalizability test in Hayek's earlier works1 he
would certainly find it more difficult to argue on the same lines in regard to Hayek's
later works. The explicit way in which Hayek rejects any practical application of the
test in Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol.2 (1976), while at the same time arguing that
the only way we can understand it is by asking whether we will a rale to be generally
applied - that is, when we put it under a test of moral compatibility not with actual
cases but with individual moral values - has already been mentioned. In that sense,
the identification of the consistency principle with that of non-discrimination is
misleading. Nevertheless, the point here is that Gray seems to accept that Hayek's
test is indeed incomplete if it is limited to this first requirement. In order for the test
to become sufficient, Gray argues, we need to consider two further requirements, that
of impartiality and that of moral neutrality. Gray believes that these two requirements
are necessary preconditions if Hayek's concept is to have any credibility at all.
In this way Hayek's test of universalizability is supposed to be made efficient
for judging a rale of law and the actions deriving from it. The problem here is that
in order to avoid the criticism of being abstract, and thus arbitrary, Hayek is using two
1 As in the case of the requirement of non-discrimination between lawgivers and subjects in The
Constitution ofLiberty.
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complementary categories, which are even more abstract and arbitrary. Impartiality
and moral neutrality, if they have any meaning at all, are far from being self-evident
concepts. Hayek not only fails to define them or illustrate their meaning, but
presupposes them to be all-human characteristics too. Even if in some way he could
prove that these categories have some meaning it would still be necessary to show that
they can become the moral basis of every individual in a certain society.
An argument could be raised against the objection introduced here. It could
be asked: must every individual actually be impartial in order for the criterion to
stand? This question can be developed in two consecutive steps: a) why do
impartiality and moral neutrality have to be actual characteristics of an individual, and
b) why does every individual have to adopt them? It is true that a moral principle,
especially when it comes in the form of an abstract moral imperative, does not have
to exist in actual life. Does this mean that its validity is irrelevant to its possibilities
of becoming true? How are we to distinguish between the statements "everybody
should fly" and "everybody should be impartial"? It seems that there are two
alternatives. To establish the complete arbitrariness of any moral imperative as such
in a strict positivist sense, which would lead us to consider any moral judgment not
as true or false, as correct or incorrect but simply as irrelevant. In that sense the two
above mentioned imperatives are equal. Or, to try to establish a further criterion
according to which the imperative is to be evaluated. In Hayek's case it is obvious
that the imperative is evaluated according to its conduciveness to (and compatibility
with) the Ideal, that is, the "Great Society". But this admission simply moves the
danger of relativism one step further on; for, it is now the Ideal itself that might be
considered as irrelevant. The problem in that case is, then, that imperatives are used
in reference to an Ideal (social order under the rule of law) which, in its turn, is
already supposed to be connected with social reality itself. The links between the
Ideal and reality have been furnished by the "scientific" part of Hayek's theory, that
is, by the evolutionary account of society. It seems, therefore, that, notwithstanding
any verbal objections, Hayek does not really have a choice; his imperatives are
somehow related to social actuality, as is his "Great Society". Consequently, it is only
logical to assume that he takes them as (even potentially) actual characteristics of the
social order.
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The second question posed is whether the requirement that "all men should be
impartial" is a necessary condition for Hayek's criterion to stand. It should be
admitted that Hayek is not referring to any numerical parameter when he introduces
it. It seems, therefore, enough to say that if one individual is able to satisfy the
conditions of the imperative - thus proving that it is possible to fulfill it - the criterion
would be legitimate. Against this suggestion two objections seem plausible. Firstly,
Hayek is using the impartiality and moral neutrality criterion in order to decide if a
certain action is in conformity with a social and political ideal. Therefore, although
the imperative is addressed to individuals, it certainly refers to society as a whole as
well. For, individuals acting according to subjective imperatives against the main
moral requirements of their society can hardly constitute a solid basis for the social
order of the "Great Society". After all, the rule of law is an ideal aiming towards the
"Great Society", not the Great Individual. Secondly, Hayek's own suggestions seem
to point in that direction as well. In that sense, he argues that a "Great Society" will
not function unless the great majority of its members accept those ideals.
Consequently, it can be assumed that some sort of numerical importance is implied
in the conditions of applicability of Hayek's imperatives.
So, even if we accept that Gray's interpretation of Hayek provides us with an
answer to those critiques that demonstrate the inadequacy of the test, the problem still
persists. Gray's answer should be that Hayek's test of universalizability could refute
the accusations of being strictly abstract and thus arbitrary and empty of meaning,
only if Hayek had proved that all agents actually are impartial and morally neutral.
The fact that Gray presents those two requirements as necessary conditions, shows that
Hayek's test is incomplete to say the least, and thus his "heavy reliance on it" is
completely misplaced.
Two further points could be raised here. Although Hayek has initially based
his theory on a "scientific" evolutionary approach he suddenly enters the world of
moral imperatives in an arbitrary way. In fact, in this part of his social theory, Hayek
relies completely on obscure moral imperatives; there is nothing left from the initial
empiricist approach. After having argued that rules "grow" in the endless and
purposeless process of the evolution of mankind, after having insisted that it is
according to their persistence and ability to adapt to new circumstances that rules
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should be judged1, Hayek now, all of a sudden, introduces a further precondition:
rules should only be judged if agents are impartial and morally neutral. So, when
Hayek enters the field of social theory he abandons all the renovating attempts that
he was making in ontology and methodology and adopts the kind of transcendental
and abstract categories he criticized in his philosophical enquiries.
This brings us to the second point. A question that should be asked here is:
can Hayek really expect impartiality and moral neutrality from his individuals? The
question is being raised in this way to make clear that it does not address the problem
of whether it is possible to have any impartial and morally neutral individuals, a
problem which is quite distinct For the sake of the argument it will be accepted that
in principle it is possible to have an impartial and morally neutral individual, although
this possibility is quite debatable. The question thus is: is it reasonable for Hayek to
expect individuals as he describes them in the "Great Society" to be (or even to
become eventually) impartial and morally neutral? The main characteristic of the
Hayekian individual is that he constantly pursues his own ends. Now, although these
ends are unknown to the rest of his fellow citizens and although they might be only
partly known to him as well, he still remains basically the type of "egoistic"
individual. It must also be remembered that the major part of Hayek's argument for
the superiority of the "Great Society" is derived precisely from this presupposed
egoistic attitude. It is true that Hayek rarely uses the term egoistic in order to
describe the attitude of his individuals but the fact remains that he defends this end-
pursuing individualistic attitude throughout his work. Indeed, one could say that one
of this main objectives is to demonstrate that there is nothing wrong with that attitude
and that it is only through the acceptance of it that we can reach freedom.
1 He does so in many parts of his work. A particularly illuminating passage appears when he
discusses the relation between law and morals. Being aware of the accusation that his evolutionary
concept will eventually lead to the admission that what exists is good and moral, he argues: not all the
sets of moral beliefs are beneficial. "A group or nation may destroy itself by the moral beliefs to which
it adheres". How, then, are we to judge a set of believes if only the eventual results can show whether
the ideals which guide a group are beneficial or destructive? This sort of teleological "practical"
reasoning which Hayek uses to evaluate morality is far from being compatible with moral imperatives.
This is even more clear in the justification, he gives, of the superiority of the "Great Society": the
"Great Society" is superior precisely because it will not permit to itself to decline as a whole - "only
the groups guided by "impractical" ideals would decline, and others, less moral by current standards,
would take their place"(F.A. Hayek 1960 p.67).
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Impartiality or, as Gray explains, "the demand that one put oneself in another
man's place" can now be examined in the light of the comments that have been
suggested above. Hayek maintains that one can never put oneself in another man's
place for two basic reasons. The first is that each individual pursues his own
particular ends and that these ends are only known to him and to no one else. So,
even if one is willing to put oneself in another man's place one can never do so,
simply because one will not have the data needed to do so. To judge a rule and one's
actions with the "eyes" of another who is pursuing his interests is de facto impossible
for Hayek.
The second objection focuses on whether we can have any reasonable
expectations that the Hayekian individual will be willing to put himself in another
man's place. When Hayek discusses coercion he defines it as the incapability of one
person to pursue his own ends because of the interference of another person; this
interference aims at making that person pursue ends which are not in his interest.
This is for Hayek the most objectionable situation that one can find in social life. But
it seems that what is objectionable in social life is a requirement in moral life. What
else does it mean to put one in another's place, apart from to make the pursuit of
another's ends one's own task (if only in theory)? To be expected to regard a rule or
an action in the light of the ends of another man becomes, thus, a necessary
presupposition of the test of universalizability. It also becomes indirectly a
presupposition of the existence of the "Great Society" in which it is treated as the
worst disaster. What is supposed to be condemnable in practice becomes a theoretical
requirement.
Furthermore, when Hayek discuses the functioning of the "Great Society" he
assures us that the basic element is antagonism. "The correspondence of expectations
is brought about by a disappointment of some expectations" (F.A. Hayek 1976 p. 124),
he says. In fact the whole point about the society based on the rule of law is precisely
that it will function according to the principles of market antagonism. Now, how can
we expect individuals to put themselves in other men's places in such a society? If
the analogy is correct this would be equal to putting oneself in the place of the
competitor while functioning in the market place. But the principle of market
antagonism is to extract as much profit as possible from the goods and services one
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sells, not to put oneself in the place of one's competitors. So, Hayek's individual is
being expected to act in a different way in the market than in his "moral" life. Again,
plain reason suggests that such moral imperatives are totally arbitrary in Hayek's
system of ideas. Arguing for the "Great Society", Hayek, paradoxically enough, says:
"In a sense it is even true that such a system gives to those who already have" (F.A.
Hayek 1976 p. 123). Combine this statement with the previous one about expectations
that can be brought forward only if some other expectations (or expectations of the
others....) fail and with the assurance: "In a spontaneous order undeserved
disappointments cannot be avoided" (F.A. Hayek 1976 p. 127). If one feels that he
lives in a system that favors the strong, if he feels that in that system disappointment
and in fact failure often occur to those who do not deserve it, and if at the same time
he knows that the only way to avoid failure is by realizing his expectations, a process
that is bound to lead to a failure of the expectations of others, how can he be
reasonably expected to perform actions according to some totally abstract moral
imperative that demands him to put himself to the other's place1? The Hayekian
individual acquires a twofold existence: on the one hand he exists as a market force -
his behavior and values are expected to correspond to the functioning of the market,
like any other commodity. On the other, he exists as a bearer of abstract ideals - a
holy figure who subsists in a world of "as if' values2. Thus, the practical
implications of the distinction between "is" and "ought" become overwhelming. At
the level of social relations the distinction reemerges as a distinction between the
"intelligible" and the "practical" or "empirical" individual. Here, once more, the gap
between the two types of individual appears to be unbridgeable by definition. Hence,
Hayek's political theory acquires a systematically ambiguous content.
Hayek's failure to account for individual behavior in terms of abstract moral
rules is shown more clearly in the case of monopoly profit. In a somehow perplexing
manner he argues that monopoly profiteering is not immoral, as long as it does not
1 For the improbability of self-constrain in Hayek's scheme, see also M.M. Wilhelm 1972 as cited
in part I. See also R. Plant's argument on the difficulties generated by such a requirement as well as
the potential social instability that a theory with no substantive moral principles is likely to generate (R.
Plant 1983 p.232).
2 See M. Forsyth 1988 esp. pp.244-250.
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become a force impeding individual freedom. It is, admittedly, quite difficult to think
of some fixed limits beyond which monopoly control does become a coercive force.
Hence, Hayek avoids undertaking such a task. Instead, he gives some examples in
which monopoly power has become coercive. The celebrated example of the spring
in the oasis is supposed to demonstrate such a situation. In that sense, Hayek's
example is supposed to prove that it is not the monopoly as such but only a certain
use of it that can become coercive. Hayek's example, however, seems to create more
problems than it solves, even if its critique is limited to the same world of formalistic
abstractions. For, the actions of the owner of the spring in the oasis will become
coercive, according to Hayek, only when he will decide not to sell its water at a
"reasonable price". Needless to say that the "reasonableness" of that price is bound
to remain undefined throughout Hayek's works. Indeed, as Hamowy points out, there
cannot be any criteria whatsoever which will demark the point at which a price loses
its reasonable character. No criteria, that is, in the absence of a market. What is
really surprising then, is that, after arguing that the market is the only price
discovering mechanism possible, Hayek gives an example where a price is not only
"discovered" but also denoted in terms of being "reasonable" in the absence of a
market. For, what else is a monopolistic situation if not the negation of the "free"
competitive market?
Hayek is one of the many liberals and libertarians who make use of such
"illuminating" examples. In his attempt to distinguish between "true" freedom and
freedom to do what one wishes, he gives as an example a situation where one is
supposed to wish to have his portrait done by a famous painter. Hayek says that if
one cannot afford to fulfil such a wish, one cannot be thought to be coerced by the
painter's rejection of settling for a lower price1. What differentiates the "oasis" from
the "painter" example, then, is the actual commodity that is to be sold. Politically
speaking, both examples are persuasive only because they state the obvious. In terms
of methodology, however, they both (being two samples of precisely the same
reasoning) demonstrate the failure in practice of Hayekian social thought. For,
1 Compare also with F. Machlup's "illuminating" example, cited infra, where one wants to buy the
most expensive diamond in the world etc..
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although it might be obvious that water is essential for life while a portrait is not, the
real question is who is to decide what is and what is not essential for one's life.
Hayek's necessarily subjectivist answer to this is that an individual is coerced when
he/she is deprived from what he/she most values. But the resulting relativism of that
view can hardly consolidate the (already) formalistic account of freedom.
This brings forward the moral problem of monopoly power. Can we suppose
that somebody enjoying a de facto monopolistic situation will refrain from
monopolistic exploitation? Even if we were to answer on a strictly voluntaristic
basis1, this would be quite unlikely. Besides, this is precisely Hayek's main
accusation against a powerful central bureaucracy: once they have some
"monopolistic" power it is highly unlikely that they will refrain from using it. Why,
then, do we have to suppose that this is not the case with individual capitalists as
well? This problem which, it seems, has troubled free market advocates is left almost
completely unanswered in the Hayekian approach. The problem of "legitimate" - from
a moral point of view - profiteering in a monopolistic situation demonstrates the
inability of Hayekian2 theory to establish any abstract moral principles other than the
"laws" of the market. Hayek is obliged to lapse into some less than satisfactory
explanation whenever he tries to condemn cut-throat selling3.
Is the case different with moral neutrality? Moral neutrality is quite a similar
concept to impartiality. Indeed, as Gray explains it, it means to "be impartial as
between the preferences of others, regardless of our own tastes of ideals of life".
Therefore, moral neutrality does not exist for all the above mentioned reasons plus at
least one more: that our own ideals, if we take them to be imperatives, can easily
require from us a certain behavior towards others. Now, moral neutrality precisely
1 That is, leaving aside the fact that the capitalist who enjoys a monopolistic situation would be
forced into monopolistic exploitation by the objective competitive economic conditions as well as, by
the fact that this is the only way to maintain his monopolistic position.
2 Hayek is by no means alone into this difficulty. In fact most of the pro-capitalist theorists find
it quite difficult to produce plausible answers on that matter.
3 For an attempt to bridge the gap between profiteering and morality in capitalism, see also R.
Harrod 1972 pp.208-221. Harrod's argument is that there somehow exists a moral sentiment in all
human beings which prevents them to go over the (undefined) limits. Notice, however, that for Harrod
it is at least clear that this sentiment lies clearly in the realm of metaphysics - that is, it must be
implanted by some superhuman power (be it god or anything else).
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determines what our behavior should be and thus becomes much more than a simple
guideline, as Gray suggests; it becomes a moral ideal itself. In other words, the
requirement of moral neutrality is by no means a supra-moral doctrine, a principle
neutral in itself, but, on the contrary, it constitutes one of the main principles of a
certain moral doctrine. This seems to be quite clear to Hayek as well. He doubts
whether any rule that has passed the test of universalizability can serve the cause of
freedom if it is enforced in a society where religious fanaticism prevails. That rule,
though, could be formally legitimate. It wouldn't discriminate between rulers and
ruled, it would be impartial in the sense that those who articulated it have put
themselves in the other men's place before doing so. But it would certainly not be
morally neutral in the sense implied above because this could possibly mean a moral
offence. The members of such a society could feel, for example, that they all bear a
collective responsibility (apart from individual ones) in the eyes of god for what is
happening in their society. Hayek is obliged to accept this possibility. "But how
comparatively innocuous, even if irksome, are most such restrictions imposed on
literally everybody, as, for instance, the Scottish Sabbath, compared with those that
are likely to be imposed only on some!" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 155). It is quite clear
that after this admission there is little left from the once strict moral imperative1. It
is also clear that at times, such as that referred to in the above quotation, Hayek
forgets his "heavy reliance" on the test of universalizability and simply states that
although it is not adequate it is the best he can think of....
To sum up, the elements of generality, abstractness and impartiality as they
appear in Hayek's account of the rule of law suffer from an incurable that
deprives them of any practical meaning. What Hayek finds difficult to defend even
in theory becomes certainly unattainable in practice. The criticisms of mere abstract
formality that were launched against the Hayekian concept resulted in an attempt to
defend the initial idea by a further process of abstraction. The complementary process
of impartiality and moral neutrality are unable to provide an answer both because they
are even more abstract than the initial idea of non-discrimination - and they remain
so throughout Hayek's work - and because they are essentially inconsistent with
1 L. Robbins also challenges the Hayekian example (L. Robbins 1961 p.69).
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Hayek's evolutionary and utilitarian approach of the rules of law. Again here Hayek
was obliged to depart from his "scientific" concepts and enter the world of moral
imperatives mainly because of the unpleasant results the evolutionary approach was
bound to lead. The use of imperatives appears when he refers to a certain social stage
- namely after he has established the superiority of the capitalist society in "scientific"
terms - and serves as an argument for the development of that stage towards a certain
direction.
Finally, the purposeless character of the rule completes the picture of the law
of freedom. The first point to be mentioned here is that by "purposeless character"
Hayek does not mean exactly that the law of freedom has no purpose at all (although
sometimes he seems to use it in that context as well). Rather what Hayek means is
that the law of freedom does not serve any particular individual purposes. "We have
already seen that in the usual sense of purpose, namely the anticipation of a particular,
foreseeable event, the law indeed does not serve any purpose but countless different
purposes of different individuals" (F.A. Hayek 1973 pp. 112-113). This, however, does
not mean that law has no purpose at all. Law has a purpose and that is "The
preservation of an enduring system of abstract relationships..." (F.A. Hayek 1960
p. 113). Or, in other words, the preservation of what Hayek calls spontaneous order.
The preservation of an order, however, is a characteristic attributed to law by
definition: Hayek has argued that only effective laws and the subsequent groups
following them are allowed to survive. Therefore, any law prevailing in a society, in
the long run, is bound to be not simply effective but the most effective amongst all
known alternatives. Thus, the preservation of an overall order cannot be taken as the
purpose of law; rather it is a necessary condition for the existence of the law. In that
sense Hayek's remark that, if by "purpose" we mean "the aiming at conditions which
will assist the formation of an abstract order, the particular contents of which are
unpredictable" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 113), then law can and furthermore should have
a purpose, sounds somehow misleading. The problem here is that Hayek introduces
an arbitrary distinction between abstract order and order in general.
It is not the character of the particular order that gives law "purpose"; it is the
presupposition that law preserves an order (any order) in the most effective way.
Therefore, the aim of law cannot be an abstract order but order in general regardless
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of its character. Hayek is smuggling a qualitative distinction between orders based on
moral grounds into a utilitarian argument. Law has a legitimate purpose only if it
assists a spontaneous order1. But how are the two concepts - that of effectiveness and
that of the superiority of a certain law on moral grounds - to be connected? Either
law has a reason for existence because it provides the best - i.e. the most effective -
way of organizing a particular society or it acquires a reason for existence when and
only when it serves a particular morally superior society. The tension becomes more
clear when Hayek argues that the aim of altering or developing the law "should be to
improve as much as possible the chances of anyone selected at random" (F.A. Hayek
1976 pp.129-130). Here the moral imperative has replaced the effectiveness principle
completely. We should alter the law2 not according to its effectiveness but according
to a moral criterion. Good law is not effective but morally acceptable law. Hayek
should have at least made an attempt to explain this step. Had he done so he would
have found himself confronting a very difficult task. Firstly, a reason should have
been given as to why a morally superior society is more effective than a morally
inferior one. Then an attempt should have been made to prove that it is because of
its moral superiority that a certain society is more effective. It is doubtful if any
argument to this effect can be made. The fact is that Hayek does not make any
attempt to establish it.
Finally the purposeless character of the rule of law presents some additional
difficulties when interpreted in the context of the spontaneous development of law.
Hayek's argument that the validity of the rule of law as a political ideal lies precisely
in its spontaneous development seems to ignore some obvious questions. Thus, "It is
surely quite common for legal systems to develop spontaneously in undesired
directions. For all his criticisms of the rationalism of the utilitarians they were faced
with not merely a number of untidy elements in the system of law in the beginning
of the nineteenth century but a welter of conflicting and confusing laws which
1 In that context, see also K. Widmer's point on R. Nozick. "Even "meta-utopia" has to be
discriminating, purposive, substantive, under a particular set of historical conditions. In sum: there is
not really any such monster as a "neutral framework", for Utopias or anything else." (K. Widmer 1981
P-49).
2 A concept quite problematic in itself in the context of Hayek's anti-rationalistic theory, as has
already been argued.
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required restructuring on more or less rational principles. The system could hardly
be said to provide a model of the rules of just conduct available indiscriminately to
all; and the legal profession, upon whose expertise and intellectual qualities Hayek
relies to maintain the ongoing body of rules, had a vested interest, perhaps even a
class interest, in preserving its complexity and needless technicality." (N. Barry 1979
p.88)1. Thus one can only agree with the point that "J. Gray's explication of the
complexity and severity of the test of universalizability does not rescue Hayek from
the difficulties he incurs in making this test the fundamental test of justice." (C.
Kukathas 1989 p. 173).
A comparison between Hayek's "limited utilitarianism" and 19th century
utilitarianism can prove helpful. Thus, in terms of formal appearance Hayek's
introduction of a qualitative distinction into a theory that is based on abstract
quantitative comparisons approximates to J. S. Mill's version of utilitarianism. The
result is that he, like Mill before him, ends up with an insoluble problem. Either he
will have to abandon one of the two pillars of his argument or he will have to settle
for a theory that is clearly inconsistent. It might be desperately abstract to compare
different societies in different historical times according to some "effectiveness"
criteria; but it becomes impossible to do so when qualitative distinctions are
introduced before the very beginning of this comparison.
Hayek, as we have seen, believes that "The Good Society is one in which the
chances of anyone selected at random are likely to be as great as possible" (F.A.
Hayek 1976 p. 132). This statement reminds us of the "greatest happiness for the
greatest number" ideal at least in so far as its form is concerned. In both of them, it
seems, the quantitative element is the decisive one. They both "calculate" the value
of society in terms of "things" of the same species (happiness, chances). They both
believe that a Good Society is the one that provides the greatest amount of those
"things". Nevertheless, there are at least two important differences. In the classical
utilitarian theory it is the amount of happiness that is to be calculated while in
Hayekian utilitarianism it is the amount of chances that an individual has to achieve
his ends. Now, although happiness is a highly abstract concept and can hardly be
1 See also G. Dietze in F. Machlup 1977 pp.133-145.
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used as a guideline in a social theory, Hayek's version is even more obscure. This
is due to two reasons. The chances that one has to achieve one's own ends are
obviously determined by the nature of these ends. It is one of Hayek's firmest
convictions that the nature of these ends is known solely to the individual. Therefore,
when one has to evaluate a society, one will have to do so without being in the
position of knowing what the individual ends are. Consequently, one will never be
able to tell what the chances of realizing those ends are. But the introduction of
chances as the common element according to which society should be evaluated is
misleading because of one more reason. The determination of the chances that one
has to achieve one's ends, apart from being strictly an individual affair, is also
deprived of any objective sense. Hence a society can still be evaluated as ideal
although most (or even all) of its members will individually admit that they have not
achieved their ends because that does not follow from the fact that they did not have
the chances to do so1. And again the fact that an individual thinks that he has many
chances of achieving his ends does not imply that he actually has them2. Hence, the
greatest chances principle turns out to be an empty phrase. Not only is it impossible
for any third person to express an evaluative judgement on these grounds, but the
opinion of the members of the society themselves has been shown to be irrelevant to
the evaluation3.
The second decisive difference between classical utilitarianism and its
Hayekian version lies on the elimination of the "greatest number" part of the maxim.
Again the "greatest number" is a highly ambiguous expression that does not give us
any idea of what it may include. But if the "greatest number" is an ambiguous
expression its replacement by "anyone selected at random" is hopelessly vague. The
fact that some particular person's chances of achieving his ends are as high as possible
1 It might, for example, mean that they lost them.
2 It might simply mean that he is misled, or a fool.
3 The fact that Hayek's criterion is all too abstract can also be shown in the way he presents it in
some of his own works. Thus, he states that an economic policy is optimal if it is directed towards
"increasing the chances of any member of society taken at random of having a high income" (F.A.
Hayek 1967/69 p. 173). The achievement of unknown individual ends has now been turned into
provision of high income. This, admittedly, is a much more concrete criterion; but is the equation of
"unknown individual ends" with "high income" self-evident and unproblematic?
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(if there was a way of calculating them) does not prove that the society he is living
in is the ideal society because no one particular person (however randomly selected)
is a sufficient social indicator. Moreover, Hayek does not present any sufficient
arguments from which to deduce that the ideal society is the one in which everybody's
chances are as great as possible. On the contrary, there is sufficient evidence to the
effect that Hayek actually excludes this possibility from his ideal society1. The
conclusion may thus be that "anyone selected at random" is a phrase irrelevant to the
evaluation of society. It is also a phrase that excludes by definition any reference to
numbers, thus providing an adequate safeguard to Hayek's distrust of majority rule.
Concluding the above discussion, we can say that Hayek's concept of the
purposeless character of the rule of law illustrates in an even better way the constant
tensions between the arguments that he is using. The infiltration of qualitatively
different standards into a utilitarian method leads him into severe trouble and makes
his theory suffer from problems of inconsistency similar to those of J.S. Mill. Finally,
the formal utilitarian terminology that he uses seems to conceal some determinative
differences between his concepts and those of the classical utilitarians; differences
which are probably due to the different objective circumstances in which the two
theories were placed. In that respect Hayek's theory is shown to be systematically
vague2.
1 For example, he argues that a necessary precondition of the "Great Society" is the disappointment
of the expectations of some of its members.
2 The impossibility of identifying Hayek's theory with Mill's "indirect utilitarianism" - as J. Gray
(1983) puts it - has also been pointed out by C. Kukathas 1989 p.64.
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CONCLUSION PART H
The relating of Hayek's philosophy to the basic concepts of his social theory
provides the opportunity of a more clear evaluation of his thought. The concept of
"order" which is transferred almost directly from the field of theoretical psychology
to that of social theory reveals the essentially justificationist aspect of the theory. At
the same time, Hayek's insistence on identifying the outcomes of his naturalistic
mechanical social evolutionism with the blueprint of the "Great Society" (capitalism),
generates unsurpassable contradictions. In his effort to overcome these contradictions
between teleological imperatives and "scientific" evolutionism, he reveals the essence
of his theory: a "constructivist" rationalist approach the aim of which is to idealize
capitalism by mystifying its contradictions. It does so in two ways; a) by presenting
capitalism as the latest necessary stage in a "spontaneous" social evolution and b) by
positively prescribing particular content to the outcomes of that evolutionism in the
form of imperatives which aim at presenting capitalism as an eternal system. Thus,
the ideological form of Hayek's theory results in obscuring the outcomes of his own
evolutionism. It is the existence of a predominant political aim then, that penetrates
Hayek's thought and gives it the unity and coherence it needs in order to become a
real challenge in the field of social theory.
The examination of "freedom under the rule of law" seems to reinforce the
above position. Hayek's epistemological agnosticism in that field results in a
subjectivist and relativist account of human action. His purpose however is not to
demonstrate the dissolving power of an abstract skepticism but to produce an actual
social theory. Thus, he inconsistently argues for the possibility of accounting for
individual actions because of the supposed "objective" desire of all individuals to
preserve an overall order. His argument is conservative both formally and, more
importantly, politically. His intention to preserve capitalism forces him into an
inadequate tackling of the problem of liberty. The allegedly ultimate liberal value of
individual liberty is presented in a radically different sense. It is reduced to a mere
market value, that is, to the ability to act "unobstructed" in the economic sphere.
Liberty in Hayek's theory becomes only a synonym of the smooth operation of the
"free" market. With that, the preservation of capitalism is elevated to the highest plain
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in the Hayekian structure of values. It is true that it does so under its time-honored
liberal disguise as individual liberty. But this latter is now reformulated in such a way
as to become a mere individualized synonym of the capitalist mode of production.
The detailed examination of the requirements of the rule of law strengthens this view
further. Hayek charts a path through stagnant formalism and arbitrary deductions by
means of one guiding principle, a principle which is neither the consistent adaptation
of his epistemological propositions to social theory nor a methodological coherence
but, rather, the predominant consideration of defending and safeguarding capitalism.
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PART IH: HAYEK'S POLITICAL THEORY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
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The argument that has been advanced so far - namely, that Hayek's theory
acquires its significance only if viewed as a political defence of the foundations of the
existing socio-economic formation - will underpin the critical approach to his political
theory that is attempted in this last part. After inquiring as to Hayek's philosophical
premises and investigating how and to what extent these apply to the arguments he
advances when he presents the central idea of his social philosophy - namely, freedom
under the rule of law - it is perhaps high time to take into consideration the political
implications of that theory.
This part deals primarily with the question of state power, in the framework
of the Hayekian blueprint, the "Great Society". At the same time, it seeks to clarify
the social relations that are likely to emerge if Hayek's proposals are taken as
applicable in actual contemporary Western societies. Thus, the problems of law and
order are examined further in view of their suggested political function, and so is the
question of liberty, under the headings of democracy and Hayek's critique of the
welfare state. Some further considerations concerning the question of state power
immediately arise in the section which deals with the replacement of the term "state"
with the term "government" as well as in that which criticizes Hayek's proposals on
the functioning of a "good" government. Finally the presentation of the Hayekian
"Model Constitution" is used mainly as a supplementary argument that reinforces the
theses advanced thus far.
SECTION A: General Rules, Commands and Government
1. Rules and Commands
Hayek regards society as a kind of spontaneous order of individuals in
coexistence, believing it has no separate existence as a category of its own: "(...) the
multiplicity of grown and self-generating structures of men who have any freedom,
that alone deserves the name of society" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p. 140). On the other hand,
"government" is an organization made to aid the functioning of this spontaneous order.
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He argues that "spontaneous order and organization will always coexist" (F.A. Hayek
1973 p.48). Both spontaneous order and organization should rely on general rules (in
contradiction to specific commands). The reason for this is that "by guiding actions
of individuals by rules rather than specific commands it is possible to make use of
knowledge which nobody possesses as a whole" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.49).
There are two main types of rules or laws, according to Hayek. The first one,
namely the universal laws of justice, govern the spontaneous order of society. The
second, those formed by legislation, are rules for the performance of assigned tasks.
"Such rules will be different for the different members of the organization according
to the different roles which have been assigned to them (...)" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.49).
"By contrast, the rules governing a spontaneous order must be independent of
purpose and be the same, if not necessarily for all members, at least for whole classes
of members (...)" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.50). "They must be rules applicable to an
unknown and indeterminable number of persons and instances". "Their application
will be independent of any common purpose which the individual need not even
know" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.50).
The rule of law is considered to be independent of any individual purposes but
at the same time determinant of the form of the overall order. In that sense, it does
have a purpose and this is the maintenance of that order. The problem with such an
appeal to general principles, in order to justify an abstract concept, is that the whole
scheme is too vague. It will be argued that the appeal to the general is used as a
shield for the introduction of certain principles which, far from being of general
acceptance, tend to be identical to some very disputable characteristics of
contemporary Western societies. Hayek uses an intentionally vague conception of the
rule of law in order to smuggle in all major principles of the existing socio-economic
order without at the same time tying himself to a commitment to preserve what he
regards as concessions to socialism. We can, of course, imagine Hayek's laws in the
form of appeals or declarations that may be accepted typically as mere words or
propositions. But when we come to their real existence, namely their application to
practice, we will see that since society is class divided those laws cannot in their
essence "be the same for everybody". That is why this proposition is almost
immediately altered by the introduction of the phrase "at least for whole classes".
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This alteration, however, is decisive for the meaning. It is an indication that in a class
divided society the effects of the application of general rules cannot influence
everybody alike. The rule of law is supposed to treat all individuals as equals in
theory, however unequal they may in fact be. The order that such a "law" governs,
however, is not an abstract theoretical order but a concrete society with a certain class
structure. Thus, "The rule of law that presides over this concrete and particular order
of things is surely blind to its own particularity." (F.R. Cristi 1984 p.534). But there
seems to be more than a "natural blindness" in it; "it is a disturbingly clear-sighted
will and desire not to see." (F.R. Cristi 1984 p.534). Hayek's concept of the equal
applicability of the rule of law has also been criticized by scholars who remain aloof
from any class-based analysis of society. Critiques which emerge from the liberal-
libertarian camp and which are based on the same individualistic premises as Hayek's
seem quite plausible as well. Thus, Bruno Leoni (1961 pp.68-69) makes the point that
formal equal applicability can result in forming an infinite number of groups of people
so that law will be applied to them "equally". As members of specific groups such
people will be equally treated by laws applied to them despite the fact that other laws
will treat other groups differently. Hamowy comments that if equal applicability is
to be understood in terms of the formal effects of the legislation then it can hardly
stand serious examination since "most laws have a harsher impact on certain people
than they do on others." (R. Hamowy 1978 p.292). And he even ventures to say - in
a rather essentialist mood - that the requirement for equal applicability in Hayek's
theory results in "(...) a requirement that all laws apply equally to those the law
applies to."(R. Hamowy 1978 p.293).
In Hayek's view of the rule of law, no individual is able to know the aims of
a spontaneous order emerging from general rules. It is precisely the knowledge-
maximizing function of the rule of law that justifies its existence1. Even if one could
follow Hayek all the way up to here, it would be difficult to agree with this last point.
1 For a view, supportive to Hayek's argument, see A. Shenfield 1976 p.58. Shenfield is at pains to
demonstrate the impersonal and unforeseeable character of the capitalist mode of production. The
absurdity of his argument however, becomes apparent if one replaces the subject of his methodological
approach - namely, the time-honored abstract individual ("one") - with, say, a corporate enterprise. In
that case it is clear that the enterprise not only "behaves" according to very concrete long term planning
but also that this planning involves the regulations of wide spheres of social life such as political
measures, consumptional behavior etc.
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Keeping in mind that capitalism is the material basis of the "spontaneous order", one
can say that at least some purposes and consequences will be known before hand. For
example, even if we achieve the "free society" some people will be employers and
some employees1. The employers will, as a rule, be much more wealthy than the
employees; they will probably be much more famous and powerful as well. Hayek
might have said then that they will be so because they are more clever, capable and
so on. But the point here is that from arguing that rules are independent of personal
purposes it does not automatically follow that one cannot predict any results at all.
On the contrary, the consequences emerging from the application of the above
proposed rules look very much the same as the situation already existing in our
societies2.
As far as the second kind of rules is concerned, namely rules of organization,
their definition and their purposes refer direcdy to the common concept of law. They
should be totally determined by the general rules and cannot question them under any
circumstances. It should be noticed that it is only these rules that can be altered by
governmental or any other humanly designed action.
In his effort to prove the existence and superiority of the general rules
(universal rules of just conduct), Hayek tries to give them a historical as well as
logical basis. Hayek's arguments, in brief, are: law is older than legislation. Its
existence in the sense of enforced rules of conduct is coeval with society, whereas
rules for the organization (commands) were produced long after. The superiority of
the first category thus derives from its pre-existence. The problem, according to
Hayek, arises from a misunderstanding, common among people nowadays, according
to which law governing human action is the product of legislation. This seems to be
a result of a constant gain of power of the legislative bodies during the last centuries.
There always existed of necessity an authority which had power to make the rules of
organization of government and it came as a natural result that this authority could
change the rules of just conduct too when such changes became recognized. So, the
1 These terms are applied to avoid any evaluation.
2 This point will be discussed later when Hayek's account of the unforeseeable results of
spontaneous orders in relation to the question of social justice, will be criticized.
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task of the ruler was, at the beginning, only to enforce rules of just conduct and to
organize defence and various other services. Yet, a ruler would find it to his
advantage to claim for his rules the same dignity as was generally conceded to the
universal rules of just conduct. It seems that for Hayek the undertaking of
law-making by the legislator (an individual in previous years, an assembly in
bourgeois democracy) was more or less a coincidence1.
Hayek's account of the superiority of law in comparison to legislation suffers
from a profound lack of consideration of actual historical circumstances2. By
attributing to law a self-contained existence separate from the historical conditions in
which it emerged, Hayek is actually granting it its own "life" and history quite apart
from the life and history of the people who produced it. This unhistorical approach
allows him to argue that Law3 has remained essentially unaltered throughout history.
But that is very doubtful. Even if we accept the term law (with or without capital
"L") to describe the conditions under which a primitive group of people were kept
together, we cannot regard the point that this law had the form of enforced rules as
self-evident. It is much more probable that the reasons keeping people together did
not follow from the enforcement of rules but from mutual interest. The general "laws"
existing in such societies were not dressed with the sovereign attire in which laws
appeared later on in history; they did not stand above society, determining in an
alienated way how this society should function. It is only through the existence of the
state that law acquired its contemporary "sovereign" sense. The difference between
"laws" in primitive societies and legislation in our societies can be asserted by
contrasting the free, voluntary respect of the members of the former with the
obligation required by the latter. Today, the most powerful leader, the most sovereign
constitution has of course much more "authority" than the "elders" of the tribe but
1 F.A. Hayek 1973 chapter 4. Hayek recapitulates the "historical" account of the rule of law in most
of his major works. For example, see F.A. Hayek 1983 pp.29-32.
2 On that, see also R. Vernon (1976 p.266). Vernon considers Hayek's approach as profoundly non-
historical. His categories of association are abstract types rather than social systems or stages, he says.
3 With capital "L", that is, the abstract and general conception of law rather than existing law itself.
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they cannot have the voluntary and undisputable respect that they used to have1.
To this extent, and only to this extent, it is true that "laws" were not something
which men could make at will (as Hayek maintains) but this was not due to a
tendency inherent in the individual to accept metaphysical values but to the simple
fact that human will was objectively limited. Man was not determining his life, not
because he did not want to, but because he could not. Hayek seems to forget this and
compares primitive societies with those of the twentieth century directly as if they
both had the same abilities to determine their own form as well as the natural world.
Hayek's view leaves the creation of law outside the social process2. It is
Hayek's expressed belief that law creates societies and not vice versa. What he fails
to explain sufficiently .however, is where and by whom law is created. Furthermore,
it is Hayek's firm belief that "There always existed of necessity an authority which
had power to make law of a different kind, namely the rules of the organization of
government (...)." (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.90). It seems that this assurance contradicts his
own main idea that law is older than legislation since it now presents the state as
coeval with law. This arbitrary conclusion arises from Hayek's desire to legitimize
"government" (i.e. the state) as an eternal organism. The reason why he is led to it
lies in his inability to understand law as a social relation. Primitive "laws" did not
derive their power from coercion but from effortless respect; so did the "legislator".
This was possible because, and in so far as, all members of the community had
compatible interests.
Legislation, in the sense of a separate function of particular people, appeared
later, exactly as Hayek says. But the point is that it did not appear as a supplement
to primitive tribal law; on the contrary it appeared as a confirmation that the old
society had died along with its primitive law, and that the new society that emerged
should make its own rules of organization suitably to its own needs. Hayek, himself,
seems to realize the mutually exclusive character of "tribal" and "positive" law. After
1 For the complete argument, see F. Engels, in K. Marx and F. Engels 1970 p.577. For further
Marxist reference, see G. Plekhanov 1940. For more recent accounts, see A. Rakitov 1982 and P.
Anderson 1988.
2 See also the "historical" objection raised against the creation of the rules of law, in Manin 1983
p.53.
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all, his "Great Society" is the direct negation of the "tribal state" in which humanity
was living. The distinguishing and fundamental characteristic of this new social order
was that it had to serve a social structure involving disparate interests. Primitive
"law" was not effective any more precisely because it did not use force to make
people follow it. As soon as the social structure changed, i.e. as soon as interests
different from and opposed to each other appeared in one society, the need for an
enforced legislation appeared too. This legislation could not depend on respect any
more. It had to give itself a supra-social appearance based on force in order to make
people with conflicting interests obey.
The essential point, therefore, is not whether or not there were individuals or
assemblies which had some law-making power in primitive societies but that law, as
a supra-social corpus of enforced commands, appeared as a result of changes in the
social structure of such societies. In that sense, we can say that law is a result of
necessity. It does not reflect the arbitrary subjective "will" of the legislator but it does
reflect the concrete stage of the development of social relations in the society it is
striving to order.
Hayek appears to base the essence of his argument exactly on the point that
since law is not an act of the deliberate "will" of the legislator it does not express any
"will" or interest at all. But the fact that a general law may not be the expression of
the "will" of the individual legislator, taken in an abstract subjectivist way, cannot lead
logically to the total negation of any kind of expression of will or interest through
law.Again the essential point is that, as Hayek admits, law is responsible for the
setting of the overall order. Therefore, it is the law that expresses the actual social
relations, albeit in an abstract and mystified way. The fact that Hayek deprives human
beings of their ability to determine their lives and thus attributes to law a superhuman
character is then an example of the application of his philosophical conservatism in
politics. This conservatism has already been accounted for in the previous part.
Broadly speaking, it is the equation of all knowledge with "our" knowledge and the
further delimitation of the latter to such things as are man created. This, in turn,
results in an a priori limitation of human action (even in its potentiality) to an
extremely restricted realm conceived of as the realm of humanly created phenomena.
The rest of actuality thus becomes, equally a priori, forbidden territory for rational
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conscious activity. Law, in Hayek's account, is obviously pushed into the realm of
the beyond. Notwithstanding this point, a difference might be thought to exist
between classical conservatism and Hayek's account. Hayek admits that law is "man
made" but, he adds, not "man designed". Nevertheless, the fact that law is considered
as "man made" is in its essence irrelevant; what counts is that it cannot be changed
because it cannot be designed1.
Considering "law" as socially "neutral", Hayek proceeds to the critical question
of who is the ultimate authority, who limits the legislator and becomes the source
from which he derives his authority. The answer here is, surprisingly enough, "the
common opinion". By opinion Hayek means "a common tendency to approve of some
particular acts of will and to disapprove of others, according to whether they do or do
not possess certain attributes which those who hold a given opinion usually will not
be able to specify" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.92).
Formally speaking, the definition of "common opinion" as the ultimate
authority hardly makes any sense. Hayek maintains that the ultimate power of society
is the common approval or disapproval of some acts according to criteria that cannot
be specified because reason is unable to understand or guide man in the search of such
principles. Man is thus expected to approve or disapprove of actions le d by
superstitions and myths2. Common opinion then is something that nobody is able to
specify rationally. Hence, the "definition" proves that the subject cannot be defined3.
What Hayek refers to, however, is, once again, a tacit knowledge which can
only be crystallized implicitly in tradition. Common opinion, then, far from having
anything to do with Rousseau's general will, is only a more politically acceptable way
of referring to "tradition". It is that sum of unarticulated rules that find their way into
tradition that will prescribe, according to Hayek, which acts of will will be approved
and which disapproved. What is certain of this definition of ultimate authority is that
1 That this differentiation does not challenge conservative premisses can also be asserted by the
similarity of Hayek's thought on that matter with that of the prominent conservative M. Oakeshott.
2 See for example, F.A. Hayek 1952b p. 162.
' Thus, C. Kukathas (1989 p.158) notes on the matter of the criteria of justice according to which
a change to the rule of law might come about that "Hayek seems both to assume that there do exist
such principles and to deny that they can be identified.".
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it leaves many questions, crucial for the political form of a society, essentially
unanswered. Thus, it is highly possible that common opinion may tend to approve of
acts of will of an authoritarian character. In that case, and insofar as no infringement
of its formal characteristics will occur, the "Great Society" can rightfully be identified
as an authoritarian society1. And again, even if we assume that common opinion
tends towards a more liberally orientated social organization, it seems that the far
more important question is who will interpret that highly ambiguous implicit common
opinion and how.
Hayek takes common opinion as the ultimate authority in a society because he
unhistorically presupposes that this society, and the consequent prevailing common
opinion that emerges from it traditionally, can be identified (however broadly) with
a liberal order. But, firstly, this can historically hardly be taken for granted and,
secondly, Hayek is logically unable to establish an argument which will meet these
points. The problem is, thus, twofold. On the one hand, it simply is not the case that
common opinion was and is always favorable to a liberal social order. On the other,
if that order is a sine qua non for common opinion to become ultimate authority, then
Hayek's purposeless evolutionism collapses. For, in that case, one would be in a
position of specifying what the common opinion will approve and what it will not;
and the result is bound to be that it will approve of the "Great Society". The
unfortunate step here is that the conclusion is already included in the presupposition.
By identifying the results of this ambiguous process with the ideals of "Great
Society", then, Hayek not only uses some very definite criteria (which, nevertheless,
are supposed not to exist...) but he also determines the results of the whole procedure.
It is only towards a certain kind of order that it should lead2. If we try to place this
argument of common opinion as the ultimate power within the general Hayekian
conception of democracy, we will find further problems. For, if common opinion is
the ultimate power, consequently it should be the source of all values. But Hayek
rejects this reasonable result of his own methodology in two ways. First, he believes
1 Notice that this is more than a remote possibility and that Hayek indeed argues explicitly for the
compatibility of liberalism and authoritarianism.
2 For a similar point, see Manin 1983 p.53.
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in the existence of values per se\ second, he repeatedly demonstrates his profound
distrust towards the political expression of common opinion.
Finally, by law of legislation, Hayek means all positive law, including the
constitution. Financial legislation and administrative law (including the function of
police forces) are also regarded as falling within the same category. These ideas,
combined with another main belief of his, namely that the term "government" should
be used rather than the term "state", lead to the conclusion that legislatures and
assemblies are governmental bodies "whose chief activities were of the kind which
ought to be limited by law (...)" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p.130).
The legal expression of the same thing is to be found in the distinction
between private and public law. Hayek introduces "the distinction between private
and public as being equivalent to the distinction between rules of just conduct and
rules of organization" (F.A. Hayek 1973 p. 132). Private law, the rights of the
individual under capitalism, is thus presented in a supra-social form, reinforced by a
metaphysical power and assured of its dominant position; "public law passes but
private law persists", Hayed argues (F.A. Hayek 1973 p. 135). Public law, in contrast,
is adjusted to the limited concept of government, stripped of any power (apart from
its obligation to serve private law), accused of all the evils of contemporary society
and threatened with drastic limitation in the future.
2. "Government" instead of "State" - Merely a Change of Terms?
The distinction between supra-social law and legislation paves the way for a further
differentiation in Hayek's theory, that between the term "government" and the term
"state". In fact Hayek proposes the complete abolition of the latter term and its
replacement by the former. In The Constitution of Liberty he offers no explanation
for this change, whereas in the first volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty, he feels
the need to explain this decision. "In English it is possible and has long been usual,
to discuss these two types of order in terms of the distinction between "society" and
"government". There is no need in the discussion of these problems, so long as only
one country is concerned, to bring in the metaphysically charged term "state". It is
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largely under the influence of continental and particularly Hegelian thought that in the
course of the last hundred years the practice of speaking of the "state" (preferably with
a capital "S"), where "government" is more appropriate and precise, has come to be
widely adopted. That which acts, or pursues a policy, is however always the
organization of government; and it does not make for clarity to drag in the term
"state" where "government" is quite sufficient. It becomes particularly misleading
when "the state" rather than "government" is contrasted with "society" to indicate that
the first is an organization and the second a spontaneous order" (F.A. Hayek 1973
p.48). Thus, it would seem that Hayek only proposes to use a more accurate term in
the place of "state".
Hayek's objections here are, firstly, that "state" is a "metaphysically" charged
term. Secondly, the term was adopted under the influence of continental and
particularly Hegelian tradition and, thirdly, it is always the organization of government
which acts, or pursues a policy. As far as the first two points are concerned, it should
be noted that Hayek does not advance any argument in order to underpin his
objections, and this can only be interpreted as a weakness. Moreover, he seems to
base his case on a dogmatic total negation of the continental philosophical tradition
(and Hegel in particular). It is worth saying that Hayek never presents a total view
of what he calls continental philosophy and yet he continually uses it as a synonym
for dogmatism and metaphysics1. Perhaps it is one more of those views that need no
explanation because they are self-evident. One way or the other, the condemnation
of a term as metaphysical simply because it derives from a theoretical tradition
different from his own, far from being scientific, consists of a dogmatism in itself.
The reduction of the state to government plays a crucial role in Hayek's theory.
For Hayek, all social entities, including society as a whole, exist as sums of
individuals and government is no exception. When Hayek says that it is only the
government that acts or pursues a policy, he means that it is only individuals who
decide what to do and act towards that direction. But this conception is quite
1 As R.F. Drinan points out, "we are simply expected to accept on faith, and adopt as our own,
Hayek's fear that socialism has so influenced modern language as to render redefinition of its most
important terms obligatory. We are also expected to agree that the definitions Hayek provides are the
most suitable replacements." (R. F. Drinan 1980 p.627).
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debatable. In the strict sense it is not the individual members of the government who
act. The individuals who constitute a government decide and act only as members of
that government, never as isolated units. This has a twofold meaning: the government
acts as a whole in that it has to pursue a policy which usually needs the coordination
of the actions of its individual members. That much Hayek seems to accept. What
he does not accept, and what is by far the most important point, is that government
has a quite unique status in social organization very different from that of any
other group of individuals1. The status which distinguishes government from all other
groups derives its existence from the fact that it has the "legitimate" right to
materialize its decisions, which latter concern society as a whole. Thus, government
decides that an action should take place but the action is realized through the countless
organisms that the government controls, i.e. the state apparatus. Hayek's argument
is that we do not need the "metaphysical" term "state" because "government" is
enough: why do we have to assume the existence of something more complicated
when it is always the "government" that decides? But this appeal to the "obvious" is
misleading. Nobody - and certainly not Hayek - could imagine a government without
the whole strictly organized mechanism that composes the state. The image of a
group of people who decide on various matters and, after announcing their decisions,
rely on the good will of their fellow citizens to materialize them, is certainly not
Hayek's image of the "Great Society"2.
Hayek's attempt to reduce the state to a mere sum of individuals goes hand in
hand with his effort to delimit some functions of the state drastically. His aim is
primarily the social functioning of the state; but he is also concerned with
"modernizing" the economic and ideological functioning. Secondly, by identifying
government with the individuals who compose it and by maintaining that state and
personified government are two words for the same thing, he is excluding a very
1 For a classical libertarian account of the problem which starts from the assumption that a direct
comparison between government and other groups in society is legitimate, see R. Nozick 1988
especially chapter 1.
2 R. Nisbet, for example, argues explicitly for a strong government and a decentralized and
"inconspicuous administration" (R. Nisbet 1986 p.41). Hayek is reluctant to promote similar arguments
explicitly, apparently because of the implications they tend to generate in the political appeal of such
a theory.
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important part of the state from his "critical" approach by definition. This part, which
is supposed to be independent from the state1, consequently acquires an impermeable
status: it is a part of the spontaneous order and, therefore, one cannot criticize or alter
it since one can never get to know it. And that goes both for the various "pressure
groups", such as the trade unions, and for the government itself which is thus relieved
of the pressure to take any drastic steps towards the amelioration of the "social order".
This approach gives Hayek two advantages: on the one hand, he can "criticize"
government, arguing that all the evils of society are due to the misjudgments or faults
of the persons who compose it; on the other hand, he can keep in a relatively safe
place - i.e. beyond the reach of criticism and, above all, practical political action -
some of the most important functions of the state. In fact, this attempt to claim that
a considerable part of existing problems are beyond the reach of human abilities is
apparent throughout Hayek's work and in the field of politics it acquires cardinal
importance in his "Model Constitution".
What must be noticed, here, is that Hayek is trying to limit the content of the
term "state" rather than the state itself. In the event, the latter emerges as more
powerful after his critique has taken place. That Hayek's intention is to delimit the
content of the term "state", is also shown in his insistence on separating "politics" (i.e.
government actions) from "economics" (i.e. the function of the market)2. But, as one
can easily notice, what is left out of both categories is, characteristically enough,
production itself. The structure and functioning of the latter is treated (if treated at
all) as a mystifying process which takes place outside politics and, up to a point,
outside economics as well3. In that sense, Hayek's proposal is indeed a proposal for
a limited government. But if we consider the state as an active participant in the
process of production itself, then Hayek's proposal is reduced to a simple demand for
less interference in the last stage of this process - less interference in the market only;
but not less - in fact, sometimes more - interference in the relations of production
1 In reality, it is somehow supposed to be integrated in the concept of the free market.
2 See also N. Barry 1987 p.38.
3 Certainly outside any rationally comprehended economic activity, since the only rational activity
that Hayek allows for is activity of individuals in the market.
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either in the sense of the enforcement of some abstract rules of law, or in the sense
of direct suppression.
A basic element in Hayek's thought is that he never aims to question
contemporary Western societies so far as their socioeconomic foundations are
concerned; on the contrary, he usually avoids mentioning all fundamental problems
related to capitalism as such - while at the same time he invokes capitalism - and
when he is obliged to do so he alters them and presents them as human imperfections
and misjudgments resulting from an erroneous theoretical point of view. That is
exactly Hayek's intention when he replaces the term "state" with "government". This
replacement allows him to attack present "governments", and to suggest all sorts of
minor theoretical changes - and with that he comes close to Popper's "piecemeal
engineering" once more - "if a free society is to be preserved".
Concluding this point, crucial for an understanding of Hayek's theory, it must
be noticed that the use of the term "government" is not a simple correction of a
mystifying term1. What Hayek calls "government" is far different from what
comprises the state, and, therefore, it would be incomplete to criticize it simply as an
unfounded terminological innovation. In fact, it is an illegitimate reduction of some
parts of the state functions to the supposedly superhuman "free" market order and a
parallel reduction of some other parts (which are now thought of as government
actions) to personal failures. In the following sections an attempt will be made to
develop the implications of this "terminological" correction.
1 Indirect support on that point can be derived from the fact that most of the open advocates of
strong and authoritarian states argue precisely on the same grounds as Hayek. For example, see R.
Nisbet 1986 p.41.
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SECTION B: Hayek's Ambivalent Attitude to Democracy
1. The Theoretical Problem
Hayek discusses the problem of democracy extensively. His main ideas are
examined here under two headings. The first refers to the nature of the concept of
democracy in general. The second to its applied form as it is presented in the
developed capitalist countries today. Thus, the first sub-section tries to illuminate the
theoretical basis of the concept, while the second deals with the contemporary
malfunctions of the applied idea and attacks the actual institutions of the political
organization.
Hayek tackles the question of democracy within the frame that he has created
by the presentation of his conception of the rule of law, that is, according to the
distinction between laws which are responsible for the overall shape of a "social
order" and commands which merely regulate some specific parts of that order but
should not interfere with its general structure. Politically, this distinction reemerges
as the separation of the individual sphere of action from the state1. This distinction,
which is only another expression of the classical bourgeois distinction of the civil
from the political, and the consequent confrontation of its two poles as mutually
antagonistic, self-contained categories, serves as the logical basis for the "legitimate"
demands of the former for the least possible interference in its internal affairs from
the latter. Thus, the state emerges as a means to the fulfillment of the ends of civil
society. It is within this scheme that Hayek develops his view of the instrumental
value of democracy. "Democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device for
safeguarding internal peace and individual freedom" (F.A. Hayek 1944 p.52) and,
"being a method, [democracy] indicates nothing about the aims of government." (F.A.
Hayek 1960 p. 104).
In Hayek's theory, then, the separation of the civil from the political appears
1 For the determinative importance of that distinction in the neo liberal thought, see also N. O'
Sullivan 1989 pp.4-5.
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as a constant desideratum. At the same time, this approach delimits the horizon of
"freedom as absence of coercion". The "Great Society", of itself, does not appear to
be incompatible with coercion as long as an objective delimitation of the political by
the rule of law allows individuals to shape the course of their future actions1. In that
sense, and in the mechanistic spirit that has already been mentioned, Hayek comments
that "a democracy may well wield totalitarian powers, and it is conceivable that an
authoritarian government may act on liberal principles." (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.103)2.
Ultimately, democracy is justified on the grounds that, firstly, it is "the only
method of peaceful change that man has yet discovered"; secondly, "democracy is an
important safeguard of individual liberty"; and, thirdly, "(...) because a great part of
the population takes an active part in the formation of opinion, a correspondingly wide
range of persons is available from which to select." (F.A. Hayek 1960 pp.107-108)3.
Strictly speaking, from these three arguments meant to support democracy,
only the second refers to an ultimate end. Hayek never maintained that "a peaceful
change" or "an effective method of educating the majority" are the ends towards
which a society should aim. Therefore, it is only as "an important safeguard of
individual liberty" that we can judge democracy. Hayek, however, seems to doubt
this. His point is that "since coercive power must in fact always be exercised by a
few, it is less likely to be abused if the power entrusted to the few can always be
revoked by those who have to submit to it." (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 108). Thus, the
argument is based on the possibility of the people revoking the power entrusted to
their governors. How is this applied in the "democratic" societies that he proposes?
As we shall see, his proposals for an ideal government seek to restrict the right of
revoking those in power rather than to extend it4.
In actual politics, however, it would seem that the only "meaningful" right of
1 "The state and other collectives are viewed as the enemy but, as a possible paradox, the state is
granted a monopoly of violence in society as a means of preventing others from infringing on individual
rights." (P.W. Dyer and R. Harrison Hickman 1979 p.383). The paradox however, only holds in the
realm of formal logic, as the argument in this thesis seeks to demonstrate.
2 Hayek's formalism is also stressed by RJ7. Drinan 1980 p.626.
3 For a sympathetic account of Hayek's concepts see also G. Dietze in F. Machlup 1977 p. 139.
4 See also D. Meiklejohn 1980 p.121.
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the people is the right to vote. But this has proved to be a very elastic criterion, one
able to justify almost any governmental action. On the one hand, people may vote for
a certain government not because they like it particularly but because they think, or
they are made to think, that it is the least harmful solution. This is a typical example
of what happens in Britain and the U.S.A.. On the other hand, people may believe
that there is a need for an oppressive government (as they did in Germany with the
Nazis). This possibility illustrates the inadequacy of Hayek's utilitarianism. If the
ultimate value was indeed individual freedom, then the choice made by each and every
individual to vote for a government that could interfere, in the most arbitrary way, in
all spheres of life, should have been respected by Hayek. In an analytical sense this
choice is a free choice, but its results would certainly differ greatly from Hayek's
"Great Society"1. In this case individual liberty is eliminated voluntarily. But since
liberty is for Hayek a value per se, such occurrences can never be justified. Hayek
is aware of this danger; so in the end he comes up with a conclusion that practically
reverses the validity of his own argument: "The prospects of liberty depend on
whether or not the majority makes it its deliberate object. It would have little chance
of surviving if we relied on the mere existence of democracy to preserve it" (F.A.
Hayek 1960 p. 108).
Liberty is thus, once more, presented as a value per se, founded on moral-
imperative grounds. Hayek refutes the essential validity of the utilitarian approach he
has introduced above; he also refutes the "scientific evolutionary" approach. Liberty's
prospects lie in its being accepted as a deliberately chosen object by the majority.
This also brings forward a point mentioned previously - namely the appeal to the
majority in a rather eclectic way. Liberty is the ultimate idea; therefore, its value does
not depend on its acceptance by any majority. At the same time, its existence seems
to depend chiefly on whether it will become the deliberate object of the majority or
not. Furthermore, the majority is the determinative factor in order for liberty to exist,
while at the same time majority rule poses a severe danger to its existence in Hayek's
view....
As far as his first argument is concerned, there is no indication in Hayek's
1 See also N. Barry 1979 p.59.
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work of what a peaceful change means and why this is desirable. Hayek seems to
regard peaceful change as a separate value towards which democracy is conducive.
If that is the case, then Hayek should have explained why peaceful change is a value
and in what way it is related to individual liberty. He should also have indicated the
ways in which it promotes liberty. He does neither. A suggestion could be made that
what Hayek means here by peaceful change is an equivalent of the maintenance of an
overall order. But in that case democracy is taken as a synonym of conservatism;
democracy is effective in so far as it promotes social stability and order - a statement
quite revealing in itself.
By social change, then, Hayek means just a change of government - i.e. the
replacement of the individuals who make up the government by some others. What,
however, distinguishes democracy from, for instance, monarchy or dictatorship, at
least formally, is that the majority decides when this change will take place and who
the successor will be. In other words, the essence of democracy turns on whether it
provides real options of different types of government or not. But that is by no means
what Hayek thinks. Apart from being wrong, his argument is quite conservative (in
the essential meaning of the word) too. Arguing that democracy is desirable because
it can provide peaceful changes, means that he is taking the whole social structure as
naturally given and eternally desirable. Indeed, at this point, Hayek does not seem to
be prepared to discuss the social organization of capitalism under any evolutionary
perspective. He is simply interested in making this given social organization somehow
more effective.
So far as the third and last argument is concerned, a comparison of this
theoretical issue with the real political conditions of any Western democracy of the
20th century will be enough to demonstrate its insufficiency. It is certainly not a
characteristic of capitalist democracy that "a great part of the population takes an
active part in the formation of opinion". On the contrary most of the population do
not even care how these opinions are formed and by whom. With this, however, we
come to a more essential point of criticism. The question that suggests itself here is,
to what extent does Hayek think that the participation of people in politics is desirable.
For Hayek, as has been argued earlier, the state is an indisputable necessity in a "free"
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society. Its essence lies explicitly in its coercive function1. State coercion, however,
is desirable as long as it is a safeguard of individual liberty. "This is possible only
by the state's protecting known private spheres of the individuals against interference
by others (...)." (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.21). The private sphere (the civil), then, is
conceived of as the protected domain of liberty. The aim of the rule of law is to
safeguard the distinct character of the civil against unwanted interference (F.A. Hayek
1960 p.21). This negative, protective role of the state, nevertheless, has another aspect
as well which never appears explicitly in Hayek's works. Effective delimitation and
protection of the civil by the political is only another way of demanding the latter's
independence from the former. Thus, in the "Great Society" the state is in fact
granted the autonomy it needs when it stands beyond society and confronts it; it is
only the other side of the same coin. The process of the delimitation and protection
of the civil then seems to carry as an inseparable "side effect"2 the prevention of the
politicalization of the civil society. It is the consolidation of that separation that
Hayek regards as the ideal type of political organization3. Liberal republics, however,
especially under the influence of socialist ideas, tend to compromise the distinction
between civil and political. It is precisely against that compromise that Hayek
launches his attack (F.A. Hayek 1976 chapter 12)4.
As a further indication of this, perhaps we should note the change that Hayek's
justification of democracy underwent. In The Constitution of Liberty, when he first
presented the three arguments for the justification of democracy systematically, he
stressed the importance of the last argument5 according to which democracy is
1 See for example, F.A. Hayek 1960 p.21.
2 That this is not a simple side effect will be argued later on.
3 Hayek is by no means the only one who upholds that view. N. Barry, for example, explicidy states
that "Most people display a healthy apathy towards politics, an indifference, which is only harmful when
society is heavily "politicized"^. Barry 1987 p.198). R. Vernon makes the same point for Hayek and
Popper (1976 p.262).
* For G. Walker that point is self-evident. Thus, "Democracy has not proved successful at
preventing this politicization of the economic process. In fact Hayek is convinced that democracy in
its present forms exacerbates and encourages this politicization, and is thus not the safeguard of freedom
that is commonly thought to be." (G. Walker 1986 p. 19 emphasis added).
5 "This seems to me the most powerful (..)" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 108).
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desirable because it is the only way of educating the people in political matters. This
argument was in such an apparent contradiction with the spirit of the presentation of
the whole problem of political organization that, only six pages after stating it, he
comments (with no apparent dissatisfaction) that ideas concerning the form of political
organization must be left to enlightened individuals since "The practical [sic!] man
concerned with the immediate problems of the day has neither the interest nor the time
to examine the interrelations of different parts of the complex order of society. He
merely chooses from among the possible orders that are offered to him and finally
accepts the political doctrine or set of principles elaborated and presented by others."
(F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 114). In Law Legislation and Liberty, however, he corrects
himself by stating "I rather regret that in that book [The Constitution of Liberty]
(p. 108), carried away by de Tocqueville, I described the third of the three arguments
in support of democracy which I mentioned, (...), as the "most powerful" argument."
(F.A. Hayek 1976 p. 180). And he concludes by suggesting that the major argument
is that of peaceful change in government, thus strengthening the separation of the civil
from the political and attributing democracy strictly to the latter.
In order to secure the depoliticalization of civil society, Hayek employs three
arguments. Firstly, by the exclusion of the vast majority of state institutions from his
definition of "government", he manages to end up with an extremely limited definition
of the "political". Secondly, this limited character of the political secures an
essentially impermeable area of apparently non-political ("individual") activity.
Thirdly, when arguing for a democratic form of state, he makes it clear that the
adjective can only be attributed to a method of government and that no other social
institutions (such as education or market relations) can be meaningfully characterized
as democratic. Thus, the meaning of democracy in Hayek's theory acquires a
paradoxical character. His attempt to distinguish between the civil and the political
and to delimit the latter results to the impossible situation of defending a
"democraticization" of the state, while considering the "democraticization" of society
as the chief threat against the "Great Society". This is clearly shown in his (at the
least) unstable attitude towards majority opinion and majority rule.
It has already been suggested that a delimitation of the term "state" does not
necessarily lead to its weakening. It can now be argued that in Hayek's theory this
203
alleged delimitation implies an actual strengthening of the state itself to the point
where it becomes authoritarian. This argument questions directly Hayek's verbal
commitment to democracy. For, although Hayek has stated that the "Great Society"
is compatible with authoritarianism (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 103) as a result of his
distinction between the civil and the political, he still maintains that the latter is
incompatible - and in fact the opposite - with democracy. The fact that Hayek argues
explicitly for the depoliticization of civil society however, must not obscure the
equally undeniable fact that his argument results in the autonomy of the political from
the civil and thus in the constant possibility of the former acquiring an authoritarian
form. That means that the claim for a politics-free, self-regulating society can also
be read backwards as a claim for an autonomous self-sufficient political authority, that
is, an authority in practice unaccountable to society. This process becomes clearer
when we take into account the necessity that Hayek attributes to the existence of the
state as the only source of legitimate coercion. The dethronement of politics from
society is achieved by attributing to the latter a self-regulating, spontaneous character.
The negative role of the state in such a society however, at least to the extent that it
is conceived as a necessity, can only be ensured by the state's own action. It is self-
regulative activity that guarantees the negative existence of the state and the
consequent depoliticization of civil society; and it is that same self-regulative activity
that can be considered as making possible the state's active preservation of the
monopoly of political power as well.
The spectrum of authoritarianism does not haunt Hayek's theoretical schemes
only1. On the contrary, it reveals its real functioning when one considers that behind
the abstract formal theoretical schemes of the rule of law and the separation of the
civil from the political lies an actual attempt to justify and promote a concrete social
and political mode of organization. Even if actual society is the product of the
undesigned natural evolutionary selection of competing traditions, as Hayek maintains,
it is still a real concrete society. And that society, which is structured according to
a particular class structure, will not represent everybody in the same way. The fact
that Hayek considers the stratification concerned as a "natural ranking", as a result of
1 See also S. Brittan 1980 p.33.
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some individuals adopting more effective rules than others, can only in fact strengthen
the conclusion that it is for the preservation of the existing society that the political
blueprint of Hayek's strives, irrespective of its authoritarian or "democratic" verbal
disguise. It could be argued then, that to the extent that Hayek refers to capitalism
as a socio-economic formation he has to argue for some kind of democracy, because,
after all, it is under bourgeois democracy that capitalism exists in the Western
countries. At the same time, he constantly attacks the concrete form of social
organization that capitalism acquired in our days, especially as far as its democratic
elements are concerned. It might be unfair to accuse Hayek of being the only
bourgeois philosopher who does so. In fact, the insufficient character of bourgeois
democracy reflects one of the main contradictions of capitalism on the political level -
namely that it needs both freedom and coercion at the same time. It is a necessity
that people should be "free" to enter into economic transactions, while at the same
time this freedom is extremely limited as far as the option of the determination of
their own lives is concerned. In that sense, Hayek's account of democracy captures
the contradictory process of the growth of capitalism adequately. He is constantly
obliged to delimit and alter the meaning of democracy in order to defend his ultimate
end - the preservation of capitalism.
His profound distrust of what he calls majority rule is only an expression of
the above process. "We have no ground for crediting majority decisions with that
higher, superindividual wisdom (...)" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p. 110). "Moreover majority
decisions are peculiarly liable, if not guided by accepted principles, to produce overall
results that nobody wanted" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.lll). Phrases like these are common
in Hayek's work1. Notice the eclectic attitude towards the role of majorities in a
social order. On the one hand, "Great Society" essentially rests on the unquestioned
adoption of its principles by the majority of its members. On the other, the majority
should not be granted any superindividual wisdom. The crux of the problem seems
to lie in the respective functions that the majority undertakes in the two cases. In the
first case it is conceived of as an abstract aggregate of equally abstract individuals.
1 In that sense, "There is certainly no logical connection between democracy and freedom" (N.
Barry 1987 p. 197). See also T.R. Machan 1982 p.332.
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As such it cannot challenge any part of the actual social order. To make matters even
clearer Hayek presupposes the "adoption" of the "Great Society's" principles to be a
"passive" acceptance of unarticulated rules. In the second case, the majority acquires
(potentially) an ontological substance and a concrete political power. Thus, its actions
can challenge the existing social order. In that sense, it becomes an explicit threat to
the "Great Society". It is in this second case, then, that Hayek regards the majority's
concrete (potential) political power as a plague from the standpoint of his social
theory.
Democracy then should only be a device in the service of a certain end, the
"Great Society". When it is not, it becomes condemnable as such. For Hayek,
democracy is desirable as long as it is kept within certain "common principles"
abstract and eternal, namely the principles that guide the economy and politics of
capitalism. When we come to the point where the growth of democracy becomes an
obstacle to the growth of capitalism then the former should be "altered" so that the
contradictions may be surpassed peacefully. This logic is neither new nor unusual.
What, however, is of some novelty, is the frank, perhaps even cynical, way of its
exposition.
2. Malfunctions of Contemporary Democracy: The Problem in Practice
After stating the problem in its general form Hayek proceeds to a more
concrete critique of democracy as it appears in contemporary societies. Democracy,
he argues, is not an ideal state. Its main problem is that it was given unlimited power.
The concept of majority rule as the source of ultimate power is fundamentally wrong.
Instead, democracy should be the safeguard of individual freedom by accepting the
limitations imposed by a higher "nomos". But nowadays this does not happen because
of the belief that the control of government by the democratically elected legislature
could adequately replace the traditional limitations (F.A. Hayek 1979 chap. 12
esp.par.2).
The topic of democracy, conceived of as majority rule, is not altogether
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unproblematic in the liberal tradition1. In Hayek's case, majority rule is confronted
almost with open hostility. There has been a long debate on whether the concept of
majority rule has any application in contemporary Western societies2. There is a long
tradition of critics, occupying different positions in the ideological spectrum, who have
repeatedly argued that majority rule in Western societies is more or less a formality.
More recently, it has become a common belief among people that not only do they not
rule but there is no point in trying to participate at all. Many theorists have argued
for the death of democracy or even for the death of politics, basing themselves on
those facts. Hayek's arguments seem to point in a different direction. Not only is
majority rule not a mere formality; it is also an actual threat. Hayek believes that it
is because of the application of the idea that majorities should rule, that Western
democracies tend to perish. It is because it has become both an accepted principle and
a prevailing practice that the people of Great Britain, for example, rule, that
democracy has imperiled liberty in this country. This concept overlooks certain facts
that seemed to be undeniable even among liberals. How is Hayek going to explain
the general apathy that prevails in Western societies if he holds the view that majority
rule is both an accepted principle and a practice? How is he going to explain
artd
abstaining from elections from any social activity? It seems that at times Hayek takes
some very disputable things as granted.
What then, is Hayek's suggestion in order to overcome the problems created
by the "application" of majority rule? Majority rule should be replaced by the consent
of the people, Hayek argues. It should "be limited, not by another superior "will" but
by the consent of the people on which all power and the coherence of the state rest"
(F.A. Hayek 1979 p.3). But if majority rule was accused of being a mere formality,
mainly because of its abstract character which did not permit any identifiable
outcomes, what could be said about the consent of the people? Of course, Hayek
takes once again for granted that the consent of the people is an existing possibility.
In fact, he takes it to be an actuality, since he states that the power and the coherence
1 J. Gray also considers democracy as the cause of decline of classical liberalism (J. Gray 1986b
p.92).
2 For a Marxist account of the status of democracy in the liberal theory, see J. Hoffman 1988.
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of any state rest on it (not "should rest")1. Even if there was something like a
consent, how could it become observable or quantifiable? Hayek does not provide us
with any direct answer here.
There are, however, reasons to believe that "consent" is a deliberately abstract
and unidentifiable concept. Hayek has argued that the consent of people to certain
ideals can be given without the people being explicitly aware of what these ideals are.
It is a semi-conscious, spontaneous process during which the people do not need to
"know what" the principles are - in the sense that they cannot articulate them
explicitly - as long as they "know how" they work. Therefore, the people are
supposed to give their consent to unknown principles virtually by definition, and since
the coherence of the state depends on this, it follows that the existence of the state
implies such consent a priori. So, there is a dual abstraction in the concept of
"consent". Firstly, it is a consent to unknown principles, and, secondly, it is a consent
that exists a priori and that cannot be articulated as such.
But that is not the end of the problems that "consent", as the source of ultimate
power creates. So far, Hayek's argument, although extremely abstract, had the
appearance of the value-free suggestion. He started from the "fact" that the existence
of the state rested on an a priori consent of the people to certain abstract ideas. His
suggestion was that this consent should always be considered as the source of ultimate
power. Matters become more complicated when Hayek introduces, apart from the
"fact" of a priori consent, the contents of people's ideals as well! The power and
coherence of the state have ceased to rest on the consent of the people to abstract
ideals and now rest on their consent to the concrete ideals of the "Great Society".
Hayek not only commits the mistake of articulating ideals that were supposed to be
non-articulable, but also seems to argue that the concept of consent is only valid when
it refers to the concrete ideals of the "Great Society" - which in turn is supposed to
validate the "consent".
It has been argued that the insufficiency of the liberal concept of democracy
1 This assumption, however, remains arbitrary since, in Adorno's words, "it is only the unity of the
principle of an individualistic society which unite the dispersed interests of the individuals in the
formula of their "opinion"" (T. Adorno in T. Adorno (et al.) 1976 p.78).
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lies in its high degree of abstraction1. If this argument is accepted, then Hayek's
propositions on "democracy" appear to be intentionally much more abstract. At the
same time, and because of his "renovative" intentions, his propositions on the content
of consent reveal the essential political conservatism of his theory. Consent, for
Hayek, means an a priori submission to the concrete demands of the "Great Society".
Hayek's attack upon majority rule on logical grounds, starts from the point that
"government" is necessarily a means of coercion. He, then, introduces the question:
by whom should we be coerced? By a majority whose interests could be to oppress
the remaining minority or by some abstract rules of just conduct based on universally
accepted moral principles?
This dilemma is partial to say the least, since it deprives us of the possibility
of having a majority whose interest would be to abolish coercion, at least in the sense
of deliberate exploitation, altogether. Moreover, it seems to reach its conclusion too
easily, because it presupposes the existence of some universally accepted principles,
which in addition are supposed to serve the interest of all individuals. Having
introduced the dilemma, Hayek argues in favor of the latter case. The ultimate
justification, he says, is that it serves an aim desirable for all - namely to maintain a
viable order. "But this justification does not extend further than the need. There is
clearly no need that anybody, not even the majority, should have the power over all
the particular actions or things occurring in society" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.6).
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that because a majority wants something,
this particular desire is an expression of its sense of justice. "There is, therefore, also
great need that a majority be required to prove its conviction that what it decides is
just by committing itself to the universal application of the rules on which it acts in
a particular case" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.9).
Here, again, Hayek makes a double mistake. He argues for the adoption of
abstract universal moral rules not because they serve the ultimate value, i.e. liberty,
but because they are supposed to promote a viable order. Hence, the aim is now
order, instead of liberty. It can be argued, of course, that it is only within an order
that liberty can be conceived. The problem, however, seems to be that if the aim of
1 J. Hoffman 1988 pp.131-202.
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abstract rules is order, an argument should be introduced to prove that by adopting
abstract moral rules, order (not liberty) is maintained more effectively than, for
example, by sheer coercion. It is one or the other: either Hayek is seeking for an
order which will permit a certain conception of individual freedom to flourish, or he
is arguing for the preservation of an order - any order - on the grounds of it being
effective - i.e. viable. Therefore, the fact that Hayek believes that the preservation of
the actual order - namely capitalism - is a sine qua non for individual freedom to be
achieved, remains an arbitrary assumption in terms of his own "scientific evolutionary"
approach. The same problem occurs when Hayek says that a majority has to prove
its commitment to the universal rules of justice. The problem is that, according to
Hayek, the majority (or any number of people, for that matter) does not have to desire
things that are "just" as long as its desire is conducive to the preservation of an overall
order. And it is obvious that an action that is conducive to the preservation of an
overall order might easily be against the moral principles of justice. Hayek again
assumes that the abstract moral principles of justice are the principles of his "Great
Society" (and in that sense they are not at all abstract) but this assumption remains
totally arbitrary.
As it has already been mentioned, Hayek presupposes that coercion by
"government" is unavoidable if an order is to be maintained1. But this concept
undermines his commitment to the reconcilability of the interests of all people because
if people's interests were actually reconcilable, coercion would become useless2. For
Hayek, coercion is justified for the maintenance of order in society as long as it does
not interfere with the individuals and their concrete actions. In other words, it is
justified as long as it is directed against actions that might put in danger the "Great
Society", but it becomes unjustifiable when it is used to prevent the particular actions
of individuals which are not opposed to the system. Coercion then is fully justified
1 For a similar to Hayek's view, see J. Gray 1986b p.61.
2 This is not to suggest that all problems of coordination in social relations can be solved
completely. What is maintained is that when there will be no irreconcilable social interests in principle,
the existence of an apparently supra-social, permanent mechanism of coercion will become superfluous.
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within the political realm1. It is only in the separate civil realm that individual
freedom can have any meaning. From the above thoughts, as well as from his whole
attitude towards democracy, it becomes apparent that the first task of "democracy" is
to eliminate majority rule because of its (potential) harmfulness for the system.
At the same time, the replacement of state by government and the narrowing
of the fields for which the latter is held responsible brings forward the political
significance of the comment made in the previous section. Government is not, or at
least should not be, concerned with the form of social organization. This latter is
considered as the outcome of a spontaneous, superhuman process that is independent
of the humanly designed actions of government. The obvious political implication of
this separation of government from society, is that the sphere of the former is
delimited to a series of secondary, piecemeal activities, which should not affect the
structure of society. Spontaneous order, thus, becomes a framework that includes all
major relations of production, distribution etc.. Government, on the contrary, is a
mechanism of coercion, limited to a specific social area, the task of which is the
preservation of order. At the same time, the sovereignty of the government in this
area becomes indisputable. Its role - namely, the preservation of a concrete social
order - which is attributed to it by definition is elevated into its reason for existence.
The political is justified as long as it can provide a safe framework for the functioning
of the "free" market society. From this point of view its democratic or authoritarian
form is obviously irrelevant.
In this way, Hayek accomplishes two things: firstly, by including all social
relations in his spontaneous order he can present them as "natural" and unavoidable.
Their existence is the result of natural selection and therefore nobody can question
them as imposed or arbitrary; secondly, all attacks against a bad government are made
on a politically safe ground. Their aim can only be the individuals who constitute the
government personally and their actions. The potential danger inherent in connecting
the existence and particular activities of a government with the general social
framework in which it exists has been exorcised. Bad governments exist and probably
1 For a revealing argument on the necessity of state coercion, see R. Nisbet 1986 p.55. Nisbet
openly admits that the only reason of existence of the state is the conservation of property.
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will exist in the future, but that is as far as any criticism may reach. Nobody has
either the ability or the right to question the overall order which now includes all
major relations of capitalist production. Thirdly, and this accounts for the
antidemocratic essence of Hayek's theory, as long as the government can provide for
the smooth functioning of the "free" market society its desirability must be taken for
granted, irrespective of its form. While this argument may have allowed Hayek to
launch a massive attack against the welfare state and, at the same time, keep
capitalism unquestioned, it also creates methodological problems in his theory. It has
repeatedly been argued that in order to be self-consistent Hayek has to apply the same
standards to every form of social organization that exists; and this effectively excludes
all evaluative statements based on moral imperatives.
Hayek systematically attacks any institution that may grant some power to the
majority, and parliament is no exception. "The electors of a "legislature" whose
members are mainly concerned to secure and retain the votes of particular groups by
procuring special benefits for them, will care little about what others will get and be
concerned only with what they gain in the haggling" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.9). The
result is that decisions will "not be based on judgment of merit but on political
expediency" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.9). "To leave the law in the hands of elective
governors is like leaving the cat in charge of the cream jug - there soon will not be
any, at least no law in the sense in which it limits the discretionary powers of
government" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.31).
The contradiction that arises in connection with the arguments he produces in
order to establish the functional superiority of democracy reflects his unstable views
on that mater. On the one hand, he argued that it is to the advantage of democracy
that although the coercive power will be exercised by the few it is less likely that
abuses will occur because these few can always be revoked. On the other, he states
that it is a disadvantage that those in power are likely to act on political expediency
rather than merit precisely because they will be afraid that they will not be reelected.
Is, then, the right of the people to decide who is going to occupy a certain position
at any time an advantage or a disadvantage?
In a way, Hayek's contradiction reflects a real problem of bourgeois
democracy. It is true that bourgeois democracy presupposes the right of the people
212
to revoke their representatives in theory; it is equally true that in practice it has turned
out that the representatives depend, not on the people in general but on some groups
of the most powerful to get elected and thus tend to act primarily as representatives
of their interests rather than advocate "merit" of any kind1. But the root of this
contradiction is in the inconsistency between the theoretical premises and the actual
social conditions rather than in any ideological misconception or practical malfunction.
That is why this contradiction is not spontaneous or accidental but constitutes a
component part of the bourgeois democracy. It is because people are ideologically
conceived as equal, while in their actual lives they are necessarily unequal, that the
contradiction emerges. Formal equality in theory can serve as an ideological shield
but it cannot conceal actual inequality. Therefore, when one descends from the sphere
of formal equality one finds oneself either on the side of those who control society,
or on the side of those who are controlled. The fact that the latter might believe that
they are controlled by an impersonal spontaneous order (or the will of god etc.) only
reflects the ideological form of this control. The actual expression of this process is
the "unfortunate" fact that the representatives of the people tend to be concerned
mostly with what they get out of their "job" rather than with abstract judgments of
merit. In other words, they tend to behave as ordinary human beings in a competitive
society; they act as free agents in the market place. Thus, the contradiction exists
only as long as the theoretical premises of formal equality are taken into account
seriously, but it collapses when one confronts reality according to actually prevailing
social relations.
Hayek attempts to suggest a way of surpassing this problem. It is not the
right of the people to revoke their representatives that is harmful as such, he says; it
is the fact that these representatives have too much power. Consequently, if they are
deprived of that excessive power, the right of the people to control them can be
maintained. Of course, these "controllable" representatives will be allowed to decide
on secondary matters only, but the people can be happy with the illusion that they are
the ones who govern. This is indeed a solution to the contradiction; but a solution
which implies a move away from democracy and towards political conservatism.
1 See also G.L. Arnold 1960 p.101.
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These concepts put in danger the very existence of democracy - especially
when they are combined with suggestions for a peculiarly stronger government1. "If
government is going to be strong enough to maintain order and justice we must
deprive the politicians of that cornucopia the possession of which makes them believe
that they can and ought to remove all sources of discontent" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p. 11).
In other words, "government" should be strong enough to use coercion against all
those who may be discontented but not strong enough to be in their favor. Finally,
Hayek's loyalty to democracy seems even more doubtful because of his statement "I
must frankly admit that if democracy is taken to mean government by the unrestricted
will of the majority I am not a democrat, and even regard such government as
pernicious and in the long run unworkable" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.39). Thus, the
lurking tension between democracy and freedom, that haunted liberal tradition,
emerges in a clear form. Democracy is no longer a complementary concept to liberty;
it is not even simply a different one; it is systematically opposed to it2.
The point, however, is that Hayek is not a democrat even if democracy does
not mean the unrestricted will of the majority3. In fact, Hayek is not a democrat to
the extent that democracy can put into danger his ultimate end, that is, the "free"
market society4. If we consider that he wrote his book The Constitution of Liberty
in 1960, and reprinted it in 1963, under the same dedication, namely, "To the
unknown civilization that is growing in America", as well as his whole attitude
towards the American social and political system5 during a period that Americans
1 See also J. Dunn 1978 p.28.
2 See also N. Bosanquet 1983 p.34. Bosanquet argues that in Hayek's theory freedom actually
requires a limitation of democracy. Moreover, it is the same attitude that enables G. Dietze to comment:
"In the modern era, an era characterized by the march of democracy, the rule of law [which is only "the
other side of freedom"] has declined in Hayek's opinion" (G. Dietze in F. Machlup 1977 p. 129).
3 Thus, "His confidence in the market is not supported by a democratic consensus" (D. Meiklejohn
1980 p. 121).
4 "It may be that Hayek resents particular special-interest rules less for any lack of majority
approval than for their incompatibility with his political philosophy" (RF. Drinan 1980 p.624).
3 He considers it as one of the "freest" societies.
214
themselves are trying to forget1, we may form a rough idea of what "individual
freedom" and democracy mean in their practical application. Hayek's theory of
democracy and freedom not only allows him to consider Pinochet's Chile a society
that allows individual freedom2 but it also provides a friendly scholar with the
opportunity to "demonstrate" that a typical example of servitude is Sweden (R.
Huntford 1980)3. The distinction and counterpoising of liberty to politics is bound
to justify many such conclusions. For example, some thirty years ago J. Davenport
distinguished between liberty and a nations self-determination. He continued: "It
could be that Algeria would be better off if it were made independent of France. But
it could also be that such independence would lead straight to the extinction of such
human liberty as Algerians now enjoy." (J. Davenport 1960 p.135). In that case
liberty has become a synonym for paternalistic rule and open violence. But if such
a concept of "liberty" can be used effectively to deny national self-determination, why
can not it also be used - in its Hayekian version - in order to deny personal self-
determination4?
Hayek is trying to provide a "historical" as well as theoretical foundation for
his approach. "There is not first a society which then gives itself rules, but it is
common rules which weld dispersed bands into a society. The terms of submission
to the recognized authority become a permanent limit of its powers because they are
the conditions of the coherence and even existence of the state" (F.A. Hayek 1979
pp.34-35). It is amazing how little this trend of thought progressed over the past 100
years. On December the 23rd, 1846 K. Marx was criticizing Proudhon for his false
conception of economic categories; a critique which may easily be applied to the
above passage. "Thus, M. Proudhon, mainly because he lacks the historical
knowledge, has not perceived that as men develop their productive faculties, that is,
1 See for example, F. Machlup in Erich Streissler 1969 p. 143.
2 Because "it is more important that government be limited than democratically elected" (N. Barry
1987 p. 197).
3 This amazing conclusion is repeated by H. H. Gissurarson in The Institute of Economic Affairs
1984 p.20.
4 Not all liberals agree with such open cynicism. See for example, L. Robbins 1961 p.68.
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as they live, they develop certain relations with one another and that the nature of
these relations must necessarily change with the change and growth of the productive
faculties. He has not perceived that economic categories are only the abstract
expressions of these actual relations and only remain true while these relations exist.
He therefore falls into the enror of the bourgeois economists, who regard these
economic categories as eternal and not as historical laws which are only laws for a
particular historical development, for a definite development of the productive forces.
Instead, therefore, of regarding the political-economic categories as abstract
expressions of the real, transitory, historic social relations, M. Proudhon, thanks to a
mystic inversion, sees in the real relations only embodiments of these abstractions.
Those abstractions themselves are formulas which have been slumbering in the heart
of God the Father since the beginning of the world" (K. Marx in K. Marx, F. Engels
1970 p.664).
For Hayek, then, "common rules" exist irrespective of their subjects (social
relations). Moreover they seem to derive their existence practically out of no/where.
Ideas (rules), however, cannot exist without men and men cannot construct them
outside their physical and social environment. This, nevertheless, does not mean that
ideas that serve as a theoretical basis for the justification of a particular social
organization necessarily express the interests of all people. It is true that a certain
amount of compromise is vital for the existence of any society. But this does not
mean that this compromise is either a result of the "free will" of every individual or
that it works for his best interest. If we look back to all known social formations up
to today we will see that each one was so constructed as to serve the interests of one
particular sub-total of the people. It would be absurd to maintain that ancient Greek
or Roman civilization flourished because the slaves wanted to be slaves or considered
themselves as "res"; or that the feudal regime was based on the "free will" of the serf
to be exploited by landlords. It is equally absurd to maintain that capitalism is based
on the agreement of workers to be exploited by capitalists. In each case some ideas
were presented as universal but this does not mean that they were universal in fact.
It only means that the particular interests of the particular dominant sub-total were
disguised and presented as interests of the whole society. As long as this disguise
lasts, we can have what Hayek calls "common principles" and "universal values".
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SECTION C: Hayek's Critique of the Welfare State
1. The State as Exogenous to Society
Hayek, it has been argued, portrays the state as a mechanism exogenous to
society; he takes it to be a mere regulator, instead of an organic part, of society. The
personification of the state through the term "government" permits him to argue that
any abuse of power is a result of individual choice. Therefore, he claims, government
has to be delimited in the application of higher abstract moral values. This line of
argument, however, is not free from problems. The first one we shall examine is that
of the legitimacy of the assumption that the state is necessary1. Hayek claims that
the state exists for the provision of certain standards as well as for the maintenance
of order. The problem,then, seems to be that the self-regulating spontaneous order,
that emerges as a result of an unconscious process, is not self-regulating after all.
This argument has been used by many anti-statist libertarians2. It acquires an evident
importance in so far as the state is considered as a mechanism that stands outside
society. The question, thus, is: since orders are spontaneous and self-regulating what
is the need to adopt an additional regulating apparatus which, after all, is fully
designed? It is doubtful whether an answer can be given to that question if the state
is considered as a mechanism exogenous to society.
The second problem that arises here is that of the eternity of the state. Hayek
argues that "governments" existed ever since the first societies were put together. So,
historically speaking, the state was an indispensable part of society rather than a supra-
social apparatus. But the state seems to acquire the same status on logical grounds
as well. Hayek repeatedly stresses that "government" is necessary in a spontaneous
order for the reasons mentioned above. Therefore, the state appears to be an
indispensable part of the "Great Society" as well. On what grounds, then, is Hayek
1 The uneasy coexistence of spontaneous self-correcting markets and state regulation is a
characteristic of "mild" neoliberals, see N. Barry 1987 p.64.
2 For a further elaboration of the problematic coexistence of self-regulating orders and the need for
an exogenously regulating state apparatus, see also Hayek's own statements in AJ. Anderson 1986.
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arguing that the state is merely a humanly designed mechanism exogenous to society?
The personification of the state creates some further problems in Hayek's
theory of the state. If the state is to be reduced to the individuals constituting the
government then it is only logical to assume that "good" individuals imply a "good"
government. If that is the case then what need is there for the complex legal and
institutional framework that Hayek proposes in his "Model Constitution"? It could be
argued here that for Hayek "good" individuals are those who function according to the
Rule of Law and therefore that the legal framework is the principal condition of their
"goodness". This objection could have been valid if for Hayek the legal framework
was a result of human design. But, since law is an attribute of any order by definition
and since that law is independent of human design, it is only logical to assume that
law will exist prior to and independently of the complex legal framework that Hayek
proposes. Therefore, "good" governors would be those who would govern according
to the preexisting law. By introducing an explicit institutional system in order to
regulate an order, Hayek not only argues for a superfluous complexity, but also
contradicts the basic idea of the spontaneity of the order of "Great Society".
Secondly, it seems that for Hayek "good" government implies more than just lawful
government. It actually implies effective government. The large legal framework that
Hayek proposes can thus be seen as an attempt to improve government's effectiveness.
However, if that is the case it would seem that the problem has been shifted to a
simple quantifiable comparison.
The delimitation of the state to the role of coordinator leaves many questions
unanswered. The problem of ideology is one of them. Although Hayek does not treat
ideology as a separate subject systematically, he seems to suggest that it has three
main features. It is self-generated, it is traditionally adopted, and it is exclusively
evaluated according to its ability to adapt and persist. Hayek has argued for the
complete distinction between factual and normative statements and consequently he
has defended the position that no moral or ideological principles can be deduced from
facts. It has been argued that this position leads to an extreme subjectivism which can
hardly be used as the basis for the foundation of ideology. It must also be stressed
that Hayek somehow takes traditions to refer to groups or even nations. However, the
subjectivism that emerges from the Hayekian distinction between factual events and
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normative rules can only explain individual systems of moral values. By implication
when Hayek implies group or national ideologies these categories can only figure as
mystified forms of expression of his initial individualism. The adoption of ideologies
through tradition, as proposed by Hayek, fails to resolve this question. Although it
is based on the dubious presupposition that self-generated scales of values can become
traditions, i.e. group ideologies, it still ascribes a transcendental dimension to ideology
which can hardly be justified in a historical perspective. Finally the evaluation of an
ideology according to its ability to adapt has been proved a very troublesome criterion
in Hayek's theory. In fact, Hayek systematically abandons the "effectiveness"
criterion whenever he argues for the superiority of his "Great Society". It has also
been argued that this proposition, when taken consistently, will inevitably lead to the
acceptance of any system just because it exists. N. Barry's comment on this is in the
same vein: "But there does seem to be a difference between the acceptance of things
because they can be explained in this way and the acceptance of them merely because
they are there." (N. Barry 1979 p.65).
Consequently, Hayek's account of the problem of ideology is less than
satisfactory. Nevertheless, ideology, at least in the sense of abstract ideals, plays a
determinative role in Hayek's theory. It seems that his theory tends to isolate
ideology both from de facto social reality and from the state, thus ascribing to it an
indisputable character, indisputable not in the positivist sense that all ideologies are
"metaphysics" but in an arbitrary and eclectic way. The result of this attitude is that
the system of values of the "Great Society" is elevated into a superhuman sphere,
beyond any criticism.
2. The Ambitions of the Welfare State
With these preliminary considerations taken into account, a closer examination
of Hayek's critique of the welfare state can now be attempted. The welfare state is
objectionable not because of its aims but because of the methods of government action
it involves (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.258). Hayek believes that "there is undeniably a wide
field for non-coercive activities of government and that there is a clear need for
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financing them by taxation" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.257 and chapter XV). There are
common needs that can be satisfied only by collective action and which can be thus
provided for without restricting individual liberty (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.257). He even
argues that these "services" may gradually rise, as "we grow richer". Furthermore, he
believes that a bottom, poverty line is a safeguard for the peace and good functioning
of society.
What he criticizes is the "coercive" interference of the state in society and,
above all, in the market "The reason why many of the new welfare activities of
government are a threat to freedom, then, is that, though they are presented as mere
service activities, they really constitute an exercise of the coercive powers of
government and rest on its claiming exclusive rights in certain fields" (F.A. Hayek
1960 p.258). We now have to find out which are these "activities" that are
objectionable and why.
There are three main ambitions of the Welfare State according to Hayek1:
1. All kinds of public amenities (parks, museums etc.) which may be in the
interest of all members of the community.
2. Security, i.e. "protection against risks common to all, where government can
often either reduce these risks or assist people to provide against them".
3. Social justice, i.e. the state becomes "primarily a redistributor of income".
The first aim is positive - "though there are strong reasons why those services
should be provided by local rather than national authorities". The second aim can
only be justified partly, namely as long as it refers to actions taken for the protection
of all at the same time. Hayek here points out a danger. There are two conceptions
of security, he says, "a limited security which can be achieved for all and which is,
therefore, no privilege, and absolute security, which in a free society cannot be
achieved at all" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.259). This second conception refers to "the
assurance of a given standard of life, which is determined by comparing the standard
enjoyed by a person or a group with that of others" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.259). This
second conception of security leads to inequality of treatment and is therefore counter
to a free society. The third aim of the Welfare State is altogether objectionable. It
1 F.A. Hayek 1960 ch.17.
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leads to a state of affairs irreconcilable with a free society. Furthermore, "it is bound
to lead back to socialism and its coercive and essentially arbitrary methods" (F.A.
Hayek 1960 p.260).
It has been argued before that Hayek is not an anti-statist. This remark is not
of any novelty since both Hayek and the majority of his critics point out the
circumstance explicitly. What however is not so widely accepted is that Hayek
actually harbors the idea of an extremely coercive state in any but the "market" area.
It seems that the dominant opinion among scholars is that he is mainly arguing for a
drastic delimitation of the state functions. This opinion is partly due to the polemical
tone that Hayek employs against the welfare state. In most of his major works he
seems to attack the excessive powers of bourgeois democracy. Another reason why
Hayek is thought to argue for a limited state lies in his concept of coercion. He
repeatedly accuses the welfare state of being coercive in contradiction to the
"government" of his "Great Society". Nevertheless, there are many parts of the
Hayekian theory of the state which indicate that such a conclusion might be
superficial. In fact, the "Great Society" does not look any less state dominated than
the society existing today. It is true that Hayek explicitly suggests a delimitation of
the area in which the state should function. An important part of the state functioning
is thought of as coercive and therefore condemnable. Of course, it is no accident that
this part coincides with the social functioning of the state; and, besides Hayek does
not hide his intentions in that respect. A less recognized fact, however, is that along
with this delimitation Hayek's theory proposes a dynamic reinforcement at least of
some of the remaining functions of the state. Thus, paradoxical as it may sound,
coercive functioning is openly advocated and unreluctantly called upon, whenever the
need arises - that is, whenever the "Great Society" is to be protected from all kinds
of internal and external enemies. At the same time, a very important part of state
functions are not delimited as such but.simply dismissed on the grounds that they do
not belong to the sphere of the state activities. This tactic was followed during the
replacement of the term "state" by the more convenient term "government" and the
subsequent personification of the latter. It has been followed again during the
methodologically insufficient account of democracy and democratic government.
Finally the trick of "delimiting" the state without essentially touching its authority and
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power is completed by the introduction of a curious definition of coercion according
to which most social or collective activities are considered as coercive while
bargaining in the labor market between an unemployed worker and IT&T is
considered as the essence of equality and freedom.
Hayek, consequently, is not anti-statist. He has never suggested that any
society can function without a coercive state. Furthermore, he believes that the state
should be strong enough to assure to its citizens a certain amount of security against
any internal or external enemy1. Nevertheless, he is against the particular form of
state that involves itself in the functioning of the "market". What he seems to suggest
is that the state should keep on being a mechanism of social "order" and even
reinforce its position as such but at the same time it should cease functioning as a
mechanism of "social justice"2.
3. Trade Unions and Coercion
In what fields then has the state become "coercive" by the unequal treatment
of its citizens and its ambition to guarantee social justice? In The Constitution of
Liberty, Hayek points out three main fields of welfare state "coercion", namely its
policy concerning the labor unions, its policy on social security and its economic
policy.
The way Hayek chooses to present the problems of Labor policy under the
welfare state is quite peculiar. Instead of referring directly to the state's activities, he
reverses the process by trying to prove that labor unions are "coercive" by definition
under their present form. The overall conclusion is that under the welfare state, trade
unions were given many arbitrary privileges that should be taken back if we wish to
avoid chaos and live in a "free" society.
Hayek starts his argument by saying that trade unions, in their present form,
1 See also J. Gray 1986b pp.73-81.
2 For the compatibility and, more importantly, the necessity of an authoritarian state in a "free"
market society, see R. Nisbet 1986 p.58.
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are mechanisms for the coercion of the individual worker and, furthermore, that their
action is necessarily opposite to such an individual's interests in the long run. If we
accept the above argument the question that inevitably arises is: how did the trade
unions gain all the powers that they possess at present? The state (even the welfare
state) certainly did not give the trade unions any power that they did not ask for and
surely the workers themselves could not have demanded a reinforcement of the trade
unions, since they are so profoundly coercive, unless we assume that the workers had
somehow formed a false belief that it is through the unions that they could materialize
their expectations. But is this not in contradiction with Hayek's fundamental (and
vital for the validity of his individualist theory) belief that it is the individual and only
the individual who can judge his own interests in the best way possible1?
An objection to the above interpretation could be raised here. Hayek accepts
that some "tribal" sentiments still exist among people and the existence and support
of the trade unions could be justified as an expression of these sentiments. The
argument could then continue by maintaining that a strict legal framework must exist
in order to prevent these sentiments from dominating society. Although this could be
a perfectly valid objection under different conditions, it is doubtful whether it can
stand examination in the context of the Hayekian theory. The problem appears as
soon as one attempts a definition of "tribal" sentiments as distinct from those
sentiments that characterize the "Great Society". Hayek only gives a rough idea of
what is "tribal" and what is a product of a "Free Society"; he does not provide one
with any clear criterion2. The question is: according to which criterion is one to
1 It is argued, for example, that for Hayek "The individual may not know everything nor will he
fully understand his world but he is still the one most qualified to know himself and his own best
interests" (P.W. Dyer and R. Harrison Hickman 1979 p.388). In theory it is of course conceivable that
a particular individual can be liable of mistaken judgment In practice, however, this possibility is of
little importance, since even in these cases it is that same individual who will be the "most qualified
to know his own best interests" and thus to understand his mistakes. Moreover, the decision to join and
support the trade unions is not taken by some insignificant number of "individuals" but from the
overwhelming majority of them. What is more, this decision seems to enjoy the support of the
"individuals" concerned over a long period of time. In short, if the individual is taken as the "best
judge" of his/her interests there is little room left for judgements from the "outside" that are turned
against what this individual explicitly prefers.
2 The obscurity of this point has troubled many neo-liberals. In that sense, S. Brittan asks: if Hayek
is prepared to grant evolved institutions a superior wisdom why deny this hidden wisdom to more
interventionist or authoritarian structures (S. Brittan 1980 p.34)?
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judge? The answer can only be according to some abstract moral values that exist a
priori. In short, this is only another form in which the inner contradiction between
the "evolutionary scientific" and the morally imperative aspects of Hayek's theory
appears.
His arguments on the coerciveness of trade unions are no less arbitrary.
According to Hayek, the term "freedom of association" has now lost its meaning and
should be replaced by "the freedom of the individual to join or not to join a
union"(F.A. Hayek 1960 p.268). There is no further explanation given for this
"change of terms". Hayek argues that "Trade Unions exercise coercion of fellow
workers contrary to all principles of freedom under the law" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.269).
"The interest of those who will get employment at a higher wage will therefore always
be opposed to the interest of those who, in consequence, will find employment only
in the less highly paid jobs or who will not be employed at all" (F.A. Hayek 1960
p.270). "Their success [i.e. of Trade Unions] in raising real wages beyond that [i.e.
beyond the point that the employers are willing to pay] point, if it is to be more than
temporary, can benefit only a particular group at the expense of others" (F.A. Hayek
1960 p.270).
There is nothing new or unusual about this argument. It has been repeated
ever since the trade unions were created. It is based on some real problems existing
under, and specifically as a result of, capitalism which are presented as eternal and
unavoidable problems of any society. Starting from the fact that under contemporary
capitalism an increase of the wages of a certain sector of labor may lead to
unemployment for a part of the working class, Hayek draws the arbitrary conclusion
that trade unions' actions are always opposed to the interest of the workers as a whole.
What Hayek deliberately avoids here is the fact that this may well be necessary under
a system of wage-labor where the means of production are in the hands of a capitalist
whose interest is to increase his profits as much as possible, whereas it need not be
the case if everybody were to benefit from the profits of production; on the contrary,
it would seem likely that this would not happen. Moreover, it could be argued that
the fact that the increase of wages in a certain sector of labor may have negative
results for the rest of the workers indicates either that trade unions are not strong
enough to prevent such outcomes, or that they do not want to prevent them. The
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latter case applies to the example of the trade unions in the U.S.A.1 where all major
trade unions have been totally corrupted by the employers and/or the state and have
nothing to do with the real interest of the workers, and Great Britain where the trade
unions have long ago ceased to represent the workers as a whole and are exclusively
interested in the narrow wage demands of particular sectors or even of particular
enteiprises. The result of such a policy, which is due to a lack of strategic social
goals, is that trade unions have failed to represent the working class even in its
everyday demands. The former case applies to many other capitalist countries, such
as France, Italy and Greece, where the trade unions have failed when they were not
powerful enough to face the coercive mechanisms of capitalism, often expressed in an
extremely violent way. Trade unions in these countries have most of the time
managed to express the interests of the working class as a whole while at the same
time ensure more favorable conditions of work in each sector. Thus, the first part of
Hayek's attack on the trade unions is not concerned directly with their "coercive"
character, but is directed against their ineffectiveness in guaranteeing better conditions
for the workers.
The second argument is that they become the cause of economic failure.
Although Hayek believes that "the spectacular legal privileges granted to the trade
unions have since become the chief cause of the progressive decline of the British
economy" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.32), he suggests that "Our argument will not be
directed against Labor Unions as such" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.269). It only takes five
pages for him to contradict himself by appearing in his true colors: "Far from being
a public calamity, it would indeed be a highly desirable state of affairs if the workers
should not feel it necessary to form unions" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.274).
The fact, however, seems to be that the workers do not feel the same way
about labor unions. Therefore, Unions must be deprived of their "coercive" power,
even if this implies direct state oppression. "It is in fact more than probable that
unions will fully develop their potential usefulness [i.e. usefulness of the capitalists
but total uselessness for the workers] only after they have been diverted from their
present antisocial aims by an effective prevention of their coercive powers" (F.A.
1 An example that Hayek likes very much for obvious reasons.
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Hayek 1960 p.276). Hayek does not hesitate to elaborate on what he means by
"effective prevention". In the conclusion of his chapter on "Labor Unions and
Employment", he uses an illuminating expression. Referring to labor unions he writes:
"There is only one such principle that can preserve a free society: namely, the strict
prevention of all coercion except in the enforcement of general abstract rules equally
applicable to all" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.284).
Thus, the requirement of equality in front of the law is the only argument that
Hayek can raise in his case against the labor unions. He bases this proposition on the
conclusions of his strictly formal and individualist social approach. His opinion is that
individuals are units with no social dimension. Therefore, law should treat them
equally. It is worth noticing that even this formalistic equality is seriously shaken in
some parts of Hayek's theory. Thus, while the logical assumption would have been
that since the trade unions should be deprived of privileges because they are
"monopolistic" organizations preventing free competition, the same measures should
have been taken at least against some monopolistic aggregations of capital (as being
equally (!) monopolistic), Hayek does not hesitate to argue that it is the former that
constitute a threat to the "Great Society"1. Thus, if for example, employers
discriminate on grounds of color or sex then it is not the business of law to intervene.
A free market can protect employment opportunities much better than can coercive
laws2. The sexism and racism that has prevailed in Western societies for so long
remains terra incognita for Hayekian neoliberalism.
The question that remains unanswered in Hayek's theory is how did individuals
acquire the unequal places they hold in society? People live in societies and societies
have states which "organize" them. It is only reasonable at least to wonder whether
the structure of those societies and the function of those states played an active role
in the creation of inequalities between individuals in the first place. While Hayek is
1 In that sense,"(...) in the Constitution ofLiberty, and in other essays, he took the view that labor
monopolies not only are the greater danger to the smooth functioning of the market order but also that
the two cases [labor "monopolies" and capital monopolies] are not the same. It would appear that the
monopoly power of unions is a product of discriminatory law granting unions special privileges, used
mainly against the workers themselves, while that of employers, as well as being much exaggerated,
does not pose the same threat to liberty." (N. Barry 1979 p.50).
2 See N. Barry 1979 p.92.
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so eager to point out all the "discriminations" that the welfare state entails, mainly
against the wealthy and the powerful, he systematically omits to place the initial
inequalities in a social context. These inequalities are created in a mystical way
somewhere outside the existing social relations and are therefore irrelevant to the form
of society and its political expression - the state. Thus, the model of spontaneous
order in society appears to be illusory. It requires a belief in liberty and equality
which fails to question the initial inequality of material life. It, thus, functions as a
cover for the social "game" - that is, it obscures the fact that it is a struggle rather
than a game. The appeal to an unobstructed functioning of the spontaneous social
order, then, acquires the significance of an appeal to redefine the rules of the social
"game" in terms of an inegalitarian social determinism. Liberty reappears in the form
of its opposite: submission to the unknowable and unmasterable destiny (Y. Quiniou
1989 pp.80-81).
This point also contributes to the argument made previously on the supposed
delimitation of the state. It is obvious that Hayek suggests a delimitation of the state
if we agree in seeing it as an exogenous factor that stands over the existing social
relations. But it becomes much less obvious, in fact it becomes doubtful, if we
consider the state as a component part of society - that is, if we accept the view that
it plays an active role in the creation and maintenance of existing social relations. In
that case state interference has already occurred long before Hayek detects it and has
played a determinative role in the formation of the initial social inequalities between
individuals.
The neoliberal "radical" contention that "The basic point about exchange
processes is that from them every participant benefits - or else why would he make
trades?" (N. Barry 1987 p.33) seems to have been accurately criticized more than a
century ago: "This sphere that we are deserting, within whose boundaries the sale and
purchase of labor-power goes on, is in fact the very Eden of the innate rights of man.
There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both
buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labor-power, are constrained only by their
own free will. They contact as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but
the form in which they give legal expression to their common will. Equality, because
each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and
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they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what
is his own. And Bentham, because each looks to himself only, and no-one troubles
himself about the rest, and just because they do so, do they all, in accordance with the
pre-established harmony of things, or under the auspices of an all-shrewd providence,
work together to their mutual advantage, for the common will and interest of all" (K.
Marx 1954 vol.1 p. 172). What is important in this critique is that it singles out the
core of the liberal argument, namely the formalistic and legalistic logic entailed by
abstract individualism in all its versions.
However, in order to do justice even to 19th century liberals, a difference
should be noticed here. Hayek's argument does not simply remain within the sphere
of abstraction. The difference of neoliberalism lies in the aggressive way by which
it presses home these abstractions in their practical application, thus revealing their
illusory character. In that sense for neoliberalism "Even if the threat of starvation to
me and perhaps to my family impels me to accept a distasteful job at a very low
wage, even if I am at the mercy of the only man willing to employ me, I am not
coerced by him or by anyone else" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.137) and, therefore, I am free.
The inadequacy of Hayekian social and political theory is, thus, demonstrated
in the way he approaches the problem of the trade unions. For Hayek the bargain
between an individual worker and an all-powerful enterprise is a legitimate bargain
between free and equal "units", while any collective bargain, or for that matter any
trade union activity, is coercive. Even a sympathetic critic of Hayek is skeptical on
this point: "Firstly, since Hayek concedes that there is a range of coercive activities,
this in principle would allow an inclusion of more employer/employee relationships
in the coercive category than appear there as odd exceptions, such as monopsony, in
an otherwise open economy. Secondly, he is able to exclude certain candidates for
coercion virtually by definition. Since coercion exists only when an individual is
under the control and direction of another agent, the meaning of the concept does not
turn upon the severity of the act of the coercion. This means that it is possible that
the effects of, say, the action of an employer over an employee would not be coercive,
even if they were particularly severe, since the employee could have technically gone
elsewhere, while fairly mild directions from political officials would count as coercive
orders." (N. Barry 1979 p.73). Consequently, it is one thing to delimit the term
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"coercion" and quite another to delimit coercion itself.
Hayek suggests a drastic alteration in the functions of the labor unions. In the
first place, he suggests that "so long as the powers that the unions have been allowed
to acquire are regarded as unassailable, there is no way to correct the harm done by
them but to give the state even greater arbitrary power of coercion" (F.A. Hayek 1960
p.283)1. Hayek's attack, consequently, does not simply aim at depriving the trade
unions of their "legal privileges"; it also requires a drastic state interference of a
coercive type. This is a sample both of Hayek's inconsistency and of his real
intentions towards the Labor Movement For example, he says that closed shop
agreements are against free trade and therefore they should not be enforced at law.
But that is a dubious argument If Hayek maintains that workers are "free" to sell
their labor-power in the labor market, why does he not consider employers equally
"free"? A perfectly logical argument would be that the employer is free to choose non
closed shop agreements if he wants to. And again if he chooses voluntarily a closed
shop he might suffer severe loses but this would only be an outcome of impersonal
market forces and therefore there is neither coercion involved nor anybody to be
blamed. At any rate, it certainly is not the "government's" job to ban those
agreements; this is at least as arbitrary as to enforce them. Another argument could
be that joining a trade union in order to get a job is mutatis mutandis the same as any
condition that an employer might impose and therefore no more coercive. Hayek
approaches the question of coercion eclectically so that it is no surprise that he
discovers it only in the activities of the organized Labor Movement. But, it would
seem, his argument on coercion mainly depends "on whose ox is being gored" (J.
Viner 1961 p.231).
1 There seems to be a unanimous agreement in the neoliberal camp on that matter, see K. I. Vaugn
in The Institute ofEconomic Affairs 1984. Also, M. Olson 1982; Olson's argument seems to be in favor
of a drastic solution to the labor unions problem as the only solution for the "purification" of democracy
and the achievement of economic freedom. F. Machlup adopts a more moderate position than Hayek.
Instead of arguing that there are no other freedoms than economic freedom, he says: "we may regard
some freedoms as absolute or ultimate values, others only as instrumental or intermediate values" (F.
Machlup in E. Streissler 1969 p. 129). Leaving aside the apparent difficulty (if not impossibility) of
shaping an adequate criterion for the classification of freedoms, Machlup regards free economic choice
and activity as freedom of the first kind and he argues that "Mere freedom of coalition could not have
created all the strong monopolies of our days; active government interventions and failure to suppress
private coercive activities have helped in this process" (F. Machlup in E. Streissler 1969 p. 139; stress
added).
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The most crucial implication of the argument is that Hayek suggests open state
interference and coercion where confrontation of the trade unions is concerned. This
interference will acquire the form of legislation in the first place, but direct
suppression is by no means excluded. The problem here is that once Hayek embarks
on the logic of "more coercion to get rid of coercion" there is no way back to the
spontaneous order theory1. Hayek openly states that a defence of the values of the
"Great Society" by interference and coercion is legitimate. This might be his opinion
but it is also a legitimation of the efforts of the "socialists" or the "collectivists" or
anybody in general who seek to defend their values in the same way. It seems,
therefore, that in the process of his attack on the Labor Movement Hayek has to admit
a very important fact. When one reaches a state of direct social confrontation it is not
the abstract ultimate values that compete in a peaceful eliminatory process; what
counts is who has the state power.
This point is critical for the Hayekian theory for it constitutes a direct appeal
for state oppression against the working class in he name of individual freedom. It
also indicates that his whole theory is based on a strong, coercive and authoritarian
state the existence of which is justified through its dynamic opposition to the
organized Labor Movement. "Today (...) all the picketing in numbers should be
prohibited, since it is not only the chief and regular cause of violence but even in its
most peaceful forms is a means of coercion" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.278). "Next the
Unions should not be permitted to keep non-members out of any employment"2.
Then, there are the "chief objects of strikes and boycotts" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.278)
that should be set aside. Apropos of the right to strike, it is worth quoting Hayek's
full argument. "It should be said, however, that the latter - the right to strike - though
a normal [?] right, can hardly be regarded as an unalienable right. There are good
reasons why in certain employments it should be part of the terms of employment that
the worker should renounce this right; i.e. such employments should involve long-term
obligations on the part of the workers, and any concerted attempts to break such
1 In that sense N. Barry even argues that the conditions of a spontaneous order may be deliberately
created or designed and, what is more, they can also be enforced. (N. Barry 1979 p. 105).
2 Of course, these "non-members" could be all sorts of strike breakers.
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contracts should be illegal" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.269). But this is not enough, because
labor unions even under such a scheme might still create trouble for the "Great
Society". Thus, "Finally, the responsibility for organized and concerted action in
conflict with contractual obligations or the general law must be firmly placed on those
in whose hands the decision lies, irrespective of the particular form of organized
action adopted" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.278).
It is obvious that under such conditions labor unions will never be able to
demand anything. Besides, it would seem that for Hayek there is no reason or even
moral right for a worker to make demands on his employers. "There can be no doubt
that most of those who have built up great fortunes in the form of new industrial
plants and the like have thereby benefitted people through creating opportunities for
more rewarding employment (...). The suggestion that in these cases those to whom
in fact the workers are most indebted do wrong rather than greatly benefit them is an
absurdity" (F.A. Hayek 1976 p.98)1. Thus, labor unions should be transformed in
peaceful halls of debate. The aim would be the reconciliation of all contradictions
between the employer and the employees. One should notice however that there is
no argument aiming to persuade the reader that the interests of the capitalist and the
worker are in fact reconcilable. In other words, Hayek disputes any evidence of
contradictions of interest between capital and labor by presenting them as
contradictions within the working class.
Finally, there is one more role that labor unions could play in their Hayekian
form - namely that of charity. "The oldest and most beneficial activity of the Unions,
in which as "friendly societies" they undertake to assist members in providing against
the peculiar risks to their trade" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.277)2. This last activity is
beneficial to Hayek's "Great Society" in two ways. First, it transforms labor unions
from organizations of class struggle into peaceful charities and, second, it relieves
1 The claim that workers are deeply indebted both morally and in terms of their "always improving"
living standards not only to capitalism as a system but also to the capitalists in particular, is frequent
in the Hayekian texts. Reference can be made especially to Hayek's contribution in F.A. Hayek 1954
where he fights against the "absurdity" of the historians - taken almost en masse - who have second
thoughts about the beneficiary nature of capitalism in its historical development.
2 The notion of charity as a basic aspect of contemporary society is central to this trend of thought.
See also R. Nisbet 1986 p.61.
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capitalists and the state of all pressure to provide any material insurance against those
"peculiar risks".
Summing up this important chapter, we can say that Hayek aims at an essential
elimination of the powers of labor unions. His attack is developed in three stages; a)
theoretical. He is aware that the power of labor unions lies in the solidarity of the
workers and their organized action. His theoretical attack, therefore, aims at proving
that there is no objective ground for solidarity among the workers because their
interests are necessarily contradictory and organized action means coercion of the
"free" personality of individuals, b) The creation of a legal framework which will
exclude any organized action of the workers in the future, c) Direct suppression by
the state of all labor unions that resist undertaking the reduced role that he suggests.
All the above suggestions are made in the name of "individual liberty" and a
"free society". What is interesting here is that Hayek does not hesitate to use both
direct state suppression, which, of course, requires a very strong and well organized
state and, preventative legal measures which require a legislative body almost totally
independent of public control. It makes little difference that all these measures are
supposed to be necessary for the prevention of a greater evil and the protection of
"liberty". After all, a great number of reactionary political ideas have been supported
by the assurance that, unless they are adopted, some greater evil is bound to take
place.
One more point can be raised in this context - namely the antisocialist essence
of Hayek's thought. Antisocialism is a central element, common to both liberal and
conservative political thought1. In the case of Hayek, it is used for two purposes.
First, to attack directly non-capitalist societies and, secondly, to use socialism as a
threat to all "free societies" in order to justify almost any social measure that he
suggests. Antisocialism is not a new phenomenon within Western societies. It has
existed ever since socialism was born. After World War II and the reinforcement of
1 See, for example, N. Barry 1987 pp.86-87 and p. 190, where antisocialism is regarded as the self-
evident common denominator of both liberalism and conservatism.
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the position of the Soviet Union, however, hostility towards socialism1 became one
of the most important tasks of any advocate of the ideals of the "Free World". In that
sense, Hayek's theory supplies no particular novelty here.
4. Hayek on the Problem of Social Justice
"Governmental" actions aiming towards social justice constitute the second
element we shall examine in Hayek's critique of the welfare state. It must be stressed
that the content of "social justice" is doomed to remain unclear in Hayek's theory,
"despite the many pages that Hayek devotes to the discussion of these concepts." (G.
Walker 1986 p.46). His central idea is developed in two "steps". Firstly, the concept
of social justice has no meaning within an economic order based on a free market.
Secondly, social justice is irreconcilable with market order and individual freedom.
It seems that the first part of this idea appears as a conclusion from his
epistemological premises as developed on the plane of social theory. Hayek construes
society as a mere sum of individuals. An aim, therefore, in order to be social, has to
serve the individual interests of particular members of the society. "But social justice
as used today is not "social" in the sense of "social norms", i.e. something which has
developed as a practice of individual action in the course of social evolution, not a
product of society or of social process..." (F.A. Hayek 1976 p.78). Since the interests
of every individual cannot be known to anyone we will have to accept that no
particular action can aim at a "social" goal. This agnostic approach serves as the basis
for an attack on social values2.
The other component of his critique is the concept of justice. We have already
seen his purely, formalistic ideas on this. His argument here is only an extension of
1 In this view much depends upon the content of "socialism". Hayek, for example, believes that the
period that followed World War II was stigmatized by the conscious or unconscious decision of
everybody to become socialist This period, however, coincides with the "coldest" (warmest?) part of
the "Cold War" during which being a socialist was a synonym of being a public enemy.
2 However, "(...) it is not enough for Hayek to say that the people cannot agree upon ends. This
may be true but it is also worth pointing out that Hayek's proposition that people can agree upon means
is itself an empirical one which may be true or false." (N. Barry 1979 p.140).
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his previous thoughts. It is meaningless to characterize the outcomes of a market
order as just or unjust because justice is an attribute of human conduct, while the
outcomes are results of an impersonal and unforeseeable function.
Hayek's second conclusion - namely, that social justice is contradictory to a
"free market" order - gives him the opportunity to argue that a "free market" order
should try to eliminate any remaining elements of social justice1. The problem here
seems to be the characterization of social justice as "meaningless"2. This
characterization presupposes a notion of "pure" capitalism which seems to distance
itself from reality quite dramatically. It is impossible to imagine a capitalist system
without contradictions, the most determinative among them being the conflict between
capital and labor. These contradictions must necessarily find their expression in the
political superstructure in the form of workers' demands and state "concessions". The
level of the development of such demands can only indicate the level of the
development of the class struggle and the relative positions of the social classes within
the given socio-economic formation. In that sense, "social justice" depends on the
relative power of the capitalist to coerce the workers without any opposition and on
the relative power of the workers to materialize their demands despite the capitalists'
opposition. In neither of these cases can we have "pure" results. Capitalists can never
eliminate "social justice" totally in practice because it is essential, for the very
functioning of the system, that a minimum level of social well-being should be
provided to everybody. The guaranteeing of such a level is entrusted to the state
which, far from acting as a distributor of justice, has actually functioned as a
"collective capitalist" in the sense that its primary task is the overall safeguarding of
the capitalist relations of production - hence, of the interests of the capitalist class as
a whole rather than that of individual capitalists. A good many contemporary
bourgeois philosophers understand the necessity for a minimum of welfare state, and
1 Thus, "Every form of social justice (...) tends towards confiscation, and confiscation when
practiced on a large scale, undermines social standards (...)" (I. Babbitt as quoted in R. Nisbet 1986
p.67).
2 See also N. Barry 1979 (pp.137-143), where he argues that Hayek's objections turn upon the
consequences of the implementation of schemes of social justice rather than upon its meaningless
essence.
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indeed Hayek himself argues for a minimum of social provision1.
A "bargaining"2 method is particularly prominent among neoliberals3, most
of whom use the same concept in different ways in the course of its theoretical
exposition and practical application. Hayek, for example, argues that social justice is
meaningless and does not hesitate to attack the concept in the most ruthless way. But
when the same concept appears in its applied form he is obliged to defend a necessary
minimum of its existence at the expense of consistency4. Hayek, then, does not seem
to question the need for a minimum of social welfare in the "Great Society".
Moreover, he does not question the view that the state is the only institution able
effectively to provide it. But the justification of social "welfare" is based on a
concern for the maintenance of order in society. It is obvious however that such a
foundation can lead to a considerable increase of state intervention. At any particular
time new "welfare" measures can be adopted in view of the possibility ofmajor social
unrest But, Hayek would argue, if the state interferes any more drastically in the
"market" then society ceases to be "Great" and thus its preservation is no longer
desirable5. In cases of (actual or potential) social unrest the state should interfere not
as a redistributor but by directly suppressing such unrest. This point becomes evident
in the case of the dynamic crushing of the Labor Movement (traditionally a major
source of "social unrest") which Hayek proposes. It seems thus that for all its
theoretical foundation (or, more accurately, for all the undermining of its theoretical
foundation) social justice in Hayek's theory is still defined in the well known "stick
1 That the concept of spontaneous order does not necessarily entail the exclusion of social justice,
can also be derived from the views of one of its most prominent defenders, M. Polanyi. Polanyi, far
from excluding social justice from a spontaneous social order, argues that he is "convinced (...) that a
system of capitalistic enterprise can be made [!] to conform in this respect to any standard of social
justice on which society is sufficiently agreed." (M. Polanyi 1951 p.144).
2 In Hayek's case the "bargain" is between social provisions in return for social stability
3 That Hayek actually promotes the idea of "bargaining" in the political process is also argued in
RJ7. Drinan 1980 p.624, although "bargaining" is used in a more restricted way. It must be noticed that,
in Hayek's own opinion, his arguments are meant to be against any notion of "bargaining democracy".
4 See B. Manin 1983 p.63n.
5 Notice the ambiguity of the concept of "more interference" as well as the abandonment of order
as such, as the reason of existence of the state.
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and carrot" way, although the stress has definitely been moved further towards the
"stick"1.
The fact that Hayek bases his argument on the concept that a minimum of
social provision is essential because it provides a considerable amount of stability to
the overall order, is, in this sense, quite revealing. Thus, Hayek's line of argument
contributes to the destruction of the time-honored liberal rights of the abstract
individual and their replacement by the more realistic admission that the only reason
for granting some social provision is the preservation of the smooth functioning of
capitalist reproduction2. A quite reasonable conclusion at this point is to assume that
in the "Great Society" (and in any such "ideal" scheme) the less the people will be in
a position to endanger the "order", the less they will get...3. At times, the cynicism
of Hayekian theory contributes to a better understanding of certain social and political
phenomena.
Hayek's account of social justice is not altogether false. His argument that
justice is a product of human understanding is correct up to a point. To this extent
his attack upon transcendental and mystical concepts of justice (divine justice for
example) or on justice based on abstract humanitarian grounds and natural rights
traditions is justifiable. But when Hayek argues that justice is a human attribute he
commits a double mistake. Firstly, by human he means strictly individual. This is
obviously a result of his methodological individualism and his consequent subjectivism
and to that extent it is a consistent conclusion. The problem is that social justice (as
with ideology in general) appears to be an attribute of whole classes of society and
therefore Hayek has to make an illegitimate deduction from his subjectivist premises
to a general ideology. What Hayek is unable to explain adequately from his
individualist starting point is the problem of the formation of ideologies, an expression
of which is the concept of social justice. Secondly, Hayek claims that social justice
is a human attribute because he seeks to contrast it with the "superhuman" outcomes
1 Brittan relates this point to Hayek's conservatism quite accurately. (S. Brittan 1980 p.39).
2 The neo-liberal case is also argued for, with the same implications, in J. Gray 1986b p.80.
3 Notice that in this sense Hayek's argument actually points towards the necessity for organized
collective activity rather than against it
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of his market order. This is a totally false contradiction: the outcomes of a free
market society appear spontaneous and superhuman because Hayek is not willing to
consider their constitution within the sphere of production. In this sense, social justice
(as with in fact most other moral values) can be justified on exactly the same grounds
as the "impersonal" outcomes of the free market order. After all, it is in a free market
order that social justice emerged as a moral value and therefore it can easily be
claimed that it is only the "ideological" expression of the factual relation that takes
place in that order1. Hayek could, of course, argue that social justice did not emerge
in a free market order but simply preexisted in "tribal" societies and survived as a
"sentiment" in the "Great Society". But such a claim is simply wrong, at least in a
historical perspective, since social justice as a widely accepted concept emerged
relatively recently in history - that is, long after capitalism was established as the
dominant mode of production. One must also notice here, that Hayek suggests that
social justice is a meaningless concept because it is a man-made moral value.
Although this statement might be valid in a positivist theory, it creates problems of
inconsistency when placed in Hayek's own theory. After all, Hayek does not hesitate
to claim moral superiority for his "Great Society" - a claim that he obviously does not
consider as meaningless2.
Hayek bases his first argument on two further, abstractly logical, points. First,
although we can see injustice all around us we cannot say who is to be blamed for it.
"It is certainly tragic to see a failure of the most meritorious efforts (...) of young men
to build a career (...). And we will protest against such a fate although we do not
know anyone who is to be blamed for it, or any way in which such disappointments
can be prevented." (F.A. Hayek 1976 p.69). Second, in a system where each is
allowed to choose his occupation nobody can have the power to see that the results
correspond to their wishes. This thought is based on his previous argument
concerning the identity of the outcomes of natural and social laws. In that sense, it
can be maintained that the meaninglessness of social justice derives directly from the
particular status of the rule of law. It is only because the overall shape of the social
1 See also G. Walker 1986 p.24 and pp.95-99.
2 See infra for the whole argument
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order is determined by the rule of law, that social justice can have no place in political
theory. For, the rule of law in its abstractness and impartiality acquires the status of
natural law. Hence, it is meaningless to interpret it according to judgements of merit,
just as it is meaningless to attribute any notion of justice to physical laws.
With this, Hayek's abstract naturalism enters the field of applied politics1. So
far, the equation of social and natural laws, albeit not always explicit, only took place
in the realm of theory. This resulted in a mystification of social laws and their
consequent elevation into ahistorical entities. This process was mainly limited to a
justification of the existing social structures. Thus, the equation resulted in an attempt
to guarantee what already exists. With the exclusion of social justice from political
theory, Hayek's naturalism undertakes a further task, that of the correction of what
exists. Naturalism is not just the justification of what exists as natural; "natural" itself
now seems to be what is in accordance with the "Great Society" regardless of whether
what is natural exists or not2. By implication many existing practices and institutions
are deemed to be contrary to nature. In terms of methodology, then, Hayek proves
himself inconsistent once more. It is neither "scientific" evolutionism nor abstract
normativism that prevails in his theory. It is simply an unconditional desire to
establish the inevitability of his blueprint3. Thus, "nature" has turned out to be only
a synonym of the "Great Society". In terms of politics, what characterizes his theory
is maintenance of the status quo: the foundations of the "Great Society" are the
foundations of capitalism4. And their preservation, which must be achieved at all
costs (ranging from theoretical inconsistency to the promotion of authoritarianism), can
only be achieved after the "purification" of the social order of unhealthy practices such
1 There seems to be a close similarity between the role that the rule of law undertakes under its
naturalistic form in Hayek's political theory and that of a secularized religion as it appears in R. Nisbet
1986 pp.72-73.
2 Kukathas comments in a similar way that in Hayek's theory laws are just "if they conform to or
uphold the rule of law". (C. Kukathas 1989 p.155).
3 The same point is made from a different perspective by G. Walker. "The paradox of his attitude
is perhaps unavoidable, reflecting the tension that the issue of ethics creates between Hayek's
philosophical commitments and his political aims." (G. Walker 1986 p.97).
4 In fact, Hayek does not deny this. In many of his major works capitalism emerges as a synonym
for his "Great Society". This point comes out more clearly in his latest works - for example, in his
contribution in A.J. Anderson 1986 and above all in F.A. Hayek 1988.
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as majority rule, democracy and social justice. Hayek's cynicism once more appears
as illuminating so far as the future development of capitalism is concerned.
Hayek's naturalism has been the focus of many critiques. Liberals and
Libertarians tend to concentrate their attacks on the inadequacy of the argument itself.
Thus, for example, it is said that social laws are not the same as natural laws because
the former can be altered (even if not directly or immediately) while the latter
cannot1. Furthermore, it is possible to violate a social law but not a natural one2.
Besides, had this equation been valid, there would hardly be any possibility for a
stable social order, since one would choose to avoid a social law just as one chooses
to avoid a natural calamity3. It has even been argued, not without justification, that
naturalism penetrates Hayek's theory in all its aspects. From the mechanistic account
of human mind in The Sensory Order up to the formation of spontaneous social orders
and through the common denominator of spontaneous orders4 naturalism emerges as
one of the cardinal points in Hayek's thought.
More importantly, it is the role that naturalism undertakes in Hayek's theory
that renders it particularly objectionable. The sovereignty of nature in politics
becomes the successor of the sovereignty of people. It is the logical, formal frame in
which politics has to develop. It thus guarantees the objectification of the existing
social relations and stratification5. Hayek, however, differs greatly form the
traditional conservative who would simply argue on the lines of a stable social order
based on, say, a natural aristocratic meritocracy. His naturalism is negative rather than
positive. That is, instead of ascribing social positions according to fixed
characteristics of human beings, it ascribes them on the basis of the absence of a
historically determined human individuality. This, in turn, leads into his
1 See WP. Baumgarth 1978, R. Aran 1961.
2 See R. Aron 1961, R. Hamowy 1978.
3 See WP. Baumgarth 1978.
4 For an account of the role of spontaneous orders in Hayek's thought, see J. V. Cody 1982 pp.3-4.
5 Hayek's approach is so distrustful to reason that "it instructs us to submit blindly to a flow of
events over which we can have little control" (N. Barry 1982 p.52). On Hayek's naturalistic "fatalism",
see also FP. Cristi 1984.
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methodological individualism. Hayek refers to an abstract individual1 which becomes
in its abstraction nature itself. It is this atomistic reality, which is internally
conditioned by externality, which makes the most subjectivist individuality the product
of the most objective social reality. Consequently, naturalism emerges as the central
concept of social life too. Social life is an interrelation - abstract in itself - of abstract
individuals2.
Thus, Hayek's naturalism is opposed to social Darwinism in the latter's typical
conservative version (F.A. Hayek 1988 pp.11-28). It is, rather, a liberal-oriented
naturalism - "open" and dynamic - in which no particular place corresponds to
particular individuals3. It thus fulfills capitalism's need for constant mobility. It is
not the subservience of somebody in particular to somebody else that Hayek considers
as natural but subservience in the abstract, that is, subservience as such, subservience
of "anyone" to "anyone"4.
5. Amorality of the Free Market?
Hayek argues that nobody is to be blamed for the unpleasant outcomes of the
"Great Society". But this might only be true when by "nobody" one means no
particular person (there are many cases where even this highly limited and abstract
presupposition is difficult to defend). Hayek's argument then refutes the advocate of
social justice who might claim that for each individual case of failure there exists a
certain individual (other than the one who failed) who should be blamed personally.
1 "Someone" or "anyone"; for example, he defines the "Great Society" as the society in which
"someone" would wish to place his/her children.
2 Hence, its conception as a "game"; see Y. Quiniou 1989.
3 It is precisely this point that those who accuse Hayek of direct social Darwinism overlook. See,
for example, G. Walker 1986 p.29 and J. Viner 1961 p.235. The differentiation proposed here seems
quite close to the distinction Kukathas draws between "abstract" and "substantive" conservatism (C.
Kukathas 1989 p.182).
4 Another defender of spontaneous orders captures the point clearly when stating that spontaneous
orders should condition the actions of subordinates (sic!) rather than determine them (M. Polanyi 195 1
p.115).
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But it is doubtful if this answer meets all conceptions of social justice. For example,
a widespread opinion is that social injustice is not perpetrated by certain persons but
by the actual structure of capitalism, i.e. by the fact that capitalism is based on human
exploitation1. Hayek's argument simply does not meet this point at all. It is one of
the most frequently applied tactics of the Hayekian reasoning to leave the general
framework in which actual human relations take place completely out of consideration.
The form of Hayek's comparison verifies this opinion. He chooses to compare the
outcomes of a relation that takes place in a society, structured in a particular way,
with that of a relation that takes place in nature. The reasonable conclusion is that a
society structured in a particular way and nature are two orders equally unalterable by
human action. Thus, the comparison serves as beneficial for Hayekian theory in two
ways: on the one hand it presents a particular society, i.e. capitalism, as unalterable
and as "given" to man as is nature. From here it is quite easy to assume the eternal
existence of capitalism. On the other hand, it makes the "unfortunate" outcomes of
that order appear somewhat harmless since it is in vain that one might complain about
something so unalterable as the laws of nature. What Hayek's arguments show,
actually, is that it is impossible to criticize or even to create a rough idea of the social
relations that exist in a certain society if one does not take into account the framework
in which they subsist, i.e., the way in which such a society exists; and that is precisely
what Hayek systematically avoids. So, while in the case of a natural calamity we can
only take every precaution possible and hope that science will soon provide us with
an effective answer in the case of a "social tragedy", we can react effectively to social
calamities by changing such laws as have proved to be unsuitable. In the first case,
there is nobody we can protest against, since natural laws are objectively given to
mankind. In the second, we can certainly protest against those who created a
particular form of society and its laws and against those who defend it. What Hayek
maintains is that in a social failure people will be frustrated because of an "objective"
function of a certain type of social organization - namely capitalism; he is trying to
identify nature with society at a particular stage of the latter's development
1 For a liberal objection to Hayek's argument, see C. Kukathas 1989 p. 129, where it is argued that
Hayek's account cannot meet concepts of social justice based on entitlement or rights.
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(nature=capitalism). However, although social relations are objective in each historical
period, they remain objective only for that period and therefore they can certainly be
altered by deliberate human action. The tragic failure of young men to build their
careers is a necessary outcome of capitalism because in capitalism there will always
be a few able to materialize their dreams and a lot who will have to watch then-
dreams dying and settle for inferior positions.
There is also another aspect of Hayek's theory that emerges from this
conception. It seems that the ideal "Great Society" will have to sacrifice a part of its
members on the altar of spontaneous order1. Whether this sacrifice is the price paid
for an unobstructed social evolution or whether it is just an unfortunate outcome of
the "Great Society", that Hayek does not explain2. But whichever is the case Hayek
appears positive that the price must be paid. The obvious question then is why do
societies have to suffer such losses? If Hayek was an evolutionist he could have
argued that, since the ultimate value of his system is social evolution, no price is too
high in order to achieve it. But this is hardly his case. By invoking an idealist
abstract moral value as the ultimate value of his system, Hayek seems to be trapped
in his own eclecticism: what could he answer to the legitimate case where somebody
might prefer a safe life for everybody instead of a "free" life for some?
Hayek's second thought is based on a logical presupposition - namely that in
a free market society each is allowed to choose his occupation - and an arbitrary
assumption - to the effect that nobody can have the power to foresee the results
corresponding to his wishes. The presupposition becomes obviously wrong if we
accept the arguments presented above. In a system based on the principles of
capitalism it is possible to allow each individual to choose what he would like to
become but quite impossible to have each becoming what he has chosen. In fact, this
irreconcilable coexistence of "freedom" and coercion is one of the main characteristics
of this particular mode of production. Capitalism, in contrast to former socio¬
economic formations, bases its existence primarily not on direct, open oppression but
1 In fact, the continuous and systematic failure of expectations is taken as a crucial condition for
the successful operation of the "free" market society (F.A. Hayek 1978 p.185).
2 See also G. Walker 1986 pp.58-59 and n.78, where he points out the confusion of Hayek's ideas
on that question.
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on the covert coercion that emerges through its relations of production. In a sense
coercion, although concealed becomes thus a component part of capitalism rather than
a necessary supplement. Thus, as far as the "unforeseeable" results of a "free" market
order are concerned, we can say that, contrary to Hayek's claims, we can predict who
is to become what in such a society without much difficulty. But what is more
important is that we can be sure, regardless of particular personal outcomes, that the
overall shape of that "order" will be structured according to a strict hierarchy based
on the exploitation of man by man1. And this outcome, which is both certain and
fundamentally important, is what Hayek omits to take into account when he argues for
the "unpredictability" of the outcomes of his spontaneous order2. Social or
distributive justice, in this sense, is only a mechanism that tries to diminish these
certain results. It can never become a full and complete justice because it only
appears as a cure for the effects and not for the causes of the problem to which it is
addressed.
There is still another aspect of the way Hayek approaches the problem of social
or distributive justice. He takes it for granted that social justice is a concession to the
people, a present given by the "government" as a result of a philosophical conception
of justice. In his "Great Society" this task is left to the benevolent individual (usually
identified as a capitalist). This scheme has the additional merit of providing "an
intellectual adherence to the free market and the emotional attachment to authority and
imposed tradition". Thus, "to talk of the new class as the donor not just of welfare
payments but of "permission" - indeed to attest that a state that cannot of course be
"compassionate" can nonetheless be "permissive" or otherwise - is to speak the
language of parenthood" (D. Edgar in R. Levitas 1986 p.74).
Hayek argues that social justice is closely related to egalitarian considerations.
He believes that social justice is based on a specious analogy with the situation in
which some human agency has to distribute rewards, in which case, indeed, justice
would require that these rewards be determined in accordance with some recognizable
1 See for example, R. Nisbet's views on the structure of society (1986 pp.34-54).
2 In that sense, R. Vernon argues that although a particular incident (say, the price of a product at
a given moment) may be unintended "the orderliness is not at all an incidental outcome of individual's
behavior" (R. Vernon 1979 p.66).
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rule of general applicability. However, in a "free" society any attempt to introduce
a redistributive system in regard to people who differ greatly in strength, intelligence,
skill, knowledge and perseverance as well as in their physical and social environment
means that "government" would have to treat them very differently in order to
compensate for those disadvantages and deficiencies it could not directly alter.
Hayek seems to believe that the relative position of each individual in respect
of the relations of production and the resulting social structure is irrelevant to their
abilities, knowledge etc.. He also believes that these relations of production are in
their turn totally independent from their corresponding political organization at the
level of the state1. Finally, he attributes to abilities, skills, etc. a transcendental
substance, thus reducing them to objective "goods" defined independently of any
particular pattern of social relations2. For Hayek, then, talents and values are abstract
categories with no historical or social connotations3.
A further point should be stressed here. Hayek bases his attack against social
justice on his general antiegalitarian concept of human beings. Thus, he criticizes all
versions of natural equality which are based on natural rights theories before he
concludes that "as a statement of fact, it just is not true that "all men are bom equal""
(F.A. Hayek 1960 p.87). The methodological basis of this argument is Hayek's belief
that there is a boundless variety in human nature. Hayek's rejection of the natural
rights tradition is undeniable. What is less certain, however, is the legitimacy of the
methodological basis he uses. Far from constituting an explicit argument, his
objection to the premise of natural rights theories, that men are equal because they are
created that way, seems to be simply that men are not equal for the same reason, i.e.
because they are not created the same. His defence of human inequality, then, merely
reverses natural rights theories without challenging their logic. The argument that men
1 A similar point is made by N. Barry 1982 p.51.
2 For a clear albeit cynical equation of physical advantages with social ones, see R. Nisbet 1986
p.52. What is interesting is that in his argument Nisbet refers to Hayek's ideas as his own guidelines.
3 For the same point see, Y. Quiniou 1989. Gray offers a view similar to Hayek's."(...) although
in a system of full liberal ownership the individual is unavoidably constrained by the limitations of his
own talents and resources, he is not constrained by the values or opinions which prevail among his
neighbors (...)." (J. Gray 1986b p.65 emphasis added). Notice the equal status attributed to "talents" and
"resources" as well as their complete isolation from any social parametre.
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are not equal because they have a wide range of differences in individual capacities
and potentialities can be met by a counter-argument to the effect that although this is
true the less powerful can still take the life of the strongest, or, that regardless their
differences they still are equal creatures of god. The problem with Hayek's attack on
natural rights theories is that he uses the same theoretical premises, albeit in the
opposite direction, in order to criticize it. It is also worth noticing the explicit way
in which Hayek attacks these theories right in the parts which have become annoying
to the bourgeois regime. The shift against the natural equality of men which began
during the early part of the 19th century is developed in its Hayekian version into a
ruthless polemic; natural equality has become a synonym for social decay and even
for socialism. It thus appears that with his account of inequality Hayek completes his
naturalist argument Inequality is reduced to, and thought of exclusively as, physical
difference between men. It is this natural inequality however, that penetrates all social
relations. Natural inequality, then, is at the same time both the cause and the effect
of the rule of law. It is the effect in so far as the rule of law must treat unequals as
if they were equals in order to preserve their inequality. And it is the cause in so far
as its "natural" character provides the necessary basis of the equally "natural" character
of the rule of law.
Apart from the theoretical aspects of the critique of equality, there are also
some political implications. From the presupposition that human beings have many
differences in their capacities Hayek concludes that "the desire of making people more
alike in their condition cannot be accepted in a free society as a justification for
further and discriminatory coercion" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.87). In this way Hayek
makes a simple caricature of equality and then "proves" it to be incompatible with
freedom. But equality is not uniformity. Hayek's argument is answered by pointing
out that equality is not the "desire of making people more alike in their condition"
(especially not when by "condition" is implied their physical condition)1.
But the most dangerous result of social or redistributive justice based on
1 The tendency to identify equality with physical uniformity seems to be a common feature among
antiegalitarians. Milton Friedman (1962 chapter 10) and Milton and Rose Friedman (1980 chapter 5),
are some among the many who adopt it Robert Nozick (1974 especially in part II), can also be included
in those who attack equality on an abstract humanitarian basis.
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egalitarian grounds is, according to Hayek, that it authorizes "government" to
undertake an active role in telling people what to do. In such cases the rewards of
individuals will not correspond to the value which their services have for their fellow
citizens, but to the moral merit or desert the individual is deemed to have earned; and
this will lead to a totalitarian government. This argument starts from the point that
in a "free" society the services of any man are paid for according to their value for
the citizens. This, however, would seem to imply that the value of the services of a
garbage collector or a professor is much less for his fellow citizens than the value of
the services of a car dealer or a football player because the former are paid
considerably less than the latter1. It is also based, and this is the most important
consideration, on the false bourgeois conception that in a capitalist economy all profit
is made in the sphere of exchange and is hence a result of particular individuals' life-
chances. Thus, it ignores the very basis of economy - namely the sphere of
production where concepts like the satisfaction of the mutual interests of capitalists
and workers are obviously naive.
Hayek's attack on the notion of social justice is characterized as exceptionally
strong, comparable only to that of Nietzsche's (Quiniou 1989 pp.82,86). Its profound
implications for the moral content of his theory are of capital interest especially if one
considers that Hayek himself relies heavily on the moral superiority of his ideal
society. Social justice is meaningless, for Hayek, because there is no way in which
the human mind can determine any common aims in human action. Thus, it must be
delimited in the determination of the formal conditions of action. By implication,
reason cannot determine a just (re)distribution of wealth; hence, distributive justice
becomes an epistemological impossibility2. At the same time, the terms "just" and
"unjust" cannot be attributed meaningfully to an impersonal social order for which
nobody is responsible. Social justice is just a mistake initiated by anthropomorphic
construal of impersonal social order. It is thus an ontological impossibility as well3.
1 See however the different view taken on this point by M. Polanyi 1951, notably in the paragraph
entitled "Financing of Intellectual Activities".
2 For a different approach, see T.R. Machan 1982 p.334.
3 Notice the conservation of the contradiction that permeates the whole of the Hayekian
methodology: social justice is at the same time both impossible and undesirable.
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Hayek's reasoning, then, drastically denies the possibility of attributing to social
justice and morality in general an essential social content1. It also points towards the
impossibility of constructing a normative theory of ends rather than of formal abstract
means2; it thus deprives the latter of any necessary content. Morality, in that sense,
is excluded from social life as an impossibility3.
Hayek's attack on the notion of social justice, then, reveals an essential
indifference towards the actual social conditions of human life. What is more, judging
by current moral standards, it seems that it is an attempt to theorize and even idealize
injustice (or, for that matter, immorality) itself. It could, of course, be argued that
Hayek dismisses current moral standards completely. Indeed, such a view could find
some support in Hayek's rejection of a substantial part of contemporary beliefs and
practices on the grounds of them being remnants of a past, "tribal" stage of
development of human societies. Notwithstanding that point, the advocate of such a
view would still have to face two difficulties which appear to be overwhelming. The
first, which has already been encountered previously, is that Hayek's evolutionism
simply does not allow for such evaluative judgments to take place. Thus, to the extent
that Hayek criticizes various beliefs and practices in contemporary societies, he does
so at the expense of consistency. This point becomes all the more problematic when
issues concerning current morals are involved. For, Hayek's inconsistency in that case
transcends the methodological level and enters that of his basic epistemological
premises. It is precisely the view that it is this "impartial" (i.e. detached from any
current social "patterns") standpoint which permits such evaluative judgements, that
Hayek emphatically disavows in his argument against modern rationalism. The second
difficulty relates to the political nature of his theory. In his effort to present a
politically tenable ideology, Hayek does not hesitate to argue for the superiority of
capitalism in terms of current moral standards - that is, in terms of those same
1 R. Nisbet persuasively demonstrates the Burkean origin of that argument (R. Nisbet 1986 p.58).
2 G. Walker 1986 p. 14.
3 On that and on a very accurate remark on the essential differentiation (or even opposition) of
Hayek's thought from Kant's, see Y. Quiniou 1984 pp.82-83. D. Meiklejohn is also of the opinion that
to the extend that Hayek uses Kantian ethics to backup his theory he distorts Kant by emphasizing the
formalistic aspects of his morals (D. Meiklejohn 1980 p.123).
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standards that he dismisses as "tribal"1. The theorization and idealization of injustice
emerges clearly in the substitution for actuality (capitalism) by the norm of actuality
("free enterprise society"). As Quiniou observes (Y. Quiniou 1989 p.84), in Hayek's
social theory this substitution becomes a systematic process which has wide
ramifications in the field of social relations. Thus, "social classes" become "groups"
or "multitudes", "private property" becomes "pluralist property" and "not finding a
job" replaces "unemployment". In that sense Hayek's insistence on presenting the
relations of production in society as a social "game" is quite illuminating. But the
"game" model is not neutral. It actually leads to a conception of social order as a
self-contained and self-regulating order2 while at the same time it promotes the idea
of liberty and equality (as between "players") and obscures actually existing coercion
and inequality3. However, it is that same conception of the social "game" that
denotes Hayek's immorality. For, "games" are amoral as such. There is neither
morality in or morality of the game. There are only rules of the game4.
1 He does so in many parts of his work. For example, see F.A. Hayek in F.A. Hayek 1954 pp.3-29,
where he is at pains to disprove the accusation that capitalism has historically been found incompatible
with some moral values, not on the grounds of a different morality, but by saying that capitalism
actually promoted rather than impeded these moral values. On that, see also G. Walker 1986 p.62. The
same problem appears in other advocates of the "free" market morality. Thus, Milton and Rose
Friedman (1980 pp.146-148) actually argue for the grater equality that the "free" market is bound to
produce in a society. The argument is obviously incompatible with the rejection of the moral status of
equality that constitutes one of the most fundamental aspects of their approach. It even becomes self-
defeating in view of the fact that equality is actually considered as a lethal danger for any "free" market
society.
2 For a discussion of "methodological individualism", which is the basis of Hayek's social theory,
in terms of games theories, from a libertarian perspective, see R. Nozick 1977.
3 Which, of course, preexists before the "players" start their "game" and is made even sharper after
each round of the "game" is completed.
4 A similar concept of morality appears in the works of M. Polanyi. Polanyi, who is much less a
political theorist than Hayek, does not hesitate to use the game model in order to reach such conclusions
as that the sole legitimate incentive of a worker is to tr^ to "gain promotion by pleasing his superior"
(M. Polanyi 1951 p.l95n.). The rest of the ethical"relating to one's job or social position are simply not
of his concern (the former being of the concern of his "superiors", while the latter that of the
spontaneous social order). On the eliticist implications of a morality such as Hayek's, see S. Brittan
1980 p.36.
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6. Economic Functions of the State: The Problem of Coordination
Hayek next proceeds to the problem of the economic function of the state in
relation to society. The use of the words "government" and "market" respectively
shows his intention of limiting the study of the structure of capitalism as a mode of
production to the form in which it appears after production has taken place. Although
this is not a study of economics there is one general remark that should be made.
When analyzing the political organization of society, Hayek presupposes, as we have
seen, that some general laws exist beyond it and should rule its spontaneous
development. Political organization under the falsely personalized limited notion of
"government" should be concerned with the adaptation of these preexisting general
laws to concrete conditions. When analyzing the economic order, then, he
presupposes what is most important - the mode of production. This latter plays in this
connection the role of the "universal rule" that exists beyond society. Economic
organization is limited by the introduction of the term "market" as determinative for
his analysis. The free market in the same way becomes an idea (method) of
organizing the already given and unalterable mode of production. The spheres of
circulation and consumption then, are proclaimed to be paramount economic spheres
and what is more they exhaust the whole of the economic area1. The general point
that arises from this correspondence is a constant attempt to regard all fundamental
problems - the way that production is organized, the way relations between people are
structured in society, etc. - as natural and to direct all "scientific" analysis towards the
question of the method that should be used within the given frame.
The relation between economy and politics is of the utmost importance in the
understanding of Hayek's theory. Hayek starts from the idea that economic structure
and political organization are two separate things. "These two kinds of power
[namely, "power over material things and power over the conduct of other men"] are
not necessarily connected and can, to a large extent, be separated" (F.A. Hayek 1979
1 Afanasyev 1983 pp.355-356.
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p.80)1. This view provides him with the necessary presupposition to defend the major
socio-economic foundation of contemporary capitalist monopolies. Since the power
over material things - the control of the means of production - does not lead to the
control of people too, large accumulations of capital in the hands of individuals cannot
be blamed. On the contrary, it can be said that such accumulations - monopolies - are
beneficial to the whole of society if they can produce commodities at cheap prices.
The argument to this effect consists of two separate parts. The first part refers
to the relation between the mode of production and the mode of social organization
and is totally false, while the second refers to the fact that large scale production can
make a fuller use of resources. Starting from the second part we should say that as
a fact it is undeniable. Historically speaking, this was the reason why large-scale
industry took precedence over manufacture during the last century and this, up to a
point, is the reason why monopoly accumulations of capital took precedence over
separate large-scale industries. The tremendous development of technology during the
last half of our century only speeded up a process that was already under way during
the 19th century. But evaluating such a process without placing it in its concrete
socio-economic frame is an incomplete approach. The main feature of the capitalist
mode of production is the contradiction between the private ownership of the means
of production and the socialized character of this production. This contradiction
becomes sharper as long as the means of production continue to concentrate in the
hands of smaller and smaller groups of people while, on the other hand, production
itself augments, and consequently its socialized character augments too; and this
contradiction renders critical the process of social development. This is the
characteristic of monopoly dominated capitalism (Afanasyev 1983 pp.385-386). And
this, as well, is the point of the attack on the part of its opponents: not the "large
aggregations of material resources" as such, as Hayek maintains. Choosing to defend
monopolies on the ground of an abstract formation, Hayek tries to present then-
opponents as enemies of development in general.
1 For a similar concept, see N. Barry 1987 where he argues that it is the "politicization" of social
and economic life that bears the responsibility for the failure of the welfare state. But even Barry is
skeptical about the implications that this sharp distinction leads to. "But nevertheless it may still be
legitimate to ask whether Hayek can exclude entirely the concept of political rights from the rubric of
liberty by a kind of verbal fiat?" (N. Barry 1979 p.58).
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Hayek defends the first part of his argument by maintaining that in modern
societies it cannot be said that monopolies exercise power over men apart from
influencing the standards of the services required. As long as a monopoly stands
ready to supply everyone who wants its products, even though it thereby makes a huge
profit, not only would all its customers be better off, but they could also not be said
to be dependent on its power. Thus, Hayek shifts the aim of social sciences to the
study of subjective psychological phenomena1. Notice that in doing so he claims to
have dismissed socialism and Marxism on "scientific" grounds. Despite his claim,
however, Hayek completely ignores the differentiation made by Marxism between
concrete and abstract labor. It is only through that differentiation2 that Marxism
establishes the two-fold nature of all phenomena in capitalist production: that is, the
material content on the one hand and the socio-economic form on the other of all
economic processes. Thus, Hayek does not find any sort of exploitation because he
does not look for it in the sphere of production but in the sphere of exchange.
Another implication of his exchange-oriented account is the equation of all the
participants in the market in terms of their being equivalent units. This concept,
usually presented as the application of individualism in economics, leads to the
conclusion that the market is the place where equal units (for example corporate
enterprises and individual workers) compete. However, "There is also a greater
contrast today between the power of the individual and the small family group and
that of the big organization." "The difference in power means that transactions in the
market are often not between independent and roughly equal contracting parties. The
individual household is not striking a free bargain with the corporate enterprise. There
is often a strong possibility that private coercion will replace free market outcomes.
The imbalance in power further strengthens the case for a third party to which
households can turn." (N. Bosquanet 1983 p. 106).
Hayek's concept of monopoly totally avoids the problem of social relations
1 On the matter of subjectivism in social sciences, see also C. Kukathas 1989 pp.57-58.
2 The importance of this distinction cannot be overemphasized in Marxism. For Marx it is the key
for the understanding of all facts (K. Marx, F. Engels 1975 p. 180). The analysis of these categories
cannot be undertaken here. The point made refers to Hayek's effort to dismiss Marxism without taking
into account one of its most fundamental concepts.
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within capitalism1. A monopoly cannot function by exercising power over material
things only. It needs human labor too. If human labor is taken as the basis of the
category of "material resources", then it follows that monopolies not only exercise
power but practically dominate over the people who sell their labor power to them.
In Hayek's own words: "Competition is, after all, always a process in which a small
number makes it necessary for larger numbers to do what they do not like" (F.A.
Hayek 1979 p.77). Moreover, "As Hayek has pointed out again and again, there is
no such thing as a control over the production of wealth which is not also a control
over the lives of men" (G.C. Roche HI in F. Machlup 1977 pp.2-3). Considering that
in contemporary capitalism monopolies are not an isolated phenomenon but on the
contrary, their existence determines the whole mode of production, we can assume that
all men selling their labor power are "owned" by the owners of the monopolies thus
producing the phenomenon of "new feudalism"2. This is the direct way through
which monopolies exercise power but it is not the only one. Through the advantages
emerging from their vast capital, monopolies systematically prevent competition. It
is not the interference of a neutral but theoretically misguided state in favor of some
monopolies that prevents competition, but the very existence of monopolies, whether
they use the state apparatus directly or not3. This, perhaps, is the crux of Hayek's
inadequacy in terms of economic analysis. It seems that his theory simply cannot
1 This seems to be the opinion ofmany sympathetic critics as well. For example, N. Barry "Hayek,
on many occasions, laments the apparent passing of the individualist market order but does not really
examine adequately the value system needed to sustain it" (N. Barry 1979 p. 143). In a different vein,
"The contrast between a spontaneous order and the dead hand of state prescription is an unreal one. It
completely misses out the possibility that private power can be a very serious barrier to experiment and
to innovation" (N. Bosanquet 1983 p.99). Finally reference must be made to Hamowy's critique of the
Hayekian notion of monopoly which has tended to become a "classic" in the libertarian camp. Hayek
himself is quite frank in his intention not to allow monopolies to interfere in his theory. Thus the
subject usually occupies a distinctively small section of each of his works while many times it is
grouped together with "other minor problems" (F.A. Hayek 1960 p.264). In his effort to dispense with
monopolies Hayek has even argued that they have nothing to do with capitalism anyway. In reality, he
says, they are just "remnants or revivals of precapitalistic features" (F.A. Hayek in F.A. Hayek 1954
p.28).
2 For a critique of Hayek's intentional omission of these aspects, see G.L. Arnold 1960 p.105. A
classic Marxist analysis is to be found in V.I. Lenin 1964.
3 Even bourgeois theorists understand that clearly; thus, "Undoubtedly, the emergence of the large-
scale enterprise is part of the spontaneous evolution of the market order yet it would appear to be
accompanied by a set of values which are not merely inimical to the market order but are agents of its
destruction." (N. Barry 1979 p. 142).
252
account for the nature and function of monopolies as the determinant factor of
contemporary capitalism. The problem for Hayek then seems to be that the state by
its nature can never become a mere instrument in the hands of monopolies. It will
always reflect, albeit in a distorted way, the structure and relations of the whole of
society. Therefore, it might obstruct certain monopolies, especially during a period
in which their existence depended upon the intensification of the exploitation of then-
workers. Thus, "It seems clear that this [i.e. the achievement of a "free" market order]
can be done only by depriving government of the power of providing such protection,
for as long as it has such power it is vulnerable to pressure" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.83).
In that sense, Hayek's suggestion of a self-regulating economy within monopoly
capitalism can only be interpreted as an attempt to place society under the most
arbitrary control both of the state and of monopolies. As he himself puts it: "Size has
thus become the most effective antidote to the power of size; what will control the
power of large aggregations of capital are other large aggregations of capital (...)"
(F.A. Hayek 1979 p.79). Although the concept itself is quite doubtful, since the
history of the growth of capitalism has shown that capital tends to accumulate more
and more, what is beyond any doubt is that in such a society nobody will be able to
limit the aggressiveness of monopoly capitalism as a whole1.
1 On that, see also S. Clarke 1987 especially pp.419426.
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SECTION D: HAYEK'S ALTERNATIVE
1. The Functioning of Government According to Hayek
Hayek has never defended libertarians or "anarchocapitalists" in their demand
for a stateless society. What he has proposed is a state which will function in a
different way from the existing one. He thinks it essential that most of the social
functions of the state should cease to exist, that they should be left in the hands of
individuals. At the same time he suggests some important alterations in the state's
economic function. Its political function, on the contrary, which is the central and
dominant state function, should be enforced in order to reach a level of considerable
independence from society. Thus he is not against the state; he is just against some
of its functions, while, at the same time, he suggests the enforcement of some others.
The state is regarded as a necessary "evil" which has to protect legal institutions - the
most important among them being private property - by coercion1. Consequently, the
question that arises is: is he for or against the actual form of the state - namely
bourgeois democracy? It is true that he has declared his faith in democracy many
times2; but can we accept this assurance when his ideas lead to a form of state quite
different from the one we know as democratic?
We have already seen Hayek's opposition to majority rule and
parliamentarianism. His further argument concerns the limitation of the social
function of the state. It is presented in terms of the division of social activities into
two main sectors, the private and the public. The latter has overgrown during the last
century and should be limited. The public sector should include three fields of
activities: the enforcement of the rules of just conduct, defence and the levying of
taxes to finance its activities. Nevertheless, these aspects are not the only ones. The
state should provide its citizens with some goods which cannot be provided within the
1 See also J. Gray 1986b p.81 for an account of the need to safeguard private property through the
means of a coercive state.
2 Though, not without some noticeable exceptions, as we have already seen.
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function of the free market but are of vital importance for all. "To this category
belong not only some obvious instances as the protection against violence, epidemics,
or such natural forces as floods or avalanches, but also many of the amenities which
make life in modern cities tolerable, most roads (...), the provision of standards of
measure, and of many kinds of information ranging from land registers, maps and
statistics to the certification of the quality of some goods or services offered in the
market. In many instances the rendering of such services could bring no gain to those
who do so, and they will therefore not be provided by the market. These are the
collective or public goods." (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.44).
The introduction of "collective or public goods" in Hayek's theory, however,
is quite problematic1. Hayek has long argued that we cannot assume the existence
of any collective aims in social relations for a number of reasons, the most important
among them being the inner inability of human mind to predict the outcomes of a
spontaneous order. The dilemma, so far, has been: either individuals will accept the
fact that they cannot predict the outcomes of their social life and thus will resign from
any notion of social or collective planning, or they will have to infringe each other's
freedom. It has even been suggested that this is not an "open" choice, since even if
they adopt the latter alternative it still will not be possible to predict anything because
the inability to comprehend and consequently to plan is an attribute of human mind
and, therefore, not a matter of free choice. So, human beings are unable to plan their
social lives by definition.
Another element in Hayek's theory, deriving from his methodological
individualism, is the subjectivist account of human aims2. Thus, it has been argued,
even if there were a possibility of planning, this would not be desirable because each
individual member of society has his/her own particular aims which are not connected
in any way either to any factual state of affairs, or to the particular aims of his/her
fellow members. So, human beings develop their personal aims as self-contained
units. Besides, it is precisely on this subjectivist account of human desires that the
validity of the market as a discovery mechanism rests. If it were possible to
1 For a similar view, see P.W. Dyer and R. Harrison Hickman 1979 p.387.
2 Also F.A. Hayek 1949 pp.77-91.
255
determine what is that people want, in the absence of a market, then why should we
need markets in the first place?
From the above two presuppositions it becomes obvious that it is quite difficult
to derive any "collective or public" goods. The reason lies not in the selfish account
of human nature that Hayek implies, but in the subjectivist and agnostic philosophical
premises that he introduces. Furthermore, the provision against violence and natural
forces is obviously a kind of planning. The implications that arise in Hayek's theory
after the introduction of a kind of "limited" planing are profound. Once planning is
introduced, it seems that all weight should lie on the definition of what should be
included in that area - which can now be described as everything that is included in
the "public goods" concept. The "obvious instances" and "amenities" that Hayek
refers to are certainly a suggestion1. But they remain just a suggestion as long as the
lack of a general criterion according to which some state activities would be thought
of as providing "public goods", while some others will not, is apparent. Thus, most
welfare policies can be regarded as public goods in that sense. Education, for
example, becomes a public good when it is treated as a wider social benefit and as
an investment in training for employment2. Hayek needs to introduce a criterion in
order to evaluate state activities. The fact that he does not do so only indicates his
uneasiness when he discusses the problem of the state in his legal and social
philosophy3.
An argument could be raised against this critique. Hayek avers that the
maintenance of an overall order is a public good in the sense that it provides
everybody with more chances to achieve his/her unknown ends. That this concept lies
1 Public goods in that sense are defined in terms of non-excludability and non-rivalness. That is,
once a public good is provided it is available for all and its use by a person or a number of persons
does not reduce the amount available to others. A similar definition is proposed in M. Polanyi 1951
pp. 140-143. The vagueness inherent in such "calculations" is it would seem unavoidable.
Characteristically enough Polanyi uses robots carrying "gauges" which record degrees of satisfaction
in his examples (M. Polanyi 1951 pp.167-168). What is more important however is that Polanyi ends
up advocating a much more comprehensive content of the category of "public goods" and state activity
than Hayek does, without apparently violating the formal preconditions of his methodology.
2 T. Adorno, for example, argues that knowledge in contemporary society becomes to an increasing
extent a force of production (in T. Adorno (et al.) 1976 p. 16).
3 See also P.W. Dyer and R. Harrison Hickman 1979 p.387.
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behind some state activities has been shown in the case of the provision of a minimum
of support for the most "unfortunate". It is true that Hayek does not include this
particular activity in the examples of the "public goods" that he presents, but there is
no reason why it should not be included in that category as well. It has been argued
that the concept of the "maintenance of an overall order" suffers from a high degree
of abstraction and that, in its essence, is a strictly conservative concept. Therefore,
the provision of "public goods" can also be seen as an ambiguous attempt to "correct"
the outcomes of the "Ideal Society", thus making it more appealing to the people. In
any case, the contents of the category "public goods" remain unclear in the Hayekian
approach. Whether it will be understood as an extension of the concept of the
maintenance of order, or simply as a vital completion of Hayek's account of social
organization, the category remains obscure as long as there is no recognizable criterion
according to which state activities can be judged as conducive or non conducive to
"public goods". In fact it seems that any such attempt is bound to remain arbitrary1.
Notwithstanding the importance of the above point, probably the most
important implication is that the introduction of state activities aiming at "public
goods", as well as the characterization of those activities as vital for the "Great
Society" demonstrates that the main political principle of Hayek - namely the self-
regulating market order - that serves as the starting point of his attack against state
interference, should not be taken at face value, at least as far as the social function of
the state is concerned. Hayek indirectly admits the failure of the market to generate
a viable society. He proposes a limitation of some social functions of the state simply
because he believes that the given order will not persist if it keeps on providing "high"
standards of welfare.
There are at least three points of interest in this respect. Firstly, the free
market is said to be unable to regulate society. It needs supplementary aid. Secondly,
this aid - namely state interference - should strictly remain in the non-profitable sphere
that individuals are not willing to exploit. In other words, the public sector is to a
large extent a negative concept. It includes everything that the private sector cannot
1 For an account of the problems that neoliberalism faces on that matter, see the "friendly" critique
of N. Barry 1987 pp.64-69.
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or does not want to include. Thirdly, when we come to practical examples we can see
that there cannot be (at least not as a reasonable outcome of Hayek's definition) a
sufficient criterion according to which we will be able to distinguish "public goods"1.
This negative definition can lead to a variable size of the public sector according to
historical circumstances. These variations may lean either towards a concept of a
minimum state or to a concept closer to the welfare state. The weakness of this
method is expressed in Hayek's own words. "It is not to be denied, however, that in
this connection a prima facie conflict arises between the basic principles of a
libertarian order and what appears to be unquestioned necessities of governmental
policy, and that we still lack adequate theoretical principles for a satisfactory solution
of some of the problems which arise in this field" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.63).
Although uncertain in terms of methodology, Hayek's model becomes quite
clear when we take into account his supplementary explanations. Apart from arguing
that the "public sector" should extend only to the field that no private interest is
willing to enter he also maintains that state financing of such a sector should not mean
that the state controls it as well. "(...) the fact that some services must be financed
by compulsory levies by no means implies that such services should also be
administered by government. Once the problem of finance is solved, it will often be
the more effective method to leave the organization and management of such services
to competitive enterprise and rely on appropriate methods of apportioning the funds
raised by compulsion among the producers in accordance with some expressed
preference of the users" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.46).
In that sense, state interference becomes a necessary component of the
spontaneous order on the economic level exactly as it has become necessary on the
social and political one2. The obvious contradiction that arises between spontaneity
and state interference does not seem to trouble Hayek at all. Nor does the fact that
he has condemned the latter on moral grounds, before reintroducing it as a vital
element of the "Great Society". Instead, it seems that Hayek implies a distinction
between a particular degree of interference rather than between spontaneous and
1 See also P.W. Dyer and R. Harrison Hickman 1979 p.387.
2 See also P.W. Dyer and R. Harrison Hickman 1979 p.389.
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planned orders or between "free" and state controlled ones. Far from being the
outcome of a thoroughly skeptical epistemology or a strict methodology, his whole
argument can be reduced to merely quantitative comparisons. A certain amount of
interference is both necessary and desirable while a different amount is condemnable.
The libertarian criticism, that once we accept some state interference there is no way
to stop it from taking over the whole of the market, might be a little partial but what
becomes apparent is that once we smuggle in state interference there cannot be any
impartial abstract ideal or purely theoretical criteria which will allow a decision as to
whether a certain amount of it is "good" or "bad". The criterion is bound to be
practical, i.e. connected to the actual social and political situation and therefore it
should be evaluated in ordinary political terms. By "different amount" it should not
be understood a net increase or decrease since what Hayek suggests is a partial
increase in some state functions and a partial decrease in some others. Overall, it is
a change of the relative weight of the various functions of state policy which however
is moving on the same tracks as traditional bourgeois political thought In that sense
the neoliberal "revolutionary" approach to the problems of social and political
philosophy becomes a mere disguise; in fact it is ordinary conservative ideas under
a different appearance1.
Hayek's suggestion also means that the main task of the "government" is to
extend the private sector by creating favorable conditions for it where such do not
exist. This is an important point in the Hayekian theory because it is a point of
confrontation with libertarianism and because it illustrates the intentions of the writer
as far as the functioning of the state is concerned. We have seen that this idea did not
emerge as a logical result of the Hayekian theory but as a more or less necessary (in
the pragmatic sense) function that cannot be abolished. But what appears to be
1 The conservative approach is captured by N. Barry "Thus it is the case that the conservatives now
require both a strong and a limited state. They have a Hegelian vision of a powerful sovereign state
that stands above the conflict within egoistic market society and impartially delivers law and order."
(N. Barry 1987 p.194). The fact that Barry regards this concept as exclusively conservative is of
secondary importance. For example, Nisbet does not hesitate to couple together the claim for a strong
central government (R. Nisbet 1986 p.41) and the statement that for the conservative, laisser-faire and
decentralization are sovereign (R. Nisbet 1986 p.37). What is important then is that the strong-limited
state exists. The neoliberals tend to stress the legal sovereignty of that state whereas the conservatives
its substantial; but this is only a secondary difference. Also A. Gamble 1988.
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contradictory in this theory is the fact that "government" has to create the necessary
conditions for private capital; and that is quite a different thing from the initial self-
generating free market order. Furthermore, it is undeniable that those individuals who
will be the organizers and the managers of the services financed by the "government"
will be in a favorable position in comparison with all other individuals who have to
support their enterprises on their own. The argument that this field will be open to
all individuals does not alter the fact that in the end only some will take these jobs
and they will be in a favorable position because of the "government's" interference.
So, government is shown to be no-more "supra-social" and "impartial" than
law. It is supra-social only if society can be accurately reduced to a mere sum of
individuals and it is impartial because it is supposed not to discriminate any particular
person. But what Hayek leaves out of his account of both law and government is the
most important thing of all: towards the overall shape of the society, the overall order
as Hayek puts it, government is not and cannot be impartial. The fact that Hayek
arbitrarily assumes that if a law or a government action is conducive to the
maintenance of order it automatically follows that it is a "good" government (or law)
only reinforces this point. What Hayek takes as granted constitutes a crucial problem
of all political theory and action.
For Hayek the main task of the state is to create the most favorable conditions
possible for the capital. This could be achieved both by authoritarian suppression of
any resistance and by direct positive interference with the market mechanism. The
state then is not simply an "unavoidable malfunction" but an actual prerequisite of the
"Great Society".
There is also a third sector of social activity introduced by Hayek, the
"independent sector". This sector is supposed to include "cultural activities" as well
as many important fields of social activity such as the "urgent problems of our cities".
This sector would consist of churches, foundations and endowments, private
associations, charities and welfare agencies. The first thing that becomes apparent
here is the effort to remove a number of very important and dangerous problems from
the objective responsibility of the state to the moral good-will of individuals. The
immediate result is the creation of institutions that will survive and prosper as a result
of the inability of "government" to meet basic social needs. Combining this idea with
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the ones we have discussed previously we can reach the following conclusion.
"Government" is supposed to be an independent machine for maintenance of the free
market. Its task is to provide that market with all the necessary services that will
maintain order and assure its reproduction. In doing so it should always try to enlarge
the sphere where private capital can make profits. This enlargement can be achieved
either by direct financial support or by an indirect transfer of its responsibilities to the
independent sector. In both cases, "government" activity should be directed towards
the enforcement of private capital exclusively.
Although Hayek apparently considers liberty as a negative concept, his political
theory is not limited to the doctrine of the absence of "state interference". Thus, he
does not hesitate to find refuge in drastic state interference when this seems more
convenient for his "free" market order. This concept appears in relation to the rights
of the individual as well. So far we have seen that the general direction of his
argument was against "government" interference in some spheres that were supposed
to be the exclusive territory of individual action. According to the original definition
of freedom as absence of coercion it would seem quite reasonable that these spheres
would become "free" from the moment of the retirement of the "government". The
general concept of the function of the "governmental" power enforces the above notion
- in a "free" society "government" should avoid giving specific commands to specific
individuals; it should rather try to apply the general rules of just conduct as
impersonally as possible. But it seems that the above suggestions cannot guarantee
"freedom" after all. Hayek appears to maintain that "government" interference is
necessary, in the form of protection and positive action, to achieve liberty. Individuals
should be protected from the coercion of some social, non-governmental institutions.
His attitude towards the protection of privacy and secrecy in individual actions
can be used as an example at this point. "The delimitation of some such fields [i.e.
privacy and secrecy] in which the individual is protected against the inquisitiveness
of his neighbors or even the representatives of the public at large, such as the press,
seems to me an important requirement of full liberty" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.63). In that
particular case the epistemological premises of Hayek's are violated directly: the
market should be highly praised because of its knowledge maximizing role which
alone can compensate for our cognitive weaknesses. The press however should be
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restricted regardless of the role it plays in that very process in the name of "full
liberty". No inconsistency seems able to present a decisive obstacle to Hayek's
defence of the "Great Society". Freedom of opinion has long been a basic principle
of liberalism and so has freedom of the press. Actually the latter has long been
regarded as a criterion according to which one can tell whether a society is democratic
or not. By his suggestion for restricting the freedom of press, especially by using
"governmental" coercion, Hayek contradicts his own theoretical tradition1. But he
also proves that when he feels there is a need for it he does not hesitate to take refuge
in positive state interference. Thus, even a committed advocate of capitalism feels
obliged to admit that "the contents of Hayek's agenda of government do seem a little
arbitrary and would not be accepted by all liberals" (N. Barry 1979 p.111).
2."Model Constitution": A Proposal
The section referring to the "model constitution" gives us a good opportunity
to see Hayek's ideas in a more concrete and comprehensive way. The aim of such
a constitution is to provide societies and "governments" with a framework within
which the line of the separation of the power between lawmaking and "government"
will be clearly drawn. Practically this can be achieved by the creation of an assembly
- the legislature - which will consist of individuals chosen in a way, and for a period
of time, different to those of the "government". The general task of this legislature
will be the discovery of universal rules of just conduct. These rules, as we have
already seen, are the concrete expression (although in a general and impersonal form)
of superior values which exist above society. So this legislature will be limited by the
general principles and the values that determine society. Apart from the legislature
there will be a governmental assembly the task of which is to give effective responses
to problems arising during the process of social functioning. This assembly will be
limited drastically by the general rules of just conduct formulated by the legislature.
1 Hayek could have tried to make some kind of distinction, for example, between "intrusive" and
"investigative" journalism. Although such distinctions are not always unproblematic, they can, at least,
be taken as attempts not to infringe the overall liberty of the press.
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Thus there are three distinct levels in the Hayekian constitution. The first, that
of abstract ideas, is totally independent of society and identifies the ultimate values
of the latter. According to Hayek this process of the battle of pure ideas is a matter
which goes forward between charismatic individuals, philosophers etc.. The ideas
emerging from this battle will lay down in the most general terms the aims, values and
modus vivendi of society. The second level, that of the "demigod" legislature, is
supposed to play the role of the mediator between total abstraction (first level) and
concrete vulgar material conditions (third level). The individuals who compose this
assembly are unfortunately human beings and therefore they are related to their society
in various ways. So they must be purified of these relations in order to gain the
desired impartiality and neutrality towards their own society. Hayek's scheme is to
try to isolate them from everyday troubles so that they become independent from
society. Consequently, impartiality and neutrality are attributes that exist as a result
of the isolation of the individual from society. In order to obtain the desired moral
quality the individual has to deny his social dimension. This idea seems to penetrate
Hayek's political theory; his suggestions are attempts to resolve the permanent
problems that are created by the "dual" existence of human beings: they are considered
to be social beings to the extent that they live of necessity in a natural dependence on
each other, and at the same time they are required to become bearers of supra-social
abstract ideas. In this sense Hayek's account of politics is based on the principle that
the further an individual distances himself from society the more "neutral" and
"impartial" he becomes.
Our objection to this scheme lies in two points. Firstly, it is impossible to
think of individuals outside society and therefore it is a distortion of reality to give
any account of isolated neutral individuals. In a way, Hayek himself does not
disagree with this. Although his impartial individuals are supposed to be neutral in
respect of their various personal interests, they are not supposed to be neutral in
respect to the dominant traditions of their society. On the contrary, they are supposed
to support them and promote them in the best way they can. The fact that Hayek
considers this order to be a superhuman and neutral framework and thus deduces the
consequent neutrality of the individuals who serve it, is, of course, a major difference
between the two approaches. This order, however, is not necessarily a spontaneous-
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liberal one. But if social order is conceived as a concrete class-divided formation, it
becomes obvious that his suggestions lead to an extremely static and in fact self-
defeating scheme. Some attention should be drawn to the fact that even Hayek cannot
think of his impartial individuals as completely isolated units.
Secondly, this scheme is bound to lead to elitism and authoritarianism1. As
a hint of Hayek's elitism, it can be noticed that he seems to reserve the attributes of
moral neutrality and impartiality for the members of the legislature. The introduction
of an openly coercive "government" completes the picture. In Hayek's "Ideal Society"
there is no need for everybody to acquire the ideal characteristics. It is enough that
the members of the legislature (a sort of Platonic guardian class) have them2; the rest
(that is, the compliance of the people with the rules lead down by the legislature) is
the business of the "government" - a part of its legitimate job to put into practice the
general rules of law3. The products of the mental labor of the members of legislature,
i.e. the general rales of just conduct, will be the incarnation of ultimate values and
will serve as a general frame for the function of "government".
On the third level, we find the "government" in the very limited role of the
guard whose task is the application of the above rules in each concrete case. Hayek
considers the state apparatus as a potential field of battle between opposite group
interests. This concept is close to reality. The state is indeed a battlefield of opposite
interests but it is more than that. In fact it is not a neutral ground; it reflects the
interests of the opposite groups in different ways. It is favorable to some and
unfavorable to others, but the very fact that it is obliged to reflect all interests makes
it "vulnerable" to the demands of the less privileged "groups". This is where the
problem arises for Hayek's "free" market society. In other words the question is one
1 In that sense, with regard to his "Model Constitution" D. Meiklejohn comments that "it is precisely
to remove from popular influence discussion of the fundamental issues that Hayek proposes his
legislative assembly" (1980 p.123).
2"(...) [Hayek] clearly hankers like a good philosophe, for a Legislator to implement his Utopia and
force the Demos (...) to be free" (J. Dunn 1978 p.28).
3 For a similar concept that is based on the compatibility of liberalism and authoritarianism, see J.
Gray 1986b chapter 9.
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of making the state impermeable to any pressure that might emerge from the people1.
To this Hayek replies with the sharp distinction of the civil and the political and the
delimitation of individual liberty to the field of the former. The political is
superimposed on certain parts of the civil but this coercive action is thought to be
irrelevant to the problem of individual liberty because it is considered as exogenous
to the civil.
The conception of the state as a (potential) battlefield of interests, however,
creates some questions right from the beginning. In Hayekian theory, actually or
potentially opposed interest need not be considered as a necessary characteristic of
society. On the other hand, there are no historical examples of homogenized societies
and our society is no exception. So, opposing social interests occupy an unstable
position in the structure; they are there as a fact but there is no attempt to explain
them either historically or methodologically. The first step was to destroy all forms
of organized expression of "group" interests in theory and in practice. The second
step is to create a form of political power as distant and impervious as possible.
What becomes incomprehensible after this description of the political
organization of the "Great Society" is Hayek's persistence in the idea that this "order"
will not function unless the majority accepts certain abstract moral values.
Notwithstanding Hayek's claim it seems that under such an elitist institutional
framework the "Great Society" will survive regardless of particular personal opinions
on abstract moral matters. So, it is one of the following two options: either Hayek
relies on the acceptance of the suggested moral values as a sine qua non of the "Great
Society", in which case the proposed strict institutions become superfluous, or he
relies on the existence of these institutions precisely because he believes that there is
not going to be any agreement on abstract moral values by the great majority. It is
in the latter context that Hayek suggests the three level structure of power. The first
level is impermeable by definition since we have already seen that the discovery and
expression of abstract ideas is the task of the few, the philosophers and not of the
1 For a more clear statement of the same principle and a striking similarity with Hayek's "new"
proposals, R. Nisbet 1986 pp.37-38.
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ordinary people1. The second level becomes forbidden ground as a consequence of
the proposed structure. Since only "successful" individuals will participate and since
elections will take place under extremely strict conditions, ordinary people are
practically excluded. The third level, that of the governmental assembly and its
executive organism, is still "vulnerable" in theory but its absolute control by the
legislature renders this "vulnerability" a mere formality.
It is in this scheme that Hayek concludes that individual freedom is preserved
if we can drastically limit the power of government. This, nevertheless, is a very
dubious conclusion, as has already been argued. In the case of the "Model
Constitution" for example, Hayek leaves his proposed legislature out of the state
corpus by identifying the state with government. It is in that context, and only in that
context, that Hayek suggests a delimitation of state activities. Only if one accepts the
separation of the state from society and the consequent delimitation of the term "state"
can one argue that the Hayekian theory introduces a delimited state. The apparently
"secondary" paragraph in which Hayek argues that we should use the term
"government" rather than the metaphysically charged term "state", now acquires its
proper importance. Far from discussing two terms for the same thing as he seems to
imply, it is now evident that Hayek suggests a new content for the term "state". But
if one does not accept this smuggling, that is if one includes in state functions both
the legislative and the executive acts as two supplementary aspects of state
domination, then the image of the proposed theory changes dramatically. Instead of
a delimited state theory it becomes a state centered theory whose main target is the
drastic increase of the coercive and authoritarian aspects of the capitalist state2.
A closer look at his suggestions on the organic composition of the legislature
might perhaps help towards an understanding of the consequences of the proposed
scheme. The first suggestion that Hayek proposes as a "cure" of the malfunctioning
of democracy and as a conclusion of his historical and theoretical analysis, concerns
the division of democratic powers. "Legislation in the true sense ought always to be
1 Which latter, according to Hayek, have neither the time nor the ability to think through abstract
ideas (!).
2 See also D. Meiklejohn 1980 p. 123.
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a commitment to act on stated principles rather than a decision how to act in a
particular instance. It must, therefore, essentially aim at effects in the long run, and
be directed towards a future the particular circumstances of which are not yet known;
and the resulting laws must aim at helping unknown people at their equally unknown
purposes. This task demands for its successful accomplishment persons not concerned
with particular situations or committed to the support of particular interests, but men
free to look at their tasks from the point of view of the long run desirability of the
rules laid down for the community as a whole" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.37). The
legislature will thus consist of individuals "who have already proved themselves in the
ordinary business of life" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p. 113). The exclusion of all people who
did not manage to prove themselves in the ordinary business of capitalism is
characteristic of Hayek's elitist tendency1. Various supplementary safeguards of this
elitist assembly are introduced. One of them is the abolition of universal suffrage
because people can only be judged by their contemporaries, i.e. by people of the same
age. So only these individuals who came to the 45th (that is the suggested age for
somebody to become a member of legislative (F.A. Hayek 1979 p. 113)) year of their
lives should vote2. To make things worse and in order to complete the control of the
candidates over their voters, Hayek suggests a further limitation, namely, that of
indirect elections. "This might well make it advisable to employ an indirect method
of election, with regionally appointed delegates electing the representative from their
midst" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p.114).
But this is only the first step towards what Hayek calls a free political system.
The second is to assure the members of the assembly a position that will permit them
to exercise their "impartial" powers. Thus, an extremely long period of service -
fifteen years - is introduced along with high salaries which are supposed to make
people independent of the needs of everyday life. The long period of their service and
especially their irrevocability by the people or by any other body underscores Hayek's
inclination towards elitism and authoritarianism.
1 See also D. Meiklejohn 1980 p.122.
2 That, of course, makes matters easier for the candidates and their sponsors. Individuals quite
powerful by definition can control the votes of an extremely limited number of voters much easier. For
example, see Hayek's suggestions in F.A. Hayek 1979 pp.117-119.
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As a sample of the inconsistencies that permeate Hayek's theory, one can note
that, when he was arguing for the advantages of democracy as a method of political
organization, he included the revocability of the people's representatives amongst
them. However, in the case of the legislature, Hayek urges the irrevocability of its
members as a necessary guarantee of their neutrality. It might be argued that Hayek
was referring to democracy as a method of government only. But this would imply
that the "Ideal Society" should be based on a "democratic" government controlled by
a non-democratic superior power, namely the legislature, an argument which looks less
than persuasive. By creating a "legitimate" group of people who will have supreme
power in their hands, Hayek abandons the final elements of liberal democracy, as far
as the political organization of society is concerned1. The proposal of a high salary
as a safeguard of the independence of these people, is surely not an adequate measure.
There is no indication that people who earn a certain level of money are not willing
to increase their incomes even more. Furthermore, a well paid position and the
ensuring of a high pension has always been the best reward for buying one's services.
What is beyond any doubt is that, in a system such as this, people who have already
proved themselves in the business of life will be able to exercise an excessive control
over society, either directly or indirectly by their representatives in the legislature2.
Hayek's critique of existing bourgeois democracy starts from the true
recognition that contemporary parliaments are a cover for governmental activities.
But, instead of interpreting this widely acknowledged phenomenon as a result of the
historical process of the development of bourgeois society, he thinks that it is the
result of the action of misguided individuals; a matter of wrong application of correct
ideas. And he ends up by rejecting the democratic element of representative
institutions3. In order to understand more fully the extent of power that such a
1 See also Gray's flat statement that the political can never be democratic "because power cannot
by its nature [sic!] be distributed equally" (J. Gray 1986b p.58).
2 S. Brittan adopts a very similar position on that matter although he is prepared to grant the
legislature more autonomy in respect to particular pressure groups (S. Brittan 1980 pp. 45-46).
3 The reason why parliaments became halls of debate instead of centers of decision is that their
members acquired an artificial independence from society, some very essential privileges and high
expectations of not losing their jobs. All these elements are stressed to an extreme degree in Hayek's
(continued...)
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legislative assembly will possess we need to place the conception of it within the
whole Hayekian structure of political power. In a "free" society there will be a
constitution but it will have an even more abstract and formalistic role than
contemporary ones: "while the Constitution allocates and restricts powers, it should
not prescribe positively how these powers are to be used" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p. 123).
This prescription is, again, a task of the legislature. On the other hand, the
governmental assembly and its "executive organs" would be bound by the decisions
of legislature too. Combining the above remarks we end up with a superpowerful
group of people who determine all political decisions directly and all political actions
indirectly (through the "limited" government) and who at the same time are not
controlled by the people. This becomes still more apparent owing to the "right" the
legislature will have to grant governments "emergency" powers "which normally
nobody should possess" (F.A. Hayek 1979 p. 124) as well as the right to revoke
powers when it is thought necessary1. Hayek, then, seems to abandon the abstract
normative character of his "Model Constitution". In the end, it is the decisionist
element of the authoritarian legislature that determines the order of the "Great
Society"2.
Hayek's "ideal" constitution is a sample of theoretical arbitrariness and political
oppression3. Its implication is to safeguard the state from any pressure of the people
and to render it a mere tool in the hands of the most powerful. In that sense, Hayek's
proposals clearly testify to his intention not only of distinguishing between liberalism
and democracy but also of eradicating the latter from the former. In short, it is the
theoretical expression of the most aggressive part of contemporary capitalism.
3(...continued)
"ideal" constitution. Only when the members of any legislature or assembly feel the results of their own
decisions on themselves, only when they do not consider their function as a profitable business and
when they are expected to work to earn their living, only when all privileges that go along with the
"job" are abolished and all these parliamentary assembly and legislature members are directly
responsible to and revocable from the people can we expect to have a truly representative democracy.
1 See also D. Meiklejohn 1980 pp.121-123.
2 On this point, see F.R. Cristi 1984.
3 For a similar charge, see also A. Belsey in R. Levitas 1986 p.187.
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CONCLUSION PART HI
In Hayek's theory there is ample evidence as to the importance of the state.
Of course, the state as such is never explicitly treated as the key concept in politics.
Rather it is subsumed under skeptical epistemological considerations, terminological
"renovations" and eternal traditional laws. It is not a matter of coincidence, however,
that Hayek's political theory became widely known as the result of the propositions
he advanced in relation to the function of the state. Indeed, it seems quite doubtful
that anybody outside a small professional academic circle was aware of or interested
in the radical epistemological or methodological propositions that Hayek was at pains
to promote in his political theory. And properly so, it might be said, since the part
of his thought referring (directly or indirectly) to the problem of the state seems to
incarnate all the power and insight of the "new" theory. It is here that Hayek warns
contemporary societies on the matter of the irreversible road to socialism and self-
destruction that they have taken. It is also here that he attacks all the misconceptions
and fallacious beliefs - such as democracy and social justice - that have prevailed
among socialist and crypto-socialist intellectuals and their fellow-travellers, the
politicians. And, above all, it is here that he sketches the organization of the "Great
Society" as a social and political formation. The study of this aspect of his thought
would, then, seem to supply the best opportunity for an accurate evaluation of Hayek.
It may not come as a surprise, by now, to learn that the connection between
this and the other major aspects of Hayek's theory, such as epistemology or even
social philosophy, is, generously speaking, loose. Indeed, in each and all the major
points of his political theory - be it the attempt to legitimize abstract rules as guiding
principles of a "free" social order, or the role of democracy, or, more importantly, the
nature and role of the state in respect to the spontaneous order of the "Great Society" -
Hayek seems unable to avoid diverting from or even contradicting his supposedly
guiding epistemological premises. This can be interpreted as a methodological
weakness, and it certainly is one. However, such an interpretation, if delimited at this
point, would fall short in that it would not be able to explain the influence that
Hayek's theory exercises currently. His theory seems to acquire a "life" and
importance of its own contrary to the scholarly reservations on the part of its critics.
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If this point is relatively clear by now, it seems that the road towards an evaluation
of Hayek's theory in terms of the political significance of its suggestions has opened.
It is, then, in reference to its political outcomes that the totality of Hayek's thought
must be evaluated.
The argument in the present part has attempted to show that Hayek's proposals
are of a distinctively conservative kind. His "Great Society", it has been argued, is
the idealized projection of contemporary capitalism on a theoretical level. Indeed the
presentation of the "Great Society" by Hayek looks very much like an attempt to
legitimize the needs of capitalist reproduction and make them more attractive, both for
those who do not participate in holding means of production (since it presents all
human progress as an achievement of capitalism while it holds that all social
"misfortunes" are simply unavoidable and irrelevant to it) and for those who actually
own the means of production (since it guarantees them a strong authoritarian central
power which will in effect be at their service only1). The activist authoritarian
dimension of Hayek's theory, rather than any attempt to demonstrate the necessarily
limited nature of the human mind, is the predominant characteristic of his thinking.
To this, one can add the circumstance of his cynical and aggressive way of addressing
traditionally "sensitive" problems in politics, such as social justice. This combination
of cynicism in morality and conservative authoritarianism in politics constitutes the
basic novelty of the theory.




Hayek's theory occupies a unique place in contemporary social thought. This
uniqueness derives form two different features. The first concerns Hayek's endeavor
to cover a very wide range of different theoretical topics. It would seem that in a
period of specialization par excellence, Hayek has placed himself against the current.
The second feature touches upon a more essential point. It is that his thought has
always strived to combine different currents of theoretical discourse.
This feature is present in all the aspects examined previously. In matters of
ontology, it assumes the form of a conflict between a mystified and ultimately idealist
monism and a more conventional (but equally idealist) rational dualism. In
epistemology, it appears as a constant tension between agnosticism (skepticism) and
a mechanistic rationalist account of the cognitive process. In methodology, it is
reflected in the ambiguous relation between, on the one hand, a thesis as to the basic
unity of science and, on the other, a recognition of determinative differences between
social and natural sciences. In political philosophy, it makes itself felt through the
coexistence of naturalistic evolutionism and abstract normativism; and finally, in terms
of applied politics, it emerges as a simultaneous appeal to order, authority and liberty.
In this sense, Hayek's theory can be understood as a constant struggle to reconcile
different theoretical propositions. It is then a theory of compromise and eclecticism.
One of the two main points of the above discussion has been to show that this
compromise is unattainable on "purely" theoretical grounds. The tension between the
conflicting starting points of Hayek's theory remains unresolved despite Hayek's
endeavors, and is ultimately fatal for the logical validity of the theory itself. Thus,
it has been argued that Hayek's thought results almost invariably in some sort of
logical vicious circularity.
A recent work on these issues suggests that Hayek's main task was to reconcile
a Humean social and political theory with a Kantian moral theory (C. Kukathas 1989
pp. 1-19). The view taken in the present work suggests that a broader interpretation
is both helpful and necessary. It is helpful, because the mere characterization of a
contemporary thinker as Kantian or Humean seems to create more problems than it
solves. For one thing, there is much disagreement about the meaning of the content
of the labels "Kantian" and "Humean". The use of the label "Kantian", for example,
can acquire quite different significances according to the ideological perspective as
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well as the individual point of view of whomsoever employs it. For another, there
seems to be a tendency among those who prefer the "labeling" of modern theorists in
the above sense, towards an unhistorical oversimplification of such theories'
characterizations. Such an approach commonly attributes an independent life to the
ideas of past thinkers. Thus, ideas seem to survive somehow unchanged, and are
reprojected in the theories of subsequent thinkers regardless of the social changes that
occur in the meantime. It looks, though, as if this approach runs the constant danger
of becoming formalistic, that is, of ignoring the actual interrelation between a certain
set of ideas and the socioeconomic environment in which it appeared, as well as the
historical function of the ideas concerned. Thus, although there is a partial overall
similarity between the form of some ideas of the 18th century liberalism and those of
Hayek, their historical and social significance is quite different. The former were
referring to a primitive stage of "free competition" capitalism while the latter refer to
the latest stage of monopoly capitalism where any pretence of "free competition" has
long since ceased to exist.
It is necessary, because, as has been argued before, it is indeed doubtful if a
theory with the breadth of Hayek's can be contained within the general propositions
of Hume and Kant only. It is not only the influence of Berkeley's idealism that is
overlooked as a result of such a delimitation. It is mainly the overwhelming
importance of empiricism (in its versions of critical empiricism, pragmatism, logical
positivism etc.) that is underestimated. There is, of course, always a possibility of
establishing an indirect link between empiricism and Hayek's thought via the Kantian
and Humean doctrines. However, the importance of the influence of empiricism in
Hayek's thought is such that the connection must be made explicitly and analytically.
To try to restrict Hayek's lengthy empirio-critical account of theoretical psychology
to some version of abstract Kantian or Humean ideas,is, it would seem, to overlook
the whole development of society and philosophy for more than a century.
This view does not question the need to establish a link between the thought
of contemporary thinkers and that of previous generations. It merely tries to point out
that, if this is to become the only or even the main criterion according to which
contemporary thought is to be understood and evaluated, the result is likely to be
scholasticism devoid of interest.
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Thus, notwithstanding the above reservations, the argument that "(...) the
philosophical assumptions which underpin [Hayek's] social theory are inconsistent
with those underlying his attempt to justify liberal principles" (C. Kukathas 1989 p. 17)
has also been advanced in this work. But whereas Kukathas (and many scholars
before him) condemn Hayek's theory as a failure, based on such grounds, the view
taken in the present work is that this reason is insufficient. Hayek's failure can only
be asserted in such terms "if we take seriously Hayek's claim" (C. Kukathas 1989
p. 15), that is, if we accept that his enterprise depends on a successful combination of
a particular account of social theory with a particular account of morality. This latter
view tends to attribute a determinative role to the element of inner consistency in
Hayek's theory. There is however ample evidence that Hayek himself does not
attribute major importance to this aspect of his thought. Thus, it has been argued that
"Hayek is not afraid of bold paradox. (...). Or more likely he just doesn't care." (A.
Belsey in R. Levitas 1986 p. 177). Indeed such an interpretation has the merit of
avoiding the unconvincing argument that the inconsistency of Hayek's theory depends
either on his personal inability to combine different theses that are in principle
reconcilable, or on his erroneous choice of a priori irreconcilable principles.
But if a characterization of Hayek as Kantian or Humean and a consequent
critique of his theory in terms of consistency with these doctrines alone is not
sufficient, how should his thought be evaluated? The proposed alternative is to
approach the failure of Hayek's thought in terms of inner consistency on logical
grounds, as the main dynamic of the theory itself. In order not to become an apology
for irrationalism, this apparently paradoxical proposal presupposes a further point of
reference in relation to which some notion of coherence can be established.
The second of the two main points of this work has been to try to demonstrate
that this further point can be identified as a defence of monopoly capitalism, presented
throughout Hayek's work as a defence of the "free" market social order. Hayek
defends de jure a social order where free competition reigns supreme. His social
evolutionism, however, necessarily leads him to the admition that what exists is good.
As a result, what he defends de facto is not free competition but existing, monopoly
domination. Thus, he ends up in arguing for a free market society while actually
defending monopoly capitalist regimes. The instability of his qualified utilitarianism
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lies between a deontology which supplies, in the name of "anyone selected at
random", an alternative to existing social arrangements, and an evolutionism which
suggests that (owing to a process of "natural" social selection) what we have at present
- namely, monopolistic social arrangements - must be best. In every case where
Hayek's theoretical premises clash with the need for an argument for the "free" market
order (that is, the existing, monopoly dominated society) it is always the latter that
emerges victorious. Thus, the argument maintains that it is the limits of the "free"
market society that determine Hayek's philosophy rather than the other way around.
In that sense, Hayek's theory does indeed want to expose all social institutions to the
challenges of the "free" market (M.M. Wilhelm 1972) but this is not attempted
regardless of the results this exposure will generate. It is not just any "free"
competition that Hayek favors, as it is not any outcomes of his evolutionism that he
supports; what is favored is solely such competition as will (in his view) produce
results favorable to the "free" market order. Thus, for Hayek "all behavior is for the
sake 0/the market order of capitalism" (A. Belsey in R. Levitas 1986 p.183). It is
only after understanding that, in any clash or contradiction, there always exists an a
priori criterion for the case of capitalism, that the merely descriptive level of criticism
can be surpassed and the essence of Hayek's theory grasped.
According to this argument, "given the lack of logical coherence required by
common-sense ideologies, contradictions may be a strength rather than a weakness"
(R. Levitas in R. Levitas 1986 p. 11) in Hayek's theory. How can this be achieved?
Take the case of the "free" market order, as an existing and at the same time futuristic
model of social organization. As an existing social order it is presented as the
ultimate one possible within Hayek's evolutionism. Its mere existence guarantees its
desirability. At the same time, this order is heavily criticized as a socialistically
contaminated society, in the light of abstract moral imperatives which are supposed
to prescribe an even more "free" social order. Now the logical paradox, as expressed
through Hayek's methodological inconsistency1, is obvious. However, the function
of the argument is impressive: capitalism as an abstract general concept, in the form
1 And, of course, the epistemological as well, since Hayek's agnosticism does not allow anything
near prescribing future social conditions.
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of the "free" market order, emerges as the best possible type of society through the
first part of the argument; at the same time, some of the actual problems emerging in
the current stage of capitalist reproduction (such as the economic and ideological
failure of welfare policies) are deemed to be results of inadequate application of
capitalism. The logical paradox involved in this procedure becomes the political
dynamic of the theory. Its ideological power thus lies in its ability to transfer
responsibility for the failures of its ideal - i.e. the capitalist socioeconomic formation -
to the people that live according to specific social relations, in that way1.
This method can easily be extended infinitely. Thus, in every historical
moment the general abstract premises of capitalism can be presented as prescribing
the ultimate socioeconomic formation while the concrete expressions of the crises of
this system can be regarded as a result of the incomplete application of these premises.
A theory based on such circular reasoning may be able to draw more strength the
more the actual crisis of capitalism deepens2.
Hayek's theory then can be viewed as a theory of crisis. It is a theory of crisis
in that it was born out of the actual crisis of monopoly capitalism (that of the 1930s);
it is also a theory of crisis in that its appeal found grounds in a period of a particular
strengthening of that crisis (the 1970s); it is finally a theory of crisis in that its main
task is apologistically to account for the crisis of monopoly capitalism. It can
particularly be understood as a dynamic response to the political crisis of the state
under capitalism and its legitimating ideology. Thus, the view that "Hayek's political
thought is worthy of attention because he has offered a distinctive conception of a
liberal social order" (C. Kukathas 1989 p.215), where that conception consists of a
"revival of the idea of the liberal polity as a modus vivendi rather than an expression
of a comprehensive philosophical doctrine" (C. Kukathas 1989 p.225), points towards
the heart of the matter. It is not the attraction of new philosophical perspectives but
an idealization of the existing social relations that characterizes Hayekian theory in the
1 S. Clarke 1987 p.423 makes the point in reference to monetarism.
2 Viewed in that way Hayek's theory becomes the perfect example of non-scientific theory
according to the Popperian methodology. It is precisely the attribute of potential falsification that
Hayek's theory lacks completely, and it is that unfalsifiability that guarantees it its actual political
strength.
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first place. Its main task is to legitimize the political and ideological crisis of the state
which emerged as a result of the economic crisis of monopoly capitalism. Thus, it is
not an ideology aiming at reformed social relations but a reformed ideology of
existing social relations.
Hayek's attitude towards all major problems of political theory testifies to the
above. For example, if democracy sometimes requires changes in existing social
relations, then it is the attitude towards democracy that must be changed rather than
social relations themselves. When the feeling that capitalism cannot fulfill its
promises of social "justice" is apparent amongst people, it is the ("tribal") desire for
a better life that must be fought over rather than the capitalist relations of production
that have proved unable to provide it.
The argument presented here, further maintains that what constitutes the
strength and significance ofHayek's theory also points towards its essential weakness.
For, by deriving his guiding principles from a crude pragmatic defence of monopoly
capitalism, Hayek is, at the same time, revealing the actual limits of his theory. In his
attempt to legitimize the ideological crisis of capitalism Hayek is obliged to abandon
any pretence of presenting a universally humanistic political ideology. The necessary
(that is, for its reproduction) choices of monopoly capitalism can be presented as
"inevitable", "unpredictable" or even "natural"; they can be placed in the realm of the
"beyond" - that is, beyond the reach of conscious political activity - but they cannot
be presented as "good" or "just" for everybody in the abstract liberal sense. Thus, the
conscious refutation of reason in practical activity undertakes the task of negating the
validity of "goodness" and "justice", that is, of time honored abstract liberal morality.
But, at the same time, it underlines the impossibility of constructing a plausible - even
in its abstractness - notion of "goodness" and "justice" for everybody. Consequently,
the ideological function of Hayek's theory becomes imperiled. It is precisely for that
reason that the majority of liberals and libertarians criticize Hayek for his lack of a
normative theory of rights. What they seem unable to understand, however, is that
such a theory becomes impossible on logical grounds once a pragmatic apology of
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monopoly capitalism has been undertaken1.
Of course, Hayek's theory, insufficient as it may seem to many, is after all an
attempt to legitimize an actual complex of social relations. It is not surprising then,
to find Hayek arguing that in the long run the "Great Society" is the best choice
available. His arguments have already been criticized at length. What however is of
interest here and indeed what singles out Hayek's apology for capitalism from
previous attempts, is the conclusion reached if his arguments are taken as valid. The
"Great Society" is not presented as good but as the best available. It is not that Hayek
does not propose an ideal, then. It is that his ideal is no longer presented as an
ultimate but only as a relatively better society. It seems that the defender of
contemporary capitalism feels that at any level of abstraction, no matter how utopic,
his proposals would never stand a chance of becoming the ultimate goals of
everybody; at best they can be treated as the best available - "as if' they were ideals.
Moreover, the already weakened position of these "as if' ideals becomes even more
doubtful since their relative superiority can only be revealed at an indeterminate
moment in the obscure future. Hayek's claim is that we must obey the demands of
capitalism now because this may be proved the best choice available sometime in the
distant and unknown future. His seemingly realistic claims, however, remain
counterfactual wagers. This compromised account of the "Great Society" is a
necessary result of Hayek's apology for capitalism. In other words, it may no longer
be argued that what is good for capitalism now is also good for society as a whole.
It has been argued that the importance of Hayek's theory rests in that it has
demonstrated that "an understanding of the nature of social process may offer a surer
guide by telling us what kinds of rights and liberties cannot be adopted if the liberal
order is to survive." (C. Kukathas 1989 p.228). This point seems to capture the
1 Whether a theorist will consider himself bound by logic is, of course, an altogether different
matter. Nozick, for example keeps a logical appearance in his arguments throughout Anarchy, State and
Utopia. This superficial logic however depends on whether one will accept his axiomatic abstract
presupposition of a state of nature as the basis of social life. The same applies to a certain extent to
Rawls' Original Position as the basic abstraction of his Theory of Justice (for an interesting critique of
Rawls' Original Position in terms of formal rationality, see J. Charvet 1981 pp.109-115; for further
criticism see B. Barry 1973 ch.9, and R.M. Hare in N. Daniels 1975). The fact that Hayek consciously
refuses to take such arbitrary steps at the beginning of his theory may be attributed to the positivist
influences of his thought
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essence of the argument presented above. The crux of Hayek's theory is indeed that
there is a whole range of "rights" or practices that cannot (or can no longer) be
adopted if the "Great Society" is to survive. Which are these lethal (for the "Great
Society") rights and practices?
Firstly, what the "Great Society" is incompatible with is conscious rational
social activity. The "free" market order cannot maintain itself unless a certain part of
society1 willingly denies the possibility of acting in accordance with conscious
rational decisions. This denial does not apply equally to all spheues of human activity.
Thus, in the market rational planning is still necessary and desirable as long as it does
not transcend the limits of the market order. It is only political activity - that is,
conscious social activity that aims at altering social relations - that must be considered
as standing beyond the limits of reason if the "Great Society" is to survive.
Secondly, freedom - even in the liberal sense of individual freedom - is also
perilous for the "Great Society". It is only freedom of, and in, the market that is
necessary and desirable according to Hayek's blueprint Any other freedom (including
political freedom) may become incompatible with the "Ideal" order. Furthermore,
freedom no longer entails rights or political liberties but only the obligation to obey
the rules of the market. In Hayek's theory, "what is at issue is not civil liberties but
setting the capitalist free." (A. Belsey in R. Levitas 1986 p.191). The freedom of the
capitalist becomes the bond that holds the "Great Society" together, for it further
necessitates the obligation of everybody to obey the rules of capitalism; and these
rules are no longer compatible even with some of the traditional formal civil and
political liberal liberties.
Thirdly, the "Great Society" is incompatible with the welfare concept of state.
Thus, the liberal concept of the state looses some of its ambiguity. It is, of course,
still presented as a neutral supra-social mechanism (as administration and government).
Hayek's theory is at pains not only to stress that some functions of that mechanism
are now harmful to the "Great Society" but also that, in many cases, it must actively
intervene to secure and promote capitalist reproduction. Thus, the state's neutrality
1 Whether this should be the vast majority, or simply people at the right places, has already been
discussed.
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becomes questionable at the same time as does its supra-social character. Its existence
is justified to the extent that it promotes the capitalist social order. Moreover, and
because of the nature of its role, the state in contemporary societies must be strong
and authoritarian enough to be able to carry out its mission. A state open to pressures
from sections of the society, the aims of which might not be identical to those of the
"free" market, is not only insufficient but also dangerous. Thus, the subordination of
the state to the needs of capitalist reproduction, which is the central desideratum not
only in Hayek's theory but in the whole of the "New Right" (S. Clarke 1987 pp.419-
424), becomes a sine qua non for contemporary capitalism.
Fourthly, it seems that if the "Great Society" is to survive, democracy must be
crippled substantially. It is not only the concept of majority rule (a concept which has
already troubled generations of liberals) that Hayek disavows. It is the politicization
of the members of civil society that he most fears. What seems to be incompatible
with the smooth operation of capitalism is the possibility of legal political activity
aiming at the fulfillment of particular social demands. Hayek's opposition to
democracy - even in its present form - is a further testimony to his belief that the
"Great Society" will not in fact be a society desired by everybody. It is precisely the
political activity of those who will not be satisfied with the outcomes of the "free"
market that Hayek tries to suppress through his attack on most of the democratic
institutions of contemporary Western societies. Democracy, of course, has long since
ceased to be considered a synonym for liberalism or as the only desirable form of the
state in capitalism. But while the view that a democratic state was not a necessary
prerequisite of a liberal society was widely held for some time, Hayek's innovation
on this matter is that he explicitly opposed democracy to capitalism. Thus, in his
theory the argument seems to be that the survival of the "Great Society" actually
requires the abandonment of democracy.
Fifthly, one of the severest dangers for the "Great Society" comes from the
belief that its members are somehow equal. Egalitarianism - even in the sense of
abstract "human" or "natural" rights - has left the liberal ideological armory long ago
especially in view of the danger that it presented for liberal societies after the
strengthening of socialism. Notwithstanding these developments, Hayek's thought has
the merit of presenting anti-egalitarianism as a component part of any theoretical
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attempt to legitimize capitalism. In that sense, social inequality is no longer a
necessary evil; on the contrary it becomes praiseworthy, an element in the absence of
which a society is doomed to moral and material decay. In his attempt to legitimize
the existing social relations, Hayek shows, convincingly enough, that capitalism is
actually based on social inequality.
Finally, any activity aiming at "social justice" must be eliminated if the "Great
Society" is not to perish. Hayek's attack on the notion of "social justice" has been the
most notable element of his social theory. In the "Great Society" Hayek avers there
is no place for social justice. Thus, the bourgeois ideal of controlling social struggle
and maintaining social order through the "redistribution" of wealth becomes one of the
major foes of the "free" society. The way Hayek treats the subject is once more
revealing. For one thing, his arguments show that there is little connection between
the abstract bourgeois concept of "justice" (taken as a moral attribute) and the system
of redistribution under the welfare state. The bold proposition that the only reason for
providing a certain standard of living, far from having anything to do with abstract
humanitarianism and moral considerations, is the prevention of major social unrest,
reveals the essence of the existing mechanism of social welfare. At the same time,
it testifies to the fact that, in periods of a crisis of reproduction of the capital, one of
the primary aims of the state should be to try to diminish the existing standards of
"welfare" to the point of near elimination1.
Hayek's theory, it has been argued, acquires its importance only when viewed
as an unconditional apologia for the crisis of modern capitalism. In this sense, it is
predominantly a political theory, a component part of the bourgeois ideology. It is
not, of course, the only component part. Differences exist among bourgeois theorists
and some of these are of profound importance. Hayek's thought however may be
considered as particularly illuminating for the student of contemporary political
bourgeois thought in that it combines many elements of fundamental importance from
the trends of thought traditionally called, in the English-speaking world, liberal and
conservative. Indeed as critics were quick to point out2 Hayek seems to bring
1 On this, see also A. Gamble & P. Walton 1976 especially chapter 6.
2 For example, A. Belsey in R. Levitas 1986 p.189.
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together conservatism and liberalism. In doing so Hayek is only expressing an actual
process in theoretical terms. For, the characteristic of what has become the dominant
view in the bourgeois thinking of the past 15 years is that despite any theoretical
differences in practice there exists a widespread agreement on all the fundamental
issues referring to the basis of the capitalist society. It is this process, captured by
Hayek's theory with extraordinary accuracy and clarity, that the wider concept of
conservatism proposed in this work1, tries to accommodate. In this wider perspective
Hayek's theory emerges as conservative par excellence. It is also a reactionary theory
in the literal meaning of the word. Hayek himself sees the proposals of his theory as
the necessary reaction to a process of socialist contamination of the "free" market
society. His proposals aim at reversing this process and driving society (back?) to a
golden age of capitalism. Moreover, it is in many respects politically reactionary in
the sense that it proposes a series of drastic active measures in order to subordinate
social relations to the needs of capitalist reproduction.
If the significance ofHayek's theory is that it has pushed contemporary liberal
theory in a promising direction (C. Kukathas 1989 p.228) then its merit is that it has
shown the limits of any such trend of thought and, for that matter, of any apology for
the crisis of capitalist reproduction. The destruction of some of the most deeply
founded liberal myths by their demystification and at times vulgarization, may have
marked the end of yet another generation of bourgeois ideals. Their replacement by
proposals such as those of Hayek is one alternative. Given the ambiguities inherent
in Hayek's theory, however, it would be nihilistic to assume that the Hayekian
alternative is the only one.
1 For a definition of this concept, see in particular the relevant discussion in the "Introduction".
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